Is There Genuinely Scientific Progress?
In: On Comparing and Evaluating Scientific TheoriesSearch for other papers by C. Ulises Moulines in
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The traditional notion of scientific progress is too simple-minded and has justifiably been questioned by epistemic relativists. Genuinely scientific progress cannot be explicated as “knowing more about the same things”. History and semantic analysis speak against such an interpretation. However, the epistemic relativist is wrong in inferring from this that the notion of genuinely scientific progress should be abandonned. Using the structuralist metatheory allows for several explications of scientific progress which are both conceptually precise and historically applicable. The core idea is that we may have theoretical incommensurability in the course of scientific development and nevertheless a specifiable structure of comparability at the level of intended applications.