1 Introduction
The principles of faith were a topic of extensive discussion in Jewish thought from the Middle Ages, through the early modern period, and into the late modern era.1 A great deal of academic scholarship has been dedicated to clarifying diverse approaches to them and to exploring various disputes.2 In the following, I will seek to expand the academic discourse to the North African diaspora, a region that has thus far received only incidental and minimal attention in this context, with a particular focus on the discussions of R. Raphael Berdugo (1747â1821).
Berdugo, a prominent North African rabbi of his era, was also known by his epithet âThe Angel Raphael.â3 Serving as a dayyan in Meknes, Morocco, he contributed to the establishment of numerous ordinances for the community.4 In the course of his career, Berdugo authored works in a variety of fields: Mey Menuḥotâsermons on the Torah (two parts: Jerusalem, 1910; Djerba, 1942); Rav Peninimâsermons for special occasions and eulogies (Casablanca, 1970); Mesammeḥei Levâa brief and comprehensive commentary on the twenty-four books of the Bible (Jerusalem, 1990);5 Å arviá¹ ha-Zahavânovellae on the Talmud (two parts, Jerusalem, 1975 and 1978);6 Roqeaḥ Merqaḥatâa comprehensive and critical discussion of rabbinic Aggadah (Paris, 2007);7 MiÅ¡paá¹im YeÅ¡arimâresponsa (Crakow, 1891);8 Torat Emetânovellae on the four parts of the Å ulḥan Ê¿Arukh (Meknes, 1939); and LeÅ¡on Limmudimâa short commentary in Mughrabi Jewish Arabic on twenty books of the Bible (Jerusalem, 2002). Based mostly on the study of the first five items in this list, scholars have concluded that he tended towards peÅ¡aá¹ interpretation and rationalism.9
Berdugoâs composition Rav Peninim is, as mentioned, a collection of sermons for special occasions such as a Å abbat Kallah,10 Å abbat ha-Gadol,11 Å abbat Zakhor,12 Å abbat TeÅ¡uvah,13 charity events, Å abbat Eikhah,14 eulogies, bar mitzvahs, and weddings.15 The final discourse in this book, which is dedicated to the thirteen principles of faith, will be the focus of the current study, thus expanding the current academic discourse on the acceptance of Maimonidesâs tenets of faith. Moreover, focusing on this text will also enrich our knowledge of North African scholarsâ affinity to the Guide of the Perplexed in the final stages of the early modern period and on the cusp of the late modern period.
Academic scholarship on the non-kabbalistic thought that developed in Morocco (and North Africa in general) from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries is only in its early stages. I propose that this aforementioned lengthy period be divided into three sub-periods. The first spans from the early sixteenth century, with the settlement of the Sephardic exiles in the Maghreb, until the mid-seventeenth century with the arrival of Lurianic Kabbalah and the Sabbatean movement. The second spans from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, coinciding with the onset of French colonialism, the penetration of the Haskalah movement, and the growing influence of Jewish Orientalism in the region.16 The third spans from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, at which point these communities ceased to exist. The little existing scholarship on non-kabbalistic Jewish thought in North Africa focuses on the first period. This scholarship emphasises that the descendants of the Spanish exiles who resettled in North Africa continued to reference and cite the Guide (along with other medieval thinkers) in their writings, which primarily took the form of biblical commentaries, commentaries on rabbinic Aggadah, and homiletic discourses on the weekly Torah portions and other significant events. Key themes addressed include, inter alia, creation, providence, prophecy, and human perfection.17 The scholarship devoted to the second periodâin which Berdugo is situatedâis even sparser, and the prevailing view is one in which only a handful of figures, Berdugo among them, sustained the affinity with the Sephardic philosophical tradition.18 Berdugo frequently invoked works such as Baḥya ibn Paqudaâs Ḥovot ha-Levavot, Judah Haleviâs Kuzari, Maimonidesâs Guide, Joseph Alboâs Sefer ha-Ê¿Iqqarim, Gersonidesâs Milḥamot Adonay, Hasdai Crescasâs Or Adonay, Isaac Aramaâs Ê¿Aqedat Yiṣḥaq, and others. He also referenced Greek philosophers (whom he knew secondhand), primarily Aristotle, alternately endorsing and disagreeing with them. A close reading of the final discourse in his Rav Peninim reveals the manner of his interpretation of Maimonidesâs thought in general, and in particular illuminates his dialectical relationship with Maimonidesâs doctrine of the principles of faith.
2 Principles of Faith in Early Modern North Africa
According to Menachem Kellner, after the fifteenth century, âengagement with the principles of faith almost entirely disappeared from the agenda of Jewish intellectuals, only to resurface in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.â19 Eli Gurfinkel, however, has recently contended that there is an unbroken literary tradition concerning the principles of faith, though he acknowledges the fluctuations in the intensity of engagement with the subject over various periods. He asserts that the issue continued to be addressed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and into the first half of the eighteenth century.20
An analysis of the writings of the descendants of the Sephardi exiles who resettled in Fez indicates that while they did not extensively discuss the principles of faith, they did engage with the topic intermittently. It appears that they adopted an approach in line with that of Joseph Albo, Yosef YaÊ¿aveá¹£, and others, distilling Maimonidesâs thirteen principles to three core tenets. Moreover, they likely identified with the criticism directed against the Maimonidean formulation due to its omission of such key doctrines as creation and divine providence and re-emphasised these doctrines, positioning them among the three fundamental principles of faith.21 For example, Å muʾel Ḥagiz (d. 1633) in his collection of sermons on the weekly Torah portion, MevaqqeÅ¡ ha-Å em, and his commentary on Deuteronomy Rabbah, Devar Å emuel, mentioned the three principles of Judaism several times: âThe greatest principles number three [in all]: His reality, His providence, and His omnipotence.â22 Similarly, Saul Serero (1566â1655) adopted YaÊ¿aveá¹£âs approach in one of his sermons for Å abbat ha-Gadol:23
The pious scholar Rabbi Yaʿaveṣ, in his book Yesod ha-Emunah, wrote that in order to inherit the world to come, the perfected individual must believe with complete faith in three fundamental principles, which encompass the thirteen principles laid down by Maimonides, of blessed memory. These are [firstly] the creation of the world. The second is His general and particular providence and His care for the human species, His interest in their deeds, and His recompense to each person according to his actions. The third is divine unity, that He, may he be blessed, was, is, and will be forever and ever.24
In the generations after the Spanish expulsion, a limited discourse on the principles of faith also took place in other cities across North Africa. For example, in his Sefer ha-Tappuaḥ, Josef al-Ashqar of Talmasan (b. end of the fifteenth century) explained a rabbinic statement as constituting an allusion to the principles of the faith:
Know that this article contains thirteen principles [â¦] one that God exists [â¦]. Furthermore, that of faith that God is not corporeal [â¦]. Furthermore, that God is one [â¦]. And furthermore the belief in prophecy.25
Moreover, in his book Ṣofnat Paʿneaḥ, al-Ashqar compared these principles with the thirteen attributes of divine mercy.26 Šlomo Duran from Algiers (second half of the sixteenth century) determined that divine providence is among the principles of faith, but without specifying the other principles:
It is known that the foundation of the Torah commanded to us by Moses, peace be upon him, is to believe with complete faith that the people chosen by God, blessed be He, are governed by His providence, blessed be He.27
If so, partial discussions of credal beliefs did occur in the North African Jewish diaspora in the generations following the Spanish expulsion (i.e., the first period mentioned above). However, in the subsequent (i.e., second) period, even these limited discussions dwindled to almost nothing. Kellnerâs suggestion that the post-expulsion neglect of philosophy led to a decline in engagement with credal matters may serve to elucidate the shift that transpired in the Maghreb.28 In the initial post-expulsion generations, a moderated version of the philosophical tradition persisted in North Africa,29 thereby sustaining engagement with the principles of faith, as briefly surveyed above. From the latter half of the seventeenth century onward, affinity to this Sephardic tradition weakened significantly in the Maghreb, with the rise in influence of kabbalistic, particularly Lurianic, perspectives. Likely as a result, this period also saw a decrease in engagement with creed. In this context, Berdugoâs comprehensive discussion of the principles of faith in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries stands out as distinctly anomalous for his time and place, while perfectly reflecting his rationalist orientation and his affinity to the Sephardic philosophical tradition.
Before analysing Berdugoâs work, it is worth taking into account the broader context. The discourse about principles of faith was very vibrant in North African Muslim thought in the early modern period, as Khaled El-Rouayheb has demonstrated.30 The fifteenth-century North African theologian Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi argued that it is the individual duty of every Muslim to master the essentials of AshÊ¿ari theology, and he accordingly wrote concise and accessible credal works for the general populace, alongside longer and more sophisticated works for scholarly circles. Sanusi emphasised that the believer should not rest content with firmness of conviction, for such firmness of conviction may be found in equal measure among non-Muslims. Rather, one should familiarise oneself with each tenet of the creed alongside at least one demonstration of it. A nominal Muslim entirely ignorant of Kalam, Sanusi declared, is at best a sinner who neglects a religious duty and at worst not strictly a believer at all. Since theological reasoning is the individual duty of every legally competent Muslim, he concluded, theologians are consequently duty-bound to offer theological instruction to the community.
Sanusiâs view inspired a distinctive North African genre of theological literature in subsequent periods. One of the more influential of these credal works was a didactic poem by the Moroccan scholar Ê¿Abd al-WÄḥid ibn Ê¿Äshir (d. 1631), which elicited a number of interpretations over the centuries. Sanusiâs radical stance precipitated two theological disputes in southern Morocco in the latter half of the seventeenth century, as documented by AbÅ« Ê¿AlÄ« al-Ḥasan al-YÅ«sÄ« (1631â1691), the eminent Moroccan theologian and logician. The first dispute concerned the status of the âimitator,â one who is unable to provide a theologically satisfying account of the creed and its rational grounding. The second concerned the proper understanding of the initial part of the Islamic profession of faith, âThere is no God but Allah,â requiring a grasp of both what is denied and what is affirmed by this statement.31
3 Berdugoâs Purpose, Target Audience, and Literary Framework
An examination of Berdugoâs opening remarks on the subject of the thirteen principles reveals his alignment with the medieval discourse on the limits of human inquiry and the minimal obligations imposed upon individuals within this framework. As is well known, this issue engendered extensive discussion and heated debates in the Middle Ages. This discourse continued in post-expulsion North Africa, throughout the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth,32 but it significantly waned thereafter. Berdugo commenced his remarks with a particularly lengthy admonition that while the virtue of wisdom is indeed great, a person should not excessively indulge in intellectual inquiry:
Despite the great virtue and splendour of wisdom [â¦], one should be careful not to overly indulge in it. [â¦] And if one cleverly challenges and questions endlessly, then the answer will be hidden from his eyes [â¦]. Do not presume to investigate where investigation is forbidden, for it will avail you nothing, but will leave you confused and bewildered [â¦]. And that is what King Solomon, peace be upon him, said, âHave you found honey? Eat only as much as you need, lest you be filled with it and vomitâ (Prov 25:16) [â¦], as our Rabbi [Maimonides] elaborated on this in chapter 32 of the first part [of the Guide].33
Notwithstanding this warning, he added that âeveryone who possesses an intellect is obligated to know the fundamentals of his existence and the core of his [divine] service and religion.â34 In Berdugoâs opinion, knowledge of the principles of faith lies outside the realm of forbidden inquiry; it is permissible, and even obligated. The delicate balance between forbidden inquiry and that which is allowed, and indeed desirable also emerges from his other writings.35 In this context, it is noteworthy that Berdugo suggested that one should only engage in the study of external wisdom and philosophy after reaching the age of twenty-fiveâper the ban enacted by the Rashba (R. Solomon ibn Aderet [1235â1310])âat which point it is good and appropriate to do so:
For man was not forbidden the Tree of Knowledge except at the beginning of his days. The matter should be properly directed towards the advice of our teacher, the Rashba, of blessed memory, that a person should not study that wisdom until they reach the age of twenty-five. [â¦]. Then, of course, after his heart is filled and his kidneys are overflowing with the wisdom of the Torah, it is fine and fitting to study it, and it is an obligation to study it, as the eloquent Rabbi elaborated on its many benefits [â¦] in his apology to the Rashba.36
He reinforced his argument by asserting that the path of human inquiry into the fundamental principles of faith had already been paved by his predecessors who established the thirteen principles. Therefore, he concluded, âto fulfil the will of my Creator and to instil in my heart His pure beliefs, my heart has told me to expound and clarify them.â In other words, Berdugo engaged in an interpretation and elucidation of the thirteen principles of faith, which he accepted as integral to the Jewish tradition. He deemed it essential to explain these principles because of the duty incumbent upon every rational being to acquire knowledge of them. Berdugo justified his endeavour of explaining the principles anew, notwithstanding his predecessorsâ extensive treatment of the matter, by stating that âthere is no interpretation without innovation.â Within this pithy statement may lie a hint as to his intention to offer certain unconventional interpretations.
It is significant that when describing his purposes in the introduction, Berdugo employs the first person singular, âto instil in my heart,â suggesting that his target audience was intellectuals like himself. Similarly, his demand that âevery intelligent personâ must grasp the principles of his religion is directed towards himself and his scholarly peers, rather than the general public. It is clear that Berdugo recognised varying levels of intellectual achievement among individuals. In his book Mey Menuḥot, he proposed that âthe great God, mighty and awesomeâ (Deut 10:17; the first blessing of the Amidah prayer) alludes to the three principles of faithâGodâs existence, omnipotence, and providenceâwhich are concepts that are understood and internalised in different ways by different individuals, as he states:
Every one of Israel believes in them, but not all are equal in their faith, as the Rabbi, in the Guide of blessed memory [Maimonides], wrote. Some believe in them through tradition, and some believe in them through demonstration, which is greater than tradition, and greatest of all is he who sees with his own eyes, like our assembly, the assembly of Israel, whose eyes saw it all.37
Berdugo based his discussion on the thirteen principles of faith on a short poem:
His existence and His unity, and [He has] no body, and He is eternal, He [alone] is to be worshipped, and He knew His prophets / He gave Moses [the Torah], and the Torah will not be altered; [He grants] recompense, and salvation, and will resurrect His hosts.38
These brief lines serve as a summary of the Maimonidean thirteen principles of faith, as described in the introduction to his Pereq Ḥeleq.39 Over the centuries, Maimonidesâs erudite discussion has been transformed into dogmatic creeds, folk songs, and liturgical poems that have been incorporated into daily prayers. A fierce debate was waged over the Maimonidean text, and these reworkings often censored, adjusted, or reinterpreted the original text with a more conservative slant.40 The best known among the approximately two hundred hymns and liturgical poems inspired by Maimonidesâs thirteen principles of faith is Yigdal Elohim Ḥay by Daniel Ben Yehuda ha-Dayyan (thirteenth century).41 Liturgical poems on the principles of faith were also composed in Morocco; those from Berdugoâs era included works such as I Will Come into Your House to the Camp of the Shekhinah by R. Saadia ibn DanÄn the Third (d. 1819) of Fez and I Will Thank God with a Pleasant Voice, I Will Declare My Knowledge with You, and Songs and Thanksgivings, Come and Tell by R. David Ḥassin (1722â1792) of Meknes, who was Berdugoâs brother-in-law.42
Berdugoâs explanation of the principles of faith defied the prevailing trend of reducing Maimonidesâs discussion to a brief dogmatic text; instead, he re-expanded it into a detailed and comprehensive discourse. At the beginning of his treatment of each principle of faith, Berdugo cited the relevant word from the poem. He explained that he chose this particular poem as his basis because it was âthe shortest of them allâ (and therefore, presumably, the most convenient).43 As will be clarified below, while Berdugo generally adopted Maimonidesâs thirteen principles of faith,44 he did alter their order, supplementing them with content from Maimonidesâs other writings, primarily the Guide, and imbuing them with a different meaning from their original intent.45
4 Reordering the Thirteen Principles of Faith
As noted previously, Berdugoâs discussion is organised around the words of the short poem mentioned above, which determine the order of the discussion of the principles. His choice of this poem may, as mentioned, have been for reasons of convenience due to its brevity; however, it is also a significant and interesting choice in that it moves the position of Maimonidesâs tenth principleâthat of divine knowledgeâinto sixth place. If we accept the tripartite structure of the thirteen principles suggested by Rashbaá¹£ (Simon ben á¹¢emaḥ Duran) and others,46 then this shift involves moving the principle of divine knowledge from the third and final groupingârelating to reward and punishmentâto the first group of principles, which pertain to God. Berdugo was under no obligation to base his discussion on this particular poem; he could have directly engaged with the Maimonidean text and adhered to the original order. Thus, he almost certainly chose it with intention and careful consideration. As will become apparent later, Berdugo not only altered the order, but also deviated from Maimonidesâs original meaning in this context and in his discussion of other principles. For him, the principle of divine knowledge of human behaviour forms the basis of religion, and therefore all religions subscribe to it, though philosophers might not:
âAnd He knew.â This important principle is the foundation of all religions in general, at which all religions aim in their actions to fulfil the will of the Creator of this reality, for they believe that the Lord knows their actions and secrets [â¦], and indeed all religious people are equal in this except for the philosopher [= Aristotle] and his associates.47
Berdugo held that Godâs knowledge encompasses every detail, down to an individualâs thoughts, for there is no place devoid of God, as clarified in the third branch of the first principle (see below). Yet Godâs comprehensive knowledge does not include foreknowledge of future events, as Berdugo explains elsewhere. Berdugoâs stance appears to stem from the need to refrain from presenting any contradiction to human free will, in an acceptance of Gersonidesâs radical view on the matter.48 He made it clear, however, that this denial of divine foreknowledge does not constitute the rejection of a principle of faith, since Maimonides himself did not include this type of knowledge in the principlesâthough we do find that he attributed foreknowledge to God in his other writings.49
5 Insertion of New Content and Shifting Emphases in the Principles of Faith
Not only did Berdugo deviate from the order of Maimonidesâs principles, but he also changed their content. The following section will be dedicated to elaborating how and why he did this. For ease of reading, I have indicated each principle under discussion with a Roman numeral.
I
Berdugoâs independence from the Maimonidean approach is already evident in his discussion of the first principle regarding the existence of God. He states that this is the âroot of all beliefs [â¦] and the foundation of all religions.â According to him, every rational person must accept this principle, as âits obligation is not only religious, but also intellectual.â50 However, rather than directing his readers, as one might expect, to Maimonidesâs proof of Godâs existence (Guide 2.1), he turns to that of Baḥya ibn Paquda (Duties of the Heart 1:4â6), though without citing this work explicitly.
Berdugo proceeds to elaborate on the content of this principle, which he states includes three âbranches.â This claim echoes the dogmatic ranked and hierarchical approach of Crescas and Albo,51 though Berdugo did not offer a methodological explanation for his distinction between roots and branches, making it difficult to reconstruct his position on the matter. The three branches of the principle of the existence of God are:
-
God is a necessary existence, in contrast to all other beings, which are possible existences: as is well known, this distinction originates in Ibn Sina, and Maimonides mentions it in his third proof of Godâs existence (Guide 2.1).
-
The existence of God is independent of the existence of other beings, but they are dependent on it: Berdugo clarified that not only is the creation of all beings dependent on God, but also their ongoing existence. This follows Maimonidesâs dual characterisation of the principle of Godâs existence as not only a precondition for all other entities, but also an active cause of their being.
-
Godâs existence differs from that of all other beings inasmuch as while they occupy a finite space, no place is devoid of God.
II
In his understanding of the second principle of the unity of God, Berdugo followed Maimonides, writing: âHe is one, it is impossible for there to be another, neither equivalent to Him nor second in rank or that you should say a second in degree.â His meaning is that divine existence is one and no more. The second branch of this principle asserts that God is âutterly simpleâ by virtue of His eternal nature, in contrast to all other existences, which are contingent upon cause and effect. Divine existence lacks internal multiplicity. Berdugo goes on to add, however, in a manner significantly diverging from Maimonidesâs original discussion and intent, that âit is part of the belief in His unity to believe that He is One in His governance, One in His omnipotence, One in His greatness.â Thus, the knowledge of uniqueness also implies a recognition that there is no ruler, governor, or leader in the world other than God. According to Berdugo, the emphasis thus extends beyond the static and non-personal aspects of divinity to encompass Godâs exclusive control over the world.
Berdugo argues that the vast chasm separating celestial and terrestrial entities may lead some to erroneously presume that each has its own ruler and that one is superior to the other. However, the miracles performed by God both in heaven and on earth prove that He rules over both. âIn His performance, may He be blessed, of miracles in heaven and on earth [â¦] lies proof and demonstration that He is the ruler in heaven and on earth.â Berdugo notes that, per Maimonides, it is not sufficient for a person to believe in the existence and unity of God solely on the basis of tradition; rather, this belief must be supported through rational demonstration. However, he posits that the Jewish peopleâs knowledge of this truth surpasses the degree required by Maimonides, for they experienced the miracles of God directly, and he notes that according to Judah Halevi, knowledge of God based on historical experience is more reliable than that based on science (notably, Maimonides espoused precisely the opposite view, deeming knowledge of God based on science to be superior to that based on historical experience):52
Our Rabbi wrote in the Guide of the Perplexed that it is not sufficient for a person to merely accept the existence and unity of God. Rather, the essence of knowledge is to know them through a proof that will instil their truth in oneâs heart. And Israel knew them better than [it could via] the knowledge by proof, for their eyes saw and not [those of] a stranger. And to this end, âand you shall know this dayâ (Deut 4:39) that through the miracles and wonders I have performed for you, you will easily know all that which all the philosophers have struggled with [â¦]. And as the Kuzari said, the accepted truths in Israel are far superior witnesses to knowledge by rational demonstration.53
In other words, while Maimonides sought to establish knowledge about the existence of God through metaphysical proofs, Berdugo gave precedence to proofs based on historical experience. Surprisingly, he primarily situated this discussion in his writing about the second principle, the unity of God, and not in the discussion of Godâs existence.54
V
In his discussion of the fifth principle, which states that God is the sole being worthy of worship, Berdugo once again deviated from Maimonidesâs original intent. He questioned the rationale behind Maimonidesâs decision to categorise this as a principle, arguing that according to the latterâs own interpretation, this principle is a commandment, not a belief. Consequently, Berdugo ascribes new meaning to his predecessorâs original formulation:
âHe [alone] is to be worshipped.â This principle requires clarification, as it is not something that directly involves Him, may He be blessed. And Maimonides, of blessed memory, wrote [â¦] that He, may He be blessed, is the one who is worthy of our service and so on [â¦]. And I cannot understand the words of our teacher, of blessed memory, for if so, this should not be called a principle, but a commandment, as all principles are beliefs, not actions, and according to the words of our teacher, this is an action, not a belief. But let us expand on the words of our teacher.55
According to Berdugo, Maimonides articulated this as a principle in order to refute the philosophersâ erroneous view that God does not oversee the sublunar realm.56 In contrast, according to traditional Jewish belief, God actively supervises human affairs (as Berdugo notes that he will later explain), and therefore also desires their service: âMoreover, we must believe in this principle that the Lord, may He be blessed, desires the service of this lowly human and cares about his deeds.â57 While acknowledging the struggle inherent in attributing desire to God, Berdugo avers that since God created the world through His will, we are obliged to believe that He desires us to serve Him.
At this juncture, it is important to point out that Berdugo, like Maimonides in his commentary on Pereq Ḥeleq,58 omitted to dedicate a principle of faith to creation. In fact, from the first four principlesâthe existence of God, His unity, the denial of physicality, and His eternityâit does not necessarily follow that God created the world ex nihilo by His will, for these principles could plausibly be rooted in an Aristotelian interpretation of God as the Prime Mover, the Unmoved Mover. Thus, Berdugoâs attitude to creation is only indirectly implied in the discussion above, while in his other writings, in contrast, he explicitly expressed the belief that God created the world through His will.59 We might suggest two possible explanations for the omission of the belief in creation from Berdugoâs list of principles: the first, that this is a deliberate choice because he did not perceive it as a fundamental religious principle, and the second, that it is due to this notionâs absence from the short poem around which he structured his work. This latter explanation is flawed, however, for we can presume that had Berdugo strongly objected to the absence of this belief in the poem, he would have refrained from utilising it altogether.
To sum up, in his discussion of the fifth principle, Berdugo substituted the belief in divine desire for human service for Maimonidesâs principle that God is the sole being worthy of worship. In his words: âUltimately, the content of this principle is to believe that the Lord desires our service of Him and our observance of His commandments.â60 While Maimonides sought to limit the attribution of will or desire to divinity, Berdugo actually expanded the scope of the divine will and applied it to the divine desire for human service.
VII
Berdugoâs discussion of the seventh principle, prophecy, likewise reveals his complex relationship with Maimonides. At the beginning of his discussion, he writes, âIt is incumbent upon us to believe that the Lord, may He be blessed, will speak with the worthy man who is perfect in his opinions and actions.â61 From this statement, it is clear that Berdugo accepted Maimonidesâs critique (Guide 2.32) of the opinion that God grants prophecy to whomever He wills, even to a fool. He adopted the view (in line with the second and third opinions mentioned in the discussion in the Guide) that prophecy is only possible for those who have perfected themselves in both opinions and actions. However, immediately after this passage, he added: âHowever, the essence of prophecy and its nature are not known to us because it is not natural but miraculous, like all other miracles.â These words imply that Berdugo did not fully embrace Maimonidesâs view that prophecy is an entirely natural phenomenon attained after self-perfection (unless God prevents this achievement).62 By leaving room for the perception of prophecy as a supernatural phenomenon, he allows for the idea that a natural preparation process entailing perfection of beliefs and actions does not suffice and that divine emanation upon the individual is additionally required. I should note that this dialectical conception of the phenomenon of prophecyâthe obligation of human preparation alongside the active influence of Godâwas very prevalent among the scholars and rabbis of Fez in the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century.63
XI
In his discussion of the eleventh principle, Berdugo, like Maimonides before him, emphasised that the primary reward for the righteous and punishment for the wicked does not occur in this world:
âRecompense.â [â¦] What we are obligated to believe beyond what is explicitly stated in the Torah [in the blessings and curses that appear in Lev 26 and Deut 28] is that God will punish the sinners in the next world and will also reward those who do His will. And that good and evil in this world are not the sole reward or punishment for a personâs actions, but rather they are [only] part of the reward or punishment, and that the primary reward or punishment comes after death; and this is the âcutting offâ mentioned in the Torah.64
However, it is evident from the above quotation that Berdugo did not adopt Maimonidesâs view that the reward in the next world refers to the immortality of intellect; that is, the consequence of intellectual achievement. Rather, he adhered to the traditional notion that heavenly reward results from the performance of the commandments. It is worth noting that nowhere in his writings does Berdugo express identification with the Maimonidean ideal of intellectual perfection as conjunction with the Active Intellect; whenever he refers to human happiness, he ties it to the notion of submitting oneâs will to that of heaven.65 Likewise, he parted company with Maimonides regarding the fate of the wicked in the world to come. For Maimonides, the intellect is the only part of the human soul that survives death, and hence there can be no otherworldly punishment for evildoers.66 In contrast, Berdugo admitted that it is indeed difficult to understand how punishment after death or reward in the absence of the body can occur, and he directed his readers to his clarification of this topic at the close of his discussion of the thirteen principles. Nevertheless, he says, we must believe âthat punishment will come to the wicked, more bitter than any bitterness we can comprehend in this world. And the righteous will receive goodness and pleasure, far greater than all the pleasures of this world.â Thus, in contrast to Maimonides, who posited that the punishment of the wicked amounts to the destruction of the soulâthis being his understanding of the punishment of karet [cutting off]âBerdugo emphasised that the wicked are destined for a punishment in which they will endure terrible suffering, without the soulâs destructionâindeed, the very suffering is that of the soul itself.
Berdugoâs explanation at the end of his discussion of the thirteen principles reinforces this impression, as he posits there that before the soul assumes a corporeal form, it has no interest in physical needs. However, upon entering the body, a ânew nature is formed in it,â and it becomes interested in bodily needs and pleasures, such that the soul bears responsibility for the bodyâs sins. At death, with the separation of the soul from the body, the nature formed with the latterâs entry into the body endures within it, and it receives punishment for its sins. Berdugo cautions against underestimating the pain of this punishment, even if it does not physically affect the body, just as a person may suffer from a nightmare even while sleeping between silk sheets.67
After addressing reward and punishment in the next world, Berdugo devoted an even more extensive discussion to the question of divine providence and reward in this one, which once again illustrates his departure and independence from Maimonidesâs thought. He recognised that the goods and evils of this world provoke âa very great perplexity.â While he believed that the issue of the sufferings of the righteous is beyond the scope of human inquiry, he argued that there is room to âsomewhat alleviate the difficulty without hoping to settle it entirely,â with the benefit of this investigation being vindication of the divine judgement (theodicy). He began his remarks on the subject with a description of Aristotleâs view, a denial of divine providence over the particulars of the sublunar world. In contradiction to this, he cited Maimonidesâs claim in Guide 3.17 as follows:
Everything that happens to a person is under individual providence, and all the evils and goods that befall him are all just, fair, and upright, and there is no injustice in them, to the extent that even if a thorn enters a personâs hand and he removes it immediately, it was only for the sake of punishment.68
Maimonidesâs conception of providence has been the subject of considerable engagement among Jewish thinkers and interpreters down the centuries. Extreme rationalistsâsuch as Samuel ibn Tibbon, Zeraḥiah b. Isaac b. Shealtiel Ḥen, and othersâposited that he linked divine providence with intellectual attainment and even equated it to human intellect; in their view, individual divine providence has no external expression. However, moderate rationalistsâsuch as Isaac ibn Latif, Shem Tov Falaquera, Abraham Shalom, and othersâargued that for Maimonides, the basis of divine providence is not exclusively intellectual and includes the observance of the commandments. They also believed that individual providence has a clear practical dimension.69 We see from Berdugoâs quotation above that he aligns with the latter approach, ascribing to Maimonides a traditional conception of divine reward and punishment, according to which there is a clear pragmatic element to divine providence, and that he does not mention that in Maimonidesâs opinion, divine providence is contingent upon intellectual attainment.
Indeed, Berdugo explicitly stated that he was only partially in accordance with Maimonidesâs position: âIn regard to what our Rabbi concluded, I partially endorse it and partially query it.â He accepted the assertion that divine providence does not pertain to animals, yet expressed reservations about Maimonidesâs conception of divine providence in relation to humans. Berdugo observed that while Maimonides believed that several talmudic statements support the notion that humanity is subject to divine providenceâfor example, âA person does not move his finger below unless they proclaim it aboveâ (b. Ḥul. 7b)âother talmudic statements suggest the opposite, such as âChildren, life, and sustenance depend not on merit but on fortuneâ (b. Moáµed Qaá¹. 28a). Since the words of the Sages can be subject to varying interpretations, we are entitled to decide based on our own reasoning.70 According to Berdugo, while nothing is impossible for God, His wisdom decreed that the world should operate according to the laws of nature, and this includes chance and luck. Hence, the majority of events in a personâs life are determined by these factors and not by divine providence:
It is an article of complete faith that the Lord, may He be blessed, oversees details and minutiae; nothing can escape Him, and nothing can escape His notice to do as He wills in heaven and on earth. Yet He entrusted His world to humanity and His wisdom decreed that the world should operate according to nature and chance, and according to oneâs effort, one achieves what one can of good and evil. Most of the misfortunes that befall humans are purely coincidental, most depend on fate, and some details are random.71
In this passage, it is evident that Berdugo opposed the moderate position he attributed to Maimonides regarding divine providence and adopted a more radical view. However, he did not completely deny the possibility of divine providence over particulars, leaving room for its occasional exercise according to heavenly will and intervention, as miraculous acts that deviate from nature:
Yet despite all this [â¦] sometimes His simple will may be to harm or benefit a person according to His wisdom, like all the miracles He performs that defy nature. [â¦] In a way this suggests that divine providence regarding particulars is akin to miracles. That is to say, just as miracles are not common, so sometimes for the sake of a matter according to His supreme wisdom, He will benefit the righteous and save them from the evil destined for them according to nature, or harm the wicked for whom good was naturally prepared.72
In other words, Berdugo believed that humans are generally subject to chance and that they are only governed by divine providence in exceptional cases. Having said this, there are two categories for which providence, rather than chance, is the default: the first is the case of a large collective, and the second is that of a wholly righteous individual.73
Berdugo summarised his position by noting that according to this principle of faith, it is incumbent upon a person to believe in heavenly reward in the world to come, which serves as the primary locus of divine reward and punishment. Worldly good and evil represent only a portion of a personâs desserts, as determined by the divine will.
XII
The subject of the twelfth principle in Maimonidesâs commentary on Pereq Ḥeleq is the messiah.74 In Berdugoâs version, apparently under the influence of the literary framework, the focus is on the future redemption as a whole, with the coming of the messiah mentioned only once, in passing. Berdugo omits a detail greatly emphasised by Maimonidesâthat the messiah will descend from the royal lineage of the House of David. He writes:
âSalvation.â We must believe that the Lord will elevate the status of this nation, and even though it has fallen to the dust more than any other nation on the face of the earth [â¦] the day will come when it will rise above all the nations of the world.75
A significant part of Berdugoâs discussion of this principle revolves around the idea that this belief in redemption has the power to reinforce a different belief, while undermining a contrary and erroneous idea, as follows. He starts by lamenting the lowly state of Israelâs exile as absurd. How is it possible that the chosen people of God, to whom He gave the Torah, should suffer under the harsh rule of nations who did not merit this distinction? In light of this existential absurdity, some might deny the unique status of Israel. But here, the belief in the future redemption comes into play, bolstering the belief in the greatness of Israel by offering an understanding of the terrible current reality as an affliction to atone for sins (and thus purifying them in preparation for their redeemed future).
As is well known, Maimonides did not incorporate a principle concerning the uniqueness of the Jewish people into his thirteen principles of faith, an omission that prompted inquiries within the general debate that ensued over them. Some have contended that the uniqueness of the Jewish people is implicitly foundational to Maimonidesâs creed, while others have added it to the alternative lists of principles they proposed.76 From Berdugoâs discussion, it emerges that he attributed a unique status to the people of Israel, founded in their being chosen by God and given the Torah. However, he did not confer upon this belief the status of a fundamental principle, possibly due to its absence from the short poem that served as the literary framework for his treatment. Yet it is likely that he attributed great significance to it, as is evident from his claim that future redemption is a principle of faith specifically because it reinforces the unique status of Israel.77
The challenge with which Berdugo primarily grappled was apparently not the theological matter of theodicy, but rather that of the doubt cast by the ongoing historical experience of exile on the belief in the chosenness and uniqueness of Israel. It is possible that the severe disturbances that affected the Jews of Morocco, including the Jews of Meknes, under the rule of Mawlay al-Yazid b. Mohammed (r. 1790â1792) lie in the background of these issues, since Berdugo referred to them on several occasions in his other writings.
A second reason Berdugo proposed to explain why the belief in future redemption is a principle of faith is that its realisation will enable renewed fulfilment of commandments that are currently inapplicable; thus, the eternity of the Torah is substantiated.78
XIII
Finally, we have Maimonidesâs thirteenth and final principle: the belief in the resurrection of the dead. Berdugo, like Maimonides, did not necessarily link the resurrection of the dead with the messianic era:
âWill resurrect His hosts.â We must believe that the bodies that are of the children of Israel [â¦] even though they may be lost and buried in the dust [â¦] the Holy One, blessed be He, will by His supreme will [â¦] return the souls to those bodies.79
It is well established that despite its inclusion in his list of principles, Maimonides came under suspicion of not believing in the resurrection of the dead in its literal and plain sense during his lifetime. Therefore, in his Epistle on the Resurrection of the Dead, he took pains to explicitly clarify that the possibility of the resurrection of the dead follows from the concepts of creation and the possibility of miraclesâsuch that one who denies the former must also deny these latter notions and thus also the Torahâs status as divine revelation.80 Berdugo, however, did not regard the focus of this belief to be the possibility (or impossibility) of miraculous resurrection, but rather, at its core, the restoration of life in a corporeal form similar to the original and capable of remembering its previous life. In this context, he suggests that resurrection may not be the revival of a personâs original body, but rather the creation of a new one:
Our belief is fundamentally established that God, may He be exalted, will return the soul to the body, similar to the [original] body in its stature and form, whether it be from the personâs [original] body or another place [â¦]. Thus, when the dead rise, they will remember everything that happened to them in this world [â¦] and they will recognise each other and draw near to each other, the son to his father and the father to his sons, the man to his wife and the woman to her husband. And for this, there is no concern about whether the new body is built from the personâs [original] body or other dust.81
Maimonides also posits that after a certain period, those righteous individuals who merited resurrection will die (again), but Berdugoâs position on whether resurrection is of limited duration or whether it will last forever is unclear. Furthermore, while Maimonides claimed that the resurrection of the dead would be selectively applied only to the righteous, Berdugo brought up the possibility, based on rabbinic sources, âthat even the babies of Israel will be resurrected.â He concluded thus: âAnd in what is beyond us we will not inquire, and the God who kills and gives life knows who will live and who will not live.â82
I should note here that Maimonidesâs radical interpreters allege that he completely rejected the concept of the resurrection of the dead and only included it in his list of principles for social and political reasons. They point out that physical resurrection does not align in any way with Maimonidesâs naturalistic view, nor is it compatible with his understanding of the intellectâs survival in the world to come.83 While some identification with the former rationale can be attributed to Berdugo, given his approach that seeks to minimise the breach of natural laws,84 he clearly did not identify with the latter rationale. As mentioned above, I have found no evidence in either the volume under discussion here or any of his other writings that he accepted the notion of intellectual survival that occupied such a central place in Maimonidesâs approach.
In his discussion of this principle, Berdugo also put forth the âadvantages of resurrection.â He first mentioned Isaac Abravanelâs idea that this miraculous event would cause all nations of the world to recognise God and band together in His service.85 Subsequently, he detailed the benefits that resurrection will offer to the field of halakah: it will enable the clarification of corrupted texts by both early and later halakic authorities and a renewed examination of rabbinic enactments that are no longer relevant due to the passage of time or human error.86 The resurrection of the dead will also ultimately allow reconciliation between those who were offended and those who offended them.87 Berdugo added that the resurrection of the dead is a fundamental principle of faith because, embodying as it does divine judgement of the human body, it will foster diligence in the service of God.88
In conclusion, it emerges from the current discussion that while Berdugo demonstrated a strong affinity with Maimonidesâs worksâboth his thirteen principles of faith and his Guideâhe did not hesitate to diverge from his view in some instances, to adopt a more radical view than the one he attributed to him, or to proffer his own original interpretation of the principles of faith in Jewish thought.
6 Questioning the Number of Principles
In the two previous sections, I presented selected discussions of Berdugoâs reordering of Maimonidesâs thirteen principles of faith and the new content he infused into them. Now, I will address the possibility that he also questioned the fixed number of these principles.
Commentators and philosophers who have dealt with Maimonidesâs principles have wondered why he specifically enumerated thirteen principles, no less and no more. Was this number the result of his intellectual inquiry, or did he aim to arrive at this specific figure for some reason? Advocates of the first view argue that it is inconceivable that Maimonides would establish principles of faith based on external considerations, thereby compromising the content of his list. Proponents of the second view, on the other hand, argue that he chose the number in question for its typological significance, as it frequently recurs in the Bible and rabbinic literature (thirteen tribes of Israel, the age of obligation for commandments, thirteen hermeneutical principles of Torah interpretation, and more).89
From Berdugoâs introduction to his discussion of the principles, it emerges that he aligned with the latter opinion. He noted that Maimonidesâs enumeration of the thirteen principles of faith was without precedent in rabbinic literature and that it must, ipso facto, be a product of his own reasoning, unconstrained by prior tradition. However, he (mistakenly) emphasised that it was âan accepted traditionâ that the liturgical poem Yigdal Elohim Ḥay [Exalted Be the Living God], which also enumerates thirteen principles of faith, was written by Rashi, who preceded Maimonides, therefore concluding that âthis number [thirteen] is ancient in our nationâ90 and that it was thus a typological number to which Maimonides was obligated in establishing the fundamental principles of the Jewish faith.
Berdugo explained the typological significance of the number thirteen in several ways. In the introduction to his discussion of principles of faith, he suggested that the high priestâs breastplate and the twelve stones embedded in it taken together allude to the thirteen principles of faith,91 while in his conclusion, he noted that the thirteen principles equal the number of the tribes of Israel (including Manasseh and Ephraim).92 He further added that the arrangement of these principles in a numerical order signifies the vitality of each principle within the system of principles and that âtheir total number is EḤâDâ (meaning âone,â where the numerological value of the three letters E, Ḥ, and D totals thirteen), intimating that even though they are thirteen in number, they are a unity, all one: âIf one of them, God forbid, collapses, it is as if they all have collapsed.â93
However, in the body of the discussion, Berdugo raised the possibility that two of the beliefs are not fundamental principles of faith, but rather two branches of a particular principle. (This would imply that there are not thirteen principles, but eleven, though Berdugo did not explicitly state this conclusion, nor did he explore the implications of this possibility.) The two beliefs in question are in the uniqueness of Mosesâs prophecy and in the immutability of the Torah. While belief in Torah from Heaven is indeed a fundamental principle of faith, Berdugo does not consider these two aforementioned beliefs to be so; they are simply offshoots of the former.
At the outset of his discussion of the eighth principle of faith, the prophecy of Moses, Berdugo queried why this belief is considered a fundamental principle of faith. What great harm would ensue if we were to equate Mosesâs prophecy with that of other prophets, such that this would be considered apostasy? âIn any case,â Berdugo argues, âthis should not be called a fundamental principle, as it is derived from the principle of Torah from Heaven.â94 Maimonidesâs particular emphasis on the superiority of Moses as a prophet is widely understood as stemming from his polemical stance against the Islamic conception of Muhammad as the final prophet and its claim that the Torah has been abrogated (al-Nasḫ). Denying the uniqueness and supremacy of Mosesâs prophecy could open the door to the assertion that some other past or future prophet might amend the Torah of Israel, thus undermining its eternal validity, which is Maimonidesâs eighth principle.95 Berdugo, however, apparently did not share the same sense of urgency that had compelled his predecessor to safeguard this theological point. His opening words in discussing Torah from Heaven, the ninth principle, illustrate this:
âAnd Torah.â Following the fundamental belief in prophecy, we believe that this is the Torah that Moses placed before all of Israel, from the beginning of Genesis to âbefore the eyes of all Israel,â all of it transcribed from the mouth of the Almighty.96
It should be noted that Berdugo situates the principle of Torah from Heaven after the principle of belief in prophecy, and not after the principle of belief in Moses as one might expect. This presumably reflects his claim that belief in Mosesâs prophecy is a branch of the principle of Torah from Heaven. His stance is also evident in his use of the words âthis tooâ at the beginning of his discussion of the next principle, the tenth, concerning the immutability of the Torah. He writes: âIt will not change. This too is a branch of the other principle, and it is called a principle in its own right.â97 In short, according to Berdugo, after affirming the fundamental belief in the existence of prophecy, one must embrace the principle of Torah from Heaven, a principle with two branches: the uniqueness of Mosesâs prophecy and the immutability of the Torah. And it is specifically here, in his discussion of the tenth principle, that Berdugo chooses to propose an answer to his previously posed question regarding the significance of the belief in the uniqueness of Mosesâs prophetic statureâbecause for him, the two beliefs are mutually reinforcing. The belief in Mosesâs unique prophetic role necessitates the belief that the Torah can never be altered, and, conversely, the immutability of the Torah affirms the unique value of its moral teachings:
For this reason, one must believe in the superiority of Moses our teacher over all other prophets. This belief prevents one from ever considering nullifying any commandment based on the words of any prophet: in considering Moses our master to be greater than all other prophets, one will not believe any prophet who contradicts the words of Moses our teacher. This is similar to not relying on a less experienced doctor over a highly skilled and renowned physician. Connected to what we have said is the magnification of the value of the Torah: since it is established for all generations, its transmission must be through one who is honoured and exalted above the entire world.98
As mentioned, Maimonides had already established a correlation between the denial of the Torahâs eternity and the denial of the supremacy of Mosesâs prophecy. Berdugo also recognised this connection; he argued, however, that these two beliefs are not fundamental tenets of faith, but rather branches of another principle. It is worth noting that he was not alone in opposing the Maimonidean viewpoint: many have proposed, contra Maimonides, that the commandments will be nullified in the future and/or that a prophet of Mosesâs stature will emerge at the end of days.99
Nevertheless, in his commentary on Parashat Qoraḥ, Berdugo ascribed a much more severe consequence to the denial of Mosesâs superiority:
For contradicting the greatness of our teacher Moses is contradicting the entire Torah, and contradicting the Torah is contradicting all true beliefs, foremost among which is the belief in creation, from which it is known that the world has a Creator and that âthe earth is the Lordâs and all that is in it.â100
It is conceivable that the context contributed here; attributing such significance to the superiority of Mosesâs prophecy serves to amplify the severity of Qoraḥâs transgression.
Berdugo does make a clear distinction between the prophecy of Moses and the prophecies of the other prophets. However, it is not a difference in the âessence of prophecy,â as Maimonides would have it;101 rather, Moses is the only one who introduced the âlaw and judgementâ that endures for all time, while all other prophets could only rebuke the people regarding those laws, not proclaim new ones. Berdugo goes on to describe the four distinctions delineated by Maimonides between the prophecy of Moses and that of others, but argues that only the first distinction withstands scrutiny and the other three do not: âThe four distinctions mentioned by our teacher are not necessary barring one, and that is the first.â102 Surprisingly, he then continues: âIndeed, we accept the other three from our Rabbi [Maimonides], and he is the strong pillar upon which we rely for them, and after his words, there is no response.â It is unclear whether this acceptance of Maimonidesâs opinionâwhich certainly seems to contradict Berdugoâs earlier explicit refutation of itâis genuine, or merely lip service.
In addition to relegating two principles to the status of mere offshoots, as we have shown, thereby reducing the total to eleven, elsewhere Berdugo aligns himself with a trend initiated by Albo that is primarily characterised by boiling down the thirteen principles to only three. Berdugo asserts that âthe principles of the principlesâ are the existence of God, His omnipotence, and His providence.103 The special status of these three principles is evident in his repeated references to them in his other writings.104 It is interesting to note that among these three principles, we find divine providence, for which, as discussed above, Berdugo proposed a minimalist interpretation.
In conclusion, this discussion has, in line with those above, served to highlight Berdugoâs independent and original stance on the issue of the principles of faith in Jewish thought. While he attached great importance to Maimonidesâs thirteen principles, he maintained intellectual autonomy and did not view himself as inextricably bound to them.
7 Conclusions: The Late Eighteenth-Century European versus North African Study of the Guide
As demonstrated, Berdugoâs discussion of the thirteen principles of faith reveals his strong affinity with Maimonidesâs Guide. In the opening sections of this study, I briefly mentioned the scholarly findings regarding the predilection of sixteenth-century through mid-nineteenth-century North African scholars for the medieval Sephardic philosophical tradition (covering the first and second periods of the three sub-periods I outlined). In the closing section of this study, I would like to offer some initial thoughts about Berdugoâs affinity with the Guide compared with that of his European counterparts.
The Europe of this time was witnessing a reawakening of interest in Maimonidesâs Guide, which became the object of study and controversy to a far greater degree than at any time in the previous two centuries. It is well known that the Guide was rediscovered by German Jewry in the late eighteenth century, or more precisely, commencing in 1742 with the publication of a new edition, arranged by David Fraenkel, almost two hundred years after its previous printing. Moses Mendelssohn, who published a commentary on Maimonidesâs Treatise on Logic in 1763, is said to have claimed that his hunched back derived from hours bent over the Guide as an adolescent. Isaac Euchel produced a new edition of the Guide in 1791 and encouraged Solomon Maimon to compose a commentary on the work (Givâat ha-Moreh), which was later completed by Isaac Satanov, while Mendel Lefin paraphrased the Guide into philosophically loose maskilic Hebrew, and so on.
These writers and other members of the Haskalah movement looked to Maimonides for justification for their novel social and educational agenda.105 Wishing to cultivate a Jewish Bildung as a way of approaching greater participation in European cultural and social life, they turned to Maimonidesâs works with great enthusiasm. For them, he symbolised the possibility of accepting the authority of Reason and of affirming the compatibility of Reason and the Torah. In response, traditionalist opponents penned attacks on Maimonides, to the extent that possession of the Guide (and similar books) marked one as an intellectual or radical, whether one had read them or not. Solomon Maimon testified that one of the reasons he was refused entry to Berlin in the mid-1770s was his intention to publish a new edition of the Guide with a commentary. Thus, by the final decades of the eighteenth century, Maimonides and his writings had become integral parts of the culture war [Kulturkampf] between proponents of the Haskalah and their traditionalist opponents. (In the context of the present study, it is also worth noting that Mendelssohn argued that Judaism had no articles of faith [Glaubenslehren], but only legislation [geoffenbartes Gesetz].106)
The current sparse scholarship on the intellectual history of the North African diaspora indicates that the situation there was different. As mentioned above, it has been pointed out that while the descendants of the Spanish exiles who resettled in the Maghreb (during the first sub-period) continued to refer to the Guideâalongside the works of other medieval thinkersâin their writings, only a few North African scholars from the mid-seventeenth century onwards (the second sub-period), Berdugo among them, maintained an affinity with the Sephardic philosophical tradition, including the Guide. In my opinion, the limited scope of the scholarship on this period precludes the drawing of definitive conclusions. It is highly probable that further research, especially on manuscripts, will reveal additional figures who maintained this affinity. However, if we restrict ourselves to current findings, it seems that Maghrebi engagement with the Guide significantly decreased after the mid-seventeenth century, though it did not completely disappear.
At any rate, the present study of Berdugoâs principles of faith reveals that his reading of the Guide is a direct continuation of the medieval discourse and that of the post-expulsion generations. In contrast to his contemporaries from the European Haskalah, Berdugo did not interpret, confront, or challenge the Jewish tradition in light of Kantian philosophy or Newtonian physics. He formulated his positions on topics such as the existence of God or divine providence in the medieval style, in response to the Greek philosophers and their Muslim interpreters. Moreover, his reading of the text was not oriented to the promotion of modern values or agendas. For instance, while the maskilim invoked Maimonidean authority in their Enlightenment-based efforts to reform the traditional education system to include secular studies, Berdugoâs opinion of the appropriate approach to secular studiesâan issue absent from the agenda of North African Jewry during the period in questionâwas formulated within the framework of the compromise laid out in the Rashbaâs ban, as mentioned above. In other words, while the European maskilim found their primary inspiration in the Enlightenment and mobilised the medieval philosophical tradition as the authority in order to implement their programme, for Berdugo, the latter was the source of both inspiration and authority.
We know of no opposition to Berdugoâs or othersâ study of the Guide or of any attempt on his part to justify it. Apparently, such engagement was not perceived as radical or in need of legitimisation, probably due to the continuous tradition of such engagement in North Africa, involving numerous scholars in the post-expulsion generations and subsequently a small number of individuals (at least as far as is currently known). For more comprehensive and grounded conclusions, further research is required in order to locate additional scholars in the Maghreb from the second sub-period who continued to peruse the Guide and other medieval philosophical works and to analyse how they interpreted these works. This research will also contribute to a deeper understanding of the North African scholars of the third sub-period (mid-nineteenth century onwards) who expressed a strong affinity to the philosophical tradition of the Middle Ages in their writings, such as Å muel Ṭayeb, Maklouf Abitan, and Avraham Zarbiv, whose contributions are also gradually being brought to light.107
For a discussion of the approach that the fundamental principles of Jewish faith can already be found in biblical and post-biblical literature, see David Neumark, The History of Dogmas in Israel [Hebrew] (Odessa: Moriah, 1913).
This is not the place to detail the extensive research literature on the subject; relevant studies will be mentioned in context.
For a brief overview, see Amos Frisch, âBerdugo, Raphael ben Mordecai,â in Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception, Volume 3: AthenaâBirkat ha-Minim, ed. Constance M. Furey et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 894â895.
On the internal legislation of the Meknes Jewish community and Berdugoâs part in it, see Moshe Amar, âOn the âMeknes Regulationsâ in the 18thâ19th Centuriesâ [Hebrew], in Society and Community, ed. Avraham Ḥaim (Jerusalem: Misgav Yerushalayim Institute for Research on the Sephardi and Oriental Jewish Heritage, 1991), 35â45; Amar, âThe Meknes Regulations and Their Connection to the Fez Regulationsâ [Hebrew], Miqqedem Umiyyam 9 (2006): 109â185; Mori Amar, ed., The Regulations of Meknes [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Ḥevrat Ahavat Shalom, 1995), 27â72.
Michael Avioz, âRabbi Raphael Berdugoâs Approach to Resolving Contradictions in the Bible in His Book MeÅammeḥei Levâ [Hebrew], in Fes and Other Moroccan Cities: A Thousand Years of Creativity, ed. Moshe Bar-Asher, Moshe Amar, and Shimon Sharvit (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2013), 205â213; Avioz, âBiblical Text Criticism in Rabbi Raphael Berdugoâs Commentariesâ [Hebrew], in Meḥqerey MaÊ¿arav Umizraḥ: Collected Papers, ed. Moshe Bar-Asher, Elimelekh Westreich, and Shimon Sharvit (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2018), 41â54; Amos Frisch, âOn the Interpretive Method of R. Raphael Berdugo (Based on His Exegesis of the Former Prophets),â Revue des études juives 163 (2004): 445â462; Frisch, âRabbi Raphael Berdugoâs Explanation of the First Two Verses of the Book of Ruthâ [Hebrew], Sinai 150 (2018): 83â92.
Ḥaim Bentov, âRabbi Rephael Berdugo: His Contribution and Approach to Talmudic and Halakhic Researchâ [Hebrew], in North African Jewry in the 19thâ20th Centuries: Studies in Its History, Culture and Society, ed. Michael Avitbol (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1980), 141â149.
Michal Aziza Ohana, âRoqeaḥ Merqaḥat by Rabbi Raphael Berdugo on Rabbinic Aggadot, Commentary and Authorityâ [Hebrew], Tarbiá¹£ 90, no. 2 (2024): 305â333.
On his audacity in halakic rulings, see Moshe Bar-Asher, âBold and Innovative Figures among the Sages of the Westâ [Hebrew], in Progress and Tradition: Creativity, Leadership and Acculturation Processes among the Jews of North Africa, ed. Moises Orfali and Ephraim Hazan (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2005), 3â15, especially 5â7.
EliÅ¡a Naḥmani, âR. Raphael Berdugo and His Torah Commentariesâ [Hebrew] (MA thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 1988); Dan Manor, âR. Raphael Berdugo: His Attitude towards the Philosophy and Rationalism of His Timeâ [Hebrew], Miqqedem Umiyyam 4 (1991): 127â143; Henry Toledano, âThe Centrality of Reason and Common Sense in the Biblical and Talmudic Exegesis of Rabbi Raphael Berdugo (1747â1821),â in Between History and Literature: Studies in Honor of Isaac Barzilay, ed. Stanley Nash (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1997), 171â205; David Asulin, âRabbi Raphael Berdugo: Philosophical Aspectsâ [Hebrew] (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2017).
The Sabbath following a wedding, when the two families celebrate the bride and groom.
The Sabbath before Passover, when it is customary for the rabbi to sermonise about the upcoming festival.
The Sabbath before Purim, when it is customary to read the Torah passage about remembering Ê¿Amaleq (Deut 25:17â19).
The Sabbath between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, when it is customary for the rabbi to sermonise about repentance.
The Sabbath before Tishʿah be-Av.
On the place of sermons in the North African space, see Michal Aziza Ohana, ââ¯âTo Preach on the Order of the Dayâ: Oral and Written Sermons in the North African Diaspora in the Early Modern Periodâ [Hebrew], PeÊ¿amim (forthcoming).
The new periodisation in the historiography of Jewish communities in North Africa began at different points in time for each community throughout the nineteenth century.
Michal Aziza Ohana, âJewish Thought in Fez in the Generations Following the Spanish Expulsion: Characteristics, Style, and Content,â Jewish Quarterly Review 111 (2021): 605â621.
Alongside him, we can also mention Moses ben Isaac Edrehi (who at some point migrated to Amsterdam and later to the land of Israel) and Å muʾel ben Zaken, on whom see Dan Manor, âHumanity in Rabbi Shmuel ben Zakenâs Thoughtâ [Hebrew], in Studies in the Culture of North African Jews, ed. Issachar Ben-Ami (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991), 133â144; Michal Aziza Ohana, ââ¯âLet No One Suspect My Words of Contradicting the Ariâ: Traditional, Zoharic, and Lurianic Conceptions in Rabbi Samuel ben-Zaken of Fezâs Thought,â Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy (forthcoming).
Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel (Liverpool: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1986), 1.
Eli Gurfinkel, âThe Engagement with the Principles after Maimonides: Between Continuity and Changeâ [Hebrew], Ê¿Aley Sefer 22 (2012): 5â17.
Many fifteenth-century thinkers (such as Rashbaá¹£ [Simon ben á¹¢emaḥ Duran], Abraham Shalom, Isaac Arama, Yosef YaÊ¿aveá¹£, Abraham Bibago, and Isaac Abravanel) emphasised the dogmatic centrality of the belief in creation; see Kellner, Dogma, 213â216.
Å muʾel Ḥagiz, MevaqqeÅ¡ ha-Å em [Seeker of God] (Venice, 1666), 211aâb. See also ibid., 141b, 149b; Ḥagiz, Dvar Å muel [Samuelâs Statement] (Venice, 1666), 4aâb, 41a.
Yosef YaÊ¿aveá¹£, Kol Sifrey R. Yosef YaÊ¿aveá¹£ [All the Books of Rabbi Yosef YaÊ¿aveá¹£] (Bnei Brak: Yitzḥak Fuchs, 1985), 3â6. On YaÊ¿aveá¹£âs doctrine of principles, see Kellner, Dogma, 161â164.
Saul Serero, DeruÅ¡ey MaharÅ¡aÅ¡ Siriro [Sermons of Rabbi Saul Serero], vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1989), 425. I should note that Serero later mentioned YaÊ¿aveá¹£âs assertion that âthe first principle, namely the creation of the world, is the main principle and everything depends on it.â Thus, the trend of the dogmatic centrality of the belief in creation highlighted by Kellner continued even in the generations following the expulsion.
Josef al-Ashqar, Sefer ha-Tappuaḥ [The Book of the Apple] (Lod, 1997), 46â47.
Eli Gurfinkel, âThe Thirteen Principles of Faith and the Thirteen Attributes of Mercyâ [Hebrew], DaÊ¿at 84 (2018): 35â82, primarily 64â69.
Å lomo Duran, Tifʾeret YiÅraʾel [The Glory of Israel] (Jerusalem, 2005), 15.
Kellner, Dogma, 217. I should note that Kellner proposes another possibility, attributing the intensive fifteenth-century engagement with the issue of principles to the vigorous Jewish-Christian polemic of the time and the pressures exerted by the Church. He likewise attributes the minimal post-expulsion engagement with the issue to the absence of this context. For more on the connection between the Jewish-Christian polemic and the discussion of fundamental beliefs, see Daniel J. Lasker, âFundamentals of Religion, Interfaith Polemic and Community Leadership in Fifteenth-Century Spainâ [Hebrew], in Studies of Leadership Phenomenon in Jewish Communities during the Middle Ages: A Jubilee Festschrift on the Occasion of the Seventieth Birthday of Prof. Menachem Ben-Sasson, ed. Nahem Ilan, Hagai Ben-Shammai, and Miriam Frenkel (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2024), 329â342.
Ohana, âJewish Thought in Fez.â
Khaled El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 173â203; Caitlyn Olson, âBeyond the Avicennian Turn: The Creed of Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi (d. 895/1490),â Studia Islamica 115 (2020): 101â140.
El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History, 204â231.
Michal Aziza Ohana, âThe Polemic of External Wisdom and Intellectual Inquiry in the Sephardic Diaspora in North Africa in the Generations Following the Expulsionâ [Hebrew], Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 26 (2021): 333â365.
Raphael Berdugo, Rav Peninim (Casablanca, 1970), 407â408.
Berdugo, 408.
Raphael Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 1910; Djerba, 1942), 1:13b.
Berdugo, 1:9b. On the Rashbaâs ban and his exchange with Yedayah ha-Penini, see Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom: Rabbi Menaḥem ha-Meiri and the Maimonidean Halakhists in Provence [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 152â180; Ram Ben-Shalom, Jews of Provence and Languedoc: Renaissance in the Shadow of the Church [Hebrew] (RaÊ¿anana: Open University, 2017), 538â554.
Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2:92b. On the distinctions between the different types of proof, see below, note 54.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 408.
For a systematic examination of Maimonidesâs thirteen principles of faith, see Dror Ehrlich, Maimonides on the Foundations of Jewish Faith [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2019). Maimonidesâs discussion of the principles of faith is mirrored in his list of heretics (heresiography), also consisting of thirteen items, which is presented in the Laws of Repentance (3.6â8). This list of thirteen types of heretics is a sub-category within a group of twenty-four types of people who do not have a portion in the world to come, despite being classified under the title of âIsrael.â See Hannah Kasher, Heretics in Maimonidesâs Teachings [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2011), primarily 96â181.
Abraham Melamed, âMaimonidesâ Thirteen Principles: From Elite to Popular Culture,â in The Cultures of Maimonideanism, ed. James. T. Robinson (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 171â190.
Hannah Kasher and Uri Melamed, âThe Origins of the Piyyut âYigdal Elohim Ḥayââ¯â [Hebrew], in Prayer in Israel: New Aspects, ed. Uri Ehrlich (BeÊ¿er-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2016), 155â183. Kasher and Melamed are in the process of preparing a book that will include an annotated edition of the liturgical poems about the principles of faith. For now, see Israel Davidson, Thesaurus of Medieval Hebrew Poetry, vol. 4 (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1933), 493a.
Regarding the poets mentioned who incorporate a connection to Aristotelian philosophy and the Maimonidean approach alongside kabbalistic motifs in their liturgical poems, see Hannah Kasher and Uri Melamed, âMaimonidesâs Thirteen Principles in Kabbalistic Garbâ [Hebrew], in Ḥallamish LemaÊ¿eyeno Mayim: Studies in Kabbalah, Halakha, Custom and Thought Presented to Prof. Moshe Hallamish, ed. Avi Elqayam and Haviva Pedaya (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2016), 256â302, especially 263â264. According to Ephraim Hazan, Ḥassin was influenced by the poet R. MoÅ¡e Adhan (d. 1736), who also wrote a poem on the principles of faith: see Hazan, Hebrew Poetry in North Africa [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1995), 262. Samuel Elbaz (1790â1844) of Sefrou also wrote a piyyut on the thirteen principles of faith; see ibid., 329.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 408.
On the positive attitude of some of Moroccan rabbis, including Berdugo, towards Maimonides, see Dan Manor, âMaimonides in the Writings of Moroccan Scholars of the 16thâ19th Centuriesâ [Hebrew], in Fez and Other Cities in Morocco: A Thousand Years of Creativity, ed. Moshe Bar-Asher, Moshe Amar, and Shimon Sharvit (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2013), 215â245.
Regarding the partial acceptance of Maimonidesâs thirteen principles of faith, see Marc B. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonidesâ Thirteen Principles Reappraised (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2004); Joshua Berman, âOrthodox Rabbinic Exception to the Thirteen Principles of Faith: The Dynamics of Boundary Permeability,â Modern Judaism 39 (2019): 161â183, especially 162â164.
Kellner, Dogma, 24â25; Eli Gurfinkel, âOrder and Structure in the Maimonidean List of Principlesâ [Hebrew], MaddÊ¿ey ha-Yahadut 55 (2021): 115â182, especially 118â138.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 414.
See Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 1:30aâb, and Israel Nathaniel Rubin, âWhat God Cannot Do: The Problem of Godâs Subservience to the Laws of Logic and Mathematics in Jewish Philosophy and Theologyâ [Hebrew] (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2013), 147â148.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 414. On the absence of this concept from Maimonidesâs thirteen principles of faith, see Kellner, Dogma, 48â55. In contrast, in his discussion in the Laws of Repentance, Maimonides established this belief as a âgreat principleâ and a âpillar of the Torahââsee Kasher, Heretics, 186â190.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 408.
Kellner, Dogma, 108â109, 120â125, 140â149.
Warren Zev Harvey, âThe First Commandment and the God of History: Halevi and Crescas vs. Ibn Ezra and Maimonidesâ [Hebrew], Tarbiá¹£ 97 (1988): 203â216. Berdugo was aware of the differences of opinion between Halevi and Maimonides on this matter, as can be inferred from his words elsewhere: âAnd since we have written that all the eagerness and astonishment to recount the exodus from Egypt is to believe in a tangible way what the philosophers believed and knew through proof, and behold, the sun has not yet set in its fullness, for even knowledge by a miracle would be very fine if we were to attain it. Although the Rabbi, great in his wisdom, told his friend the Khazar king that it is better not to seek a miracle, those who followed, like Rabbenu Moshe, did not say so.â (Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 77).
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 411.
I will note that in his other writings, Berdugo expressed inconsistent appreciation for the two types of proof under discussion. For instance, in one case, he established the following hierarchy (from low to high): faith, intellectual proof, historical experience (see above, note 37) (Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2:92b). Elsewhere, he claimed that philosophical proof and proof from historical experience regarding the existence of God are of identical weight; the hierarchy he established there (Mey Menuḥot, 1:44b) is (from low to high): faith, philosophical proof/proof from historical experience, and prophetic knowledge.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 412â413.
Berdugo, 413.
Berdugo, 413.
Only in a later addition, unavailable to Jewish thinkers over the centuries, did Maimonides add in the fourth principle: âAnd know that the great foundation of the Torah of Moses our teacher is creation.â See Yosef Qafiḥ, Mishnah with Maimonidesâs Commentary [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1968), vol. 3 142.
See Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 1:93a; 2:13bâ14a.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 414.
Berdugo, 414.
Many studies deal with Maimonidesâs conception of prophecy, and this is not the place to mention them all. See Howard Kreiselâs comprehensive book Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 148â315.
Michal Aziza Ohana, âBetween the Natural and the Supernatural: The Theory of Prophecy in Jewish Thought in Morocco in the Generations after the Expulsion from Spainâ [Hebrew], DaÊ¿at 83 (2017): 175â198.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 422.
Michal Aziza Ohana, ââ¯âTo Do the Will of Their Creator [â¦] for in This Matter Happiness Will Be Achievedâ: Halakhic Religiosity of Obedience and Submission in Jewish Communities in North Africa in the Early Modern Periodâ [Hebrew], Maḥševet YiÅraʾel 5 (2014): 96â112.
Scholars have offered various explanations for Maimonidesâs decision to compose his thirteen principles of faith and to treat them as incumbent upon every Jew in order to earn a portion in the world to come (and to be considered part of the Jewish community). For a comprehensive overview of the various suggestions, see Howard Kreisel, âBack to Maimonidesâ Sources: The Thirteen Principles Revisited,â Jewish Thought 1 (2019): 53â88.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 436â437.
Berdugo, 423.
Dov Schwartz, Contradiction and Concealment in Jewish Medieval Thought [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002), 126â143.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 423.
Berdugo, 424.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 425; Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2:86a. I should note that according to Berdugo, even in the act of performing miracles, God seeks to preserve the natural aspect as much as possible and to minimise the miraculous aspect. In the spirit of Gersonidesâs interpretation of the verse âAnd the Lord drove the sea back by a strong east windâ (Exod 14:21), Berdugo too argued, âFor He, blessed be He, prefers nature, and anything that He can do naturally, even a fraction of a thousandth, He will do through nature, and only then will He act through a miracleâ (Mey Menuḥot, 1:84a; see also Rav Peninim, 242).
Berdugo reiterated his main views in his other writings: âEven though our teacher of blessed memory, in the Guide of the Perplexed, when he brought the opinion of Aristotle on providence and disagreed with him, he of blessed memory raised the idea that all matters of a speaking living creature are under providence [â¦]. However, as an addition to his words, may his memory be a blessing, I say that human affairs are sometimes entirely coincidental, and sometimes providential, depending upon human actions, and the more oneâs actions are rectified, the more providence will increase for himâ (Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2:86a).
On the face of it, there seems to be a gap between the title of this principle in Pereq Ḥeleq, âThe Days of the Messiah,â and its content, focusing on the personal character of the messiah. Ehrlich suggests that while the overt message of this principle deals with the messianic figure, a close reading of its content reveals a message hidden between the lines that pertains specifically to the political changes that will characterise the messianic era. This principle serves as an example of esoteric writing: in the external layer of the text, Maimonides emphasised the concrete belief in the figure of the messiah, while the hidden layer deals with the messianic era itself. See Ehrlich, Maimonides, 182â183.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 430.
Eli Gurfinkel, âThe Uniqueness of the Jewish People as a Principle of Faithâ [Hebrew], DaÊ¿at 81 (2016): 207â235.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 430.
Berdugo, 431.
Berdugo, 432.
Albert D. Friedberg, âMaimonidesâ Reinterpretation on the Thirteenth Article of Faith: Another Look at the Essay on Resurrection,â Jewish Studies Quarterly 10.3 (2003): 244â255.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 433. See also what he writes afterwards: âAnd however it may be, there is no concern about the body, whether it remains intact or not, for God will create a new body on earth similar to the original body, and it will remember all the events that happened to it, and it will be comforted over its death and rejoice in its resurrectionâ (ibid., 433). In contrast, in other writings, Berdugo links the belief in the resurrection of the dead to other beliefs, including creation: âAnd it seems that what the men of the Great Assembly ordained to remember the resurrection of the dead at the beginning of the prayer [the Amidah] is because it is a belief that strengthens all the beliefs that every son of Israel is obligated to believe in, the existence of God, His providence, and His omnipotence. Further derived from this is the belief in creation, as he who believes in the resurrection will believe in creationâ (Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2:94a).
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 433.
For an overview of the radical interpretation of Maimonides, see Ehrlich, Maimonides, 195â199.
See above, note 72.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 433. Abravanelâs idea appears in his introduction to his commentary on the book of Isaiah, twelfth purpose.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 433â435.
Berdugo, 435â436.
Berdugo, 436.
Gurfinkel, âThe Thirteen Principles of Faith,â 36â39.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 408.
Berdugo, 408.
Berdugo, 436.
Berdugo, 436.
Berdugo, 416.
See Kasher, Heretics, 138â145, 165â167; Ehrlich, Maimonides, 128.
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 420.
Berdugo attributed great importance to this belief in the immutability of the Torah, for change only occurs in something deficient. Should change in the Torah be possible, it would imply a deficiency in God, as it would mean that He was unable to perfect the Torah. Therefore, Berdugo emphasised that âone for whom this principle is uncertain, it is as if he has denied fundamental belief, God forbidâ (Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 421).
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 421.
Shapiro, Limits, 122â131.
Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2:61a.
Maimonides clearly distinguished between the prophecy of Moses and that of other prophets, understanding their prophecy to be merely homonymous with that of Moses (Guide 2.35 and other places in his writings).
Berdugo, Rav Peninim, 420.
Berdugo, 66.
Berdugo, Mey Menuḥot, 2:77b; 2:146a; 2:148a.
Shmuel Feiner, The Jewish Enlightenment, trans. Chaya Naor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 47â48, 249, 325, and more.
Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism, trans. Allan Arkush, introduction and commentary by Alexander Altmann (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 1983), 90. See Warren Zev Harvey, âHasdai Crescas and Moses Mendelssohn on Beliefs and Commandments,â in Moses Mendelssohn: Enlightenment, Religion, Politics, Nationalism, ed. Michah Gottlieb and Charles H. Manekin (Bethesda, MD: University Press of Maryland, 2015), 79â89. Later reformers reintroduced dogmas into Judaism: see George Y. Kohler, âIs There Room for Belief in Judaism? Two German Jewish Thinkers Debate Dogma in 1834,â Jewish Thought 1 (2019): 89â114.
Michal Aziza Ohana, âBetween the Philosophers, Rashbaá¹£ and Copernicus, and between the Alliance Israélite Universelle and Rabba Bar Bar Ḥana: Studies in the Thought of Rabbi Å muel Ṭayebâ [Hebrew], in Rabbi Kalphon Moshe ha-Cohen and the Sages of Tunisia in the Modern Era, ed. Zvi Zohar and Ronel Atiya (Tel Aviv: Idra, 2024), 15â39; Maklouf Avitan (Abitan), Utopia from Casablanca [Hebrew] (BeÊ¿er-Sheva: RaÊ¿av Publishing House, 2016).
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