1 Introduction: The Attitude towards the Socratic Teaching Method in the Nineteenth Century
In 1818, a small brochure appeared in Breslau in which G.R. Freund published his thoughts on the education of Jewish girls (Ueber die Bildung der Mädchen mosaischer Religion). According to Freund, this âtender sexâ cannot âby its natureâ bear abstract ideas, which is why âeverything that is presented to a girlâ must be âeasy, pleasant, and comprehensible.â He therefore recommended the Socratic method of teaching: âThis causes the youthful mind to explore, reveals all the folds of the young heart through plausible and appropriate questions, and leads it to the point of view it wishes to have.â1 With this assessment of femininity, Freund revealed a misogynistic attitude that can be traced back to Platoâs gendering of the Logos as masculine. However, unlike Freund, Plato did not describe the dialogues of his teacher Socrates as a suitable method for teaching supposedly less intellectually gifted people, nor would he have seen Socratesâs intention as being directed by asking hisâexclusively maleâstudents specific questions in order to obtain predetermined answers. In Platoâs description, Socrates rather supported his young dialogue partners in developing their own theses by asking questions and verifying their conclusiveness in conversation. He did not present ready-made answers in his dialogues; the discussions often ended unresolved and in aporia. Plato was not concerned with results or with the presentation of his own knowledge, but rather with demonstrating argumentation strategies and questioning techniques that were suitable for challenging knowledge in a sceptical way and thus approaching knowledge of deeper truth by means of reason. In the epistemological sense, Socratesâs questions were tools for developing oneâs own views in a communicative debate with other points of view. The dialogue partners, whose characters and positions differed, had the important task of making people aware of the existence of different ways of thinking for the first time and thereby activating movements of reflection. This resulted in a sceptical attitude towards the idea of a sole possibility and exclusivity of inherited and traditional ways of perception.2
The fact that there were rather negative evaluations of the Socratic teaching method in the nineteenth century, of which Freund is just one example, was due to the criticisms of leading educationalists such as August Hermann Niemeyer, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. As a result, Socratic learning was removed from the didactic agenda.3 For the popular philosophers and reform pedagogues of the German Late Enlightenment, however, the Socratic way of teaching was highly valued. It was regarded as a pedagogical approach by which âthe growth of understanding and reason flourishes best,â as the philanthropist Ernst Christian Trapp (1745â1818) emphasised, which had âonly to do with the culture of the common sense of humankindâ and taught âthinking, not knowing.â4
This paperâs core thesis is that the method of a cognitive process carried out via questioning dialogue was a sophisticated educational concept whose inherent scepticism was undogmatically and subversively used by some representatives of the (Jewish) Enlightenment as a guiding principle for their Enlightenment goals. In the following, I will describe how some Berlin and Breslau Enlightenment philosophers drew on Socratesâs method and introduced it in a modernised form into both literature and school teaching. I will also point out that this was particularly illustrated by Moses Mendelssohnâs popular philosophical work Phädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele in drey Gesprächen [Phaedon, or On the Immortality of the Soul in Three Dialogues], which not only provided philosophical evidence for the doctrine of immortality, but also presented examples of dialogical scepticism as a cultural method of acquiring knowledge.5 Popular philosophers such as Johann Jacob Engel in Berlin and Christian Garve in Breslau developed their theories of dialogue based on Mendelssohnâs dialogical work, which were subsequently put into practice in some Berlin and Breslau schools. The aim of school teaching according to the Socratic method, as will be shown, was to educate self-thinking individuals who were able to sceptically reflect on traditional customs and doctrines. The fact that dialogue-based learning could be made âeasy, pleasant, and comprehensible,â as Freund put it, was a welcome side effect for Jewish and non-Jewish teachers alike, also in lessons intended solely for boys.
2 The Dialogue Method in an Educational Context
The ideal form in which knowledge should be acquired and presented once again became a much-discussed topic in the German Late Enlightenment. It was above all the representatives of popular philosophy who drew on the Socratic-Platonic method of academic scepticism.6 Of central importance to them was the comprehensibility of the thoughts or plot [Handlung]; that is, the processual developments and changes in attitude during the conversation. This is how the Berlin writer, popular philosopher, and educationalist Johann Jacob Engel (1741â1802) described an ideal of knowledge transfer based on Socrates. An instructive conversation is
full of true, present action; the protagonist does not doctrinate what he has long since made out for himself; it is only now that he weaves the thread of enquiry; it is only now, at this moment, that he brings the fabric to fruition. To this development on the spotâwhich is so much lacking in the dialogues of most modern [writers], because the gentlemen are almost always dogmatists, who have their fixed systemâto this development, I say, no character is so suitable as that which Socrates had; a man who never made a decision, and therefore, was always eager for new reasons to make one, who always doubted, always sought, always wanted to learn himself the truths that he propounded.7
To Engel, mutual exchange played a fundamental role in the dialogue, because the interlocutors âarranged for this very matter to be investigatedâ and determined the entire course of the investigation âwhile the main interlocutor took their particular opinions and attitudes into account.â8 Here, it becomes clear that Engel was pursuing a concept of dialogue tailored to current needs, which on the one hand understood the acquisition of knowledge as individual and on the other linked the cognitive process to a counterpart, to the human community, because it is only in dialogue that reasoning is newly structured and self-reflection is set in motion. Accordingly, the Enlightenment philosophers made self-reflection a principle of thought and called for a critical examination of judgement.
Engel therefore introduced the Socratic teaching method at the Joachimsthal Gymnasium in Berlin, where he had been director since 1776.9 In 1780, prompted by state demands for school reforms, Engel wrote the Versuch einer Methode die Vernunftlehre aus Platonischen Dialogen zu entwickeln [An Attempt at a Method for Developing the Theory of Reason from Platonic Dialogues], which he presented in seven âlessonsâ based on Platoâs dialogue Meno. In it, he criticises the authoritarian teaching methods commonly used in schools and calls for equal dialogue between teachers and pupils in lessons:
If the light and luminous dialogues of Platoâand these are pretty much all those that are moral in contentâwere introduced into schools and read from a philosophical point of view, one would finally arrive at the point of teaching the young not merely philosophy, but philosophising. In almost all of our philosophical lessons, a profoundly learned man sits down on the teacherâs chair, not like Socrates in the midst of his pupils, but far above them; [he] explains, discusses, demonstrates, refutes; astonishes the pupil with his omniscience and infallibility; fills his memory with half-understood words; but does not enlighten his mind, does not sharpen his ingenuity, does not teach him to think.10
While Engel emphasises the importance of learning to think logically through school-based reasoning training, he fears that pupils at conventional schools will be âforever deterred from thinkingâ as they are constantly made aware of their inability, leading them to self-doubt.11 The opposite effect would be achieved if the teacher were to meet the pupils at eye level. Engel continues:
This was precisely the great art of teaching that Plato possessed. In the person of his Socrates, he himself becomes so unknowing, equates himself so much with his pupil, wins his love and his confidence so well through this equality; interweaves him so intimately, and yet so unnoticedly, into the interest of the enquiry; does not actually give him the notions, but lets him seek them himself, by merely suggesting them to him; lets him himself go through the operations of the intellect, through which all philosophy arose, and grants him the sweet dream of having invented the truths for himself. How much light must thereby dawn in the intellect!12
The fact that there was a need for reform in Prussian schools, but that the recommended Socratic-Platonic teaching method was an art that conventional teachers were unable to master, was satirically illustrated by the writer and pedagogue Johann Gottlieb Schummel (1748â1813) in a fictitious conversation between a teacher named Socrates and some unnamed pupils. Through this classroom dialogue, which Schummel integrated into his educational novel Spitzbart (1779), he illustrates the teachersâ lack of knowledge of dialogical learning. The Socratic method is absurdly turned into its dogmatic opposite, so that the teacher, after an exemplary demonstration of a Socratic conversation by the school director, comes to the conclusion that âthere is no great difference between catechising and Socratisingâ;13 in other words, mere memorisation on the basis of a fixed conversation (catechism) is erroneously equated with the pupils acquiring new knowledge through thematically open and undogmatic conversation (Socratism).
Schummel was appointed vice-rector and professor of history at the Protestant Elisabeth-Gymnasium in Breslau in 1788. Thanks to this position and his reputation as an enlightened writer and pedagogue, in 1790, the Silesian provincial government commissioned him to draw up a draft lesson plan for the first modern Jewish school in Breslau.14 As a result, the Königliche Wilhelmsschule [Royal Wilhelm School] opened in March 1791, providing education exclusively for Jewish boys. The inauguration ceremony took place in the presence of many Breslau scholars and schoolmen, among them Schummel and the writer and popular philosopher Christian Garve (1742â1798).15 According to the prospectuses of the Wilhelmsschule, which were used as invitations to the annual public examinations, a number of pupils gave joint talks on these occasions, some of which were explicitly described as âSocratic conversations.â16 Both the conversations conducted in German and Polish and the wide range of topics covered in the talks prove that dialogue-based learning was a teaching method practised across all subjects at the Wilhelmsschule. This is also evidenced by a contemporary report by a visitor to the school, who emphasised that âProfessor Löweâs Socratic methodâ gave the pupils âthe best opportunity to show and develop their talents.â17
Joel Löwe (also known as Joel Bril, 1761â1802), the first headteacher at the Wilhelmsschule and the author of the early school prospectuses, brings us full circle to the Jewish and Christian Berlin enlighteners and popular philosophers. Before Löwe came to Breslau, he was a private tutor of the sons of the maskil and politician David Friedländer (1750â1834) and his wife Margarete (née Itzig, also known as Blümchen, 1752â1814) in Berlin. During this time, he was an eyewitness to the initial developments at Berlinâs Jüdische Freischule [Jewish Free School], which Friedländer cofounded in 1778.18 At the time, Löwe also had personal contact with Friedländerâs well-known friend Moses Mendelssohn (1729â1786),19 whose educational philosophy exercised a strong influence on his concept of education.20 Both Mendelssohn and Friedländer were close friends of Johann Jacob Engel,21 who in turn was a very close friend of Christian Garve.22
As it is not known how the dialogue lessons and Socratic dialogues were conducted at the Wilhelmsschule, and possibly also at the Freischule, the example of another Jewish school, the Israelitische Hauptschule in Prague, may serve as a substitute. Founded in 1782, the Israelitische Hauptschule was one of the earliest modern German-Jewish schools of the Haskalah outside Prussia.23 In 1791, a conversation âon the immortality of the soulâ was presented there as part of the public examinations.24 In this dialogue, the four debating pupils represented different characters with varying sentiments. Each of them took an individual perspective on their topic of discussion, they failed to reach a decision between the differing positions, and the dialogue ended in aporia. The topic of the debate reveals that this was a response to probably the best-known Platonic dialogue of the eighteenth century: Mendelssohnâs successful philosophical work Phädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, which first appeared in 1767 and was reprinted several times in the following years.
3 Moses Mendelssohnâs Phaedon and Dialogue-Based Scepticism as a Method of Knowledge Acquisition
Mendelssohn used Platoâs Socratic dialogue Phaedo, updated for a contemporary audience, as a model for his Phaedon. He admitted that his Socrates was ânot the Socrates of history,â because he had âput arguments in the mouth of Socrates, which could not have been well known to him, in accordance with the status of philosophy at his time.â25 Mendelssohn explains his motivation:
As I had to re-examine the immortality of the soul, and it caused me some trouble to differentiate faith from conviction, the thought occurred to me: by which arguments would a Socrates be able to prove immortality in our time to himself and to his friends? A friend of reason, as he was, would most certainly have gratefully accepted from other philosophers, what in their doctrine is founded on reason, regardless of what country, or religious party they might belong to.26
Mendelssohn was thus concerned with finding the truth through the use of reason. He considered the dialogue form to be particularly suitable for metaphysical investigations. He followed âthe method of Platoâ because in his opinion, the subject âpermits no other treatmentâ and he preferred âto be inventive, than give up some of the rigor of the argument.â27 With Phaedon, Mendelssohn not only created a popular philosophical work in which he provided evidence for fundamental religious principles, but also presented a successful example of cognitive processes that develop from speech and contradiction and a constant sceptical questioning of what is said. Without being a sceptic in a strictly philosophical sense, Mendelssohn used scepticism as a means of finding the truth by applying the Socratic method in order to question or verify conventional theorems.
Excerpts from the second dialogue of the Phaedon may serve to illustrate this cognitive process. It reports an exchange between Socrates and his students Cebes and Simmias. Remarkably, after a pause in the conversation, Socrates, in the interests of âperfect clarity,â invites his students to ask questions and express objections and doubts about the matter under discussion so as to discuss them jointly, either to remove their doubts or to share in their scepticism.28 Mendelssohn has Simmias be the first to fulfil Socratesâs request:
If I raise doubts about the immortality of the soul, it is not to contradict the truth of this divine teaching, but rather to challenge the ability to prove it rationally, or more so to contest the way which you have chosen, oh Socrates!, to convince us of it through reason. [â¦] I feel that I cannot contradict the doctrine of immortality, or of Godâs judgment after this death, without raising infinite difficulties, without seeing everything, which I regarded as true and good, shaken to its foundation. [â¦] But if that path, which you, oh Socrates! pursue, leads us through a simple series of irrefutable arguments to the truth: then we can hope to secure the proof for ourselves and always remember it. A series of clear conclusions can be recalled more easily in thoughts, than that congruence of truths, which to a certain extent demands its own state of mind. For this reason, I have no misgivings to set all the doubts before you, which the most determined opponent of immortality could assert.29
While Simmias has his doubts about the conclusiveness of the argument, Cebes is sceptical about the relevance of the knowledge gained:
Our friend Simmias, he said, seems only to want to possess with certainty that which had been promised to him, but I, my dear Socrates!, would like to have more than you promised to us. If your proofs are defended against all objections, still nothing more follows from them, than that our soul continues after the death of our body and has ideas [â¦]. Now if our soul should sink into a kind of sleep or state of lethargy with its separation from the body, and never awake again, what would we have gained by its continuation?30
In the discussion of the doctrine of immortality between Socrates and his disciples, Mendelssohn provides a concrete example of a dialogue that aims at scepticism and leads to contemplation. The doubts raised are discussed collectively and can only be resolved through a line of reasoning whose arguments can be intellectually understood step by step. However, even if conviction is achieved in this way, its meaning remains uncertain, leading to an open, unresolved outcome. Even though Mendelssohn generally took a clear position in his philosophical writings, he ends his account of the Socratic dialogue by expressing scepticism towards a doctrine that had previously seemed convincing to everyone. In essence, he offers a philosophical reflection on the uncertainty surrounding the pursuit of true knowledge:
Not only this doctrine, but everything which we knew and believed, seemed to us at that time to become uncertain and indecisive, since we saw, that either we didnât have the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood, or that truth and falsehood couldnât be distinguished from each other.31
Despite all the uncertainty, it is precisely maintaining scepticism that gives rise to further, even perpetual and never-ending enquiries, to lifelong learning and research.
In terms of scepticism fostered by dialogue, Friedländer emphasised in the introduction to the fifth edition of the Phaedon (1814) that âdoubt is the indispensable requirement for all progress in knowledge, all progress of the intellect, of education, of enlightenment,â32 thereby quoting his friend Engel, who a few years earlier had written in his popular philosophical essay collection Der Philosoph für die Welt (1801) that the philosopher must know that âdoubt is the indispensable requirement for all progress in knowledge, all enlightenment.â33 To Engel and Friedländer, methodological doubt was the cause of reflexive intellectual processes. The maskil and philosopher Salomon Maimon (ca. 1753â1800) derived Mendelssohnâs (and thus also Engelâs and Friedländerâs) methodological scepticism from Descartes. In his autobiographical Lebensgeschichte (1793), he reported on Mendelssohnâs contemplative approach:
Mendelssohn took a different sort of tack. He didnât want to block my drive to explore; in fact, he secretly rather liked it, and he said that even though I was on the wrong path at the moment, I should not curtail my thinking. For as Descartes correctly remarked, âdoubt is the beginning of all philosophizing.â34
In a very similar way, it was the scepticism of Mendelssohnâs young friend Thomas Abbt (1738â1766) that inspired him to write Phaedon.35 In their conversation, they debated âthe most important things to which all learning must ultimately relate,â as Abbt expressed to Mendelssohn, asking him to share his âthoughts and doubts about it.â36 Mendelssohn pointed out that Abbtâs doubts were aimed at developing new insights that would lead to âthe truth being set in a brighter light.â Therefore, he elaborated the Socratic dialogues of his Phaedon in order to develop âthe principal thesesâ in a didactically comprehensible way,37 in a âseries of clear conclusions,â as he has Simmias say. Due to this pedagogical intention, Friedländerâwho, not least as a cofounder of the Berlin Freischule, was intensively engaged with educational issuesâsaw Mendelssohnâs work as a textbook, thanks to the fact that it made the dialogue participantsâ thoughts and changes in opinionâthat is, the epistemological processes that unfolded in the dialogueâcomprehensible.38
4 The Dialogue Theories of Christian Garve and Johann Jacob Engel
In his review of Mendelssohnâs Phaedon, Garve emphasised the workâs twofold significance.39 According to him, Phaedon is âan important fragment of philosophyâ in terms of content and âan exercise of the Socratic methodâ in terms of literary form.40 He devoted almost all of the first part of his review to the Socratic method, which he called âphilosophical dialogue,â stating that this method was hardly widespread and its rules were largely unknown, but that it deserved more attention âbecause of all the methods that philosophy has developed from one century to the other, dialogue is the best for teaching and almost the only one for forming a philosophical genius.â A âsystem of education for good mindsâ should therefore be âbuilt on this art of dialogue.â41 With this method, âthe philosophical ideas that have been regarded as certain and established as principles of behaviour and moralsâ would have to be re-examined. A teacher who applied this âmethod of teachingâ based on scepticism âwould do more for the enlightenment of his nation as a whole, and for the happiness and virtue of the people among whom he lived, than the greatest dogmatists, and even the most profound moralists.â42
Garveâs statement likely prompted Engel to introduce the Socratic teaching method at the Joachimsthal Gymnasium, just as Joel Löwe was inspired by Mendelssohn (and possibly also by the teaching method at the Berlin Freischule) in his didactic programme for the Wilhelmsschule. Löwe could furthermore draw on Engelâs experience of the dialogue method. In Breslau, he may also have been in direct exchange with Garve himself. In his speech at the opening of the Wilhelmsschule, Löwe made it clear that in addition to religious education, he saw the âdevelopment of the intellectual powersâ as the schoolâs main task. As part of this, he counted the âteaching of the national language and other languages,â such as Hebrew and Polish, as well as the teaching of âgeography, natural history, history, geometry, and logic.â43 Löwe explicitly formulated the goal of education to be self-reflection and the critical examination of conventional principles, the overcoming of superstition and errors, and development into an independent individual who is useful to society. This ambition clearly corresponds with Garveâs idea of the education of âa philosophical genius.â
In his reviewâwhich in terms of content goes far beyond a mere book review, as it develops his own ideas regarding the theory of dialogueâGarve combines practical educational considerations with literary theory. According to him, philosophical dialogue unites the rules of drama and philosophical investigation.44 As in drama, the writer must convincingly portray the characters and describe an event as well as the time, place, and situation of the plot in a âdialogue style.â45 For the purposes of philosophical investigation, the dialogue requires âa development of ideas that proceeds through immediate conclusions; but which thereby already prepares every answer through the question.â46 In philosophical dialogue, no stereotypes appear on the stage of action, but rather âreal human beings,â whose different characters influence their way of thinking and acting.47 Garve concludes that the dialogue contains ânot just ideas that are dissected, but also human beingsâ who are described.48 It is precisely this diversity of character, combined with different ideas and ways of thinking, that he sees convincingly demonstrated in Mendelssohnâs Phaedon:
In our Platonic conversation, besides Socrates, Simmias and Cebes are the real dialogue partners; and although they speak only seldom, although they then only make mere interjections, [â¦] one recognises that Simmias reveals more imagination and Cebes more profundity; the former calms himself quickly, and sooner doubts again, the other is more difficult to convince, but maintains his conviction more firmly; Simmias looks like a young hothead and Cebes like an older, thoughtful philosopher.49
Garve further emphasises Mendelssohnâs portrayal of Socratesâs character,50 using him to describe the ideal of a teacher with a deep capacity for reflection, âwho never seems to teach, but only to examine,â and who dedicates himself to his inquisitive students with âmodest wisdom.â51 He thus proves himself to be a teacher who knows how to apply the dialogue-based teaching method and so responds to the pupilsâ needs without appearing authoritarian. Teachers and pupils are âjoint friends of the truth who seek to enlighten each other.â52 They are in a mutual educational process, which the teacher leads in a way that is unnoticed by the students, whileâin a downright talmudic mannerâalso being ready to learn from his students himself.
In the further course of his review, Garve refers in detail to the dialogical method of philosophical conversations, which in his opinion are âtruly different from dialogues that are dogmatic.â53 Here, he most likely had catechisms in mind, which were also based on dialogue, but were focused on the stubborn memorisation of fixed lesson content, as Schummel had satirically illustrated. To illustrate this, Garve gives the example of the inexperienced child from Platoâs dialogue Meno, who is taught by Socrates. He thus illustrates a process of cognition in which errors are indispensable in order to be able to unmask those things that appear true, but are not:
Socrates lays the case before him [the child] and forces him to make his judgement. Naturally, he says what seems most probable to the senses after the first glance, without reflection. He puts his answer to the test; it is found to be false. The other is already one step removed from sensuality. He sees that the first glance cannot decide. So he begins anew, and even the improvement of his first error prompts the second, but every error he commits is always a step closer to the truth; so one finally finds the right path by continuing on each wrong path until one comes to the conclusion that it is not the right one, and is now moved to turn back.54
Garve highlights two important characteristics of the dialogical teaching method: firstly, the teacherâs withholding of judgement, which keeps the learner both âin a kind of expectation and suspensionâ and also in a state of sharpened attention,55 and secondly, the openness, open-endedness, and (apparent) purposelessness of the conversations: the dialogue âseems to be nothing arranged, nothing agreed upon; one merely takes one step at random before the next, where the path leads; the present conclusion always seems to be the last intention, but it leads to a new one.â56 In this way, dogmatic doctrines, adherence to existing theorems, and the assumption of ultimate certainty are avoided. This is precisely what characterises the Socratic scepticism shared by Mendelssohn, Garve, Engel, and Friedländer; namely, the doubt regarding the ability to be in possession of the truth. In other words: âThe conviction of not already possessing the truth is the Socratic form of scepticism. However, this scepticism does not coagulate into a dogmatic thesis about the unknowability of the existent, but rather becomes a methodically fruitful motif for the joint search for truthâ between teachers and students or between interlocutors with different personalities and differing views.57
Garveâs presentation of the form of dialogical knowledge acquisition and scepticism regarding knowledge was probably a large factor in Friedländerâs extremely favourable evaluation of his review. In his view, Garveâs explanations of the ârules of the art of dialogueâ revealed âa master and authorised criticâ and were surpassed âin fineness and fullness of observationâ only by Engelâs 1774 Ueber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung [On Activity, Conversation, and Narrative].58 In this treatise, Engel, in accordance with Garve, developed an open concept of dialogue characterised by steps of knowledge acquisition that are intellectually comprehensible and open to constant questioning:
The philosophical discourse does not merely provide us, like the paragraph of a compendium, with the final result of the investigation, but with the whole investigation itself; not only the common-sense truth, but also all the steps that have been taken to find it, all the efforts to work through opposing doubts and objections.59
The Socrates of Mendelssohnâs Phaedon served as a model for Engelâs dialogue theory. Engel was probably influenced by the Haskalah to no small extent, as he corresponded intensively with Mendelssohn and Friedländer in particular. Both also contributed to the first editions of his popular philosophical magazine Der Philosoph für die Welt [The Philosopher for the World] (1775 and 1777, 2nd edition 1787). Engel even dedicated the âincreased and improvedâ 1801 complete edition to his ânoble friendâ Friedländer.60
Despite all his appreciation of the Platonic dialogues, in Ueber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung, Engel distanced himself from the Socratic works, which he felt were no longer appropriate for the times, as opinions and principles had âchanged so infinitelyâ since their inception.61 Like Mendelssohn before him, Engel, in the introduction to his Versuch einer Methode die Vernunftlehre aus Platonischen Dialogen zu entwickeln, wondered âhow Socrates should perhaps also have responded.â62 In fact, Mendelssohnâs Phaedon had significantly upgraded the Socratic dialogue in the Enlightenment discourse of the late eighteenth century, not least because of the sentiments expressed by his characters. Platoâs ancient dialogues lacked the expressions of emotions that were considered necessary by the Enlightenment philosophers in order to describe reflection and scepticism, processes of knowledge, and successive changes of mind in a credible and comprehensible way.63 Thus, Engel also demanded that the dialogue include the âanalysis of the development of the inner states of the soul; i.e., the representation of feelings and passions.â64 In doing so, he was picking up on Mendelssohn, who had already attributed cognitive powers to the emotions in his 1755 Briefe über die Empfindungen [Letters on the Sentiments]. Engel emphasises that humans are âcreated more for feeling than for understanding.â65 Consequently, he considers âthe thinking and feeling soulâ to be the âreal arena of all activity.â66
In his dialogue theory, Engel emphasised another important aspect of sceptical epistemology: self-reflection. Sometimes, the âphilosophical narrativeâ represents ânothing but the efficacy of a single reflective soul.â67 This is the case when the intended change lies âin the philosophising mind itself,â which wants to teach itself
not for others, but for its own use, to correct, develop, refute, or confirm a thought. This gives rise to a new kind of work, distinct both from philosophical history and philosophical dialogues, which nevertheless assumes to some extent the nature of the latter, in that the philosopher divides himself into several persons, sometimes playing his own part, sometimes the part of others, and, speaking thus, makes interjections from the otherâs soul, which he then answers from his own.68
Engel regarded the presentation of âphilosophical soliloquiesâ as a higher and nobler kind of dialogue treatise, as it does not offer the results without first clarifying the cause of the investigation, the changes to the preliminary results, and the reasons behind them. But even if the author pretends âas if he knew of no listeners and had not yet decided for himself what he wanted to sayâ at the beginning of a philosophical soliloquy, but is only beginning to think aloud, the reader, who listens as if unnoticed, can be âbetter and more thoroughly informed about the subject of the enquiry.â69 In this respect, with regard to the literary forms of philosophical soliloquy, Engel did not consider seemingly absent or passive participants in the conversation to be superfluous, as it is also possible to initiate self-reflection and to guide the course of the conversation from outside the field of vision.70
5 Literary Forms of Sceptical Dialogue Culture
A few years before Engelâs discussions of philosophical soliloquy, Mendelssohn had published his Hebrew commentary on Ecclesiastes [Megillat Qohelet], probably the most sceptical book in the Hebrew Bible.71 While he had not explicitly called Phaedon a textbook, he noted on the title page of his commentary, which was described as âthe exegetical counterpartâ to Phaedon,72 that it was written âfor the benefit of the studentsâ [â®
In his commentary, Mendelssohn explains that King Solomon was engaged in a self-conversation in order to clarify important questions for himself. Not everything in the book of Ecclesiastes is King Solomonâs true opinion:
Rather, he sometimes spoke as if deliberating a matter, posing questions, and answering them as scholars do with syllogisms, searching for the truth through reasoning. They attain their goal by sounding out counter-arguments, proposing all manner of doubt and, with honest scales and balances (Prov. 16:11), weighing a notion and its contrary, placing ideas next to each other so that they can distinguish truth from falsehood and the correct from the dubious. Seeing that the author of this book wrote using a method of induction and deliberation, one should properly attribute to him only the pronouncement that he made at the beginningâbefore doubts and counter-arguments were raisedâand what emerges in conclusion after the deliberation at the end of the inquiry.75
Mendelssohnâs description of Solomonâs method of sceptical questioning is strikingly like the philosophical soliloquy described by Engel. Its advantage can be seen in the fact that the dialogical ârole reversal in the adoption of potential counter-argumentsâ offers the possibility of âbreaking through the perspectivity of oneâs own cognition and thus making oneâs own positions the subject of reflection.â76 As described in Engelâs dialogue theory, the interlocutor is absent in Solomonâs philosophical soliloquy, but it is precisely in this âhigh and nobleâ form that the dialogue is of great self-reflective and epistemological benefit to all recipients who are eager to learn, especially pupils and students. Friedländer comments on the content of the last section of his translation of Qohelet: âThe preacher says that his intention [â¦] was to instruct people about truths that are useful to them.â77 With his desire to be useful to mankind and to spread knowledge generally, from the point of view of the maskilim, Solomon is a Philosoph für die Welt [Philosopher for the World], perhaps the first popular philosopher, who, much earlier than Socrates, brought philosophy from heaven to earth and among mankind in order to make it the touchstone of their attitudes and values.
King Solomonâs soliloquy in Qohelet presents various ideas, opinions, and counter-opinions in speech and counter-speech or in debate with himself. In this respect, Qohelet is a collector of different ways of thinking and worldviews, which he brings into dialogue with one another without taking a position himself or laying down dogmatic doctrines. Friedländer reflects on Qoheletâs approach, who in his eyes was ânot a cold dogmatic teacher, but a fiery, lively investigator of the truthâ:
The great author did not sketch out a precise plan for himself. He goes through the whole of human life in his own way and throws his remarks on various aspects. He contemplates, teaches, complains, comforts, gives advice, contradicts, and improves.78
As he was a âwise man,â Qohelet also allowed âopposing opinionsâ to be voiced: âRegardless of his own system, he takes note of all the objections that can be made to him.â79 By letting âtwo voicesâ talk to each other, he presented to the reader âeverything that is going on inside him, without restraint, open-heartedly.â In short: âHe is not afraid to think out loud.â80
Like Qohelet, Engelâs Philosoph für die Welt gathers different viewpoints. It brings together many dialogical pieces from different eras and authors that engage in intercultural conversation in the broadest sense. Not least among them are Mendelssohnâs and Friedländerâs Proben rabbinischer Weisheit [Samples of Rabbinic Wisdom], containing extracts from the Talmud and the Midrash.81 Remarkably, the maskilim regarded these fundamental texts of Judaism as a collection of the most diverse positions and interpretations.82 For example, in his Jeschurun (1804), an apology for Judaism, Aaron Wolfssohn (1756â1835), Joel Löweâs successor as headteacher at the Wilhelmsschule in Breslau, explained that the Talmud contained, among other things,
laws and customs that were sanctioned only by tradition. But as these laws and enactments were not transmitted from teacher to disciple in writings, but merely and solely by oral discourse and tradition, it was quite natural that the rabbis should soon be divided in opinion about this law and that, about this doctrine and that, depending on whether one disciple wanted to understand or hear the teacherâs discourse in this way or in that. In the Mishnah, these different opinions of the rabbis are cited and held against each other wherever the difference is significant, but without the collector of the Mishnah, R. Yehudah, always declaring himself in favour of one opinion or the other, or passing a final judgement on them.83
In this book, Wolfssohn interestingly combines a particularly important characteristic of sceptical dialogue culture with the Talmud: the withholding of oneâs own judgement.
While the reference to Socrates is central to the Phaedon and the Philosoph für die Welt, Mendelssohnâs commentary and Friedländerâs notes on Qohelet naturally lack any reference to Socrates. Rather, here, Solomonâs contemplative approach is presented as a âwell-known principleâ and a proven method of gaining knowledge already in ancient Judaism,84 and dialogic learning with students gives the impression of being an extension of his contemplative-sceptical approach of philosophical self-talk that was being practised centuries before Socrates and Plato. Dialogue-based learning in Judaism can already be found in pre-talmudic times and was recorded in talmudic dialogues between the rabbis and their students, whose discussions present opinions and counter-opinions that often end in aporia.85 However, the dialogue form of presentation can also be found in later periods of Jewish literature, such as in the Kuzari by the Sephardic philosopher Judah Halevi (ca. 1074â1141)âwhich Johann Gottfried Herder (1744â1803) explicitly used as a model for the discourse on Hebrew poetry and language at the beginning of his well-known work Vom Geiste der Ebräischen Poesie (1782)86âas well as in numerous publications by maskilim. Mendelssohnâs dialogues in his early Philosophische Gespräche [Philosophical Conversations] (1755), for example, are worth mentioning. Other maskilim also wrote numerous dialogues, which, for instance, can be found in another collection: the Hebrew journal Ha-Meʾasef [The Collector]. This journal brings together different ways of thinking, perspectives, and opinions, which are expressed in correspondence, among other forms, whose authors sought to examine their own positions on various topics in a dialogical exchange. In the fictitious letters of Meshullam ben Uria Haeschtemoi (1789/90), Isaac Euchel provides an educational insight into the way of life and worldview of Sephardic Jews. In the Breslau edition of Ha-Meʾasef, Aaron Wolfssohn uses the genre of âDialogues of the Deadâ in his Åikhah be-ʾErez ha-Ḥayim [Dialogue in the Land of the Living] (1794â1797) to put Moses Mendelssohn, the Sephardic philosopher Moses Maimonides (twelfth century), and an unnamed traditional rabbi (presumably the chief rabbi of Prague, Ezechiel Landau, 1713â1793) into dialogue.87 Last but not least, the Hebrew Bible itself contains dialogues whose sceptical and contemplative potential for the acquisition of knowledge was developed by the maskilim in their German translations. David Friedländer, for example, published a partial translation of the prophet Micah, which in its form of presentation resembles a theatre play to which explanatory notes and stage directions have been added in brackets. In his introduction, Friedländer refers to the âdialogue formâ of the presentation, in which each âsub-speaker is given the verses that belong to him.â88 Finally, he specifies the interlocutors: âGod, the prophet, and the nationâ enter a dialogue,89 during which the people of the nation learn to sceptically question its traditional notions of religion.
More than three decades after Mendelssohnâs death, Friedländer also published his fragmentary memoirs Unterhaltung mit Mendelssohn [Conversation with Mendelssohn] in the âreligious and pedagogicalâ journal Jedidja, which was edited by Jeremias Heinemann (1778â1855).90 These biographical memoirs are particularly noteworthy in the context of the cultural scepticism of the Haskalah, as they describe Mendelssohnâs method of instruction in detail. They appeared in a distinctly educational context, as Heinemann also used the journal to publish the prospectuses of his schools for boys and girls, which he opened in Berlin in 1816 and 1818. Friedländer evidently intended to re-establish the sceptical dialogue culture of the Haskalah as a teaching method in the educational discourse of the nineteenth century. Jedidjaâand with it Friedländerâs description of Mendelssohnâs culture of dialogueâwas read in Breslau by Freund, whose treatise Ueber die Bildung der Mädchen mosaischer Religion was published there in the same year that Friedländerâs biographical fragments appeared. In his treatise, Freund refers to the fact that Heinemann had âopened a girlsâ school in Berlin,â the prospectus of which could be seen âat the publisher of the journal Jedidja.â91 Thus, it is obvious that Freund was inspired by Friedländerâs descriptions when he suggested using the Socratic method for teaching Jewish girls.
In his memoirs of Mendelssohn, Friedländer not only establishes an ideological connection between Mendelssohn and Socrates,92 but also gives a Platonic description of the formerâs character as an ideal. He points out that even without holding an official teaching position, Mendelssohn had disciples of all kinds, all of whom found conversations with him to be âpleasant, stimulating, and instructive,â attributes that correspond to those chosen by Freund to characterise the Socratic teaching method. Friedländer echoed Mendelssohnâs criticism of learning solely from books,93 which has a parallel in Platoâs sceptical attitude towards written texts,94 and he gave a clear preference to oral instruction.95 Mendelssohn and younger maskilim who followed him opposed dogmatic teaching based on the written word with oral teaching via dialogue. In his memoirs, Friedländer recalled conversational situations in Mendelssohnâs house that provide further insight into his oral teaching method. Friedländerâs characterisation of Mendelssohnâs unobtrusive manner of conducting conversations is strikingly similar to Socratesâs method of instruction as handed down by Plato.96 The characteristics of the Platonic Socrates and the features of his dialogue show clear parallels with Friedländerâs Mendelssohn. With their virtuous qualities, both act as moral role models for young people, and both gather around them a circle of younger and older friends who are eager to learn. In their conversations, both Platoâs Socrates and Friedländerâs Mendelssohn are sceptical about their interlocutorsâ apparent knowledge, but they do not dogmatically represent and express a different opinion. Rather, they both withhold their own judgement and refrain from taking an instructive stance. For them, doubting seemingly certain knowledge is a fundamental method of acquiring new insights. Both of them are therefore greatly concerned with revealing pseudo-knowledge to be incorrect, although they do not claim to be in possession of true knowledge themselves.
6 Conclusion
The descriptions of sceptical dialogue culture point to a method that is thousands of years old, both for teaching students and for the individual educational and cognitive process: Qohelet reports on King Solomon as Plato reports on Socrates and, much later, Friedländer reports on Mendelssohn. Despite all the similarities that were emphasised between Socrates and Mendelssohn, Friedländer referred to Mendelssohnâs uniqueness, stylising him into a leading figure, a âmaster,â as called for by Engelâs dialogue theory. In his memoirs, Mendelssohn steers the dialogues and conversations between his disciples and friends in an almost imperceptible way. He aids in the development of their own ideas and understanding, whereby trains of thought and modes of action become comprehensible, but also prove to be changeable and thus undogmatic.
According to Maimon, Mendelssohn expanded the dialogical teaching method of Socratic scepticism with Descartesâs methodological doubt. He thus established a sense of scepticism towards conventional theorems and weakened their acceptance. This weakening of traditional positions became a prerequisite for reflective knowledge and truthful realisation. The students taught via this dialogical method subversively became self-thinking individuals who, using reason, were able to adopt a sceptical attitude towards traditional doctrines. However, this scepticism should not be equated with a fundamental rejection of religious principles.
Socrates, the popular philosophers, and the maskilim each acted from a comparable historical background. Socrates opposed the decline of Attic democracy, the crisis of the polis, and the rigid doctrines of the sophists. In a similar way, the popular philosophers turned against the âschool philosophyâs doctrine of truthâ97 in order to counteract its dogmatic tendencies and abstract notions. The maskilim acted against some of the rabbinical authorities of their time, in particular against unquestioned dogmatic interpretations of Scripture and negative attitudes towards modernisation efforts in Judaism. However, the youth also had to be convinced by new pedagogical methods. Realising the parallels between Socrates and the maskilim, Isaac Euchel compared himself to the Greek philosopher in a proposal to establish a Jewish school:
My previous endeavours for the youth of the Jewish nation have always had something in common with the efforts of this sage, with the difference that he was a Socrates, and I am only a layman. To some young people of my nation, I have [â¦] called out, in a brotherly fashion: âBetter stop, you are not going the right way here!â98
Above all, it was Socratesâs conducting of dialogues that was held against him and that brought him the accusation of corrupting the youth. Mendelssohn and other maskilim were also heavily criticised by Jewish traditionalists. This criticism was directed not least towards their German translations of biblical Scriptures, which they used as textbooks in school lessons and for whose commentaries they drew on explanations by non-Jewish exegetes in addition to traditional rabbinical literature. Comparable to the dialogue between interlocutors with different ways of thinking, this process of examining scriptural exegesis encouraged a different view of the subject under investigation and the rethinking of established doctrines. This could lead either to the rejection of the conventional or to a conviction of its correctness.
Maskilim and non-Jewish Enlightenment thinkers built on the cultural scepticism introduced into the Enlightenment discourse by Moses Mendelssohn through his commentary on Qohelet and, above all, his well-received Phaedon. Engel in Berlin and Löwe in Breslau practised the method of dialogue-based teaching in their schools. In doing so, they relied on their pupilsâ rational cognitive ability. Their lessons addressed current topics and needs and aimed to change attitudes towards established beliefs, sometimes in opposition to traditional doctrines that were perceived as dogmatic. The sceptical dialogue culture of the Berlin and Breslau (Jewish) Enlightenment aimed at an undogmatic education of the youth and at the formation of (selfâ)thinking individuals with their own free will. As free individuals, the students, and with them the next generations, were to be enabled to liberate themselves from (mental) dependency, mythical religious ideas, superstition, and prejudice. In this respect, Socratic conversations and dialogue-based learning had tremendous subversive power. For the Haskalah, the significance of cultural scepticism lay particularly in this explosive power, which paved the way for future generationsâand thus for Judaism itselfâinto modernity.
G.R. Freund, Ueber die Bildung der Mädchen mosaischer Religion. Ein kleiner Beitrag zur Pädagogik (Breslau, 1818), 7â8. The authorâs first name appears abbreviated on the title page. Unfortunately, his identity could not be confirmed.
See Ruprecht Mattig, âBildung aus kulturanthropologischer Perspektive,â in Qualitative Bildungsforschung und Bildungstheorie, ed. Ingrid Miethe and Hans-Rüdiger Müller (Opladen: Budrich, 2012), 85.
See Dietmar Till, âSokratische Lehrart. Das gelungene Gespräch als pädagogische Kommunikationsform im 18. Jahrhundert,â in Gelungene Gespräche als Praxis der Gemeinschaftsbildung, ed. Angela Schrott and Christoph Strosetzki (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 109,
Ernst Christian Trapp, âVom Unterricht überhaupt. Zweck und Gegenstände desselben für verschiedene Stände. Ob und wie fern man ihn zu erleichtern und angenehm zu machen suchen dürfe? Allgemeine Methoden und Grundsätze,â Allgemeine Revision des gesammten Schul- und Erziehungswesens von einer Gesellschaft praktischer Erzieher 8 (1787): 189â190.
On this subject, see also Michela Torbidoni, âSocratic Impulse, Secular Tendency, and Jewish Emancipation: A Comparison between Simone Luzzatto and Moses Mendelssohn,â in Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies 2019, ed. Yoav Meyrav (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), 11â30.
On popular philosophy and its proponents, see Christoph Böhr, Philosophie für die Welt. Die Popularphilosophie der deutschen Spätaufklärung im Zeitalter Kants (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003).
Johann Jakob Engel, âUeber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung,â Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste 16 (1774): 213 (emphasis in original).
Engel, âUeber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung,â 214.
See Alexander KoÅ¡enina, âJohann Jakob Engels sokratische Lehrmethode am Joachimsthalschen Gymnasium zu Berlin (1776â1787),â in Johann Jakob Engel (1741â1802). Philosoph für die Welt, Ãsthetiker und Dichter, ed. Alexander KoÅ¡enina (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2005), 196â197.
Johann Jakob Engel, Versuch einer Methode die Vernunftlehre aus Platonischen Dialogen zu entwickeln (Berlin, 1780), 152.
Engel, Versuch einer Methode, 152.
Engel, 153â154.
Johann Gottlieb Schummel, Spitzbart. Eine komi-tragische Geschichte für unser pädagogisches Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1779); Schummel, Spitzbart. Eine komi-tragische Geschichte für unser pädagogisches Jahrhundert, ed. Eberhard Haufe (Munich: Beck, 1983), 187.
§â¯13 of the royal âVorschrift, wie es mit dem Juden-Wesen in Breslau gehalten werden sollâ [Regulation on How the Jewish System in Breslau Should Be Maintained] of 21 May 1790 ordered that âa proper school consisting of several classes be established in Breslauâ; see Friedrich Albrecht Zimmermann, Geschichte und Verfassung der Juden im Herzogthum Schlesien (Breslau, 1791), 48.
See Aron Heppner, âAus unserem Gemeinde-Archiv,â Breslauer Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt (16 May 1927): 71.
The rare early prospectuses of the Wilhelmsschule, which contain the timetables for the respective examinations, are edited in Joel Bril Löwe in Breslau. Die Schulprogramme und andere Schriften im Kontext (1790â1802), ed. Uta Lohmann and Kathrin Wittler (Münster: Waxmann, 2025).
Christian Weiss, Wanderungen in Sachsen, Schlesien, Glatz und Böhmen (Leipzig, 1796), 168â169.
See the fundamental essay on the Freischule by Ingrid Lohmann, âDie jüdische Freischule in BerlinâEine bildungstheoretische und schulhistorische Analyse. Zur Einführung in die Quellensammlung,â in Chevrat Chinuch Nearim. Die jüdische Freischule in Berlin 1778â1825 im Umfeld preuÃischer Bildungspolitik und jüdischer Kultusreform, ed. Ingrid Lohmann (Münster: Waxmann, 2001), 13â84. See also Shmuel Feiner, âErziehungsprogramme und gesellschaftliche Ideale im Wandel: Die Freischule in Berlin, 1778â1825,â in Jüdische Erziehung und aufklärerische Schulreform. Analysen zum späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Britta L. Behm, Uta Lohmann, and Ingrid Lohmann (Münster: Waxmann, 2002), 69â105 (originally published as Feiner, âEducational Agendas and Social Ideals: âJüdische Freischuleâ in Berlin, 1778â1825â [Hebrew], Zion 40 [1995]: 393â424); Feiner, âThe Freischule on the Crossroads of the Secularization Crisis in Jewish Society,â in Chevrat Chinuch Nearim, ed. Ingrid Lohmann, 6â12; Uta Lohmann, Chevrat Chinuch Nearim:âThe Berlin Jüdische Freischule between Mascilic Aims, State Requirements and Bourgeois Demands (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2006); Michael A. Meyer, âThe Freischule as a Mirror of Attitudes,â in I. Lohmann, Chevrat Chinuch Nearim, 1â5.
On Moses Mendelssohn, see the biographies by Alexander Altman, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1973); Dominique Bourel, Moses Mendelssohn. La naissance du judaïsme moderne (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), and Shmuel Feiner, Moses Mendelssohn: Sage of Modernity, trans. Anthony Berris (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010),
This is particularly evident in his 1791 speech given at the opening of the Wilhelmsschule; see Löwe, âRede, gehalten von Joel Löwe, Oberlehrer und Inspector der Wilhelms-Schule, und Mitglied des Direktions-Collegii,â in Lohmann and Wittler, Joel Bril Löwe in Breslau. Die Schulprogramme und andere Schriften im Kontext (1790â1802), 70â74. See also Britta L. Behm, âMoses Mendelssohns Beziehungen zur Berliner Freischule zwischen 1778 und 1786. Eine exemplarische Analyse zu Mendelssohns Stellung in der Haskala,â in Behm, Lohmann, and Lohmann, Jüdische Erziehung und aufklärerische Schulreform, 107â135, and Uta Lohmann, Haskala und allgemeine Menschenbildung. David Friedländer und Wilhelm von Humboldt im Gespräch: Zur Wechselwirkung zwischen jüdischer Aufklärung und neuhumanistischer Bildungstheorie (Münster: Waxmann, 2020), 29â87.
See Uta Lohmann, âDavid Friedländers Freundschaft mit dem Kreis der Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft und seine âAufklärung über Juden,ââ¯â in Berliner Aufklärung. Kulturwissenschaftliche Studien, Band 4, ed. Alexander KoÅ¡enina and Ursula Goldenbaum (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2011), 101â107.
The fact that Löwe was a recipient of Engelâs and Garveâs writings is evident from references to their works in his school prospectuses: see Lohmann and Wittler, Joel Bril Löwe in Breslau, 476, 481â482, 501â502.
See Louise Hecht, âDie Prager deutsch-jüdische Schulanstalt 1782â1848,â in Behm, Lohmann, and Lohmann, Jüdische Erziehung und aufklärerische Schulreform, 213â252; Hecht, Ein jüdischer Aufklärer in Böhmen. Der Pädagoge und Reformer Peter Beer (1758â1838) (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), 66â110. On the Jewish schools in the Habsburg Empire, see Dirk Sadowski, Haskala und Lebenswelt. Herz Homberg und die jüdischen deutschen Schulen in Galizien 1782â1806 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010). For an overview of the early Jewish schools, see Mordechai Eliav, Jewish Education in Germany in the Period of Enlightenment and Emancipation [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Sivan Press, 1960); Eliav, Jüdische Erziehung in Deutschland im Zeitalter der Aufklärung und Emanzipation, trans. Maike Strobel (Münster: Waxmann, 2001).
Published by Moses Wiener, âGespräch. Ãber die Unsterblichkeit der Seele,â Jüdischdeutsche Monatschrift 1 (Iyar 1802): 122â128.
Moses Mendelssohn, âAppendix to the Third Edition of the Phädon, 1769,â in Mendelssohn, Phädon, or On the Immortality of the Soul, trans. Patricia Noble (New York: Lang, 2007), 152.
Mendelssohn, âAppendix to the Third Edition,â 153.
Mendelssohn, 152.
Mendelssohn, 103.
Mendelssohn, 104â105 (emphasis in original).
Mendelssohn, 107 (emphasis in original).
Mendelssohn, 108.
David Friedländer, âEinleitung des Herausgebers,â in Moses Mendelssohn, Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Von Moses Mendelssohn, ed. David Friedländer, 5th ed. (Berlin, 1814), x. See also Uta Lohmann, ââ¯âDem Wahrheitsforscher zur Belehrung.â Die Herausgaben von Moses Mendelssohns ha-NefeÅ¡ (1787) und Phädon (1814â1821) durch David Friedländer: Kontexte, Adressaten, Intentionen,â Mendelssohn-Studien 19 (2015): 45â77, and Lohmann, âDavid Friedländers Rede an den Skeptiker oder Ãber den Bildungswert der Religion in aufgeklärten Zeiten,â in Aspekte des Religiösen, ed. Rainer Kampling et al. (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2015), 29â45.
Johann Jakob Engel, âAn Herrn S**. Ãber den Werth der Aufklärung,â in Engel, J.J. Engels Schriften, Zweiter Band: Der Philosoph für die Welt, Zweiter Theil (Berlin, 1801), 322â323.
Solomon Maimon, The Autobiography of Solomon Maimon: The Complete Translation, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Abraham P. Socher, trans. Paul Reitter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 197,
On the history of the origin of Phaedon, see Avi Lifschitz, âThomas Abbt and Moses Mendelssohn: Private Correspondence and Public Exchange at the Origins of Phädon,â in Jüdische und christliche Intellektuelle in Berlin um 1800, ed. Cord-Friedrich Berghahn, Avi Lifschitz, and Conrad Wiedemann (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2021), 51â64, and Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn, 140â147.
Thomas Abbt to Moses Mendelssohn, 11 January 1764, quoted from Friedländer, âEinleitung des Herausgebers,â x.
Mendelssohn, Phädon, or On the Immortality of the Soul, 41.
See Friedländer, âEinleitung des Herausgebers,â viiiâxvi. See also Lohmann, ââ¯âDem Wahrheitsforscher zur Belehrung.â Die Herausgaben,â 68â77.
On the theory of dialogue, see Christian Garve, âUeber Gesellschaft und Einsamkeit,â in Garve, Versuche über verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Moral, der Literatur und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben, Dritter Theil (Breslau, 1797), 17â25, 81â86, and 148â157.
Christian Garve, âPhädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, in drey Gesprächen, von Moses Mendelssohn,â Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste 6 (1768): 81.
Garve, âPhädon,â 82.
Garve, 83.
Löwe, âRede, gehalten von Joel Löwe,â 73.
See Garve, âPhädon,â 102.
Garve, 88â89.
Garve, 89.
Garve, 90.
Garve, 96.
Garve, 91.
See Garve, 94â95.
Garve, 316.
Garve, 95.
Garve, 104.
Garve, 103â104.
Garve, 105.
Garve, 105.
Wolfgang H. Pleger, Die Vorsokratiker (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1991), 167,
Friedländer, âEinleitung des Herausgebers,â xixâxx.
Engel, âUeber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung,â 207.
The interrelationship between the Jewish Enlightenment and popular philosophy is particularly evident in Der Philosoph für die Welt. It would be good to investigate whether the Haskalah, with its clear practical approach, was a significant contributory factor to the development of popular philosophical trends within the Berlin and Breslau Enlightenment. Hypothetically, it can be said that Christian Enlightenment thinkers, such as Grave and Engel, adopted theories on the practice of oral teaching that had been common in Judaism since ancient times. At this point, it is worth remembering that the original Judaism demanded the oral transmission of doctrine, which only needed to be written down under the difficult conditions of exile. It was only with this process of writing down, or rather codification, that a gradual dogmatisation of doctrines took place. The preference for oral instruction continued in talmudic dialectics and later also in dialogical forms of presentation found in Hebrew literature.
Engel, âUeber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung,â 211.
Engel, Versuch einer Methode die Vernunftlehre aus Platonischen Dialogen zu entwickeln, 22.
On the cognitive role of sensations, see Sieglinde Grimm, âJohann Jakob Engel: Dichtung und Popularphilosophie,â in KoÅ¡enina, Johann Jakob Engel (1741â1802), 120.
Grimm, âJohann Jakob Engel: Dichtung und Popularphilosophie,â 106.
Engel, âUeber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung,â 191.
Engel, 201.
Engel, 207.
Engel, 207â208.
Engel, 209.
See Engel, 214.
See Zeâev Strauss, ââ¯âLernet sie und habet Acht sie zu erfüllenâ: Jüdische Erziehung, Qohelet und die Emanzipationsdebatte bei Moses Mendelssohn, David Friedländer und Samson Raphael Hirsch,â in Grenzgänge wissenschaftlicher Reflexivität in Judentum, Christentum und Islam, ed. Tugrul Kurt et al. (Darmstadt: WBG, 2023), 189â219. See also Abigail Gillman, A History of German Jewish Bible Translation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).
Daniel Krochmalnik, âKommentar zum Buch des Predigers (Biur li-megillat Kohelet),â in Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe. Band 20,1: Hebräische Schriften I/Deutsche Ãbertragung, ed. Michael Brocke et al. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2004), lv.
Moses Mendelssohn, Sefer Megillat Qohelet (Berlin, 1770). It is noteworthy that Friedländer wrote a pedagogical treatise to accompany his translation of Qohelet, in which he expounds Judaismâs non-dogmatic character: see Friedländer, âUeber den besten Gebrauch der h[eiligen] Schrift in pädagogischer Rücksicht,â in Friendländer, Der Prediger (Berlin, 1788), 3â78, edited in âLerne Vernunft!â Jüdische Erziehungsprogramme zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung. Quellentexte aus der Zeit der Haskala, 1760â1811, ed. Uta Lohmann and Ingrid Lohmann (Münster: Waxmann, 2005), 61â81.
See Joel Bril, âIntroductionâ [Hebrew], in Megillat Qohelet, ed. Bril (Berlin 1788/89), unpaginated, fifth page.
Moses Mendelssohn, âCommentatorâs Introduction,â in Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohnâs Hebrew Writings, introduced and annotated by Edward Breuer and David Sorkin, ed. Edward Breuer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 132.
Gunhild Berg and Rainer Godel, âEngels Modell aufklärerischer Selbstbefragung. Selbstreflexivität und Urteilsbildung in Der Philosoph für die Welt,â in KoÅ¡enina, Johann Jakob Engel (1741â1802), 65.
David Friedländer, Der Prediger. Aus dem Hebräischen von David Friedländer (Berlin, 1788), 130.
David Friedländer, âVorrede,â in Friedländer, Der Prediger, 84.
Friedländer, âVorrede,â 84.
Friedländer, 85.
Johann Jakob Engel, J.J. Engels Schriften, Erster Band: Der Philosoph für die Welt, Erster Theil (Berlin, 1801), 295â334.
In the dialogues of the Talmud, the relationship between hermeneutics and truth is the object of an important discussion. Bava Metá¹£ia 59aâb, which is well known as the story of the oven of Akhnai, deals with the extreme openness to interpretations of the biblical texts. David Friedländer published this passage in German translation: see Friendländer, âDer Backofen des Achnai. Eine Rabbinische Parabel,â Berlinische Monatsschrift 17 (1791): 474â447. He comments that the discussion of the parable expresses a high estimation of reason and doubts whether the sentence âwhich is peculiar to Judaism, namely: that miracles and marvellous signs are not evidence for or against the truthâ could be expressed better or more vividly (ibid., 474).
Aaron Wolfssohn, Jeschurun, oder unparteyische Beleuchtung der dem Judenthume neuerdings gemachten Vorwürfe (Breslau, 1804), 75â76.
Mendelssohn, âCommentatorâs Introduction,â 132.
See Marc-Alain Ouaknin, The Burnt Book: Reading the Talmud, trans. Llewellyn Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 82â99.
See Johann Gottfried Herder, Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie: Eine Anleitung für die Liebhaber derselben, und der ältesten Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes, Erster Theil (Dessau, 1782), xii.
See Moshe Pelli, âLiterature of Haskalah in the Late 18th Century,â Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 52 (2000): 342â343.
David Friedländer, âBriefe über das Lesen der heiligen Schriften,â Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums 1 (1822): 84.
Friedländer, âBriefe über das Lesen der heiligen Schriften,â 85.
David Friedländer, âUnterhaltungen mit Mendelssohn, aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben (Fragment),â Jedidja 2, no. 1 (1818â1819): 14â21; Friedländer, âUeber Mendelssohn, seinen Charakter, seinen Wirkungskreis und seine Verdienste um die Israeliten,â Jedidja 2, no. 1 (1818â1819): 22â31; âUnterhaltung mit Mendelssohn, aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben. Zweites Fragment,â Jedidja 2, no. 1 (1818â1819): 143â176.
Freund, Ueber die Bildung der Mädchen mosaischer Religion, 15. See Jeremias Heinemann, âPlan und Einrichtung der Heinemannschen Unterrichts-Anstalt für Töchter gebildeter Aeltern,â Jedidja 2, no. 2 (1818â1819): 125â136.
See Uta Lohmann, âSokrates und MendelssohnâZur Bedeutung der Zwillings-Metapher im Bildungskonzept von David Friedländer und Jeremias Heinemann,â in Zwischen Ideal und Ambivalenz. Geschwisterbeziehungen in ihren soziokulturellen Kontexten, ed. Ulrike Schneider, Helga Völkening, and Daniel Vorpahl (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2015), 280â301,
It should be noted here that the textbooks written specifically for teaching at the Wilhelmsschule and other modern Jewish schools were expressly intended only for the teachersâ use and not for pupilsâ self-learning.
Plato addressed the problem of orality and literacy in Phaedo in particular, but also in other dialogues. See Michael Erler, Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons. Ãbungsstücke zur Anleitung im philosophischen Denken (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987), 21â59,
See Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem oder religiöse Macht und Judentum (Berlin, 1783), edited in Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe. Band 8: Schriften zum Judentum II, ed. Alexander Altmann (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1983), 169â171. Friedländer quotes this passage from Jerusalem in his memoirs of Mendelssohn; see âUnterhaltung mit Mendelssohn, aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben. Zweites Fragment,â 145â146. For an English translation, see Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism, trans. Allan Arkush, introduction and commentary by Alexander Altmann (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 1983), 103â104. See also Uta Lohmann, ââ¯âOn Enlightenment in Religionâ: Skepticism and Tolerance in Educational and Cultural Concepts within the Berlin and Breslau Haskalah,â in âSkepticism and Tolerance: Moses Mendelssohn, Salomon Maimon, and Jewish Enlightenment Thought,â ed. Zeâev Strauss, Libera Pisano, Michah Gottlieb, and José MarÃa Sánchez de León Serrano, special issue, Religions 14, no. 3 (2023): 326,
See in detail Uta Lohmann, ââ¯âEin Bild von ihm ⦠wird immer belehrend und erquickend bleiben. Sein Leben lehrte.â David Friedländers biographische Fragmente über Moses Mendelssohn,â Aschkenas 33 (2023): 231â244,
Berg and Godel, âEngels Modell aufklärerischer Selbstbefragung,â 67.
Isaac Abraham Euchel, âPlan zur Errichtung eines jüdischen Erziehungs-Instituts in Kielâ (letter to the Danish king dated 21 October 1784), in Chevrat Chinuch Nearim, ed. Ingrid Lohmann, 237.
Bibliography
Altmann, Alexander. Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1973.
Behm, Britta L. âMoses Mendelssohns Beziehungen zur Berliner Freischule zwischen 1778 und 1786. Eine exemplarische Analyse zu Mendelssohns Stellung in der Haskala.â In Jüdische Erziehung und aufklärerische Schulreform. Analysen zum späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Britta L. Behm, Uta Lohmann, and Ingrid Lohmann, 107â135. Münster: Waxmann, 2002.
Berg, Gunhild, and Rainer Godel. âEngels Modell aufklärerischer Selbstbefragung. Selbstreflexivität und Urteilsbildung in Der Philosoph für die Welt.â In Johann Jakob Engel (1741â1802). Philosoph für die Welt, Ãsthetiker und Dichter, edited by Alexander KoÅ¡enina, 47â76. Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2005.
Böhr, Christoph. Philosophie für die Welt. Die Popularphilosophie der deutschen Spätaufklärung im Zeitalter Kants. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2003.
Bourel, Dominique. Moses Mendelssohn. La naissance du judaïsme modern. Paris: Gallimard, 2004.
Bril, Joel. âIntroductionâ [Hebrew]. In Megillat Qohelet, edited by Joel Bril. Berlin, 1788/89 (five pages, unpaginated).
Eliav, Mordechai. Jewish Education in Germany in the Period of Enlightenment and Emancipation [Hebrew]. Jerusalem: Sivan, 1960.
Eliav, Mordechai. Jüdische Erziehung in Deutschland im Zeitalter der Aufklärung und Emanzipation. Translated by Maike Strobel. Münster: Waxmann, 2001.
Engel, Johann Jakob. âAn Herrn S**. Ãber den Werth der Aufklärung.â In Johann Jakob Engel, J.J. Engels Schriften, Zweiter Band: Der Philosoph für die Welt, Zweiter Theil, 316â332. Berlin, 1801.
Engel, Johann Jakob. J.J. Engels Schriften, Erster Band: Der Philosoph für die Welt, Erster Theil. Berlin, 1801.
Engel, Johann Jakob. âUeber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung.â Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste 16 (1774): 1â80, 177â256.
Engel, Johann Jakob. Versuch einer Methode die Vernunftlehre aus Platonischen Dialogen zu entwickeln. Berlin, 1780.
Erler, Michael. Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons. Ãbungsstücke zur Anleitung im philosophischen Denken. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987. http://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.1515/9783110868708.
Feiner, Shmuel. âEducational Agendas and Social Ideals: âJüdische Freischuleâ in Berlin, 1778â1825â [Hebrew]. Zion 40 (1995): 393â424.
Feiner, Shmuel. âErziehungsprogramme und gesellschaftliche Ideale im Wandel: Die Freischule in Berlin, 1778â1825.â In Jüdische Erziehung und aufklärerische Schulreform. Analysen zum späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Britta L. Behm, Uta Lohmann, and Ingrid Lohmann, 69â105. Münster: Waxmann, 2002.
Feiner, Shmuel. âThe Freischule on the Crossroads of the Secularization Crisis in Jewish Society.â In Chevrat Chinuch Nearim. Die jüdische Freischule in Berlin 1778â1825 im Umfeld preuÃischer Bildungspolitik und jüdischer Kultusreform, edited by Ingrid Lohmann, 6â12. Münster: Waxmann, 2001.
Feiner, Shmuel. Moses Mendelssohn: Sage of Modernity. Translated by Anthony Berris. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt1np956.
Freund, G.R. Ueber die Bildung der Mädchen mosaischer Religion. Ein kleiner Beitrag zur Pädagogik. Breslau, 1818.
Friedländer, David. âDer Backofen des Achnai. Eine Rabbinische Parabel,â Berlinische Monatsschrift 17 (1791): 474â447.
Friedländer, David. âBriefe über das Lesen der heiligen Schriften.â Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums 1 (1822): 68â94.
Friedländer, David. âEinleitung des Herausgebers.â In Moses Mendelssohn, Phädon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, edited by David Friedländer, vâxxx. 5th ed. Berlin, 1814.
Friedländer, David, ed. Der Prediger. Aus dem Hebräischen von David Friedländer. Berlin, 1788.
Friedländer, David. âUeber den besten Gebrauch der h[eiligen] Schrift in pädagogischer Rücksicht.â In Der Prediger. Aus dem Hebräischen von David Friedländer, edited by David Friedländer, 3â78. Berlin, 1788.
Friedländer, David. âUeber den besten Gebrauch der h[eiligen] Schrift in pädagogischer Rücksicht.â In âLerne Vernunft!â Jüdische Erziehungsprogramme zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung. Quellentexte aus der Zeit der Haskala, 1760â1811, edited by Uta Lohmann and Ingrid Lohmann, 61â81. Münster: Waxmann, 2005.
Friedländer, David. âUeber Mendelssohn, seinen Charakter, seinen Wirkungskreis und seine Verdienste um die Israeliten.â Jedidja 2, no. 1 (1818â1819): 22â31.
Friedländer, David. âUnterhaltungen mit Mendelssohn, aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben (Fragment).â Jedidja 2, no. 1 (1818â1819): 14â21.
Friedländer, David. âUnterhaltung mit Mendelssohn, aus der Erinnerung niedergeschrieben. Zweites Fragment.â Jedidja 2, no. 1 (1818â1819): 143â176.
Garve, Christian. âPhädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, in drey Gesprächen, von Moses Mendelssohn.â Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste 6 (1768): 80â107, 313â339.
Garve, Christian. âUeber Gesellschaft und Einsamkeit.â In Christian Garve, Versuche über verschiedene Gegenstände aus der Moral, der Literatur und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben. Dritter Theil, 5â189. Breslau, 1797.
Gillman, Abigail. A History of German Jewish Bible Translation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018.
Grimm, Sieglinde. âJohann Jakob Engel: Dichtung und Popularphilosophie.â In Johann Jakob Engel (1741â1802). Philosoph für die Welt, Ãsthetiker und Dichter, edited by Alexander KoÅ¡enina, 97â121. Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2005.
Hecht, Louise. Ein jüdischer Aufklärer in Böhmen. Der Pädagoge und Reformer Peter Beer (1758â1838). Cologne: Böhlau, 2008.
Hecht, Louise. âDie Prager deutsch-jüdische Schulanstalt 1782â1848.â In Jüdische Erziehung und aufklärerische Schulreform. Analysen zum späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Britta L. Behm, Uta Lohmann, and Ingrid Lohmann, 213â252. Münster: Waxmann, 2002.
Heinemann, Jeremias. âPlan und Einrichtung der Heinemannschen Unterrichts-Anstalt für Töchter gebildeter Aeltern.â Jedidja 2, no. 2 (1818â1819): 125â136.
Heppner, Aron. âAus unserem Gemeinde-Archiv.â Breslauer Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt (16 May 1927): 71.
Herder, Johann Gottfried. Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie: Eine Anleitung für die Liebhaber derselben, und der ältesten Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes, Erster Theil. Dessau, 1782.
KoÅ¡enina, Alexander. âJohann Jakob Engels sokratische Lehrmethode am Joachimsthalschen Gymnasium zu Berlin (1776â1787).â In Johann Jakob Engel (1741â1802). Philosoph für die Welt, Ãsthetiker und Dichter, edited by Alexander KoÅ¡enina, 189â204. Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2005.
Krochmalnik, Daniel. âKommentar zum Buch des Predigers (Biur li-megillat Kohelet).â In Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe. Band 20,1: Hebräische Schriften I/Deutsche Ãbertragung, edited by Michael Brocke, Daniel Krochmalnik, Andrea Schatz and Rainer Wenzel, with Reuven Michael and Heinrich Simon, liâlx. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2004.
Leonard, Miriam. Socrates and the Jews: Hellenism and Hebraism from Moses Mendelssohn to Sigmund Freud. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
Lifschitz, Avi. âThomas Abbt and Moses Mendelssohn: Private Correspondence and Public Exchange at the Origins of Phädon.â In Jüdische und christliche Intellektuelle in Berlin um 1800, edited by Cord-Friedrich Berghahn, Avi Lifschitz, and Conrad Wiedemann, 51â64. Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2021.
Lohmann, Ingrid, ed. Chevrat Chinuch Nearim. Die jüdische Freischule in Berlin 1778â1825 im Umfeld preuÃischer Bildungspolitik und jüdischer Kultusreform. Münster: Waxmann, 2001.
Lohmann, Ingrid. âDie jüdische Freischule in BerlinâEine bildungstheoretische und schulhistorische Analyse. Zur Einführung in die Quellensammlung.â In Chevrat Chinuch Nearim. Die jüdische Freischule in Berlin 1778â1825 im Umfeld preuÃischer Bildungspolitik und jüdischer Kultusreform, edited by Ingrid Lohmann, 13â84. Münster: Waxmann, 2001.
Lohmann, Uta. ââEin Bild von ihm ⦠wird immer belehrend und erquickend bleiben. Sein Leben lehrte.â David Friedländers biographische Fragmente über Moses Mendelssohn.â Aschkenas 33 (2023): 231â244. https://doi.org/10.1515/asch-2023-2010.
Lohmann, Uta. Chevrat Chinuch Nearim: The Berlin Jüdische Freischule between Mascilic Aims, State Requirements and Bourgeois Demands. Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2006.
Lohmann, Uta. âDavid Friedländers Freundschaft mit dem Kreis der Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft und seine âAufklärung über Juden.ââ In Berliner Aufklärung. Kulturwissenschaftliche Studien, Band 4, edited by Alexander KoÅ¡enina and Ursula Goldenbaum, 94â133. Hanover: Wehrhahn, 2011.
Lohmann, Uta. âDavid Friedländers Rede an den Skeptiker oder Ãber den Bildungswert der Religion in aufgeklärten Zeiten.â In Aspekte des Religiösen: 2. Jahrbuch Zentrum Jüdische Studien Berlin-Brandenburg, edited by Rainer Kampling, Alice Buschmeier, Sara Han, and David Junger, 29â45. Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2015.
Lohmann, Uta. Haskala und allgemeine Menschenbildung. David Friedländer und Wilhelm von Humboldt im Gespräch: Zur Wechselwirkung zwischen jüdischer Aufklärung und neuhumanistischer Bildungstheorie. Münster: Waxmann, 2020.
Lohmann, Uta. ââOn Enlightenment in Religionâ: Skepticism and Tolerance in Educational and Cultural Concepts within the Berlin and Breslau Haskalah.â In âSkepticism and Tolerance: Moses Mendelssohn, Salomon Maimon, and Jewish Enlightenment Thought,â edited by Zeâev Strauss, Libera Pisano, Michah Gottlieb, and José MarÃa Sánchez de León Serrano, special issue, Religions14, no. 3 (2023): 326. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030326.
Lohmann, Uta. âSokrates und MendelssohnâZur Bedeutung der Zwillings-Metapher im Bildungskonzept von David Friedländer und Jeremias Heinemann.â In Zwischen Ideal und Ambivalenz. Geschwisterbeziehungen in ihren soziokulturellen Kontexten, edited by Ulrike Schneider, Helga Völkening, and Daniel Vorpahl, 280â301. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2015. https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-04175-0.
Lohmann, Uta. ââDem Wahrheitsforscher zur Belehrung.â Die Herausgaben von Moses Mendelssohns Ha-Nefesh (1787) und Phädon (1814â1821) durch David Friedländer: Kontexte, Adressaten, Intentionen.â Mendelssohn-Studien 19 (2015): 45â77.
Lohmann, Uta, and Kathrin Wittler, eds. Joel Bril Löwe in Breslau. Die Schulprogramme und andere Schriften im Kontext (1790â1802). Münster: Waxmann, 2025.
Löwe, Joel. âRede, gehalten von Joel Löwe, Oberlehrer und Inspector der Wilhelms-Schule, und Mitglied des Direktions-Collegii.â In Joel Bril Löwe in Breslau. Die Schulprogramme und andere Schriften im Kontext (1790â1802), edited by Uta Lohmann and Kathrin Wittler, 70â74. Münster: Waxmann, 2025.
Mattig, Ruprecht. âBildung aus kulturanthropologischer Perspektive.â In Qualitative Bildungsforschung und Bildungstheorie, edited by Ingrid Miethe and Hans-Rüdiger Müller, 77â91. Opladen: Budrich, 2012.
Maimon, Solomon. The Autobiography of Solomon Maimon: The Complete Translation. Edited by Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Abraham P. Socher. Translated by Paul Reitter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400890446.
Maimon, Solomon. Salomon Maimonâs Lebengeschichte. Edited by K.P. Moritz. 2 vols. Berlin, 1793.
Mendelssohn, Moses. âCommentatorâs Introduction.â In Moses Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohnâs Hebrew Writings, introduced and annotated by Edward Breuer and David Sorkin, translated by Edward Breuer, 123â141. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe. Band 8: Schriften zum Judentum II. Edited by Alexander Altmann. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1983.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism. Translated by Allan Arkush. Introduction and commentary by Alexander Altmann. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 1983.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Jerusalem oder religiöse Macht und Judentum. Berlin, 1783.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Phädon, or On the Immortality of the Soul. Translated by Patricia Noble. New York: Peter Lang, 2007.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Sefer Megillat Qohelet. Berlin, 1770.
Meyer, Michael A. âThe Freischule as a Mirror of Attitudes.â In Chevrat Chinuch Nearim. Die jüdische Freischule in Berlin 1778â1825 im Umfeld preuÃischer Bildungspolitik und jüdischer Kultusreform, edited by Ingrid Lohmann, 1â5. Münster: Waxmann, 2001.
Ouaknin, Marc-Alain. The Burnt Book: Reading the Talmud. Translated by Llewellyn Brown. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Pelli, Moshe. âLiterature of Haskalah in the Late 18th Century.â Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 52 (2000): 342â343.
Pleger, Wolfgang H. Die Vorsokratiker. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-03966-8.
Sadowski, Dirk. Haskala und Lebenswelt: Herz Homberg und die jüdischen deutschen Schulen in Galizien 1782â1806. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010.
Schummel, Johann Gottlieb. Spitzbart. Eine komi-tragische Geschichte für unser pädagogisches Jahrhundert. Leipzig, 1779.
Schummel, Johann Gottlieb. Spitzbart. Eine komi-tragische Geschichte für unser pädagogisches Jahrhundert. Edited by Eberhard Haufe. Munich: Beck, 1983.
Strauss, Zeâev. ââLernet sie und habet Acht sie zu erfüllenâ: Jüdische Erziehung, Qohelet und die Emanzipationsdebatte bei Moses Mendelssohn, David Friedländer und Samson Raphael Hirsch.â In Grenzgänge wissenschaftlicher Reflexivität in Judentum, Christentum und Islam, edited by Tugrul Kurt, Felix Machka, Johannes Müller, and Christoph Rogers, with Silvia Richter, 189â219. Darmstadt: WBG, 2023.
Till, Dietmar. âSokratische Lehrart. Das gelungene Gespräch als pädagogische Kommunikationsform im 18. Jahrhundert.â In Gelungene Gespräche als Praxis der Gemeinschaftsbildung, edited by Angela Schrott and Christoph Strosetzki, 95â111. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020.
Torbidoni, Michela. âSocratic Impulse, Secular Tendency, and Jewish Emancipation: A Comparison between Simone Luzzatto and Moses Mendelssohn.â In Yearbook of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies 2019, edited by Yoav Meyrav, 11â30. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-004.
Trapp, Ernst Christian. âVom Unterricht überhaupt. Zweck und Gegenstände desselben für verschiedene Stände. Ob und wie fern man ihn zu erleichtern und angenehm zu machen suchen dürfe? Allgemeine Methoden und Grundsätze.â Allgemeine Revision des gesammten Schul- und Erziehungswesens von einer Gesellschaft praktischer Erzieher 8 (1787): 1â210.
Weiss, Christian. Wanderungen in Sachsen, Schlesien, Glatz und Böhmen. Leipzig, 1796.
Wiener, Moses, ed. âGespräch über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele.â Jüdischdeutsche Monatschrift 1 (Iyar 1802): 122â128.
Wolfssohn, Aaron. Jeschurun, oder unparteyische Beleuchtung der dem Judenthume neuerdings gemachten Vorwürfe. Breslau, 1804.
Zimmermann, Friedrich Albrecht. Geschichte und Verfassung der Juden im Herzogthum Schlesien. Breslau, 1791.