The leading comrades at the International Propaganda Committee of Transport Workers wholeheartedly supported the claim of the beginning of a Third Period in 1928. itcnw Secretary Achkanov witnessed an “unrepresented intensification” and observed hitherto unseen increase in the number of disputes and strikes in the transport sector all over the world. In Germany, 25,000 Rhine water transport workers were on strike for over one month; in eastern India, some 14,000 railway workers were on strike for more than half a year and were backed by a solidarity strike involving 20,000 workers, followed by a strike of 10,000 employees on the South Indian railway. The docklands, too, were unruly in several countries. About 5 to 6,000 harbour workers went on strike in several ports in France, thousands of them were on strike in Antwerp, ten thousand in Australia. In Finland, the general strike of harbour workers lasted from June until winter 1928/29; in Hamburg, the harbour workers joined the shipbuilders’ strike; in Altona, the crews of the fishing boats went on strike.1
Most of the above listed strikes occurred during the latter half of 1928, i.e., after the introduction of the ‘United front from below’-tactic. The new tactic, in turn, had been discussed at the Fifth Conference of Revolutionary Transport Workers that summoned in conjunction with the rilu World Congress in April 1928. The shortcomings of the earlier United Front-tactic resulted in fierce (self-) criticism among the delegates. Above all, communist and revolutionary opposition groups were weak within the trade unions and disinterested in work among colonial transport workers. Not least, they had failed to launch effective international boycotts in support of national strikes and to block the transportation of war material to East Asia. Although the strategy of agitation and propaganda within the unions was claimed to have generated greater awareness of and support for the revolutionary opposition, few militant workers had joined it. Consequently, the vision of a united front proved illusionary. The main reason for this was blamed on the lack of concrete action
1 The 1928 Conference and Its Aftermath
The adoption of the new United Front from Below-tactic was publicised through a resolution. In contrast to earlier instructions, the 1928 Resolution also highlighted the importance to integrate the transport workers in colonial and semi-colonial countries in the global proletarian class struggle. The new policy was to be implemented by strike committees as well as by the revolutionary opposition within the trade unions. All transport workers were urged to demand for the abolition of overtime work and to organise the fight for shorter hours, particularly in those branches of the transport industry where intensive rationalisation was in progress. Besides, they should insist for social insurance, unemployment benefits, paid vacations and sick relief. Most importantly, they were compelled to rally behind the slogan ‘Equal pay for equal work’. The new credo of radical workers was anti-racist and anti-discriminatory and was committed to anti-colonial international proletarian solidarity, the 1928 Resolution stressed. Therefore, the 1928 Resolution stressed the need to support transport workers in semi-colonial and colonial countries in their fight against capitalist and colonial exploitation.3
The 1928 Resolution listed several specific demands to be pushed forward by the radical maritime transport workers. Apart from the general demand for 7-hour working shifts above and 6-hour working shifts below deck, the 1928 Resolution ordered to struggle for the recognition of the ship committees. Addressing anti-racist, anti-discriminatory and anti-colonial international proletarian solidarity, the 1928 Resolution called the revolutionary mariners, i.e., the members of the sea and ship cells, to expose the exploitation of non-white members of a crew by the shipowners and to struggle for equal pay for equal
The new Secretariat or Bureau of the ipac-tw discussed the implementation of the new tactics immediately after the conference. It is likely that the body had existed already in previous years although I have not been able to find any information about who belonged to it. For the 1928 Secretariat, on the other hand, a photograph published by George Mink in the journal Labor Unity, gives a hint of its international composition. Some of the names were published in the caption, namely Walter (Germany), Shuesmith (Canada), Mink (USA), Foss (Norway), Dumay (France), Bulatsil (ussr), Achkanov (ussr), Bitov (ussr), while the Danish member can be identified as Richard Jensen. Others remain unidentified, such as an additional French member as well as the Bulgarian and the five Chinese members.5 About half of its members represented maritime transport workers’ unions, namely Dumay, Jensen, Mink and Walter, certainly also one of the Chinese. George Hardy’s name is missing from the list, which is surprising as he participated at the conference and was the key organiser in Britain.
The Secretariat decided to put a special focus on work among maritime transport workers and outlined five impending areas of immediate action. Three of them concerned the activities in Britain, France and the USA, the fourth on invigorating the ‘United front from below’-tactic among the revolutionary nuclei, while the fifth was to reach out to ‘coloured’ and colonial seamen.
1.1 One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Britain
The most pressing needs for immediate action was the pitiful performance of the Minority Movement and the Communist Party in the United Kingdom in terms of organising the radical British seamen. Few of them were members of the Minority Movement or even party members. Consequently, the influence of the communists was about nil in the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union, from 1926 the National Union of Seamen (nus), and its main rival, the Amalgamated Marine Workers’ Union which had been dissolved in 1927. The nus, in turn, was at loggerheads with the Trades Union Congress and the Transport and General Workers’ Union, whose leader Ernest Bevin pushed for
The ipac-tw Secretariat appointed George Hardy as its representative and instructor in Britain. Hardy had joined the British section of the rilu after his relocation to Britain in late 1923, his chief activity being the organisation of the seamen’s section of the Minority Movement as well editing and publishing its mouthpiece, The International Seafarer (apart from his sojourn in China in 1927/1928).8 Hardy’s task was to organise a secretariat for the ipac-tw in Britain as well as to supervise activities in Britain. His office was also responsible to create and maintain communications and contacts with the British Dominions and colonies.9 Hardy returned to England in August 1928 and immediately started to reorganise the seamen’s section of the Minority Movement. Together with Fred Thompson, they opened a small office at 27a, Grundy Street in Poplar, London.10 However, Hardy soon recognised that the prospects for a new militant seamen’s union were slim. Neither the nus nor the Trades Union Congress allowed double union membership, and Hardy reasoned that only a few seamen would join a red union. Still, a red union might have chance, he wishfully noted, especially if it vehemently pushed for the abolition of the pc5-card and managed to attract unorganised and non-white seamen.11
Agitation and propaganda work among British seamen had also suffered, as the Minority Movement had not been capable to publish The International Seafarer for a long time. This, in turn, was critically commented by the officials of the Interclubs in Hamburg and Rotterdam, who complained about the lack of propaganda material as it restricted their capacity to reach out to British seamen. At one point, the comrades in Rotterdam even proposed to publish
The grandiose plan to establish a red seamen’s union in Britain soon backfired. Most of the militant mariners joined the Minority Movement but few of them backed the idea of a red union. Instead, they rather wanted to join Bevin’s new union.14 The plan finally collapsed when the leadership of the Minority Movement turned against the idea. In late October 1928, Achkanov lamented that work among maritime transport workers in Britain continued to remain unsatisfactory: “[T]he reformists will organise a new union and we will later play the role of opposition in the new union.”15 Neither were there any prospects for establishing Interclubs in Britain: “In no way can we push this question forward.”16 Even worse, the Minority Movement had not even started to organise revolutionary nuclei on British vessels.17 Hardy’s activities came to a standstill by the end of the year when he received orders from Moscow to head the bureau of pptus and direct its underground work in Shanghai.18
Nevertheless, the vision of establishing a red seamen’s union in Britain was kept alive by Achkanov who believed that neither the nus nor Bevin’s new union served the “class defence” of the seamen. If only the opposition exposed the “fascist” nature of these unions, the militant seamen would eagerly join a red union, he assured.19 In early 1929, Achkanov sent new directives to the Minority Movement and its seamen’s section, and ordered them to speed up the formation of “a class seamen’s union” and ship cells on British vessels. In addition, the Minority Movement was urged to immediately set up so-called
The ipac-tw directives on work in Britain were disseminated to all affiliated units and revolutionary opposition groups. The ipac-tw denounced Bevin’s attempt to initiate a seamen’s section within the Transport and General Workers’ Union as a camouflaged attempt to infuse ‘fascism’, i.e., social democratic tendencies among the seamen, and to lure them in an organisation resembling that of the nus. It further instructed the Minority Movement to draft a ‘United front from below’-program for its work among seamen, and to send information about the Initiatory Seamen’s Groups to all revolutionary opposition groups as well as the Interclubs. The latter, in turn, were ordered to inform visiting British seamen about the existence and addresses of these groups.21
However, something went wrong in Britain. In contrast to the ipac-tw directives, the seamen’s section of the Minority Movement sent a letter to its members in early February 1929 and advised them to join Bevin’s Transport and General Workers’ Union! Achkanov was at loss – had the comrades deliberately obstructed his orders or what had happened?22
Communications between Moscow and London were patchy and Achkanov could do little to interfere. Documentation reveals that the Minority Movement had set up a Provisional Seamen’s Committee at this point, led by Fred Thompson. Its members included N.J. Upadhyaya who represented the London-based Indian Seamen’s Union. Activities were in its infancy but at least one group existed in Tilbury, one of the deep-water ports of London.23 Although the Provisional Seamen’s Committee had no resources at its disposal to establish an Interclub, it had opened an office in Poplar, London, at 86, East India Dock Road. It soon managed to expand its activities to several British ports; The International
1.2 Opening the Doors in the USA
Promising news reached Moscow from the USA where George Mink was operating as official ipac-tw representative in organising the militant waterfront in the USA.25 A first step towards a radical platform was the Marine Workers Progressive League, mwpl, an organisation he had launched before he left for Soviet Russia in 1927. The mwpl directed its attention towards un-organised maritime workers who frequented the New York Interclub. At first, Mink’s idea was to organise them as a “progressive opposition” within the existing unions but they declined to do so (as much as the unions resisted the formation of militant groups within their ranks). However, the adoption of the ‘Class-against-Class’ doctrine opened the floor for the establishment of a militant – red – union of maritime workers in the USA in 1928.26
Mink’s position as ipac-tw representative gave him the mandate to launch a “red” seamen’s union in the USA.27 After his return to the USA in 1928, Mink contacted his old associates within the iww who joined him in his effort to expand the mwpl.28 Mink was rather successful as the mwpl managed to establish branches also on the US West Coast by the end of the year,29 in addition to opening ten new Interclubs, among others in Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia and San Francisco, and publishing the first editions of its mouthpiece, The Marine Worker.30
Mink’s career as a red union organiser almost came to an abrupt end in late 1928/early 1929 when cpusa leader Jay Lovestone accused him for belonging to James P. Cannon’s faction of Trotskyites. Like many other communist parties, the cpusa was heavily affected by the purge of Trotsky and his followers in the Soviet Union as well as within the Comintern and its affiliated parties
1.3 Hamburg: More than the Secretariat for the Western Coast of Europe
News about communist achievements on the waterfront in Western Europe had initially been positive in 1928. A revolutionary opposition had been formed in the port workers’ union in Belgium; the Hamburg as well as the Rotterdam Interclub both listed revolutionary nuclei on 120 vessels, of which 35 had been formed since the conference, whereas the opposition within the Norwegian Seamen’s and Stokers’ Union had organised 15 revolutionary nuclei and had representatives on 26 ships.32
Hopes were high for an organisational breakthrough in France. Following the instructions received after the Fifth Conference, Auguste Dumay and the ipac-tw Latin Secretariat in Paris had organised a conference of French seamen that laid the foundations for the Unitarian Seamen’s Federation.33 The main task for the ipac-tw, Achkanov highlighted, was to strengthen the new
On the other hand, the implementation of the new strike tactics, namely international support to national strikes, had been disappointing in 1928. The opposition within the Dutch Seamen’s Union had failed to support the strike of the German Rhine River transport workers; even worse, Achkanov accused the revolutionary opposition as well as the Dutch and German communist parties for insufficient political vigilance to extend the strike. In Britain, the Minority Movement had failed to support the Australian waterside strike.35 In France, the seamen’s strike in Marseille was lost in part because the ugtc and the Party did not enlist the support of the Marseille Interclub, “whose authority amongst the seamen is so great that last year it succeeded in capturing the temporary leadership of the reformist union.”36
The ipac-tw headquarters promptly reacted on the bleak transnational coordination during strikes. It instructed the RILU Berlin Bureau to summon Albert Walter and a representative of the communist fraction in the German Transport Workers’ Federation as well as Dumay and Lebègue from France, Jensen from Denmark, Foss from Norway, Dekker from Holland and Alex from the ipac-tw for a conference in Berlin. On top of the agenda was the coordination of work in the ports in Western Europe.37 However, for reasons not known, the conference was postponed and transferred to Hamburg where it convened in July 1928.38 The meeting resulted in the establishment of a new unit in Hamburg, the Secretariat of the Western Coast of Europe. The new unit was projected to maintain connections with the ipac-tw headquarters, to coordinate transnational activities in support of national strikes as well as to form port committees of seamen and port workers in Western Europe.39
Information about the trans- and international connections of the Hamburg Port Bureau are patchy before mid-1928. As previously outlined, the unit in Hamburg had close links with those in Bremen and Rotterdam although it seems likely that the main liaison centre was the rilu and/or ipc-tw bureau in Berlin. The new position of the Hamburg Port Bureau as a unit for the coordination of joint inter/transnational activities was demonstrated during the shipyards workers’ strike in Hamburg in October 1928. Walter’s directives “to our representatives in Belgium, England, France and Holland” reveal a hierarchical relation as they were instructed to launch a boycott to overhaul German ships in their respective ports. “Our comrades answered positively,” Walter noted, and underlined further that “[t]his clearly demonstrates the importance of our Port Bureau as a liaison centre.”40
The reason for choosing Hamburg as central liaison centre was due to the success of the Hamburg Port Bureau and Interclub in rapidly increasing the numbers of revolutionary nuclei on board German merchant vessels. By October 1928, the Zelle Schiffahrt listed already 256 members and “reliable” ship cells existed on board 120 ships. The nuclei formed the backbone of Walter’s global communications network as they covered shipping routes connecting Hamburg with North America (East and West Coast), Mexico, the Caribbean, South America (East and West Coast), Africa, Australia, East Asia, India, the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea. His plan was simple but clever. Walter planned to set up legal or illegal liaison offices in all ports abroad where German ships were calling at; trusted members of a nucleus would serve as
Hamburg was therefore not the ideal location for a global liaison centre of the ipac-tw, less for the Comintern and rilu-apparatus in Moscow. Although the Hamburg Port Bureau was running a clandestine courier service to Indian, Australian and Chinese ports, connections were highly irregular due to restrictions in German shipping services to these ports. This weakness was highlighted in an internal report in November 1928. Instead of solely relying on German nuclei members, other revolutionary opposition units and Interclubs were compelled to set up sea and ship cells. Top priority was to get work started in British and French ports. The former ports were important for the connections to Australia, the latter ones – especially Marseille – for the connections to China and Japan. Moreover, work had to be started in US East and West Coast ports. Once established, dispatches could easily be sent via Hamburg on a German ship to New York from where the local liaison bureau would be able to distribute it to the West Coast and further to any destination in the Pacific.43 By the end of 1928, the contours of this communication network were already visible, and included “branch offices” (Zweigstellen), namely the Interclubs in Rotterdam, New York, Philadelphia and Sydney.44
2 The Scandinavian Secretariat and Activities in Northern Europe
The introduction and application of the United Front from Below-tactic became a protracted process among the ipac-tw sections in the Nordic countries. The task of Leif Foss and the Scandinavian Secretariat’s had been to ignite and deepen the coordination between the various revolutionary trade union opposition groups in the Nordic countries. Foss prepared the ground
The 1927 Copenhagen Conference outlined the organisational foundations for work among the national transport workers’ unions. Each executive committee of the Scandinavian communist parties was to nominate a person (i.e., secretary) responsible for trade union work. The person was also to serve as the liaison person for the Scandinavian Secretariat and to meet twice a year. Further, each of the parties was to nominate a country committee (landsutskott), consisting each of representatives for land transport, railway and maritime workers as well as the party’s trade union secretary. In addition, the opposition groups within the national trade unions were each to establish a steering body consisting of three members. The local communist fractions within a union, in turn, were obliged to be in contact with the country committee as well as with the executive committee of the party. Finally, the Copenhagen Conference repeated the urge to form ship cells.46
Discussions concerning intra-Scandinavian cooperation continued at a conference held in Copenhagen in May 1928. On top of the agenda were the decisions of the rilu Congress and their implementation in the Scandinavian countries. Present were, amongst others, Leif Foss, Richard Jensen and Sven Linderot. Not much is known about the outcome of the conference, apart from it discussing ways of opening links to the Baltic countries and Finland.47
The intra-Scandinavian dimension gained momentum during the Finnish harbour workers’ strike during latter half of 1928. The strike had started in autumn 1928, and the Scandinavian Secretariat issued a call for launching supporting actions in Scandinavian ports in September 1928. Foss’ plans failed in Norway; here, the harbour workers’ union rejected the call to boycott Finnish
The Finnish harbour workers were on strike for ten months. The tactics of the export industry owners relied on the excessive use of non-organised workers, usually provided by the paramilitary strikebreaking organisation Vientirauha Oy (“Peace of Export Joint Company”). The ipac-tw, in turn, tried to counteract and launched an international solidarity campaign in support for the strikers in Finland through the Hamburg Port Bureau. The Hamburg Interclub conducted a campaign against the blackleg stand of the German Transport Workers’ Federation.51 The Hamburg Port Bureau, in turn, published three flyers, each of them in German, English and French, and sent them to its liaison offices in Western Europe. However, the conditions for an international solidarity campaign and a boycott of Finnish shipping proved illusory and clearly indicated the limited capacity of the revolutionary transport workers’ opposition groups – no answer to the calls for a boycott was ever heard from Belgium or Holland, and not much was achieved in Britain and France.52
2.1 Establishing Revolutionary Nuclei and Organising Conferences
Propelling international solidarity campaigns was an important but secondary task of the Scandinavian Secretariat. Its main obligation was to strengthen the revolutionary trade union opposition groups in the Scandinavian countries. However, Foss soon realised that he had to tackle two major obstacles – the lack of inter-Scandinavian communication as well as the weak, if not pathetic situation in Sweden. Foss addressed the first issue in a circular letter to all national committees, and instructed them to send him information on impending tariff
Foss tackled the Swedish issue at an inter-Scandinavian conference held in Stockholm in November 1928. Linderot informed him that the most promising unit was the Stockholm sea cell as it had managed to organise 16 ship cells operating on 50 vessels. He further claimed that the position of the communists was rather strong in the Swedish Stokers’ Union (Svenska eldareförbundet) where they counted three out of seven functionaries. On the other hand, their position was rather weak in the Swedish Seamen’s Union (Svenska sjömansunionen) where they only listed two out of seven functionaries, and was pathetic in the other transport workers’ unions. Similar conditions prevailed in Denmark, Foss noted; the position of the communists was shallow among the railway workers’ union in contrast to their relatively strong position among the maritime workers’ unions. (The discussion about conditions in Norway was postponed to the next conference.) Finally, the one-day conference closed by nominating the Swede Gunnar Carlsson as second secretary of the Scandinavian Secretariat and by calling for the establishment of an Interclub in Stockholm.55
Work at the Copenhagen Interclub also prospered; almost 11,500 mariners had visited 114 meetings in 1928. The club members engaged in the ongoing anti-war campaign of the Comintern and rilu (“Defend the Soviet Union”), among others by printing and distributing leaflets among visiting US American, British, Polish and Swedish naval ships. The activities of the Interclub among Danish maritime transport workers resulted in 200 seamen joining the dkp and the establishment of a revolutionary nucleus among the harbour workers in Copenhagen. Most importantly, however, was the establishment of a new Interclub in Esbjerg on the Danish North Sea coast.56
An unexpected plan of the rilu to establish its own Scandinavian Bureau shelved the plans for invigorating the capacity of the ipac-tw Scandinavian Secretariat at the end of 1928. At first, the idea was to merge the ipac-tw
The main issue on the agenda of the 1929 Oslo Conference was the report about conditions in Norway as well as the formation of revolutionary nuclei on board vessels. Foss and Samsing painted a rather depressing picture of work in Norway. In short: The influence of the communists was minimal in the transport workers’ unions.59 The only positive news where Samsing’s successful engagements at the Hamburg Interclub. Norwegian seamen had started to find their way to the Interclub and Samsing’s activities had yielded some results. The most notable outcome of his agitation was the removal of the official representative of the Norwegian Seamen’s and Stokers’ Union in Hamburg and the replacement of him with a left-wing member.60 In Norway, Foss had successfully interfered in a smear campaign of the union leadership against Samsing and his activities in Hamburg.61 Samsing’s efforts paid off; by the end of the year, he had established a 20-members Norwegian sea cell in the Scandinavian Section of the Hamburg Interclub.62
Samsing’s successful activities in Hamburg was fed into the new directives on work among Norwegian – and by extension, Scandinavian – seamen. The key for success was agitation and propaganda conducted by the Interclubs, the directives highlighted. The establishment of new Interclubs in Scandinavian ports was therefore of utmost importance as the sea cells operated in tandem with the Interclubs. The duties of the sea cells was to establish ship cells on board the vessels, to carry out agitation and propaganda campaigns, run courses and organise discussion events as well as to disseminate the ipac-tw journal Den internasjonale transportarbeider and lead international solidarity campaigns. Echoing existing ipac-tw and rilu-directives, the ship cells, in
2.2 Annus Horribilis of 1929 in Copenhagen and Stockholm
The year 1929 opened with a vigorous campaign orchestrated by the newly established rilu Scandinavian Bureau to push for a United Front between Nordic and Russian transport workers’ unions.64 A preliminary agreement for closer cooperation between the unions had been reached at a Scandinavian-Russian conference for maritime transport worker unions in December 1928 that was up for ratification by the national unions in the Nordic countries. The campaign ended in a failure. While the agreement was quickly accepted by the Norwegian and Russian maritime transport workers’ trade unions, first the Swedish and then the Finnish maritime unions declined its ratification.65 Additional negative news soon followed.
The adoption of the ‘Class-Against-Class’-doctrine created a deep rift in the Scandinavian communist parties and trade union fractions in 1929. Several leading members questioned the advisability of a full confrontation with the social democrats; others were not convinced about the ‘ultra-left turn’ of the Comintern and Moscow’s interpretation of the beginning of a Third Period. Confusion followed and by autumn 1929, the communist movement was split in two antagonistic factions. In Sweden the majority of the party members, including all communist Members of Parliament, the communist press as well as most of the communist trade union functionaries had decided to cut their ties with Moscow and established an independent Communist Party under the leadership of Karl Kilbom. The minority rallied behind Hugo Sillén, who became the leader of the Communist Party of Sweden, Section of the Comintern. The split of the Swedish Party was to have grave consequences for the Comintern-loyal minority: They had to build up a new party and trade union apparatus from scratch.66 Similar
The internal chaos in the Scandinavian parties had negative consequences for communist trade union activities. The rilu Scandinavian Bureau in Stockholm ceased its operations, mainly as Sven Linderot devoted his time in the reorganisation of the remaining Comintern-loyal trade union opposition groups in Sweden. The hitherto rather strong position of the communist fractions within (some of) the unions was gone. Instead, there existed three factions within the unions: The ‘reformists’ or social democrats who together with the second faction, the (independent) ‘majority-communists’, dominated the unions, and the Comintern-loyal ‘minority-communists’. This also reflected the state of affairs within in the Swedish maritime transport workers’ unions. Gone were the days when Linderot could claim that the communists had a strong position in the seamen’s and stokers’ unions.68 Foss and Carlsson at the Scandinavian Secretariat must have been frustrated – the erstwhile success of the Stockholm sea cell was nullified; it hardly existed after the split of the party.
Internal frictions, too, shook the Danish Party. Two blocks evolved in 1929, one around party leader Thøger Thøgersen, the other around Aksel Larsen who had recently returned from Moscow and claimed to have the backing of the Comintern. Richard Jensen was deeply engaged in the fight, being a close friend of Thøgersen. However, Jensen was also the key person of the ipact-tw in Denmark. Matters became complicated during spring 1929 when Larsen accused Jensen for mismanagement of funds for operating the Copenhagen Interclub.69
News from Copenhagen had been troubling already at the beginning of 1929. Foss had been informed that the Interclub had moved to new premises but he never received the address of the new location. Foss was puzzled. The connections between the Scandinavian Secretariat in Oslo and the Interclub had been patchy, and Jensen had been continuously late in sending the balances and activity reports of the Interclub to Oslo. Foss knew that Jensen was acting on a “special mandate” from Moscow but was also aware that Jensen had been
Shortly after having notified Moscow, Foss received a report from Einar Nilsen about the state of affairs in Copenhagen. Nilsen reported about the conflict between the two factions in Denmark as well as informed him that the Interclub at Havnegade had been closed and had moved to the backyard of a guesthouse at St. Annæs Plads. He further reported that Jensen – for reasons not stated – had been sent to Hvidøre outside Copenhagen.71 Foss promptly notified Achkanov: The situation in Copenhagen was getting worse every day. Not a word from Jensen; instead, the Danish Party informed Foss that Jensen was accused for having hired an agitator who turned out to be a waiter not knowing anything about the trade unions or the party. The reputation of the ipac-tw and the Interclub was suffering, Foss informed Achkanov, and called for outside intervention to reorganise of activities in Copenhagen.72
Foss received additional information from Copenhagen in early February, one letter each from Jensen and Larsen. Foss replied to Jensen, criticising him for not having sent any balances and reports for the Interclub. In the same vain, he informed him about the accusation brought forward against him. The gravest ones were the claims that Jensen had neglected contacts with the newly established Interclub in Esbjerg and for not informing the “North Sea Secretariat”, i.e., the Hamburg Port Bureau/Albert Walter, about his activities.73 At this point, the soup in Copenhagen was boiling as Larsen claimed that the ipac-tw had nominated him to investigate the accounts of the Interclub.74 Foss was puzzled as none had informed him about Larsen’s intervention. Of utmost importance, Foss assured Achkanov, was to ensure that the position of the communist fraction in the stokers’ union was not jeopardised by the chaos at the Interclub. He even proposed to transfer Arthur Samsing from Hamburg to Copenhagen as interim head of the Interclub.75
The course of events culminated in an in situ examination of the Copenhagen Interclub by Foss and Walter on Wednesday 6 March 1929.76 It
Next, the two comrades inspected the old premises of the Interclub at Havnegade and the new ones at Sankt Annæs Plads. Foss was not impressed by the new premises. The building was a 32-beds hostel with a restaurant. It turned out that the Interclub rented two small rooms in the backyard that were not optimal for its purpose. A private person, who paid 7 percent of its incomes to the Interclub and was supposed to offer six beds in the hostel free of charge to the Interclub, ran the restaurant. Foss and Walter regarded this to be an “unholy” experiment, and suggested that the Interclub bought the whole building and operated the restaurant and hostel by itself. The feasibility of their suggestion was dubious as Foss in the same vein stressed that the ipac-tw was not capable of funding the project.80
The meeting continued the next day. Foss’ and Walter’s auditing had not cleared the air, the situation was tense and soon the quarrel started again. The party representatives demanded to have full insights on the balances of the Interclub and insisted on external instalments for running the Interclub to be paid into the party’s bank account. Foss and Walter rejected the proposal. Instead, they suggested that 1) the leadership of the Interclub was to include two party members, 2) ipac-tw funds were to be controlled by the leader of
The meeting ended in a cul-de-sac. The two emissaries had wanted to reorganise work at the waterfront in Copenhagen and suggested a renovation of the Interclub, the party representatives declined. Walter left Copenhagen on 7 March, Foss remained for another three days. The conflict in Copenhagen deepened and Jensen insinuated that he would leave the party. Thøgersen suggested that the Interclub was to be put under the control of the party, Foss declined and reminded him that the Interclub was controlled by the ipac-tw.82
Further unpleasant news reached Jensen from Moscow during the midst of the conflict. Jensen must have been completely unprepared when Achkanov informed him about the total revision of international operations including the suspension of several journals as well as the liquidation of the Interclubs in Bordeaux and Rotterdam. His activities, too, were to be affected by the reorganisation, informed Achkanov: “We are compelled […] to stop sending materials to several of our International Clubs, the Copenhagen Club included, after March.”83 Nothing more, nothing less. What Jensen did not know at this point was that the ipac-tw headquarters also decided to suspend the transfer of funds to Copenhagen (see further Chapter 4.2.3).
Neither did Foss at this point knew that Moscow planned to liquidate activities in Copenhagen. Instead, he suggested to Achkanov that the Copenhagen Interclub should resume activities “in one way or the other.” Most important, however, was to ensure the continuation of the Interclub in Esbjerg. Being the main Danish North Sea port, operations in Esbjerg were of great strategic importance for the ipac-tw.84 All in vain. In early April, Achkanov informed Foss as well as Jensen about the ultimate decisions made in Moscow: ipac-tw funding for Copenhagen had been suspended. “We trust you will be able to manage to preserve the Club in Copenhagen without our support,” Achkanov assured Jensen,85 well knowing that this would not be the case. Foss immediately informed Thøgersen about the new course of events: Moscow had
Thus ended the operations of the ipac-tw in Copenhagen. Reduced to an office without meeting spaces, the Interclub continued merely as the editing body of its journal Lanternen. Contemporary observers described the situation as pathetic: “Though the Club apparatus at present is not worth anything, there is very favourable objective conditions for work.”87
Figures presented by Achkanov in Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers, Report by Comrade Achkanov, presented at meeting of the Executive Bureau of the rilu, 8.1.1929, 534/5/207, 10, rgaspi. Hereafter: Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929).
As outlined in Die 5. Internationale Konferenz der Revolutionären Transportarbeiter Abgehalten in Moskau im April 1928 (Moskau: Internationales Propaganda- und Aktionskommittee der revolutionären Transportarbeiter, 1928).
“Task of Militant Transport Workers. Resolution Adopted at the Fifth International Conference of Revolutionary Transport Workers, April 5–11, 1928, Moscow, ussr,” Labor Unity 2, no. 8 (September 1928): 2–5.
“Task of Militant Transport Workers,” 2–5.
Mink, “The Marine Transport Industry,” 6.
Mogridge, “Militancy and Inter-Union Rivalries in British Shipping.”
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 18, rgaspi.
Memorandum on ‘The International Seafarer’, 21.4.1925, and J. Bell to Sir Vernon Kell, Report re George Hardy, 12.1.1932, George Hardy personal file, kv 2/2127/2, 21A and 66b, tna.
Instructions from Moscow to nmm [ca. April/1928], 534/5/194, 89, rgaspi.
(Half-burnt) notes by Special Branch etc., 20.8.1928, 19.9.1928, 21.9.1928, George Hardy personal file, kv 2/1027, tna.
[George Hardy,] Tasks and Position of Seamen in the British Shipping Industry [ca. 1928], 534/5/194, 165–168, rgaspi. A (half-burnt) copy of Hardy’s memorandum is filed in George Hardy personal file, kv 2/1027, tna. Hardy’s memorandum was addressed to Achkanov.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht Januar 1928, 534/5/201, 4–7, rgaspi; Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht Mai 1928, 534/5/201, 25–27, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht Juli 1928, 534/5/201, 39–41, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht Oktober 1928, 534/5/201, 73–75, rgaspi.
Achkanov to rilu Secretariat, Moscow 29.9.1928, 534/5/194, 100–106, rgaspi; also Achkamov to Lozovsky, 24.10.1928, 534/5/194, 121–123, rgaspi.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 15, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht November 1928, 534/5/201, 86–87, rgaspi.
Fowler, Japanese and Chinese Immigrant Activists, 76. Hardy’s second term as head of the pptus lasted until April 1930. According to British intelligence sources, Hardy left Britain on 15 December 1928 and was reported to be in Shanghai at least in September and October 1929 and was believed to be on a clandestine mission in Japan in March 1930, see (Half-burnt) notes, dated 15.12.1928, 4.9.1929, 6.10.1929 and 19.3.1930, George Hardy personal file, kv 2/1027, tna.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 13, rgaspi.
Achkanov to rilu on meeting of ipac-tw Secretariat 23.2.1929, 534/5/207, 89, rgaspi.
Georg, Bureau des ipakt, An die Seeleute-Sektion der Einheitsbewegung, an die revolutionären Seeleuteverbände, and die revolutionäre Opposition der Seeleuteverbände aller Länder und an die Internationalen Klubs, 534/5/207, 33–37, rgaspi. The instructions were (at least) sent in German, French and Spanish versions. I have not yet been able to locate the English version of the text; the filed one is an undated draft version but it is likely from its context that it was written in early 1929.
Achkanov to rilu on meeting of ipac-tw Secretariat 23.2.1929, 534/5/207, 89, rgaspi.
Minutes of meeting of Provision Seamen’s Committee, 18.2.1929, 534/5/207, 59–61, rgaspi.
Report on mm work among seamen [undated, probably ca. Mach/April 1929], 534/5/207, 139.
Pedersen, “George Mink,” 310.
George Mink, “The Seamen’s Clubs and the M.W.P.L.,” Labor Unity 2, no. 10 (November 1928): 16–17.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 18, rgaspi.
Pedersen, “George Mink,” 311.
Leonard Emerson, “The Marine Workers Progressive League on the Pacific,” Labor Unity 2, no. 10 (November 1928): 18.
Pedersen, The Communist Party on the American Waterfront, 20.
Pedersen, “George Mink,” 311–313; Pedersen, The Communist Party on the American Waterfront, 21–31.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 14, rgaspi.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 14, rgaspi.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 18, rgaspi.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 11, rgaspi.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 12, rgaspi.
[Achkanov?] to Genosse Max/Berlin [1928], 534/5/194, 78, rgaspi.
Letter [in German] to “Lieber Freund,” no date [ca. January 1929], 534/5/207, 46, rgaspi. The letter was written by someone at the Hamburg Port Bureau/Interclub and was perhaps addressed to the rilu Bureau in Berlin. As it was a response to a message dated 7.1.1929, the letter seems to have been written in January 1929. I have not yet been able to trace the minutes of the July 1928 Hamburg Conference.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 10, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht Oktober 1928, 534/5/201, 73, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht Oktober 1928, 534/5/201, 75, rgaspi.
P.F. 41314, 18.3.29, Albert Walter personal file, kv 2/1799, tna.
“Y”/Port Bureau Hamburg to ipac-tw Secretariat, Hamburg 7.11.1928, 534/5/201, 81, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht November 1928, 534/5/201, 86, rgaspi.
“Tätigkeitsbericht des ipak,” Die 5. Internationale Konferenz der Revolutionären Transportarbeiter.
Leif O. Foss, Utkast til arbeidspan for 1928, Moskva 27.3.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 4. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
Foss to Linderot, Oslo 2.7.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 4. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab; Den skandinaviske faglige partikonference, 21.5.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 4. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
Foss to Linderot, Oslo 25.9.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 4. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
nn [probably Linderot] to Foss, 26.9.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 4. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 14, rgaspi.
Theses of Report on Activities of ipcaa of Transport Workers (8.1.1929), 534/5/207, 11, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Jahresbericht 1929, 534/5/210, 105–111, rgaspi.
Foss to “fraksjonslederne innen transportorganisasjonerne i Skandinavien,” Oslo 20.10.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 4. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
Foss to Linderot, Oslo 31.10.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 4. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
Protocol of Inter-Scandinavian Conference held in Stockholm, 16.11.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 7. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
Jensen, Rapport for aaret 1928, 534/5/211, 16, rgaspi.
Linderot to Foss, Stockholm 31.12.1928, Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti/Vänsterpartiet, Handlingar rörande fackliga frågor, 9. Mapp med diverse handlingar, R/7/F/3, arab.
Foss, Protocol of Scandinavian trade union conference held in Oslo, 14.2.1929, 534/4/291, 7–9, rgaspi.
Foss, Protocol of Scandinavian trade union conference held in Oslo, 14.2.1929, 534/4/291, 7–9, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht Februar 1928, 534/5/201, 12, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht August 1928, 534/5/201, 51, rgaspi; Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht September 1928, 534/5/201, 58, rgaspi.
Internationales Hafenbüro Hamburg, Bericht November 1928, 534/5/201, 86, rgaspi.
Foss, Protocol of Scandinavian trade union conference held in Oslo, 14.2.1929, 534/4/291, 7–9, rgaspi.
Linderot/Scandinavian Bureau of the rilu to Achkanov, Stockholm 19.1.1929, 534/4/291, 19, rgaspi.
See further Weiss, För kampen internationellt!, 97–98, 281.
See further Bernt Kennerström, Mellan två internationaler. Socialistiska Partiet 1929–37 (Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1974); Jan Bolin, Parti av ny typ? Skapande av ett svenskt kommunistiskt parti 1917–1933 (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2004).
See further Einhart Lorenz, Det er ingen sak å få partiet litet. NKP 1923–1931 (Oslo: Pax, 1983); Kurt Jacobsen, Mellem København og Moskva (Copenhagen: Tiden, 1989).
Bernt Kennerström, “Kommunistisk facklig politik 1929–1932,” Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia 1 (1972): 29; Tom Olsson, ”Oppositionen mot socialdemokratin i svensk arbetarrörelse under 30-talet,” Årbog for arbejderbevægelsens historie 6 (1976): 2.
[Handling iv.A.] Komintern. Schematisk uppställning av organisationen och dess underavdelningar, odaterad rapport [Reg. 20.12.41 bw], 20–21, säpo Vol. 169 iv A, sna; Kurt Jacobsen, Aksel Larsen. Stifteren af sf (Copenhagen: Informations forlag, 2010), 107.
Foss to Achkanov, Oslo 11.1.1929, 534/4/291, 10–11, rgaspi.
Einar Nilsen, Report on the Interclub in Copenhagen, no date, 534/4/291, 12, rgaspi.
Foss to Achkanov, Oslo 18.1.1929, 534/4/291, 17, rgaspi.
Foss to Jensen, Oslo 5.2.1929, 534/4/291, 24–25, rgaspi.
Foss to Achkanov, Oslo 6.2.1929, 534/4/291, 23, rgaspi; Foss to “Georg”, i.e. Grigorij Achkanov, Oslo 15.2.1929, 534/4/291, 29, rgaspi.
Foss to “Georg” [Achkanov], Oslo 26.2.1929, 534/4/291, 31–32, rgaspi.
Foss to “George”, Oslo 12.3.1929, 534/4/291, 35 – 37, rgaspi.
nn [Achkanov] to “Dear Friend” [Jensen], no date [Russian original dated 21.3.1929], 534/5/211, 9, rgaspi; Jensen to ipac-tw, Copenhagen 1.4.1929, 534/5/211, 14, rgaspi.
Jensen to ipac-tw, Copenhagen 1.4.1929, 534/5/211, 14, 16, rgaspi.
“Y” [Walter], Bericht über die Besprechung in Kopenhagen, Hamburg 11.3.1929, 534/5/210, 37–38, rgaspi; Foss to “George” [Achkanov], Oslo 12.3.1929, 534/4/291, 35–37, rgaspi.
Foss to “George” [Achkanov], Oslo 12.3.1929, 534/4/291, 35–37, rgaspi.
“Y” [Walter], Bericht über die Besprechung in Kopenhagen, Hamburg 11.3.1929, 534/5/210, 37–38, rgaspi.
Foss to “George” [Achkanov], Oslo 12.3.1929, 534/4/291, 35–37, rgaspi.
nn [Achkanov] to “Dear Friend” [Jensen], no date [Russian original dated 21.3.1929], 534/5/211, 9, rgaspi.
Foss to “George” [Achkanov], Oslo 26.3.1929, 534/4/291, 44–45, rgaspi.
[Achkanov?] to Jensen, no date [April 1929], 534/5/211, 22, rgaspi.
[Foss] to Th. Thøgersen, Oslo 2.4.1929, 534/4/291, 60–61, rgaspi.
Smith to Achkanov, Copenhagen 5.8.1929, 534/5/211, 27, rgaspi.