“Swiss foreign policy […] evolves at about the speed of those glaciers for which this country is rightly famous.”1 Alan K. Rothnie, British ambassador in Bern, thus opened his November 1978 analysis of Switzerland’s foreign policy. Looking at the country’s role in sub-Saharan Africa from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, it is indeed tempting to conclude that the rise and demise of superpower Détente and the growth and erosion of the Third World’s political power had little impact on the foreign policy of this small, Western European, neutral state. In 1967, as in 1979, a selective interpretation of neutrality that prioritised the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the separation of political and economic affairs guided the Swiss government’s foreign policy decisions on the African continent. There were no dramatic changes or spectacular initiatives—although some Swiss observers did consider Federal Councillor Pierre Aubert’s January 1979 Western Africa trip to be a departure from Switzerland’s habitual low-key foreign policy. Aubert’s visit did not herald a new era of special relations between Switzerland and Africa. It indicated, however, that Switzerland’s foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa had indeed evolved, although it was more a change in form than in content. During the OAU April 1972 visit to Bern, Swiss foreign policymakers had focused on defending their position and deflecting criticism of Switzerland’s economic and financial role in Southern Africa. In 1979, though, it was the Swiss Foreign Minister who sought out African leaders. He intended to exchange views on the leaders’ role in East–West relations and improve Switzerland’s image on the continent. His trip was an expression of a more active and dynamic approach to foreign policy; yet this approach remained restricted to the diplomatic level in Africa.
The two Social Democratic Federal Councillors, Pierre Graber and Pierre Aubert, who led the FPD from 1970 and from 1978, respectively, pursued a more active foreign policy than their predecessors had in the early Cold War. During their term of office, the Swiss government took steps towards joining the UN and participated actively in the CSCE negotiations. When it came to sub-Saharan Africa, however, this drive, which had already set in under Federal Councillor Willy Spühler (Social Democratic Party) in the late 1960s, was frustrated. Faced with an international campaign to end white minority rule in Southern Africa and to guarantee racial equality and human rights, the Swiss
From 1967 to 1979, the need to improve Switzerland’s image and the credibility and respectability of its neutrality in sub-Saharan Africa was at the core of its government’s decision-making on the continent, thanks to the harm done by its economic and financial elites’ close relations with the Apartheid regime, the Swiss government’s non-participation in the UN sanctions against Rhodesia, and its refusal to take a stand against Portuguese colonialism. During the regime changes and armed conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Somalia, Bern attempted to preserve its political and economic interests on the ground, weather Afro–Asian disapproval of its neutrality, and preserve cordial relations with the Western bloc. Yet, in the deeply polarised context of the late 1960s and 1970s, as the East–West and North–South conflicts overlapped, its actions and even its attempts to keep out of the action invited criticism from one side or the other. It thus became clear that Switzerland’s conception of neutrality was poorly adapted to the situation in the Third World.
Neutrality is, essentially, a principle applicable to armed conflicts. A legal discussion of whether it applied, or not, to the different conflicts chosen for this study—liberation wars, an internationalised civil war, and an inter-state conflict—would not be expedient. The Swiss government referred to neutrality when avoiding taking a stance during these wars and adopting a policy of impartiality, and observers judged it by that. Switzerland was not militarily involved in the independence wars in Angola and Mozambique, or the wars in Angola and the Ogaden. There was no risk of it being dragged into these conflicts and there were comparatively few economic interests or Swiss citizens present in these territories that its government needed to protect.
Switzerland’s neutrality policy was more successful during the wars in Angola and the Ogaden. The Swiss government treated the three Angolan liberation movements fighting for control of the newly independent state equally. Its neutrality during this conflict was never called into question. On the contrary, its government’s support of the ICRC relief mission convinced observers of the positive contribution of neutrality during armed conflict. During the Ogaden War, Bern’s discreet attitude averted the possible negative fallout from its association with the ICRC. Conscious that its invasion of the Ethiopian Ogaden region violated its neighbour’s territorial integrity and thus the OAU’s central tenet, the Somali government insisted that the conflict was an uprising of Ethiopian peasants, rather than a conventional war between two African states. In its official appeal for donations, the ICRC did not name the Somali government as a party to the conflict, thereby accepting the Somali point of view. This led the Ethiopian government to question the humanitarian organisation’s neutrality. Given the Swiss government’s support for the ICRC mission in the Ogaden and the multiple entanglements between these two bodies, this might have undermined Switzerland’s neutrality.
In order to judge how Switzerland’s neutrality policy performed during the selected conflicts and regime changes in sub-Saharan Africa, it is useful to consider the specific components of its conception of neutrality and the resulting policy instruments its government had at its disposal. The principle of universality called for relations with all states irrespective of their government’s political couleur. As shown above, Bern largely conformed to this principle. There was but one exception; the de facto suspension of diplomatic relations with Somalia between early 1975 and early 1978. This was a result of mutual disinterest, however, rather than a matter of political will, and relations were re-established as soon as the Somali government showed interest in doing so. In Mozambique, Bern undertook considerable efforts to overcome the FRELIMO government’s criticism of its neutrality policy and establish diplomatic relations. The same was true in Angola. By deciding to recognise the PRA in February 1976, before the end of the internationalised civil war and regardless of the Ford administration’s censure of such a step, Bern prioritised its relations with independent sub-Saharan African states. At the height of the North–South conflict, the Swiss government was keen to strengthen its relations with Third World governments in order to improve its image and protect its political and economic interests. The fact that most Western European governments showed a similar openness towards the new regimes strengthened this policy.
The principle of solidarity had a more mixed record. The provision of aid to the victims of armed conflicts was one way of demonstrating the benefits of a neutral stance. When assessing the usefulness of this principle, it is necessary to differentiate between the independence wars in the Portuguese colonies and the conflicts in Angola and the Ogaden. In the first case, the effectiveness of Switzerland’s humanitarian and development aid to improve its image was very limited—not least because the aid itself was limited. This was mainly due to the difficulty in making Swiss aid to the Angolan and Mozambican populations appear non-political and disinterested. Since development
During the wars in Angola and the Ogaden, however, the ICRC provided the Swiss government with an ideal opportunity to demonstrate Swiss goodwill. Nominally independent from the Swiss government, despite ongoing financial, personnel, and operational links, the Geneva-based humanitarian organisation arranged relief missions for the victims of these conflicts. In Angola, Bern was able to benefit from the goodwill fostered by the humanitarian action during the independence wars. By supporting the relief mission, Bern was able to play for time with respect to the recognition of Angola, without alienating any of the warring parties. As the ICRC’s role during the Ogaden War was controversial, it was less successful in cultivating goodwill towards the Swiss government. On the whole, the ICRC was an asset to Switzerland’s foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it cannot be called a foreign policy instrument of the Swiss government. Although there were exchanges of information between the leaders of the two bodies, in the cases under consideration there are no discernible attempts by the Swiss government to influence the ICRC, which acted independently in sub-Saharan Africa.
Humanitarian aid was routinely granted during the decolonisation of the Portuguese colonies in the interests of seeking amicable relations with the new governments. The results were most remarkable in Mozambique. While FRELIMO was highly critical of Switzerland’s selective neutrality policy in Southern Africa after it took over in 1974–1975, the establishment of a bilateral development cooperation relationship led to cordial relations by the end of the decade. Swiss foreign policymakers routinely suggested the use of aid when faced with a situation that required a goodwill gesture, thereby belying their own rhetoric of the non-political nature of Switzerland’s aid policy.
The Swiss conception of neutrality emphasised the principle of availability. This was of little use during the armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, as there were no opportunities for Swiss mediation in any of the wars analysed in this book. Swiss foreign policymakers regularly, almost automatically, evoked the possibility of offering Switzerland’s good offices to the belligerents in internal communications. However, African leaders preferred regional mediation, notably through the OAU. Even if external mediation had been sought, Bern was not in a position of special trust that made it a likely candidate for the
Although, on the whole, the Swiss government managed to manoeuvre rather successfully through the armed conflicts and regime changes in sub-Saharan Africa, the Swiss conception of neutrality had little to offer in the Third World context. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Afro–Asian leaders’ main objectives were the reorganisation of global economic relations and the end of white minority rule. These issues were framed in terms of justice, such that standing apart appeared highly immoral. On the North–South front, Switzerland was an industrialised state and, in the eyes of Third World observers, part of the capitalist camp. On the end of white minority rule, Afro-Asian leaders demanded more than an abstract, verbal commitment to human rights. Neutrality in itself, and the Swiss government’s insistence on non-interference in what it considered the internal affairs of third states and on the separation of political from economic issues, had nothing to recommend it to political leaders in the global South. In addition, none of the policy instruments discussed above—mediation, aid, and political recognition—were unique to Switzerland or restricted to neutral states. Neutrality was no precondition to pursue a humanitarian agenda, to mediate during a conflict, or to adopt a position of impartiality during a specific conflict. Thus, Switzerland was in competition not only with the other neutrals but also other powers, small and big.
Many Swiss foreign policymakers do not seem to have realised, or wanted to realise, the limits of their neutrality in sub-Saharan Africa and continued to insist on the usefulness of this principle. The Political Secretariat’s 1978 report on Bern’s policy options in this region reflected this idea that neutrality in and of itself was a positive value and that Africans would come to understand this if proper efforts were made to explain it. Most policymakers remained attached to the European outlook in which neutrality had been developed and made no effort to adapt it to the changing international system following decolonisation. They expected Third World leaders to conform to their own view and showed little understanding of the desire to change the political and economic system that had worked to the advantage of the colonisers. It is tempting to
At the very least, by insisting less on the benefits of neutrality in their contact with African leaders, Swiss foreign policymakers might have avoided the comparison with Sweden that could, in the African context, only be to Switzerland’s disadvantage. When compared to Swedish humanitarian support for national liberation, Swiss aid in Southern Africa appeared even more paltry. The Swedish example showed African leaders that neutrality was not incompatible with taking a stand on racial oppression. Thus, in the eyes of Third World observers, Switzerland was the ‘bad neutral’. In the polarised context of the ‘long 1970s’, however, gains in credibility and respectability in the global South almost inevitably came at the cost of losses in the North. The neutrals were faced with a trade-off and had to choose whether to please the newly independent countries in the Third World and the liberation movements, or the main Western powers. Foreign policymakers in Sweden and Switzerland made different choices. Western diplomats criticised Sweden’s outspoken position on Third World issues. But, they saw Switzerland as a politically stable and economically powerful state, whose alliance to the West, despite its policy of neutrality, was never questioned. They welcomed Switzerland’s more active foreign policy, particularly in the context of growing North–South polarisation. In their eyes, Switzerland occupied the position of ‘good neutral’.
The presence of two different, competing models of a neutral foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa invites the question of which one was better adapted to the situation in this region. At the height of the North–South conflict in the mid-1970s, the Swedish model seemed to win the day. Looking at the period from 1967 to 1979, however, it appears that the Swiss government managed to manoeuvre rather well through the different conflicts and crises. To be sure, Switzerland’s political and economic relations with the white minority regimes in Southern Africa did undermine the credibility and respectability of its neutrality in the eyes of Afro–Asian leaders. While this was undoubtedly worrying and disagreeable, the Swiss government succeeded in waiting out their criticism. When faced by situations in these four African states that demanded a response, the Swiss government tended to prevaricate and play for time. In addition, it strategically granted humanitarian aid and focused on low-cost
Switzerland’s smallness also helped overcome Third World censure. Although it had considerable investments in sub-Saharan Africa, Switzerland was but one industrialised state that engaged in controversial economic activities in the Third World. Away from the elite discussions of the UN, the OAU, and other international organisations, the former colonial powers and especially the Western superpower were much easier targets. Switzerland’s foreign policy only had a direct, bilateral, negative impact during the regime changes in Mozambique and Ethiopia. The new FRELIMO government was unwilling to overlook the former lack of Swiss support for national liberation in Southern Africa and refused to establish diplomatic relations for several months after Mozambique’s independence. Yet, FRELIMO’s leadership was similarly dismissive of the major Western powers. It seems unlikely that they consciously intended Switzerland to be the last state previously represented in colonial Mozambique with which they established diplomatic relations.
In Ethiopia, however, Switzerland was singled out for criticism. After a committee of army officers toppled Emperor Haile Selassie’s government in September 1974, the controversy surrounding the assets of the deposed Emperor in Swiss banks not only damaged Switzerland’s standing with the new regime but also led to public protests and attacks against Swiss citizens in Ethiopia. The contrast between the highly visible Duke of Harar Memorial Hospital project in the capital, Addis Ababa, and the highly publicised reception of Ethiopian state funds by Swiss banks was striking. It probably reinforced the image of Switzerland using monies misappropriated in Third World countries to pay for humanitarian activities in these same states, adding hypocrisy to accusations of exploitation. At a time when Third World governments called for a NIEO and it seemed possible that the OAU might follow the example of the OPEC states’ 1973 oil embargo and introduce economic sanctions against firms dealing with the South African and Rhodesian governments, African criticism of Switzerland’s banking secret and its links with the Apartheid regime were politically, and potentially also economically, damaging. Whether this would have led the Swiss government to make concessions if the Ethiopian regime had been able to sustain its campaign remains open to speculation.
Nevertheless, when it came to specific foreign policy choices in the mid-1970s, such as the recognition of the new Angolan and Mozambican governments, the positions of big and small Western governments were similar. They all recognised the new states, despite the Soviet ties of their new leaders—with the notable exception of the Ford administration with respect to the recognition of the PRA. On this issue, there was a gulf between the US and the rest of the Western bloc. The Swiss government’s frame of reference for its relations with sub-Saharan Africa was, in the 1970s, Western European. The FPD coordinated its policies with neutrals Sweden and Austria, but also with the EEC. Department leaders closely observed the Swedish government’s position on African issues and sometimes consulted it. This was also true with regard to Austria, even though the Austrian government was less invested in sub-Saharan Africa. After checking with Stockholm and Vienna, the FPD also
Compared to the crucial role played by neutral and Western European governments in Swiss decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa, the influence of the US appears more muted. Until the mid-1970s, the Nixon and Ford administrations showed little interest in Africa, focusing rather on the establishment of triangular diplomacy, the wars in Vietnam and the Middle East, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and the fallout from the Watergate scandal. Swiss policymakers viewed the US State Department’s interpretations of the Ethiopian Revolution and the decolonisation of Mozambique and Angola with some scepticism. For Bern, Washington’s position became important once the Cold War escalated on the African continent. The Cuban and Soviet interventions in Angola in 1975–1976 and, two years later, in the Ogaden, raised fears that the USSR would continue to expand its influence in Africa. Swiss foreign policymakers were deeply worried about the ‘inability’ of the US to ensure their allies’ victories in these conflicts. This spurred them to consider ways in which they could contribute to the containment of Cuban and Soviet influence in Africa by strengthening Switzerland’s relations with sub-Saharan African states. During the global Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa, the Swiss government clearly perceived Switzerland to be part of the Western bloc.
However, the Swiss government was no monolith. Analysis of the country’s foreign policy on sub-Saharan Africa has exposed the departmental logics and individual convictions warring behind the scenes, which echoed broader disagreements within Swiss civil society. In the late 1960s, the leaders of newly independent Afro–Asian states and a heterogeneous domestic solidarity movement started to participate in the debate surrounding Switzerland’s foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa, alongside business leaders with long-standing influence in Bern. Whether more or less openly, many Swiss foreign policymakers rejected their criticism outright and denied that these new actors were entitled to contribute to policy formation. They were distrustful of and condescending towards ‘leftist’ Swiss youth movements and ‘excitable’ African leaders.
Nevertheless, Afro–Asian and domestic criticism gave rise to disagreements about the future direction of Switzerland’s foreign policy on sub-Saharan Africa within the FPD. From the late 1960s, a small number of diplomats started to advocate a reorientation. Some of them were stationed at the centres of international debate in New York and Addis Ababa and therefore regularly confronted Third World criticism. These men repeatedly criticised the government’s continuing refusal to constrict the activities of Swiss banks and firms in Southern Africa and questioned its selective policy of neutrality in the region.
The direct impact of private economic actors on Switzerland’s foreign policy in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Somalia is more muted. Switzerland’s economic interests in these countries were few and business leaders rarely contacted the government to influence its policy. They did not need to do so, as economic considerations traditionally held great weight in Bern. During the independence wars in the Portuguese colonies, the FPD took next to no steps to restrict Swiss trade and investment so as not to set a precedent that might undermine Switzerland’s commercial and financial relations with South Africa. FPD leaders habitually made vague references to economic interests in order to validate policy decisions. The maintaining of a political presence in the four states was always justified, in part, by the need to protect Swiss investments or to obtain information about the markets. In the rare cases in which business leaders got in touch directly with the federal administration, notably in the case of the recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations with Mozambique and Angola in 1974–1976, their suggestions were immediately taken up. Intervention by these economic actors only strengthened policy decisions that had already been made, however.
Between 1967 and 1979, Swiss civil society actors played an active role in the formation of Switzerland’s foreign policy on sub-Saharan Africa. Religious organisations, anti-imperialist groups, students, intellectuals, peace activists, and Third World solidarity groups contributed to delegitimising white minority rule, put the issue of the Swiss government’s collaboration with these regimes on the political agenda, and pressured Bern to strengthen its relations with independent African states. On the occasion of Portugal’s invitation to the Comptoir Suisse trade fair in 1973, they even convinced Federal Councillor
The controversy surrounding Federal Councillor Pierre Aubert’s January 1979 trip to Western Africa underlines that the FPD’s efforts to render Switzerland’s foreign policy more active and to reach out to the Third World were hampered by the resistance from a significant part of Switzerland’s population. There was also domestic resistance to increasing Switzerland’s foreign aid budget and to its attendance as an observer at NAM summits. Much of Switzerland’s population remained attached to the selective and restrictive interpretation of neutrality developed during the early Cold War. Despite the limits of Switzerland’s conception of neutrality in sub-Saharan Africa, the attachment to this guideline united all actors involved in developing foreign policy. Neutrality meant different things to different people, however; it was cited both by Swiss anti-imperialist groups that accused Bern of infringing on neutrality by prioritising the white minority regimes over African nationalists in the liberation wars in Southern Africa in the early 1970s, and by conservative MPs and business leaders to criticise the government’s statements against Apartheid later in the same decade. Neutrality thus constituted an extremely malleable concept in foreign policy.