Moral duty is one of the most important concepts in contemporary ethical, political, and ideological debates. Where did this concept come from? According to the prevailing scholarly opinion, it did not exist in ancient Greece and Rome. While the ancients did, of course, have notions of civic, military, and religious obligations, they are thought to have lacked a concept of purely moral duty as well as a deontological (duty-based) system of ethics. When I began the present study, I had no intention of challenging this standard view. I was on the lookout for antecedents to the modern notion of duty in ancient ethics, viz. concepts and arguments that would later influence discussions of moral duty once that concept had arisen. However, my research led me to the conclusion that the ancient Greek and Roman Stoics did, in fact, develop a notion of moral duty as well as a sophisticated deontic ethical theory built around that notion. The deontic aspect of Stoicism has hitherto gone unrecognized mainly because of the paucity and fragmentary nature of the surviving evidence on early Stoicism. This monograph presents a reconstruction of the Stoic theory of duty as well as a comparison of it to modern deontological ethics, as exemplified by Kant.
In investigating the origins of the concept of moral duty, this book necessarily enters debates on philosophical, philological, and historical questions concerning various periods of antiquity and modernity. Such a wide-ranging study would have been impracticable without guidance from numerous scholars with diverse areas of expertise. The book began its life as a dissertation under the direction of Christian Wildberg, to whom I am ever grateful for his wisdom and friendship. My thesis committee members Yelena Baraz and Hendrik Lorenz also provided invaluable guidance and feedback. The dissertation was defended in June 2018 at Princeton University.
In refining the sections on Kant, I benefited from discussions with Desmond Hogan and Alan Kim, who both offered thoughtful comments on my work. Brian Johnson graciously read the sections on moral deliberation and provided useful feedback as well. As I grappled with various interpretations of the Stoic concept of kathêkon, I profited from brief but illuminating conversations with Brad Inwood, Tad Brennan, and Katja Vogt. Manuel Lorenz and Doug Metzger offered helpful comments as well. I also owe many thanks to John Cooper and Ben Morison, who taught me much over the years and offered guidance in the early phases of this project.
I am grateful to everyone who made my time at Princeton—where most of this book was written—stimulating and productive. In the Classics Department, thanks are due especially to Andrew Ford and Marc Domingo Gygax for their mentorship and enduring support. The Seeger Center for Hellenic Studies provided me with generous scholarships that enabled me to attend several philosophy seminars in Greece. Thanks are owed in particular to the Center’s director Dimitri Gondicas for his support. I also want to thank the editors at Brill for their help in publishing this work.
Last but not least, I am grateful to my family. To my wife Alessya for cheering me on throughout the writing process and helping me refine and clarify my arguments. To my sister Katerina for being my friend and teammate throughout life. Above all, I am grateful to my parents, Vladimir and Georgia, who taught me to value the pursuit of truth above all else. This book is dedicated to them with love and gratitude.