1 International Context
The decade leading up to the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II was marked globally by economic turmoil and the rise of radical political movements. The Great Depression that evolved from the US stock market crash of October 1929 caused severe unemployment and poverty in various countries around the globe, especially in the industrialized West. One major ramification was the rise of fascism and militarism, such as in Germany, where under Hitlerâs leadership the Nazis instituted a massive program of economic reconstruction and rearmament to end unemployment. In the Soviet Union, where its direct effects were limited, the Great Depression nevertheless helped Stalin to solidify his authoritarian grip by instituting a system of political repression and state terror. In Asia, Japanese militarists seized control of their national government and invaded Manchuria, Chinaâs resource-rich northeastern lands, where the puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) was established in 1932.
The invasion of Manchuria revealed the ineffectiveness of the recently established League of Nations in pursuing its primary objective of global security and peace. When the league in February 1933 labeled Japan â one of its four original Council members â an aggressor and urged it to remove its troops from Manchuria, Tokyo responded by withdrawing from the league, ignoring its calls. Absorbed in their own affairs, the Western powers refrained from taking any real action to check Japanâs expansionist drift in China, despite growing concerns among the colonial powers, including the Dutch, about the future security of their overseas possessions in Southeast Asia.1 This failure was followed in October 1933 by Germanyâs withdrawal from the World Disarmament Conference, and ultimately from the League of Nations, over disagreement on the issue of disarmament in Europe. The Abyssinian crisis of 1935â36 further underlined the inability of the international community to prevent unilateral use of force. In March 1936, the Nazis began a massive military buildup and remilitarization of the Rhineland in defiance of international agreements. Later that year, Germany and Japan joined hands under the Anti-Comintern Pact, laying the foundation for the future Axis alliance.
1.1 Consolidation of Nationalist Rule in China
In China, the decade between 1927 and 1937 has often been viewed as a relatively stable interlude between the preceding warlord era and the War of Resistance against Japan. Known as the âNanjing Decade,â this period saw the Nationalist government at Nanjing (Nanking) seeking to lay the basis of a modern, unified nation-state through economic reconstruction, modernization, and international cooperation. Nevertheless, this period was also characterized by conflict both domestically and internationally. Civil strife between the Nationalists and Communists continued unabated throughout the entire ten-year period from the collapse of the First United Front in mid-1927 until the formation of the Second United Front in September 1937. It was the era of the Long March, the epic trek by Red Army soldiers across China from 1934 to 1936 that marked the ascent to power of Mao Zedong æ¯æ³½ä¸. This was also the time of the Xiâan Incident, which saw Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi èä»ç³) in late 1936 being kidnapped at gunpoint by his own generals and being forced to accept a truce with the Communists. In the background of these events was the ever-growing Japanese threat, resulting in the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 and subsequent invasion of Manchuria and the attack on Shanghai in 1932.
Amid a massive purge of the Chinese Communists, Chiang Kai-shek established his new Nationalist government at Nanjing on 18 April 1927. In June the next year, after the Northern Expedition had led to the defeat of the Beiyang åæ´ regime, the Nationalists proclaimed Chinaâs unification and announced the relocation of Chinaâs national capital to Nanjing. Despite concerns in diplomatic quarters over the force of the Nationalist movement sweeping across China, the Nanjing government had little difficulty in securing international recognition. In late July, the United States was the first to de jure recognize the Nanjing government by initiating negotiations on a new tariff treaty. The following month, the League of Nations accepted a Nanjing-designated head of the Chinese delegation to the Assembly. On 20 December 1928, Sir Miles W. Lampson, the British minister hitherto accredited to the Beiyang government at Beiping (as the Chinese Nationalists called Beijing), was the first foreign diplomatic envoy to present his credentials to Chiang Kai-shek, who by then had been formally elected as chairman of the Nationalist government.2 Nanjing served as the seat of the central government until its capture by the Imperial Japanese Army in late 1937.
1.2 Crisis years in the Netherlands and Its Overseas Territories
The Great Depression marked the end of a period of economic recovery and optimism in Europe after the end of World War I. The crisis had a severe impact on the Netherlands, where unemployment rates rose to unprecedented levels as deflation spiraled out of control. The situation improved somewhat in 1936, when the Dutch government finally withdrew from the gold standard, though this was soon followed by a second depression. The ongoing economic stagnation caused widespread bankruptcy, impoverishment, and public discontent, which fueled social unrest and aided the rise of national socialism in Dutch politics. Yet not all was doom and gloom during these difficult years. Several major national events helped to boost Dutch pride and international prestige, including the successful enclosure of the Zuiderzee by a 32-kilometer causeway in 1932, the debut of the Dutch football team at the 1934 World Cup tournament in Italy, and the âgoing globalâ of the Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) by the launch of transcontinental airline services to the East and West Indies.
The Dutch colonies were also hit hard by the crisis.3 In the West Indies, the oil refinery industry of Curaçao and Aruba suffered severe setbacks from slumping trade, prompting forced layoffs and general stagnation until the international oil marked began to show signs of recovery in 1934. In Suriname, the effects of the depression were even more disrupting owing to a variety of factors, including plunging exports, large-scale influx of discharged laborers from Curaçao, and ill-advised protectionist measures. Although the nascent bauxite industry somewhat mitigated its adverse effects, the overall economic downturn led to grave unemployment, food shortages, and deepening social tensions. The East Indies, with its strong dependence on exports, likewise suffered badly from the global depression. Sugar exports, accounting for nearly half of Javaâs total exports, had dropped to just 20% of 1920 levels. The rubber, coffee, and tobacco industries struggled to cope with major downward pressure on wages and on tax revenues by the colonial authorities. Recovery was slow in the Indies, in part because of the strong guilder. Bataviaâs response to the resulting social unrest was to suppress the independence movement and arrest several of its figureheads, including Indonesiaâs future national leaders Sukarno and Hatta.
2 Development of Bilateral Ties
Dutch-Chinese bilateral relations saw a relatively steady and overall positive development during the prewar decade, despite Dutch concerns over Chinaâs increasingly assertive Nationalist agenda. On 16 June 1928, the newly formed Nationalist government at Nanjing issued a declaration stating that national unification had been achieved and that the time had come to âput international relations on a new basisâ by replacing the old âunequalâ treaties with new treaties based on equality and mutual respect for sovereignty.4 The following month, Chinaâs Foreign Ministry, led by the seasoned diplomat Wang Zhengting çæ£å»· (C.T. Wang), issued another statement to the 24 diplomatic missions then represented in Beiping, in which he announced several immediate steps to realize these aims.5 Despite the sweeping tone of these statements, they also made clear that the new regime intended to honor existing international agreements and to rely on diplomatic means to bring about the desired change. Reassured somewhat by this approach, the Netherlands, in the footsteps of the major powers, expressed its willingness to engage in talks with the Nationalist government on the revision of bilateral treaty relations.
2.1 Recognition and Treaty Relations
In September 1928, the new government at Nanjing proposed to start negotiations on a new bilateral treaty on customs tariffs as a first step in restoring national sovereignty.6 In late October, the Dutch minister at Beiping, W.J. Oudendijk, upon instructions from The Hague, accepted Wang Zhengtingâs invitation to travel to Nanjing for negotiations. Oudendijkâs visit to the new capital and his official audience with Wang on 31 October marked the tacit but formal recognition of the Chinese Nationalist regime by the Dutch government.7 Following several rounds of negotiations, the new tariff treaty was signed on 19 December 1928.8 Modeled on the US-Chinese accord of July that year, the treaty confirmed Chinaâs exclusive autonomy in all matters related to customs tariffs and abolished all Dutch nonreciprocal rights in this context, subject only to the principle of nondiscrimination (most favored nation). From 1928 to 1930, the Nanjing government concluded similar instruments with 12 other treaty powers. However, owing to delays in the ratification process, the Dutch-Chinese accord was the last to formally enter into effect.9 The exchange of treaty ratifications on 18 November 1930 thus signified the consummation by the Nanjing government of the long-standing Chinese pursuit of restoring tariff autonomy.10
The negotiations had been complicated by Dutch insistence on clarifying and maximizing the scope of the (reciprocal) most-favored-nation clause, which had remained somewhat ambiguous in the American text. Whereas it explicitly protected nationals from both states against tariff discrimination, it was unclear to what extent their respective goods directly fell under its scope. When Oudendijk incidentally discovered that the Sino-French draft treaty proposed by Nanjing contained a nondiscrimination clause conversely covering national products but not necessarily their nationals, he concluded that the Nationalist government was trying to drive a wedge between the foreign powers by creating diverging interests.11 With The Hagueâs endorsement, OudenÂdijk insisted that the Sino-Dutch treaty codify a âdoubleâ nondiscrimination regime which explicitly protected both their respective nationals (regardless of the origin of the goods they imported) and all goods originating from their respective countries (regardless of the nationality of the importer). The Dutch considered this especially important since much of the Indonesian sugar trade was in the hands of Chinese merchants. Despite indignant resistance from Nanjing, Oudendijk ultimately had his way once he successfully convinced his British counterparts to take a similar stance in their negotiations.12
At the same time, the Dutch government began to implement steps toward abolishing its extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. In February 1930, the Dutch consul general at Shanghai signed an agreement with China and four other powers which effectively ended a nearly eight-decade-old unilateral practice of extraterritorial involvement in Chinese court proceedings in the Shanghai International Settlement.13 Fourteen months later, in April 1931, Oudendijk and Wang signed a bilateral treaty at Nanjing that provided for the future abolition of Dutch consular jurisdiction and legal immunity in China.14 According to this treaty, Dutch subjects in China would automatically become amenable to Chinese laws as soon as all the other powers had formally abrogated their extraterritorial rights and under terms identical to those to be negotiated by the major powers.15 As set out in chapter 4, which deals in extenso with the abolition of extraterritoriality, the treaty reflected a preemptive move on the part of The Hague to safeguard its interests in China by free riding on future efforts by the United States and Britain, which seemed increasingly reluctant to support a collective front among the treaty powers.16
Another key event signifying the readjustment of Dutch-Chinese bilateral relations during the prewar period was the decision by the Dutch government to remit its remaining claim in the Boxer indemnity. As early as 1919, shortly upon assuming his office in China, Minister Oudendijk had started to look for suitable ways to return the outstanding Dutch claims under the Boxer indemnity to China. Though progress was slow, these efforts continued and were eventually completed under Oudendijkâs successor, Willem J.R. Thorbecke. On 4 April 1933, diplomatic notes were exchanged at Nanjing which stipulated that up to 65% (worth about Ð7.2 million in todayâs currency) of the remaining balance of the indemnity as from 1 January 1926, after some deduction for the settlement of other debts, would be used for joint water conservancy work in China and up to 35% (ca. Ð3.8 million) would be devoted to bilateral cooperation and exchange in the cultural and educational domains.17 As will be elaborated in detail in the next chapter, the accord of 1933 created an unprecedented, mutually beneficial framework for bilateral cooperation and Dutch-Chinese exchange in the fields of science, education, and culture.
The Dutch âChina policyâ during the Nanjing Decade did not fundamentally differ from those of the major powers. None of these powers were truly interested in changing the status quo (by abolishing the system of extraterritoriality) or checking Japanese transgressions in China (by imposing sanctions on Tokyo), and the Netherlands had little reason to be an exception. In line with its traditional policy of aloofness, the Dutch government observed strict neutrality with regard to the Manchurian Incident, refraining from taking sides during the league deliberations on the matter.18 Privately, Dutch policy observers were less impartial. On the one hand, they were concerned about Tokyoâs aggressive political and economic expansionism in the Asian Pacific region, while on the other, they welcomed the Manchurian Incident as a diversion of Japanese attention away from the Dutch East Indies and as a tool for curbing the increasingly assertive Chinese government.19 The Dutch calculated that in these circumstances Nanjing would be too preoccupied and too weak internationally to effectively push for abolition of extraterritoriality in China or for improvement of the legal status of overseas Chinese in the Indies.
This policy of âkeeping on friendly terms with Japan on account of the Indies,â as the American minister in The Hague described it, prevented the Dutch government from extending a helping hand to China.20 In early 1932, when Japan launched its attack on downtown Shanghai, the Chinese government appealed to the Netherlands and other signatory states of the Nine-Power Treaty (which had affirmed Chinaâs sovereignty and territorial integrity) to honor their pledges and halt Japanese encroachments on China. The cautious Dutch response, however, was that it would await the outcome of the deliberations of the League of Nations at Geneva.21 A similar reply was given later that year when Nanjing asked The Hague to protest Tokyoâs plans to extend diplomatic recognition to the puppet state of Manzhouguo. Again, the Dutch response was simply to refer to the pending league proceedings, claiming that unilateral, parallel action would only confuse matters.22 Behind the scenes, however, both in The Hague and in Batavia, concerns were growing that Tokyoâs expansionist policies might spark a âsecond Manchurian incidentâ in the Dutch East Indies.23
2.2 Military Ties and Dutch Naval Presence in Chinese Waters
Unlike the major powers, the Netherlands had not maintained any official military presence in China after the dissolution of the Dutch legation guard at Beijing in 1923.24 During the tumultuous decades of civil strife, Dutch warships visited China on several occasions. In 1911, at the height of the Xinhai Revolution that overthrew the imperial dynasty, the protected cruiser HMS Holland was sent to Shanghai nominally to protect Dutch interests but primarily to uphold Dutch prestige in China.25 In March 1920, the Dutch coastal defense ships HMS Marten Harpertszoon Tromp and HMS Hertog Hendrik called at Nanjing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong as part of a four-month âshowing-the-flagâ tour.26 In early 1927, as Nationalist and Communist soldiers of the Northern Expedition were advancing to the Jiangsu region, the HMS Sumatra, a âspeedy, modern and well armedâ cruiser, was deployed from the Dutch East Indies to Shanghai to defend Dutch citizens there against rioting and looting.27 While British and American gunboats bombarded the city, a party of 100 Dutch marines joined the foreign landing operations in Shanghaiâs commercial quarters.28 In May, the Dutch cruiser returned to its home base at Surabaya, but a warship was maintained on standby in East Indian waters at the instigation of the Dutch War Ministry for deployment at all times within 24 hours in case of emergencies in China.29
In December 1928, the Dutch East Indies flagship HMS Java called at Shanghai on its return voyage from Japan, where it had attended a naval review as part of the coronation ceremonies for Emperor Hirohito.30 Oudendijk especially relished this âsplendid opportunity to display a large and fully modern Dutch warship in Chinaâs foremost trade port.â31 The Dutch minister had originally hoped to seize this opportunity by making his first journey to the new capital Nanjing aboard the cruiser. Inspired by the example set by his French and British colleagues, he intended to maximize Dutch national prestige on the eve of the kickoff of the tariff treaty negotiations, which also marked the official Dutch recognition of the Nationalist government. When this turned out to be infeasible, the second-best plan was for the cruiser to steam to Nanjing by the end of the month in time for the commander in chief of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Naval Forces, Rear Admiral A. ten Broecke Hoekstra, to attend the grand military parade and the New Yearâs reception of the Nationalist government there. To Oudendijkâs great disappointment, this plan too had to be abandoned, as a problem with the shipâs turbines prevented it from leaving Shanghai in time. As a result, the rear admiral, accompanied by the Javaâs commanding captain, A.F.H. Dalhuysen, and an adjutant, ended up making the trip to Nanjing by train.
Despite these setbacks, the Dutch nevertheless rated the Javaâs China sojourn positively. According to Rear Admiral Hoekstra, the official visit had demonstrated Dutch âfriendly intentionsâ vis-à -vis the new Chinese government, symbolized by the exchange of cannon salutes at the Wusong forts, north of Shanghai.32 In Shanghai, they had had cordial meetings with several high-level military officials, including the vice-minister of the navy and first fleet commander, Vice Admiral Chen Jiliang éå£è¯, as well as the Shanghai garrison commander, General Xiong Shihui çå¼è¾. In Nanjing, they had been received by Chinaâs supreme commander, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Among the senior civil officials who had entertained them during their stay in China were the foreign minister, Wang Zhengting; the head of the Foreign Ministryâs Shanghai bureau, Chen Shiguang éä¸å ; and the commissioner of foreign affairs for Jiangsu Province, Jin Wensi éé®æ³ (Wunsz King), a talented young diplomat who was to serve later as the first Chinese ambassador to the Netherlands.33 On 4 January, after a last official lunch aboard the ship, the Java departed Shanghai for Hong Kong. Oudendijk concluded that the Dutch flag had been shown âin a dignified mannerâ and looked forward to the next such occasion.34
An interesting detail of the Java visit was that Oudendijk had sought â and secured â prior authorization from Chinese authorities for the planned calls at Chinese ports. Although this conformed to then-prevailing public international law norms, it was specifically not required at the time â nor customary â within the Chinese context.35 Under the unequal treaties â specifically, in the Dutch case, Article 13 of the 1863 Dutch-Chinese Treaty of Tianjin (which was modeled on Article 52 of the 1858 Sino-British treaty) â foreign ships were at liberty to visit any port in China. However, aware of the deep-seated resentment in China of this relic of the days of âgunboatâ diplomacy, the Dutch foreign minister â who as former minister in China had extensive experience in Chinese affairs â had instructed his envoy in Beiping to solicit prior permission. Oudendijk concurred with this more accommodating line, though mostly for tactical reasons: Chinese newspapers had recently reported of government plans to dispatch ships across the âSouth Seasâ on âshowing-the-flagâ missions, and in case these ships might some day appear at Indonesian ports for propaganda missions, Oudendijk reasoned, it would be easier to convince the Chinese to observe international law if the Dutch had done the same in China.36
Oudendijkâs considerate attitude may perhaps have been a contrived one, informed and justified mainly by strategic concerns, but there were other signs that the Dutch were coming to grips with the end of the gunboat era in China. In February 1930, the Dutch consul general at Hong Kong, M.J. Quist, expressed disagreement with the suggestion raised by the Dutch consul at Shantou â a retired naval officer â to respond to reported piracy in Chinese waters by dispatching Dutch warships to Chinese ports. In a letter to the Dutch acting head of mission in Beiping, Quist admitted that Dutch commercial interests had previously benefited from the presence of British warships in Chinese waters, but he nevertheless thought that a visit to China by a Dutch fleet was inadvisable âin the present age.â37 Such visits, he opined, would be interpreted by the Chinese as a show of force undermining the Nationalist governmentâs mission to end the extraterritorial system. Only when all the powers had surrendered their extraterritorial rights and had entered into new, equal treaties, Quist concluded, would such visits be interpreted as reflecting amicable intent.
There are no surviving records of the position of the Dutch embassy or the Foreign Ministry on the matter. Judging from the general spirit of the surviving archives of this time, however, it is unlikely that Quistâs âprogressiveâ ideas represented the majority view in Dutch government circles at the time or that dissenters to his views would have been limited to naval and military circles only. Nevertheless, in February 1931, the Dutch minister of defense, at the behest of his colleague in the Ministry of Colonies, moved to rescind the 1928 standing order that required the Dutch East Indies naval forces to keep a warship on standby for immediate deployment to China. After consultation with Oudendijk, the Dutch foreign minister consented to the repeal of the instruction. Although the request from the Ministry of Colonies had been informed merely by a shortage of available warships in the Indies for training purposes, the repeal nevertheless marked a permanent change in Dutch policies on China. From this point onward, the idea of sending Dutch âgunboatsâ to Chinese waters for purposes of showing the flag was no longer entertained.
Nevertheless, there were to be two more instances of Dutch warships appearing in Chinese ports. In both cases, however, this took place in the context of an international crisis that threatened to necessitate immediate evacuation of foreign citizens. The first such instance was during the Shanghai Incident of January 1932, when Japanese carrier aircraft bombed the city and heavy fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops erupted across several districts surrounding the foreign concessions. In February, the Dutch East Indies navy dispatched the destroyer HMS Van Galen to Shanghai, thereby following the example of the major powers who maintained warships in China.38 OudenÂdijkâs successor, Willem J.R. Thorbecke, emphasized that this was not a showing-the-flag tour, which would have been âinappropriate under the current conditions,â but that Van Galenâs assignment was limited to protection and potential evacuation of Dutch citizens.39 The destroyer left Shanghai in late April, as peace talks were still ongoing. In August 1937, following the outbreak of full-fledged war between China and Japan, the Van Galen was sent to Shanghai once again to protect Dutch citizens and property.40 The destroyer returned to Surabaya in mid-November as Japanese forces took control of the city.
Meanwhile, rumors of Chinese plans to send a naval flotilla around the South Pacific had resurfaced several times since Oudendijk had first reported them in 1928. These rumors gained traction in the course of the Fifth National Congress of the Guomindang, which opened in Nanjing in November 1935. According to reports early the next year, the Committee of Overseas Affairs was fine-tuning plans with the navy to dispatch two cruisers, the Hai Ning æµ·å® and the Hai Yung 海容, to multiple countries to âconsoleâ Chinese immigrants there.41 These reports caused considerable unease among Dutch administrators in Indonesia, who harbored a deep-seated distrust of Chinese âconsolationâ (vertroosting) and propaganda efforts aimed at overseas Chinese in the Indies. In anticipation of possible visits by Chinese warships, the East Asian Affairs Office (Dienst der Oost-Aziatische Zaken) in Batavia â a de facto intelligence agency focusing on Chinese affairs â drew up secret guidelines, which were approved by the Departments of Marine Affairs and Justice and by the High Court of Justice.42 In May 1937, the draft guidelines were filed away after the Chinese government had once again canceled the proposed visit.43
2.3 Economic Relations
As we saw in the introduction, economic and commercial interests have traditionally formed a mainspring of Dutch-Chinese bilateral ties. This was certainly true for the period reviewed in this chapter. During the 1930s, economic relations between the Netherlands and China mostly centered on Dutch investments in China and international trade. Although actual trade and investment figures for this period are unimpressive, the prospect of economic growth during the prewar years did spark renewed optimism and enthusiastic attempts to promote economic relations. These bilateral trade and investment activities have previously been analyzed and, as a field of independent inquiry, fall outside the scope of the present study.44 It does, however, serve the purpose of this study to have a general understanding of these economic relations and the importance attached to them in the context of regional politics and official Dutch-Chinese dealings at the time.
As was the case for the other powers, Dutch investment in China during the prewar period mainly comprised direct investments, although Dutch holdings of Chinese obligations â mainly loans for the Longhai Railway â also figured prominently at a certain point during the early 1930s.45 In 1931, the total value of Dutch investment, including that of transnational joint ventures and affiliates, amounted to an estimated 54.2 million US dollars.46 Indirect investments in Chinese treasury notes (including interest in arrears) made up around one-third of this number, the remainder representing direct business investment. The total Dutch investment in China accounted for about 1.5% of all foreign investment in China, amounting to 3.2 billion US dollars in 1931.47 Apart from Britain, Japan, Russia, the United States, and France â whose combined investments in China accounted for more than 92% of the total annual number â Germany and Belgium also had markedly larger economic stakes in China than the Netherlands. From the Dutch perspective too, business interests in China overall were relatively insignificant, representing only 2.6% of worldwide Dutch foreign direct investment at the time.48 When including direct investments in Dutch overseas colonies in the denominator (i.e., treating these as foreign investments), this percentage would be even much lower.
In line with the general trend, Dutch investments in China concentrated mainly on industries associated with foreign trade, such as shipping, banking, and infrastructure construction. Dutch companies active in China during this period included the Java-China-Japan Line shipping company; the Royal Dutch Shell petroleum company (a British-Dutch joint venture operating in China as the Asiatic Petroleum Company, or APC); two early predecessors of the ABN AMRO Bank, namely, the Dutch Trading Society (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij) and the Dutch Indies Trading Bank (Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank); and two infrastructure construction companies: the Dutch Harbor Construction Company (Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor Havenwerken), engaged in dredging and harbor construction at Huludao and Lianyungang, and the Dutch China Syndicate (Nederlandsch Syndicaat voor China), engaged in construction of the Longhai Railway.49 Only two Dutch firms had their own production facilities in China: Royal Dutch Shell manufactured candles; Unilever, soap and food. Along with Philips, the electronics manufacturer, they were also the most important Dutch distributing companies active in China. Jointly, these eight companies accounted for virtually the entire amount of Dutch foreign direct investment in China.50 Although technically they were independent private companies, there were various organizational, operational, and personal cross-links, and they maintained close contacts with Dutch consular representatives in China.
Several Dutch firms were involved in trade between China and the Netherlands Indies and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. Despite Chinaâs reputation for having little interest in foreign goods, Chinaâs foreign trade actually featured a significant deficit during the 1930s. In 1934, Chinese imports from the Dutch East Indies represented a little over 6% of all Chinese imports.51 By far the most important Dutch export commodity was sugar, with China and Hong Kong jointly accounting for 20% of Indonesian sugar exports in the mid-1930s.52 The two Dutch banks mentioned earlier each had major interests in the sugar plantations of Java, while the transport of unrefined sugar also was a traditional pillar of the Java-China-Japan Lineâs shipping business. Other goods imported from the Dutch colony included refined petroleum, rattan, and foods. But the size of these trade flows was unimpressive. Chinese imports from the Indies consistently lagged behind Chinese imports from British dominions in Southeast Asia, while they accounted for only 2.5% of all Indonesian exports during the mid-1930s.53 Chinese exports to the Indies, mainly silk, tobacco products, tea, and rice, amounted to a mere 1.3% of total Chinese exports and represented only a fraction of Indonesian imports.
Direct trade between China and the Netherlands during this period was even less spectacular. Chinese exports to the Netherlands, mainly soybeans, peanuts, and vegetable oils, accounted for approximately 2.7% of all Chinese exports and 1.4% of total Dutch imports for 1934.54 Moreover, a relatively large share of these export flows originated from Manchuria, Chinaâs northeastern provinces then under Japanese control.55 Still less significant were Chinese imports from the Netherlands (mainly chemicals, dairy products, and flour), which in 1934 represented as little as 0.7% of total Chinese imports and 0.3% of total Dutch exports.56 By comparison, Germanyâs share in Chinaâs total imports was about 10 times larger, while even that of Belgium nearly tripled the Dutch figure.57 On the other hand, the small deficit in the Dutch trade with China during these years was more than compensated by the surplus in the Netherlands East Indies trade with China.
These data show there was still ample space for development of mutual economic relations. As we will see in later sections, both the Dutch and the Chinese diplomatic missions attached great importance to promoting trade relations and seeking ways to unlock this potential at a time when Chinaâs economic development and financial credibility were showing promising improvements.58 With 400 million potential customers, the virtually unlimited Chinese market held tempting prospects for the Dutch, who were looking to escape the clutches of the Great Depression and to boost economic development both in the Netherlands and in the Indies. The Chinese, on the other hand, faced with the enormous task of national economic reconstruction, found themselves in constant and urgent need of technology and capital investment and were eager to open up new markets to attract foreign investment. In short, more than at any time before, both sides were keen to forge closer economic relations.
Against this general backdrop, the director of economic affairs of the Netherlands East Indies government, Dr. George H.C. Hart, visited China in the spring of 1935 to study economic conditions and opportunities for enhancing bilateral trade. Though he traveled in a private capacity, his trip was hailed in China as an official goodwill visit, and his short stay in Chinaâs leading cities was packed with meetings with senior government leaders and business representatives.59 Hart returned to Batavia favorably impressed by the development of Chinaâs light industry but also alarmed about Japanâs deep economic and political penetration into China. In his reports to Batavia and The Hague he emphasized that, for the Netherlands to maintain a position in Asia, economic ties with China should be deepened forthwith and imports from China should be increased to balance Indonesian exports to China. This would have the double benefit of increasing economic interdependence between China and the Indies (by readjusting the trade balance in Chinaâs favor) while also reducing Indonesian imports from Japan. Hart furthermore advocated the appointment of an official Dutch trade representative in China, a suggestion which found a ready response in The Hague and was realized the following year.60
Hartâs trip helped to boost optimism in the Indies about developing economic relations with China. In July, the Dutch East Indies colonial authorities established a Commission for Trade Relations with China charged with the task of investigating and advising on the possibilities for promotion of trade with China.61 Its members included Dutch officials and trade experts along with a number of Chinese and Indonesian representatives, while several Chinese experts were later added at the suggestion of the Chinese consul in Batavia. The Chinese government welcomed the initiative and soon announced the appointment of a Chinese Ministry of Industry representative in the Dutch Indies.62 The outcome of these initiatives is unclear, as the relevant archives end rather abruptly in 1937.63 The last-included files pertain to a brief stopover in China of an East Indies trade delegation on its way to Tokyo to negotiate a Japanese-Indies trade agreement.64 In Nanjing the delegation exchanged views with representatives of the Ministry of Industry on possible ways to increase Chinese export flows to the Indies, including that of cotton cloth for the Javanese batik industry.65 But these and other exploratory initiatives were prematurely aborted as a result of impending war.66
3 Dutch Official Representation in China
A distinct feature of the prewar organization of the Dutch foreign service was the strict separation of the diplomatic, consular, and interpreter branches, each with its own specific duties, hierarchy, and status.67 Within this system, the diplomats â often drawn from prominent Dutch nobility â were offered salaries or reimbursements to represent Dutch state interests and maintain political contacts abroad. Consular officers, on the other hand, were responsible for promoting Dutch trading and shipping interests at foreign ports or major cities, as well as exercising administrative and judicial powers over Dutch subjects (often businessmen and seamen) there. Initially, they were typically merchants who accepted an unsalaried position as consul to enhance their social status and promote their own business interests. Gradually, these honorary consuls were replaced by full-time career consuls, who had completed vocational training and passed the official exams.68 The interpreter service comprised a pool of academically trained linguists (mostly Sinologists and Japanologists) who served on a rotating basis as interpreter-secretaries at various diplomatic posts in China and Japan.69 After the war, these three services would be reorganized and eventually merged into a single foreign service.
In the 1930s, the three services included about 95 members, scattered around the various embassies and consulates overseas.70 Together with the departmental staff in The Hague, consisting of around 85 civil servants, they were part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Political responsibility rested with the minister of foreign affairs, who was aided in his daily executive tasks by the secretary-general, the ministryâs highest-ranking civil servant. The two successive ministers of foreign affairs during the prewar decade were F. Beelaerts van Blokland (1927â1933), a career diplomat who had previously served as the Dutch minister plenipotentiary to China, and A.C.D. de Graeff (1933â1937), another prominent diplomat who had previously headed the Dutch diplomatic missions in Tokyo and Washington and served as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies. During the crisis years of the 1930s, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs suffered from several budget cuts, resulting in notable reductions of departmental staff and the number of overseas posts.
3.1 Dutch Diplomatic Representation in China
As noted in the introduction, the establishment of Dutch diplomatic representation in China in the late 19th century basically followed the example set by Britain and the other major powers. Throughout the first decades of the 20th century, the foreign diplomatic body in Beijing did not undergo substantial change in either makeup or function. Though several other countries established a presence in China, these newcomers represented a fairly minor part of the foreign establishment.71 As before, foreign influence in China remained concentrated in the hands of the major powers: Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, and â after the establishment of Sino-Soviet ties â the Soviet Union. The dominance of these powers was reflected in the size of their diplomatic posts: the combined staffs of these seven missions in the mid-1930s accounted for nearly 85% of all foreign service officers in China, with an average number of more than 20 accredited diplomats on their respective staffs.72 The Dutch legation, comprising some five or six diplomatic officers on average, effectively headed the âsecond leagueâ of the 14 smaller powers then represented in China.73 Unlike the major powers, who successively upgraded their diplomatic missions to embassies during this period, these nonmajor powers, for the time being, continued to be represented at the level of legations.74
The first Dutch minister to be accredited to the Nationalist government at Nanjing was Willem J. Oudendijk. He first arrived in Beijing in 1894, as a student-interpreter to the first permanent Dutch diplomatic representative in China, Jan Ferguson. One of the earliest of his many unique experiences in China, as related in his informative memoirs, was witnessing the grand-scale celebration of the sixtieth birthday of Empress Dowager Cixi.75 After 13 years in China, Oudendijk was recalled to the Netherlands in 1907 to serve as secretary of the Second Peace Conference at The Hague. Following a stint in Saint Petersburg, he returned to Beijing in 1908 as counselor and de facto head of the Dutch legation. In 1910, he was appointed Dutch minister to Persia (Iran). Next, Oudendijk was sent on a special mission to the Dutch East Indies, before returning to Russia to serve as senior Dutch envoy in Petrograd (Saint Petersburg). On the eve of the May 4th Movement, Oudendijk was again sent to China, this time as the most senior Dutch envoy accredited to the Beiyang government, presenting his credentials on 27 March 1919.76 Four years later, Oudendijk became the doyen of the foreign diplomatic corps in China, a position he filled for eight years until he left China for good in May 1931.77
Since the late 19th century, the foreign diplomatic corps in Beijing had been organized under the rotating presidency of a doyen, a position typically filled by the diplomat with the longest term in China as his countryâs senior envoy. Following the Boxer Protocol of 1901, the foreign diplomatic body in Beijing exerted full control over the administration and protection of the new Legation Quarter, which had become a virtual microstate for foreigners in China: a âcity within a cityâ of European-style compounds fortified, policed, and defended by foreign troops rejecting any Chinese authority. The doyen of the diplomatic body served as the âsecretary-generalâ of this de facto coalition, in a way similar to how the senior consuls operated in the international concessions of Chinaâs treaty ports. Although after World War I, the diplomatic body had begun to show signs of disintegration and proved increasingly incapable of maintaining a united front in its dealings with the Chinese government, it nevertheless continued to function until the dissolution of the extraterritorial system during World War II.78 The official archives of this international body, covering the period from 1891 to 1943, were transferred to the Netherlands after the war and are currently preserved by the Netherlands National Archives in The Hague.79
As described in the previous section, Oudendijkâs arrival in Nanjing in the fall of 1928 to negotiate a new tariff treaty marked the de jure recognition by the Dutch government of the Chinese Nationalist government at Nanjing. As far as can be known from the surviving archives, the Dutch minister never formally presented his credentials to the new government following this tacit recognition. Possibly this was considered unnecessary, as the new government had legally succeeded the previous one, assuming the latterâs rights and obligations as its own. In his capacity as the senior envoy and doyen, OudenÂdijk represented the foreign diplomatic body in May 1929 at Sun Yat-senâs reinterment in the new mausoleum at Nanjing. Rare surviving footage documents how the diplomats, appointed by their respective governments en mission spéciale, took a specially chartered âministersâ trainâ from the Qianmen station in Beiping to the new capital.80 Following audiences with Wang Zhengting and Chiang Kai-shek, the envoys were taken to the Nationalist Party headquarters, where Oudendijk placed a wreath in front of Sun Yat-senâs bronze coffin and delivered a eulogy in French and then again in Chinese in honor of Chinaâs first president. On the day of the reinterment, the envoys, dressed in full diplomatic uniform, braved the âmercilessâ heat to join the two-mile procession to the mausoleum.81
Dutch diplomatic staff in the Republic of China, 1927
| Name | Rank | Location | Address |
| W.J. Oudendijk 欧ç»ç§ | Minister ç¹å½å ¨æå ¬ä½¿ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| W.F.L. van Bylandtæ¯å °å¾· | Second secretaryäºçç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| T.H.J. de Josselin de Jong åæéº | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| A.E. Abellé¿åç½ | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
Having served most of his career in China, including twelve years as the Dutch senior envoy, Oudendijk left Chinese soil for the last time in May 1931, days after the signing of a bilateral treaty promising the end of Dutch extraterritorial rights.82 Appointed as his successor was Willem J.R. Thorbecke, a grandson of the illustrious J.R. Thorbecke, the Dutch âFather of the Constitutionâ and three-time prime minister. In late February, Oudendijk requested agrément from the Chinese government for the appointment of his successor-designate.83 After official consent was granted, Thorbeckeâs appointment was formalized in June.84 Soon afterward, he embarked on the long voyage from Marseille to China via the Dutch East Indies.85 Arriving in China in September, the new envoy presented his credentials to President Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing on the 26th.86 Days later, Thorbecke proceeded to Beiping to take up permanent residence in the Dutch diplomatic compound, which consisted of six large houses, an empty barracks, a tennis court, garages, a large stable, and huge, well-kept gardens. Thorbeckeâs eldest son, in his private memoirs, recalled that it took them weeks to get accustomed to the place.87
Although Nanjing had been firmly established as Chinaâs capital for years, the members of the foreign diplomatic body had been reluctant to move their respective missions there. Ignoring repeated calls by the Nationalist government, the majority of the foreign legations stayed in the Legation Quarter in Beiping, while those who did decide to move south preferred Shanghai over Nanjing as their new domicile. From 1930 onward, the Nationalist government sought to accelerate the transfer of the foreign legations to Nanjing by legalizing perpetual land lease, securing and appropriating land, and initiating construction work on future legation sites there.88 But the foreign powers remained undeterred. By late 1935, when Nanjing had been Chinaâs internationally recognized capital for more than seven years, only the Soviet Union and Germany had officially moved their embassies there.89 Of the 18 other diplomatic missions in China, 10 were still domiciled in Beiping, while the other 8 had shifted their headquarters to Shanghaiâs foreign quarters.90 Preferring their traditional strongholds over a new site in the capital, the foreign envoys confined their presence in Nanjing to infrequent courtesy calls, while some posted personal liaison officers there.
Like his predecessor and many of his fellow envoys, Thorbecke maintained his formal residence and office at Beiping.91 In November 1934, he appointed secretary-interpreter Hendrik Bos as his personal representative in Nanjing.92 By December, Bos had found temporary lodgings in the capital near the ancient Drum Tower, while construction of a modern-style residence had begun in an undeveloped area of town on present-day Guangzhou Lu.93 In subsequent years, this area was turned into a small diplomatic quarter that would also house the American and Italian diplomatic missions. The new Dutch residence was located at a very suitable spot at the foot of a hill, as recorded by the world-renowned Dutch Sinologist Professor J.J.L. Duyvendak, who visited the house in the summer of 1935 when construction had just been completed.94 In late July, a three-year lease contract was signed.95 On 1 August, Bos moved into his brand-new residence at no. 3 Dong Guashi ä¸çå¸.96 The house was big enough to serve simultaneously as lodgings for the Dutch minister during his frequent trips to Nanjing.97
Eager to complete his predecessorâs unfulfilled task, Thorbecke ambitiously set to work to formalize the remission of the remaining Dutch share in the Boxer indemnity. In September 1931, the Dutch envoy caught Wang Zhengting by surprise by raising the matter during their first meeting even before he had presented his credentials and formally assumed his post.98 He even had the complete files on the matter shipped over from the legation in Beiping to Nanjing so as to facilitate discussions on the matter.99 As will be described in detail in the next chapter, Thorbecke would be instrumental in forging a historic accord in April 1933 providing for the formal remission of the remaining Dutch Boxer claim and the appropriation of these funds for bilateral cooperation in the fields of science and culture. Thorbecke was also the driving force behind several new initiatives concerning economic cooperation between the Netherlands and China, including the creation of an international trade consortium involving various Dutch companies.100 Despite these noble efforts and some initial success, however, Thorbeckeâs diplomatic career ended prematurely in 1935.
The reason for this abrupt and dramatic ending was his extramarital affair with Ellen Catleen-Kolban, a married Jewish woman with whom he had become acquainted in Berlin when he served as legation secretary there in the late 1920s. After Thorbeckeâs reassignment to China, Catleen followed him, basing herself at Shanghai as a reporter and photographer.101 Before long, she moved to Beiping, where the pair caused a stir within the diplomatic community when Catleen stayed at Thorbeckeâs official residence while his wife was in Europe.102 She also showed up at Beidaihe (Peitaho), a seaside resort where many foreign diplomats preferred to spend the summer months. This âunrestrainedâ behavior drew stern criticism from Foreign Minister A.C.D. de Graeff. Despite his superiorâs repeated warnings, however, Thorbecke continued his controversial relationship with Catleen. He even provided her with lodgings in the former Austro-Hungarian legation, which at that time was still under the temporary care of the Dutch legation.103 This led De Graeff in February 1935 to recall Thorbecke. The latter was given to understand that if he refused to terminate his relationship with Catleen, his official career would end.104 In June, Thorbecke and Catleen married in Prague. Thorbecke left the foreign service, taking up a commercial job with the Dutch electronics company Philips in Hong Kong.105
Dutch diplomatic staff in the Republic of China, 1934â1935
| Name | Rank | Location | Address |
| W.J.R. Thorbeckeæå¹å | Minister ç¹å½å ¨æå ¬ä½¿ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| H.P.J. Bosch van Drakesteiné¾æ´æ | Secretaryç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| T.H.J. de Josselin de Jong åæéº | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| A.E. Abellé¿åç½ | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| H. Boså æ¯ | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Nanjingå京 | No. 3 Dong Guashiä¸çå¸ 3 å· |
As Thorbecke left China to go on a home leave during the last days of March 1935, he entrusted the Dutch legation to the care of Secretary Bosch van DrakeÂstein.106 Several weeks later, it was announced in Nanjing that Thorbecke would not return and that his place would be taken by Baron G.W. de Vos van Steenwijk.107 A scion of an old noble family from the eastern part of the Netherlands with a law degree from Leiden, De Vos van Steenwijk had joined the foreign service in 1917 and had held diplomatic posts in Bulgaria, the United States, Turkey, Paris, and Rome. Between 1929 and 1931, he had briefly served at the Chinese legation as secretary under Oudendijk, filling in for his superior as chargé dâaffaires ad interim on several occasions during the latterâs absence.108 In early 1932, De Vos van Steenwijk was transferred to the Dutch legation in Berlin, where he served as counselor until his appointment as minister in Beiping. Formal consent was granted by Nanjing in April 1935. In June, De Vos van Steenwijk and his wife set out on their long voyage to the Far East.109
After a brief stopover in the Dutch East Indies, the couple arrived at Shanghai in the early morning of 11 August aboard the Java-China-Japan Lineâs SS Tjinegara. Among the people welcoming them at the docks in Shanghai were the retiring Dutch consul general, Frans E.H. Groenman; the director of the Shanghai office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yu Ming ä½é; and a municipal representative by the name of Tang Shixuan å士ç .110 In the afternoon of 13 August, the Dutch career diplomat boarded a wagon-lits express train for the seven-hour trip to Nanjing, where he had a meeting the next afternoon with Political Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Xu Mo.111 A tea reception was hosted that evening at the Dutch residence, which was attended by several Chinese officials and foreign diplomats. De Vos van Steenwijk left the capital for Shanghai the following day en route to Beiping.112 After an eventful train journey, during which a thief posing as a Chinese official robbed De Vos van Steenwijk of his crocodile-leather pocketbook, he arrived safely in Beiping, where he took up his residence at the Dutch legation in late August.113
De Vos van Steenwijk was one of three new foreign envoys to present his credentials in September to the then chairman of the Nationalist government, President Lin Sen æ森.114 On the 14th, De Vos van Steenwijk embarked on his southbound journey, traveling by ship from Tianjin rather than by train in light of the âprecarious conditionâ of the railroad connection owing to flaring hostilities between central government troops and the Communist Red Army.115 Three days later, De Vos van Steenwijk arrived in Nanjing, accompanied by his wife and legation secretary M.W. van Weede, who had recently replaced Bosch van Drakestein.116 The following day the Dutch envoy had an audience with the Chinese âpremierâ (head of the Executive Yuan) and acting foreign minister, Wang Zhaoming 汪å é, more widely known by his pen name Wang Jingwei 汪精å«.117 During a solemn ceremony held at the Presidential Palace on the morning of 19 September, De Vos van Steenwijk, dressed in full diplomatic attire, presented his credentials to Lin Sen.118 Wang Jingwei hosted a dinner in honor of the Dutch envoy that night at the Foreign Ministry. The following day an official reception was held at the Dutch residence. In line with diplomatic custom, De Vos van Steenwijk and his party then proceeded to Zijinshan ç´«éå±± (Purple Mountain), east of Nanjingâs city walls, to present a wreath at Sun Yat-senâs tomb. Several days later, De Vos van Steenwijk returned to Beiping.
In his official address during the credentials presentation, De Vos van Steenwijk recalled the friendly ties that had traditionally existed between the two countries. Observing that âthe whole world was still suffering from the economic crisis and that international commerce was still burdened with difficulties,â the Dutch envoy noted that a major element of his mission was to safeguard and promote the trade relations between China and the Netherlands and its overseas colonies.119 In his reply, President Lin Sen stated that it was the policy of the Chinese government to âseek as far as possible the development of commercial relations with friendly nations animated by a similar desireâ and that it would give all possible assistance to the Dutch minister in accomplishing his mission.120 A concrete step toward this goal was the decision by the Dutch government in June 1936 to let the consul general at Shanghai, Gideon W. Boissevain, concurrently serve as commercial counselor.121 However, as we will see in the next chapter, the impending war would thwart these joint ambitions.
Dutch diplomatic staff in the Republic of China, 1936
| Name | Rank | Location | Address |
| G.W. de Vos van Steenwijkå æå¾· | Minister ç¹å½å ¨æå ¬ä½¿ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| G.W. Boissevainå士è | Commercial counselor åå¡åäº | Shanghai ä¸æµ· | Unknown |
| M.W. van Weedeéå¾· | Secretaryç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| T.H.J. de Josselin de Jong åæéº | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| A.E. Abellé¿åç½ | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Beipingåå¹³ | No. 24 Legation Streetä¸äº¤æ°å·· 24 å· |
| H. Boså æ¯ | Secretary-interpreterä¸æç§ä¹¦ | Nanjingå京 | No. 3 Dong Guashiä¸çå¸ 3 å· |
3.2 Dutch Consular Representation in China
The Dutch consular service had its own, unique traditions and history, tracing its origins to the early days of the republic.122 By the early 19th century, the formal tasks of Dutch consuls included promoting trade and looking after the interests of Dutch nationals within their consular jurisdiction through implementation and enforcement of Dutch laws.123 In countries where the Dutch enjoyed extraterritorial rights, such as Japan, Siam, and China, these duties also included the adjudication of civil or criminal lawsuits involving Dutch nationals. Accordingly, in Chinese treaty ports where the Dutch had established consular courts, particularly Shanghai, the Dutch consul general spent a considerable portion of his time administering justice and attempting, through mediation, to prevent legal cases from being filed.124 From the end of the 19th century onward, Dutch consuls were required to compile regular reports on the industrial and commercial conditions within their jurisdiction and, in some cases, also on (local) political developments, a task that had traditionally been reserved for diplomats.125
As mentioned in the introduction, the earliest Dutch consulates in China were founded in the middle of the 19th century to promote Dutch commercial and shipping interests in China. Following the conclusion of the Dutch-Chinese Treaty of Tianjin of 1863, which provided an explicit legal basis for Dutch consular representation in China, the Dutch established several further consular offices in Chinaâs growing number of designated open treaty ports. Initially, however, the consular tasks were largely left to the care of British and German career consuls or to honorary consuls â mostly foreign businessmen â whose prestige in China tended to be rather low as a result of the contempt in which merchants were traditionally held by Chinese officialdom. For decades, however, this had not struck The Hague as particularly problematic, perhaps because direct Dutch interests in the Chinese market were rather limited. Trade with the Dutch East Indies was mostly in Chinese hands, while the introduction of modern steamships caused the Dutch flag to almost disappear from Chinese waters.126
The passive attitude of the Dutch changed somewhat around the start of the 20th century as a result of a growing awareness in the Netherlands of the attractions of the Chinese market.127 As sugar and petroleum exports from the Dutch East Indies were increasing, a regular shipping line was established between the Indies, China, and Japan, and a number of Netherlands firms set up offices in Chinese coastal cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin.128 Career consuls were now appointed alongside honorary consuls to promote economic interests and trade relations on behalf of the Netherlands and its colonies, resulting in intensified workloads. By 1900, the Dutch government had consular offices in nine Chinese treaty ports: Tianjin, Yantai, and Yingkou in the north; Shanghai and Wuhan on the central Chinese coast; and Guangzhou, Shantou, Fuzhou, and Xiamen in the south.129 Each of these consulates survived the 1911 revolution and Chinaâs subsequent transition from empire to republic. In 1914, a tenth Dutch consulate was opened at Harbin, near the Russian border.130
These same ten consulates were still functioning when in 1927 the Nationalists established their government at Nanjing. In addition, the Dutch government also maintained consular posts in Hong Kong and Macao. The consulate in Hong Kong was of special importance for the Dutch consular network in China, since its jurisdiction covered the whole of South China, even though Hong Kong was formally accredited to Britain. Hence, from an internal organizational point of view, the consulates in Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Shantou were subordinated to the consulate general in Hong Kong.131 The unique and more or less independent position of the Dutch career consul at Hong Kong frequently gave rise to tensions with the Dutch minister in Beiping, who â often in vain â expected up-to-date information and a final say in all economic and political affairs related to South China.132 Despite attempts by Oudendijk and Thorbecke to reorganize this historically evolved system, the jurisdictional problem was never truly solved. As the Dutch consulates in Hong Kong and Macao were formally accredited to the British and Portuguese colonial governments, respectively, they are not included in the overviews in this book.
With a total of 10 treaty-port offices, the Dutch maintained a substantial consular presence in prewar China. There were very few other countries outside Europe where the Netherlands maintained a comparable or larger consular lineup, a fact that demonstrates Chinaâs (actual or envisaged) commercial importance to the Dutch.133 Only the four major regional powers â Japan, Britain, France, and the United States â maintained a greater number of consular missions in China during these years.134 The relatively strong Dutch consular presence also reflected the importance to China of the Netherlands as a leading nonmajor or secondary power, a fact which was further underlined by ÂChinaâs extensive consular presence in the Netherlands East Indies, described in the next section. This position remained virtually unchanged throughout the entire prewar decade.
Dutch senior consular staff in the Republic of China, 1927
| Consulate | Address | Representative | Rank |
| Shanghaiä¸æµ· | No. 9 Avenue Edouard VIIç±å¤äºè·¯ 9 å· | F.E.H. Groenman 赫é¾é¨ | Consul generalæ»é¢äº |
| G.M. Bijvanck | Vice-consulé¢äº | ||
| Guangzhouå¹¿å· | [Shameen] | J.T. De Vries | Consulé¢äº |
| Harbinåå°æ»¨ | [No. 13 Commercial Street] | L. van der Hoeven | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Tianjin天津 | [No. 142 London Road] | A. van Cutsemçæ ¼æ£® | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Xiamenå¦é¨ | [c/o NL Indies Trading Bankè·å½å®è¾¾é¶è¡] | P.J. de Kant | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Fuzhouç¦å· | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | J.C. Oswaldé¿å£«å¨ | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Shantouæ±å¤´ | [c/o Java-China-Japan Lineçªå-ä¸å½-æ¥æ¬èªçº¿å ¬å¸] | A.L.W. van Dobben | Consulé¢äº |
| Wuhanæ¦æ± | [c/o Belgian Consulate Generalæ¯å©æ¶æ»é¢äºé¦] | A. van Biervliet | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Yantaiçå° | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | D. Cappelenåå¼¼é» | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Yingkouè¥å£ | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | P. Farmer | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
Yet, despite this nominally strong presence in China, the amount of work that could be handled in practice was limited because of the continuous understaffing of many of these posts. In 1935, the Dutch minister complained that staffing at the various consulates was insufficient even for the performance of day-to-day administrative tasks.135 Meanwhile, the nature and scope of consular work were rapidly changing and becoming more demanding during these years as a result of growing international travel and migration generally as well as disruptions caused by emerging conflicts worldwide. Protection of nationals in need of assistance became an important additional task and, combined with an explosive growth in the number of cases, resulted in strong pressures on an organization still largely staffed by honorary officials.136 Not surprisingly perhaps, the tasks of trade promotion and collecting market information suffered. This also explains why the idea of sending a Dutch East Indies trade representative to Shanghai to assist the consul general â in his concurrent capacity as commercial counselor â found a ready ear in The Hague.137 However, due to budgetary constraints, the overall problem of understaffing could not be solved and continued to beset the Dutch consular service throughout the 1930s.
Dutch senior consular staff in the Republic of China, 1931
| Consulate | Address | Representative | Rank |
| Shanghaiä¸æµ· | No. 25, rue du Consulat,Sainte-Anne Buildingå ¬é¦é©¬è·¯25å· | F.E.H. Groenman 赫é¾é¨ | Consul generalæ»é¢äº |
| T. Elink Schuurman | Vice-consulé¢äº | ||
| Guangzhouå¹¿å· | [Shameen] | J.J. Wierink é¦éµ | Consulé¢äº |
| Harbinåå°æ»¨ | [No. 13 Commercial Street] | L. van der Hoeven | Consulé¢äº |
| Tianjin天津 | [No. 142 London Road] | T. Snyers | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Xiamenå¦é¨ | [c/o NL Indies Trading Bankè·å½å®è¾¾é¶è¡] | B.J. Israel | Consulé¢äº |
| Fuzhouç¦å· | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | H.S. Brand | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Shantouæ±å¤´ | [c/o Java-China-Japan Lineçªå-ä¸å½-æ¥æ¬èªçº¿å ¬å¸] | W.C. Crommelin | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Wuhanæ¦æ± | Unknown | A.E. Barbanson | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Yantaiçå° | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | D. Cappelenåå¼¼é» | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Yingkouè¥å£ | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | Unknown | Consulé¢äº |
Dutch senior consular staff in the Republic of China, 1936
| Consulate | Address | Representative | Rank |
| Shanghaiä¸æµ· | No. 25, rue du Consulat, Sainte-Anne Buildingå ¬é¦é©¬è·¯ 25 å· | G.W. Boissevain å士è | Consul generalæ»é¢äº |
| H. Riemens | Vice-consulé¢äº | ||
| Guangzhouå¹¿å· | [Shameen] | J.J. Wierink é¦éµ | Consulé¢äº |
| Harbinåå°æ»¨ | [No. 13 Commercial Street] | L. van der Hoeven | Consulé¢äº |
| J.C.W.M. de Haas | Vice-consul å¯é¢äº | ||
| Tianjin天津 | [No. 142 London Road] | T. Snyers | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Xiamenå¦é¨ | [c/o NL Indies Trading Bank è·å½å®è¾¾é¶è¡] | B.J. Israel | Consulé¢äº |
| Fuzhouç¦å· | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | L.M.S. Lloyd | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Shantouæ±å¤´ | [c/o Java-China-Japan Lineçªå-ä¸å½-æ¥æ¬èªçº¿å ¬å¸] | A.A.J.B. Masseur | Consulé¢äº |
| Wuhanæ¦æ± | [c/o Italian Consulate Generalæ大å©æ»é¢äºé¦] | F. Stefenelli | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Yantaiçå° | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | M.A.W. Buss | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
| Yingkouè¥å£ | [c/o British Consulate Generalè±å½é¢äºé¦] | P. Farmer | Acting consul代çé¢äº |
4 Chinese Official Representation in the Netherlands
The history of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be traced back to the late Qing dynasty. In 1861, a government office was established in the imperial capital for the administration of commercial affairs concerning foreign Âpowers, known as the Zongli Yamen æ»çè¡é¨.138 After the Boxer Uprising, the foreign powers forced the Qing court to replace this low-status body with a âproperâ Foreign Affairs Department, or Waiwubu å¤å¡é¨, whose rank was similar to that of the highest government organs. In 1912, after the founding of the republic, the ministry was renamed Waijiaobu å¤äº¤é¨. With the establishment of the Nationalist government at Nanjing in 1927, it was placed under the Executive Yuan (Xingzhengyuan è¡æ¿é¢), the institution at the top of the executive branch of the central government, comparable to a cabinet. Pursuant to its bylaws and related regulations, revised several times between 1928 and 1936, the Foreign Ministry was officially in charge of âforeign relations, negotiations and all affairs concerning Chinese overseas, foreigners residing in Chinese territories and Chinaâs trade relations with foreign countries.â139
The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China was a high-prestige organization which employed some of the best-educated and most cosmopolitan people in the country.140 Its elitist composition was reflected in the ministryâs leadership during the years under review in this study, which boasted an extraordinary lineup of prominent experts with extensive international experience and advanced degrees from the worldâs top universities.141 Among them were such well-known Chinese diplomats as Lu Zhengxiang, Gu Weijun é¡¾ç»´é§ (Wellington Koo), Shi Zhaoji æ½èåºâ(Alfred Sao-ke Sze), and Wang Zhengting, each of whom had previously held senior posts in the Beiyang government. In addition to Wang Zhengting and Wang Jingwei, mentioned earlier, other prominent ministers of foreign affairs of the prewar decade included Luo Wengan ç½æå¹², an Oxford University graduate who had previously served as finance minister, and Zhang Qun, former mayor of Shanghai, governor of Hubei Province, and one of Chiang Kai-shekâs most trusted advisers.
In the early 1930s, the Chinese diplomatic network comprised 25 missions, including a permanent delegation at the League of Nations in Geneva, an embassy in Moscow, and 23 legations in Europe, the Americas, and Asia.142 By 1937, the total number had grown to 27, while six former legations (gongshiguan å ¬ä½¿é¦) had been upgraded to embassies (dashiguan 大使é¦).143 According to a regulation of February 1930, the average staff of an embassy comprised six to ten members, including one ambassador (dashi 大使), one counselor (canshi åäº), two or three secretaries of varying ranks (mishu ç§ä¹¦), one or two attachés (suiyuan éå), and one to three chancellors (zhushi 主äº). The diplomatic staff at legations typically comprised a minister (gongshi å ¬ä½¿), one to three secretaries, and a similar number of attachés and chancellors.144 The chancellors were not formally accredited to the government of the host state and hence did not enjoy official diplomatic status. They were civil officials (wenguan æå®), charged with internal administrative tasks and support work for the diplomats.145 Together with the locally recruited staff members, they were also responsible for the general management of the legation or embassy chancery (office).
4.1 Chinese Diplomatic Representation in the Netherlands
In June 1928, the Chinese legation at The Hague formally notified the Dutch Foreign Ministry of the coming to power of the Nationalist government at Nanjing. The diplomatic note stated that all Chinese diplomatic and consular representatives accredited to foreign governments had been authorized to keep their posts and would continue to represent the new government.146 It also specified that Counselor Dai Mingfu would continue to exercise his functions as the (acting) senior representative to the Dutch court.147 Dai had assumed charge of the Chinese legation in December the previous year, when Minister Wang Guangqi ç广å», Chinaâs senior envoy in the Netherlands for almost seven years, was recalled.148 On Sunday, 24 June, at 11:00 in the morning, the âBlue Sky, White Sun, and Wholly Red Earthâ (qingtian bairi mandi hongqi é天ç½æ¥æ»¡å°çº¢æ) Nationalist flag was hoisted for the first time over Daiâs offices.149 Following recent precedents in Washington, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow, this symbolic act marked the start of official representation in the Netherlands of the new Nationalist government at Nanjing.
On 10 October 1928, a reception was held at the Chinese legation at The Hague in honor of the 17th anniversary of the Chinese republic. In his speech, Dai pointed out the special significance of the occasion, which also served to mark Chinaâs âunificationâ and the establishment of a new national government. He went on to review recent developments in his country, the major attainments claimed by the Nationalists, and the most important tasks still ahead. Dai also touched upon Dutch-Chinese relations, praising the cordial and sympathetic attitude of the Dutch government toward the Chinese people as reflected in its recent assurances that it would facilitate the revision of existing treaties and customs tariffs. A translation of Daiâs speech was published in several major Dutch newspapers the following day.150 The papers also reported how the Chinese guests at the reception, mostly businessmen and students, performed the traditional greeting of three short bows to the Chinese flag and to the portrait of Sun Yat-sen, the late founder of the republic.151
In February 1929, the Dutch minister in Beiping informed The Hague that the Chinese government intended to send a new minister to the Netherlands and requested formal consent to the appointment of Wunsz King (Jin Wensi). Oudendijk described him as a young and promising diplomat with âexcellent English-language skills, pleasant manners, and a very bright mind.â152 Only 36 years old, King at that time held the senior post of commissioner of foreign affairs for Shanghai, having previously filled several other important official positions, including those of member of the Chinese delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, secretary of the Chinese delegation to the League of Nations in Geneva, and head of the Department of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry. In March 1929, the Chinese chargé at The Hague confirmed Kingâs appointment, a decision which was not made public through the Dutch press until July.153 Not much later, the chancery of the Chinese legation was moved from the Bezuidenhout residential area in The Hague to the Koninginnegracht in the city center.154
Chinese diplomatic staff in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1928
| Name | Rank | Location | Address |
| Wang Guangqi (Kouang-Ky Wang)çå¹¿å» | Minister (absent)ç¹å½å ¨æå ¬ä½¿ (缺任) | The Hagueæµ·ç | Unknown |
| Dai Mingfu (Mingfoe Tai)æ´æè¾ | Chargé dâaffaires ad interim临æ¶ä»£å | The Hagueæµ·ç | Unknown |
| Xie Weilin (William Hsieh)è°¢ç»´éº | First secretaryä¸çç§ä¹¦ | The Hagueæµ·ç | Unknown |
| Wang Nianzu (Niétsou Wang)çå¿µç¥ | Secretaryç§ä¹¦ | The Hagueæµ·ç | Unknown |
| Yuan Ti (Tieh Yuan)è¢æ | Attachééå | The Hagueæµ·ç | Unknown |
Owing to what King would describe as âsome duties which required my presence in China,â his appointment to the Dutch court was not actually effected until more than four years later.155 Instead, in 1930, he was appointed counselor at Chinaâs Ministry of Agriculture and Minerals (Nongkuangbu åç¿é¨), followed a year later by a similar appointment with the Ministry of Industry (Shiyebu äºä¸é¨). King became acting vice-minister of foreign affairs (daili changwu cizhang 代ç常å¡æ¬¡é¿) in December 1931.156 In September the following year, he was sent to Geneva to assist his senior colleagues and Chinaâs leading diplomats at the time, W.W. Yen (Yan Huiqing é¢æ åº), Wellington Koo, and Quo Tai-chi (Guo Taiqi é泰祺), to protest Japanâs aggression in Manchuria before the Assembly of the League of Nations.157 Several months later, King finally received instruction to assume his duties as Chinese minister to the Netherlands in accordance with his original appointment.158 In May 1933, the Executive Yuan formally ratified the appointment.159 On 8 August that year, King finally arrived in the Netherlands. As Dai Mingfu had not yet vacated the official residence, King took up temporary lodging in the luxury hotel De Wittebrug, situated halfway between The Hague and the nearby seaside resort of Scheveningen. Two days later, the envoy had his first audience with Foreign Minister De Graeff.160
Two carriages, each drawn by a pair of horses, pulled up at the De Wittebrug at around 4:30 in the afternoon on Saturday, 2 September 1933, to take the Chinese minister to the Noordeinde royal palace in downtown The Hague. Alighting at the northern entrance, King had his picture taken in front of the palace before entering it.161 At five oâclock sharp, he was received in audience by Queen Wilhelmina. In the presence of the foreign minister and several other senior Dutch officers, King read his official address in English, vowing that he would spare no effort to promote mutual understanding with a view to âthe advancement of commercial and cultural relations.â162 He then handed the letters of recall of his predecessor and his own letters of credence to Wilhelmina.163 Next, the queen read her official reply in French, extending her gratitude and completing the formal part of the ceremony. After a brief chat about Kingâs previous experiences in the United States and Europe and conditions in Chinaâs capital, Nanjing, the Chinese envoy retreated, walking backward and bowing three times, as protocol required. He was taken to a nearby room for a courtesy call on Prince Henry, the prince consort of the Netherlands, before being escorted back to the palace gate, where he climbed into the carriage and was taken back to his hotel.
After assuming his post in the Netherlands, King continued to serve concurrently as a member of the Chinese delegation to the League of Nations. A few weeks after presenting his credentials in The Hague, King left again for Geneva to attend the 14th session of the leagueâs Assembly.164 Returning to the Netherlands in late October, King resumed his diplomatic and representation work at the Dutch court with renewed enthusiasm. In January 1934, the Chinese envoy and his wife hosted a dinner banquet in honor of the Dutch foreign minister. Along with De Graeff and his daughter, the table guests that night included the English, Polish, and South African ministers and their respective spouses, as well as the Chinese consul at Amsterdam, Feng Zhizheng å¯æ§é, and his wife.165 Two months later, King and Feng accompanied General Yang Jie æ¨æ°, president of the National Military Academy at Nanjing, during the Dutch leg of his inspection tour of Europe to study the aircraft industry.166 In view of the anticipated modernization of the Chinese air force, the most important stops on his itinerary were those at the Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker in Amsterdam and the national airport at Schiphol.167 Later, during the first months of the war, Yang would play a key role in securing military aid from Moscow.
Kingâs primary mission, as emphasized in his address, was to promote bilateral commercial and cultural relations. During a visit to Amsterdam on 5 May 1934, he served both interests. First, he attended the opening of an exhibition on modern Chinese painting at the Amsterdam Municipal Museum.168 The exhibition, sponsored by the Dutch Friendship Association for Asian Art and the Holland-China Association, included some 80 Chinese paintings of various types. They were described in a catalog containing a general introduction written by the renowned scholar Cai Yuanpei è¡å å¹, founder and first president of the Academia Sinica (Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan ä¸å¤®ç 究é¢).169 The opening of this unique exhibition drew a large crowd of notable Dutch and Chinese guests, including the mayor of Amsterdam, the Chinese consul, and several other highly placed officials. Among the guests of honor was Liu Haisu åæµ·ç², a prominent Chinese painter and founding director of the first modern school of fine arts in China, the Shanghai Academy of Chinese Painting (Shanghai Guohua Meishuyuan ä¸æµ·å½ç»ç¾æ¯é¢). Wunsz King officially opened the exhibition with a speech, expressing the hope that the event would mark a renewal of Dutch-Chinese cultural ties. Outside, the Chinese flag flew over a tower of the museum building.170
Later that day, King was the guest of honor at the annual dinner of the Holland-China Association, hosted in the pavilion of Amsterdamâs main park, the Vondelpark. During the dinner, King spoke about the economic reconstruction program then under way in his homeland and about the possibilities of increasing and promoting bilateral economic and commercial ties between the Netherlands and China.171 Outlining recent developments in the industries of railway construction, civil and commercial aviation, radio communication, and agriculture, King pointed out that in each of those and several other fields China was in need of capital goods, technical skill and expertise, and finance. While hailing the fruitful and promising bilateral cooperation in the field of hydraulic and harbor work engineering, the envoy expressed surprise over the fact that international Dutch companies like Fokker (Amsterdam), Philips (Eindhoven), and Wilton Shipyard (Schiedam) had not yet entered the Chinese market. King drew attention to the great unlocked potential for bilateral trade, expressing support for Thorbeckeâs recent suggestion to establish a Dutch-Chinese consortium for such purposes and recommending that representatives of overseas Chinese from the Dutch Indies be included in any such organization.
In a speech during the associationâs annual dinner the following year, held in The Hague at the âRoyalâ restaurant on Lange Voorhout, the Chinese envoy struck a slightly more cautious tone. Earlier that year, the Chinese economy had suffered major setbacks as a result of the globally rising silver prices and the ensuing appreciation of Chinaâs silver-based currency, which had a dampening effect on Chinaâs exports. The resulting trade deficit was one reason for the economic and monetary reform initiated by the Nanjing government later that year. But apart from exports, Chinese imports had also dropped. In line with this general trend, the Dutch share in Chinese imports had decreased slightly, whereas that of the East Indies had increased somewhat.172 A major concern raised by King in his speech was that of the overseas Chinese in the Dutch Indies and the promulgation by the Dutch Indies government of immigration quotas, which affected Chinese immigration into the archipelago. This issue, discussed in detail in chapter 3, would prove a matter of increasing concern and irritation to Nanjing in the coming years.
In the field of cultural exchange there was more room for optimism. On 14 September 1935, the ancient Chinese play Lady Precious Stream (Wang BaoÂchuan çå®é) premiered at the Amsterdam City Theater under the Dutch title De geborduurde bal (The embroidered ball). The immensely successful play â which also ran in Londonâs West End, Hollywood, and New York, to glowing reviews â had been translated and adapted for Western audiences by Xiong Shiyi çå¼ä¸ (Hsiung Shih-I), a Chinese playwright and professor known for his translations of famous Western works into Chinese and vice versa. Residing in Britain at the time, Xiong traveled to the Dutch capital to attend the Dutch premiere of his play. At a high tea in the posh Amstel Hotel hosted by the Amsterdam Drama Society (Amsterdamsche Toneelvereniging), Xiong met with Dutch actors, artists, and literary figures.173 King also briefly attended, but he had to leave early, as he was on his way to Geneva to attend the 16th session of the leagueâs Assembly. Making up for his absence, he hosted a reception at the legation in October to mark the playâs premiere in The Hague.174 Among the many distinguished guests at the reception, which coincided with celebrations of the 24th anniversary of the Chinese republic, were senior members of the foreign diplomatic body at The Hague; the Chinese judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice, Wang Chonghui çå® æ ; the Dutch prime minister, Hendrikus Colijn; and several other prominent figures from Dutch government and literary and educational circles.175
In February 1936, King left the Netherlands for a six-month home leave, handing over the care of the legation to his ânumber two,â Secretary Wang DeÂyan çå¾·ç.176 In August that year, while on his way back to Europe, King paid a visit to Sumatra, where he stayed for a few days as a guest of the Chinese consul at Medan, Huang Zheng é»æ£ (also known by his alias Tianmai 天è¿). In an interview with a local newspaper, King spoke highly of the development of Dutch-Chinese ties, emphasizing the importance of the well-being of the Chinese population in the East Indies to his official duties as Chinese minister to the Netherlands.177 As we will see in part 2 of the book, the Chinese envoy would more than prove this point years later in the course of the negotiations leading up to the new bilateral treaty of 1945. In mid-September 1936, King resumed his post in The Hague, only to leave again for Geneva days later to attend the 17th league Assembly session.178
Chinese diplomatic staff in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1936
| Name | Rank | Location | Address |
| Jin Wensi (Wunsz King)éé®æ³ | Ministerç¹å½å ¨æå ¬ä½¿ | The Hagueæµ·ç | No. 53 Koninginnegracht |
| Wang Deyan (Teh Yen Wang)çå¾·ç | Second secretaryäºçç§ä¹¦ | The Hagueæµ·ç | No. 53 Koninginnegracht |
| Wang Tingshan (Wang Ting-shan)çåºç | Third secretaryä¸çç§ä¹¦ | The Hagueæµ·ç | No. 53 Koninginnegracht |
| Wu Faxiang (Frazer Wu)å´å祥 | Attachéç²ç§å¦ä¹ å | The Hagueæµ·ç | No. 53 Koninginnegracht |
Though not formally part of the Chinese diplomatic delegation to the Netherlands, mention should be made here of two prominent Chinese officials who successively served in The Hague during this period as judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This court, also known as the World Court, was connected to the League of Nations and had been formally established in 1920 for solving disputes between national states. In 1923, Wang Chonghui was elected deputy judge of the Permanent Court.179 Wang was one of Chinaâs top legal scholars and a high-ranking official, having previously served as the first foreign minister of the republic, chief justice of the Supreme Court, and acting prime minister of the Beijing-based Northern government. After brief stints as justice minister and president of the Judicial Yuan (Sifayuan å¸æ³é¢) of the Nanjing government from 1926 to 1930, Wang returned to The Hague in 1931 to accept an appointment as judge of the Permanent Court. He left for China again in 1936 to serve as foreign minister at Nanjing and Chongqing. His place at the Peace Palace in The Hague was filled by Zheng Tianxi éå¤©é¡ (F.T. Cheng), another prominent official and legal scholar and the first Chinese ever to earn an LLD degree from England.180 Zheng arrived in The Hague in early 1937 and stayed there until Nazi Germany occupied the Netherlands in 1940. After the war, the court was dissolved and replaced by the International Court of Justice.
4.2 Chinese Consular Representation in the Netherlands and Its Overseas Territories
Much like the Chinese diplomatic system, the creation of Chinaâs consular service was a direct result of the presence of Western powers in Asia during the 19th century. The first Chinese consulate was established in British-controlled Singapore in 1877 in response to urgent appeals for protection by overseas Chinese communities as well as to allow Chinaâs imperial government to monitor revolutionary developments abroad.181 On the eve of its final demise in 1911, the Qing court oversaw a network of some 40 overseas consulates. During the Republican period, Chinaâs consular service saw further growth and was modernized. By the mid-1930s, Chinaâs consular network comprised approximately 60â70 missions.182 Official ranks included those of the consul general (zong lingshi æ»é¢äº), consul (lingshi é¢äº), vice-consul (fu lingshi å¯é¢äº), and consul élève or trainee consul (fuxi lingshi éä¹ é¢äº). Their main formal duties were to safeguard the rights of overseas Chinese nationals and develop bilateral commercial relations.183
Chinese senior consular staff in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1927
| Consulate | Address | Representative | Rank |
| Amsterdamè·å ° é¿å§æ¯ç¹ä¸¹ | No. 18 Banstraat | Lu Jun (Lout siun) è·¯æµ | Consul é¢äº |
| Batavia (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå å·´è¾¾ç»´äº | Unknown | Ouyang Qi (Kee Ow-Yang) 欧é³ç¥º | Consul generalæ»é¢äº |
| Semarang (Java) è·ä¸å° çªå ä¸å®å | Unknown | S.K. Sun | Consul é¢äº |
| Surabaya (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå æ³æ°´ | Unknown | Lin Pao Heng | Consul é¢äº |
| Medan (Sumatra)è·ä¸å° èé¨çè æ£å ° | Unknown | Zhang Buqing (Pu Ching Chang)å¼ æ¥é | Consul é¢äº |
| Padang (Sumatra) è·ä¸å° èé¨çè å·´ä¸ | Unknown | Lewis Tong | Consul é¢äº |
As mentioned in the introduction, the Consular Convention of 1911 entitled China to establish consulates in those Dutch colonial ports where third powers were allowed to do the same. The first Chinese consul in Batavia (Jakarta), Su Ruizhao èéé (Su Jui-chao), took up his post in August 1912 after his appointment by the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, which had replaced the Qing court.184 Around this same time, Chinese consulates were set up in several Dutch East Indies port cities where other countries also maintained a consular presence, including Padang in West Sumatra and Surabaya in East Java.185 New consulates were subsequently founded at Medan in North Sumatra (1916) and Semarang on Javaâs north coast (1927).186 Despite the absence of a formal treaty basis, the Chinese government also found a way to build a consular presence on Dutch soil, establishing a consulate at Amsterdam in 1923.187 These same six consulates were still active when the Nationalist government at Nanjing was founded and assumed control of Chinaâs diplomatic and consular service.
Chinese senior consular staff in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1931
| Consulate | Address | Representative | Rank |
| Amsterdamè·å ° é¿å§æ¯ç¹ä¸¹ | Moved from no. 18 Banstraat to no. 112 De Lairessestraat | Feng Zhizheng (Chih Tsing Feng) å¯æ§é | Consul é¢äº |
| Batavia (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå å·´è¾¾ç»´äº | Unknown | Song Faxiang (Far-san T. Sung)å®å祥 | Consul generalæ»é¢äº |
| Lin Tingcheng (Ting Châeng Lin) æå»·æ¾ | Vice-consul å¯é¢äº | ||
| Semarang (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå ä¸å®å | Unknown | Zhang Guowei (Chang Kuo Wai)å¼ å½å¨ | Consul é¢äº |
| Surabaya (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå æ³æ°´ | Unknown | Guo Zeji (T.C. Kuo)éåæµ | Consul é¢äº |
| Palembang (Sumatra)è·ä¸å° èé¨çè 巨港 | Unknown | Cai Xianzhang (Y.C. Tsai)è¡å¸ç« | Consul é¢äº |
| Medan (Sumatra)è·ä¸å° èé¨çè æ£å ° | Unknown | Shen (Tso-Ling Shen) | Consul é¢äº |
| Yuan Ti (Tieh Yuan)è¢æ | Vice-consul å¯é¢äº | ||
| Makassar (Celebes)è·ä¸å° 西éä¼¯æ¯ æå é¡ | Unknown | Wang Defen (Teh-Fen Wang)ç德棻 | Consul é¢äº |
In 1930, the Chinese government opened a further consulate at Makassar in southern Celebes (todayâs Sulawesi), bringing the total number of consulates in the Dutch East Indies to six, and hence the total number of consulates in the combined territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to seven.188 Only in four other countries â each of them major global or regional powers â did the Nanjing government operate larger consular networks at the time.189 From the Dutch point of view too, Chinaâs consular presence in the Indies was substantial. Only two European countries maintained a greater number of consulates in the Indies during these years.190 This, of course, was not surprising in view of the size and importance of the overseas Chinese community in the Indonesian archipelago and the increasing concern shown by the Chinese government for their well-being. From a practical point of view, Chinaâs consular representation in the Indies was perhaps more important to Nanjing than its diplomatic presence in the Netherlands, whose principal task was to facilitate, support, and safeguard the proper functioning of Chinaâs consular network in IndoÂnesia.
Chinese senior consular staff in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1936
| Consulate | Address | Representative | Rank |
| Amsterdamè·å ° é¿å§æ¯ç¹ä¸¹ | No. 112 De Lairessestraat | Feng Zhizheng (Chih Tsing Feng) å¯æ§é | Consul é¢äº |
| Batavia (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå å·´è¾¾ç»´äº | No. 3 Kali Besar West | Song Faxiang (Far-san T. Sung)å®å祥 | Consul generalæ»é¢äº |
| Lin Tingcheng (Ting Châeng Lin) æå»·æ¾ | Acting consul代çé¢äº | ||
| Semarang (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå ä¸å®å | Unknown | Zhang Guowei (Chang Kuo Wai) å¼ å½å¨ | Consul é¢äº |
| Surabaya (Java)è·ä¸å° çªå æ³æ°´ | Unknown | Guo Zeji (T.C. Kuo)éåæµ | Consul é¢äº |
| Palembang (Sumatra)è·ä¸å° èé¨çè 巨港 | Unknown | Lin Langpei (Longby Ling)ææå¹ | Consul é¢äº |
| Medan (Sumatra)è·ä¸å° èé¨çè æ£å ° | Unknown | Huang Zheng (Ouang Tcheng)é»æ£ | Consul é¢äº |
| Makassar (Celebes)è·ä¸å° 西éä¼¯æ¯ æå é¡ | Unknown | Wang Defen (Teh-Fen Wang)ç德棻 | Consul é¢äº |
5 Conclusion
The development of bilateral ties between the Netherlands and China during the period from 1927 to 1936 was characterized by shared optimism, mutual goodwill, and gradual, progressive change. As the Nationalist government at Nanjing consolidated its control over large parts of the country and secured international recognition, several key elements traditionally defining their bilateral relationship underwent review and readjustment.
This period saw the emergence of the first serious cracks in the system of extraterritoriality. The conclusion of the 1928 customs tariff treaty between the Netherlands and China marked the latterâs attainment of full tariff autonomy. Another bilateral treaty signed the following year formalized the Dutch commitment to the future abolition of consular jurisdiction and extraterritorial protection of Dutch citizens in China. Along with the remission of the remaining portions of the Boxer indemnity in 1933 and the end of showing-the-flag gunboat missions in Chinese waters during this period, these developments signified a break with the past and the dawning of a new era. Although the erstwhile unity among the foreign treaty powers in China was quickly eroding under the prospect of the imminent demise of the extraterritorial system, the Dutch nevertheless succeeded in leveraging their diplomatic strength vis-Ã -vis China during this period to safeguard their interests and secure Chinese concessions.
At the same time, improved prospects for international trade injected new impetus into bilateral economic ties. Both sides started to attach increasing importance to promoting trade relations and seeking ways to unlock this significant potential as Chinaâs economic development and financial credibility improved and the Nanjing government sought ways to attract foreign investment and adjust its trade deficit. These considerations were reinforced by mutual concerns about Japanâs economic penetration not just into China but also into the Dutch East Indies. However, the few hopeful initiatives undertaken during this period to boost bilateral trade, including the construction of the Lianyungang port in Jiangsu Province, were prematurely halted by the intensifying Sino-Japanese conflict.
In the wider geopolitical context, tensions between China and Japan also prevented a more full-fledged development of Dutch-Chinese bilateral relations during this period. In line with the traditional Dutch policy of aloofness, which prescribed observing strict neutrality in conflicts between third states, The Hague took a very cautious approach in its response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. This passive attitude also reflected growing concerns both in The Hague and in Batavia over the possibility of a âsecond Manchurian Incidentâ in the Dutch Indies, as Tokyo began to show fresh interest in the Dutch colony in the context of its Pan-Asian designs. Consequently, Chinaâs repeated appeals for help to the Netherlands â based on the latterâs capacity as fellow signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty and league member â largely remained without response.
Both in word and in deed, the mutually accredited diplomatic envoys reflected the heightened optimism and determination that characterized the general development of mutual ties during this period. On the Dutch side, the long-serving senior envoy and doyen of the diplomatic body Willem OudenÂdijk and his ambitious successor Willem Thorbecke, each in his own way, were instrumental in tearing down the old system and developing a more balanced, mutually beneficial relationship by advocating a more forward-looking and accommodating policy line, without losing sight of Dutch long-term interests. And while the Chinese Nationalist government was initially represented in the Netherlands only at the chargé dâaffaires level, the appointment in 1933 of the bright and modern-minded diplomat Wunsz King likewise helped spur the development of economic and cultural ties between the Netherlands and China.
The central importance of Indonesia in their bilateral relationship was manifested not only qualitatively in the trajectories and outcomes of the negotiation of bilateral treaties but also in the size and number of their diplomatic and consular missions in their mutual territories. With a total of 10 Dutch consular offices spread over Chinaâs main treaty ports, the Dutch came just behind the top four major world powers represented there, while there were few other countries outside Europe where the Netherlands maintained a stronger consular presence. The Chinese, for their part, with one consulate in Amsterdam and six in the East Indies, easily outnumbered most other powers with a consular presence in the Dutch colonies.
In all, the period from 1927 to 1936 saw fundamental changes in the relationship between the Netherlands and China. Though the traditional character of bilateral ties since the mid-19th century â in terms of trade, passive diplomacy, and Indonesia â continued roughly to apply to their mutual dealings and respective policies during this period, the ways in which these mainsprings operated changed in light of the readjusted and enlarged basis of their mutual dealings and the evolving diplomatic context, which was marked by a decline of the structural role of the diplomatic body and increased agency of the individual actors. The successful introduction of cooperation in the domains of science, education, and culture during these years, as the next chapter will demonstrate, would prove a fruitful and lasting basis for official exchanges and people-to-people contacts.
There has been some debate about when exactly the Dutch began to become concerned about Japanese expansionism in the region and whether it was the Mukden (Manchurian) Incident or worries over Japanâs growing trade with the Dutch East Indies that prompted this. It appears that it was not until 1935â36 that the Dutch authorities began to take concrete actions with these concerns in mind. See Tarling, ââA Vital British Interest,ââ 197; De Jong, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 9, 233; Bussemaker, âParadise in Peril: The Netherlands, Great Britain and the Defence of the Netherlands East Indies,â 117â118; Braat, âDutch Neutrality in the Pacific,â 123; and section 2.3 of this chapter on G.H.C. Hartâs visit to China.
On 20 June 1928, days after the Nationalist government at Nanjing proclaimed the successÂful completion of Chinaâs national unification, Beijing (meaning ânorthern capitalâ) was officially renamed Beiping åå¹³ (northern peace) so as to mark the end of the Northern Expedition and underscore the shift of the national capital to Nanjing. In September 1949, the Chinese Communist Partyâs Peopleâs Political Consultative Conference decided to establish the capital of the Peopleâs Republic of China at Beiping and reinstate the name Beijing. In this book, I typically use the official name Beiping when referring to events that took place there between June 1928 and October 1949.
In 1922, the term âcoloniesâ was removed from the Dutch constitution and replaced by âoverseas territoriesâ (overzeese rijksdelen). As this was a mere legal technicality (the Dutch Ministry of Colonies continued to operate under this name until 1959), the terms are used interchangeably in this book.
âNationalists Declare Their Aims for China,â New York Times, 17 June 1928.
Annex to diplomatic note dated 12 July 1928 from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waijiaobu) at Nanjing to the Dutch legation at Beiping; note dated 14 July 1928 from the chargé dâaffaires of the Chinese legation at The Hague, Dai Mingfu æ´æè¾ , to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NNA 2.05.90/267). See also Chinese Year Book, 1935â36, 348; Hallett Abend, âAsks Power to Go Half Way on China,â New York Times, 14 July 1928.
Diplomatic note dated 12 September 1928 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Oudendijk; letter (no. 1408/237) dated 21 September 1928 from Oudendijk to The Hague (NNA 2.05.90/267).
Letter (no. 1227/199) dated 6 August 1928 from the Dutch minister to China, W.J. Oudendijk, to F. Beelaerts van Blokland (NNA 2.05.90/267), 17; Dutch parliamentary documents Handelingen II, 1928/29, 14, 352, 366; Kamerstukken II, 2 III, no. 7, 6. See also Van Roijen, Rechtspositie, 53n3. It appears that Minister Oudendijk, contrary to his British colleague, did not present his credentials to Chiang Kai-shek as the new head of state.
Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of China (Zhong-He Guanshui Tiaoyue ä¸åéç¨ æ¢ç´), published in Staatsblad, no. 322 (1930). The Chinese instrument of ratification, signed by President Chiang Kai-shek and Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting and containing the Chinese, English, and Dutch versions of the treaty and the exchanged notes, is currently held at the Netherlands National Archives; see NNA 2.05.02/525. The full texts of the official English, Chinese, and Dutch versions, including the related exchanged notes, can also be found in NNA 2.05.90/267. For the Chinese version, see also Wang Tieya, Zhong-wai jiu yuezhang huibian, vol. 3, 653â655; online âLaws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China,â <https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=Y0040044> (last accessed 30 June 2019).
Chinese Year Book, 1935â36, 348â349.
The new tariffs, promulgated by the Nationalist government a mere two days in advance, became effective on 1 January 1931. Hallett Abend, âChinaâs New Tariff Dismays Business,â New York Times, 31 December 1930.
Letter (Reis-/no. 3) dated 7 December 1928 from Oudendijk to F. Beelaerts van Blokland (NNA 2.05.90/267), 7. See also Oudendyk, Ways and By-ways, 368â369. For a detailed account of the negotiation process, see also Chan, âIgnored Supporting Actor,â chap. 2.
Article 1 of the Sino-Dutch treaty deals with mutual nondiscrimination of their nationals. The appended exchange of notes expands the scope of the most-favored-nation regime to include goods originating from their respective territories. The Sino-British tariff treaty was signed later that night, in the early hours of 20 December. See letter (no. 318) dated 27 December 1928 from Oudendijk to Beelaerts (NNA 2.05.90/267).
Agreement relating to the Chinese Courts in the International Settlement at Shanghai dated 17 February 1930 between Brazil, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, the United States, and China; see (UK) Treaty Series, no. 20 (1930); (US) Executive Agreement Series, no. 37 (1932), publication no. 362. The full text of the official English version, including the exchanged notes, can also be found in NNA 2.05.91/121. See also NNA 2.05.38/2272; 2.05.90/498. For the Chinese text, see Wang Tieya, Zhong-wai jiu yuezhang huibian, vol. 3, 770â772.
Verdrag betrekking hebbende op het rechtsrégime, geldende voor de Nederlandsche onderdanen in China, treaty dated 24 April 1931, published in Staatsblad, no. 522 (1931). The full texts of the official English, Chinese, and Dutch versions, including the related exchanged notes, can also be found in NNA 2.05.90/271. See also Oudendyk, Ways and By-ways, 369â370.
For reasons discussed in chapter 4, the treaty never formally entered into effect.
See also Chan, âIgnored Supporting Actor,â chap. 3.
Notes exchanged on 4 April 1933 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Luo Wengan and ThorÂbecke. See chapter 2, section 1 below and appendix 3.
Klaassen, âNederland en Mantsjoerije,â 142â144.
Ibid., 142; Wester, âNederland en de crisis in Mantsjoerije,â 46, 53, 56.
The American minister at The Hague, L.S. Swenson, reported to Washington that concerns over Indonesia formed a more important explanation for Dutch caution than The Hagueâs traditional neutrality policy; Wester, âNederland en de crisis in Mantsjoerije,â 52.
Reply dated 5 February 1932 from Minister of Foreign Affairs F. Beelaerts van Blokland to cable (no. 3) dated 31 January 1932 from Minister Willem J.R. Thorbecke; see NNA 2.05.90/247; Klaassen and Woltring, Documenten, B, vol. 1, no. 308 (n. 5).
Letter (no. 3048/106) dated 6 July 1932 from Beelaerts to Thorbecke; see NNA 2.05.90/247; Klaassen and Woltring, Documenten, B, vol. 2, no. 67.
Wester, âNederland en de crisis in Mantsjoerije,â 55â56.
Foreign powers with permanent military and naval representatives at their legations in Beijing during the 1920â1930s included Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. On the history of the Dutch legation guard in Beijing (1900â1923), see Bosscher, âDe Gezantschapswacht te Peking.â
The Dutch warship was to stay in the region throughout much of 1912 and 1913. In 1900, during the Boxer Rebellion, the HMS Holland, together with the protected cruiser HMS Koningin Wilhelmina der Nederlanden and the coastal defense ship HMS Piet Hein, had also been sent to Shanghai to protect Dutch interests. See NNA 2.05.90/414; Van Dongen, Tussen neutraliteit en imperialisme, 273â275; De Graaff and Locher-Scholten, Graaf van Limburg Stirum, 144â145.
See, e.g., âVerslag van het Consulaat Generaal der Nederlanden te Shanghai (China) betreffende het bezoek van Hare Majesteits pantserschepen âMarten Harpertszoon Trompâ en âHertog Hendrikâ aan Nanking en Shanghai, in april 1920,â report by the Dutch consulate general at Shanghai of May 1920 (NNA 2.05.90/414; 2.05.91/369); Chan, âIgnored Supporting Actor,â chap. 4.
According to a report in the North-China Daily News (10 March 1927) this Dutch âcrackâ ship was the most modern warship in the Dutch navy. It had a crew of over 400 men and was commanded by Captain George L. Schorer (NNA 2.05.90/414).
Letters (nos. 370/66 and 393/74) dated 11 and 22 March 1927 from Oudendijk to Beelaerts (NNA 2.05.90/414); Chan, âIgnored Supporting Actor,â chap. 4.
Letter (no. 859/39) dated 27 February 1931 from Beelaerts to Oudendijk (NNA 2.05.90/414). The instruction was later modified to stipulate that a ship of the âFloresâ type should be held on standby at all times to sail to Chinese waters on short notice (within eight days); letter (no. 15) dated 8 January 1929 from Oudendijk to Beelaerts (NNA 2.05.90/414), 1. See also NNA 2.05.91/370 for additional details on the Javaâs China visit.
See NNA 2.05.90/414 and 2.05.91/370 for details on the Javaâs China visit.
Letter (no. 15) dated 8 January 1929 from Oudendijk to Beelaerts (NNA 2.05.90/414), 1.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 2; âBezoek van Hr. Ms. âJavaâ aan Shanghai, 24 december 1928â4 januari 1929,â report dated 11 January 1929 from the acting Dutch consul general at Shanghai, W.A.A.M. Daniëls (NNA 2.05.90/414), 2â3.
Letter dated 22 January 1929 from Oudendijk to Hoekstra (NNA 2.05.90/414).
Letter (no. 15) dated 8 January 1929 from Oudendijk to Beelaerts (NNA 2.05.90/414), 2.
Ibid., 2â3.
Letter (no. 284/13) dated 10 February 1930 from Quist to the Dutch chargé dâaffaires in Beijing, G.W. de Vos van Steenwijk (NNA 2.05.90/414).
Among the foreign warships berthed in Shanghai during the incident were the cruisers HMS Suffolk and HMS Kent of the British Royal Navy; the USS Houston and the USS Rochester of the United States Navy; and the Waldeck-Rousseau and the Marne of the French Navy. See letter (no. 1191/111) dated 18 April 1932 from the Dutch acting consul general at Shanghai, G.M. Byvanck, to Thorbecke (NNA 2.05.91/356).
Letter (no. 594/33) dated 1 April 1932 from Thorbecke to the Dutch consul general at Shanghai, F.E.H. Groenman (NNA 2.05.91/356).
Again, it was noted by Dutch officials that this was not a showing-the-flag or social visit; see letter (no. 3894) dated 24 November 1937 from Byvanck to J.J. Kienhuize (NNA 2.05.91/356).
Letter (no. 569/36) dated 1 February 1936 from the head of the East Asian Affairs Office at Batavia, A.H.J. Lovink, to the governor-general of the Dutch East Indies, B.C. de Jonge (NNA 2.05.90/418).
Letter (no. 3106/36) dated 30 June 1936 from Lovink to De Jonge (NNA 2.05.90/418).
Letter (no. 91/A/B) dated 29 May 1937 from First Government Secretary J. Ramaer to the adviser on East Asian affairs (NNA 2.05.90/418).
See Baart, âAktiviteiten van het Nederlands bedrijfsleven in Chinaâ; Van der Putten, Corporate Behaviour. For summary overviews of Dutch-Chinese trade relations, see, e.g., Dankers, âNederland en China,â 30â34; Van der Heijden, De dans van de leeuw en de draak, 45â56.
Hou, Foreign Investment, 229â230 (tables 48â49).
This figure includes direct investments in China by Royal Dutch Shell (an Anglo-Dutch joint venture controlled by the Dutch parent company), estimated at 25 million US dollars, as well as 50% of direct investments in China by Unilever (an Anglo-British firm jointly controlled by the joint-venture partners), estimated at 0.5 million US dollars. Discounting these investments, which were effectively managed by British representatives in China, would reduce the amount of direct Dutch investments in China to a mere 10 million US dollars. Remer, Foreign Investments, 76, 658; Hou, Foreign Investment, 17, 226; Van der Putten, Corporate Behaviour, 16.
When discounting Anglo-Dutch joint ventures, the Dutch share would be less than 1% of total foreign investment; Remer, Foreign Investments, 76; Van der Putten, Corporate Behaviour, 17â18.
Van der Putten, Corporate Behaviour, 17.
Between 1915 and 1937, the Dutch Harbor Construction Company was involved in large-scale dredging and construction of new harbors at Yantai (1915â1921), Macao (1922â1929), Huludao (1930â1931), and Lianyungang (1933â1937). The work at Lianyungang was nearly completed when in 1937 the project had to be abandoned because of the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Dutch China Syndicate was engaged in the construction of the easternmost section of the Longhai Railway between Xuzhou and Haizhou (LianyunÂgang) from 1921 to 1927. Ibid., 159â174, 180â184; Boot, Havens bouwen, 45â49.
Van der Putten, Corporate Behaviour, 20.
Speech by the Chinese minister to the Netherlands given on 4 May 1935; see âChinaâs taak tot unificatie door wederopbouw,â Algemeen handelsblad, 7 May 1935, 2.
Dankers, âNederland en China,â 32.
Ibid.
Speech given by the Chinese minister to the Netherlands on 4 May 1935; see âChinaâs taak tot unificatie door wederopbouw,â Algemeen handelsblad, 7 May 1935, 2; data from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek), <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/70792NED/table?fromstatweb> (last accessed 30 June 2019).
Dankers, âNederland en China,â 33.
See n. 54 above.
Speech given by the Chinese minister to the Netherlands on 5 May 1934; see Leiden University Library, Special Collections, TLVKL, D H 1821; âOnze economische betrekkingen met China,â Vaderland, 7 May 1934, 1.
For an analysis of these developments, see an internal report dated 28 January 1937 by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, âEenige aanteekeningen betreffende den economiÂsche en financieelen toestand van Chinaâ (NNA 2.06.001/7730).
On 3 April 1935, Hart had an audience with Wang Jingwei, concurrently president of the Executive Yuan (head of government) and acting foreign minister. That same night, Wang hosted a dinner for the Dutch official at the Foreign Ministry, which was attended by several other Chinese government leaders, including Minister of Industry Chen Gongbo éå ¬å and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Xu Mo å¾è°. During his brief stay in Nanjing, Hart had separate meetings with several influential Chinese public figures such as Finance Minister H.H. Kung (Kong Xiangxi å祥ç) and delegate to the National Economic Council, T.V. Soong (Song Ziwen å®åæ). For details of Hartâs trip, see NNA 2.05.90/442.
For Hartâs conclusions and recommendations, see a summary dated 14 September 1935 (NNA 2.05.90/579) and his advice (no. 1714/HP) regarding overseas trade representation dated 31 December 1935 (NNA 2.05.90/160). See also Duynstee, âDe reis van Hart naar Tokio,â 152.
Summary of resolution (no. 27) dated 17 July 1935 by the governor-general of the Dutch East Indies, appended to letter (no. 1763b/A/B) of the same date from the Dutch East Indies government to the Chinese consul general at Batavia (NNA 2.05.90/579).
The representative was a statistician from the ministryâs Bureau of Foreign Trade by the name of Hou Houji 侯åå; letter (no. 3270) dated 2 October 1935 from the Dutch consul general at Shanghai, G.W. Boissevain, to the Dutch East Indies government (NNA 2.05.90/579).
In a letter (no. 2298) dated 13 November 1936 to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch minister at Beijing inquired after the results of the commissionâs deliberations and requested related information (NNA 2.05.90/579). The relevant archives do not contain a reply to this letter.
Members of the delegation included J.E. van Hoogstraten, head of the Trade Office of the Department of Economic Affairs; Baron E.O. van Boetzelaer, vice-director (adjunct-refeÂrendaris) of the general secretaryship of the Dutch East Indies administration; and Dr. W.A.F. Stokhuyzen, president of the Netherlands Indies Association of Importers and Wholesalers. After unsuccessful talks in Tokyo, the delegation visited China again on its way back to Batavia.
Letters (nos. 1856/137 and 2416/186) dated 7 June and 24 July 1937 from the Dutch acting consul general at Shanghai, L.A. Gastman, to the Dutch minister at Beijing, G.W. de Vos van Steenwijk.
In the spring of 1937, the head of the East Asian Affairs Office in Batavia, A.H.J. Lovink, made a three-month tour to Japan, Korea, and China to study the political and economic conditions in these countries and implications for the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies. Reports of the trip have been preserved in NNA 2.05.90/582.
A.C. van der Zwan, âDe geschiedenis van de Nederlandse consulaire vertegenwoordiging in Hong Kong,â unpublished internal study (B-2015.1419) by the research unit of the Documentary Information Systems Service of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 1996, 3.
Kersten and Van der Zwan, âThe Dutch Consular Service,â 283, 286â289.
Kersten, Buitenlandse zaken in ballingschap, 87â90.
De Graeff and Klaassen, âVoor u persoonlijk,â 4.
Zhou Yong and Zhang (Chang), Zouxiang pingdeng, 18â19, 279â281.
Ibid.; Chinese Year Book, 1935â36, 418â423.
Apart from the Netherlands, these countries included Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and SwitzerÂland. Chinese Year Book, 1935â36, 418â423; Staatsalmanak for the years 1927â1936.
In 1928, the Nationalist government at Nanjing began to attempt to raise its relations with the major Western powers to ambassadorial level. By the end of 1936, the following countries were represented in China on the level of ambassador (listed in the order in which their first ambassadors presented their credentials in China): Soviet Union (9 August 1924), Italy (25 January 1935), Japan (14 June 1935), Great Britain (15 June 1935), Germany (14 September 1935), United States (17 September 1935), and France (9 July 1936). See Zhou Yong and Zhang (Chang), Zouxiang pingdeng, 18â19, 279â281.
The celebrations took place in November 1894. In the absence of Minister Ferguson, who had returned to the Netherlands, the Dutch government was represented at the imperial audience in the Forbidden City by the German minister. Several months later, on 14 February 1895, Oudendijk had a rare audience with the Guangxu Emperor during the first-ever New Year reception in China for the diplomatic body. See Oudendyk, Ways and By-ways, 48â57.
Ibid., 321.
Ibid., 326, 370. See also âThe Dean Goes Home,â Peking and Tientsin Times, 22 May 1931.
After 1931, Oudendijkâs last year in office, the diplomatic body no longer dealt with matters related to the Boxer Protocol. Its role was reduced to the administration of the Legation Quarter and matters of diplomatic protocol. Van der Putten, âDiplomatieke cultuur,â 168.
When the diplomatic body was still functioning, the archives were kept at the diplomatic mission of the incumbent doyen and thus followed the rotating presidency. As a result of Oudendijkâs long-term presidency of the diplomatic body, the archives were stored for many years at the Dutch legation in Beijing. After the war, the archives returned to the Dutch diplomatic mission when Ambassador Lovink succeeded his British colleague as the doyen of the foreign diplomatic body. In the summer of 1951, the Dutch diplomatic representative at Beijing, N.A.J. de Voogd, following consultation with the Swedish ambassador and the British chargé dâaffaires, transferred the archives to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague. In 2008, the archives were consigned to the Netherlands National Archives, where they are accessible to the public. See NNA 2.05.322; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, âDe Nederlandse compound in Peking,â unpublished internal study (B-2015.678) by the research unit of the Documentary Information Systems Service of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 1960, 4.
Seeâ<https://blogs.princeton.edu/reelmudd/2010/08/trip-to-attend-the-interment-of-sun-yat-sen-1929> (last accessed 30 June 2019).
For Oudendijkâs engaging account of the events surrounding Sun Yat-senâs funeral, see his letter (no. 990/178) dated 10 June 1929 to The Hague (NNA 2.05.19/276); and Oudendyk, Ways and By-ways, 364â367.
Oudendyk, Ways and By-ways, 370.
Note dated 28 February 1931 from Oudendijk to Wang (AH 020000006397A, 6â7).
Through a diplomatic note dated 21 March 1931 the Waijiaobu confirmed that the Chinese government consented to Thorbeckeâs appointment. The appointment was formalized by a royal decree dated 8 June 1931, no. 39 (NNA 2.05.90/155).
W. Thorbecke, One of the Greatest Generation, 4â5.
A copy of the letter of credence, dated 4 August 1931, signed by Queen Wilhelmina and countersigned by Foreign Minister Beelaerts van Blokland, along with related documents, has been preserved at the Academia Historica (AH 020000006397A, 7â42). See also NNA 2.05.90/858 for a copy of the letter. An account of the ceremony, along with copies of the speeches given during the ceremony by Thorbecke and Chiang, can be found in NNA 2.05.90/155.
W. Thorbecke, One of the Greatest Generation, 6. The compound was located at no. 24 Legation Street (Dong Jiao Min Xiang ä¸äº¤æ°å··). On the main house, designed by the Dutch architect Pierre Cuypers, see also the introduction above.
C.C. Chu, âDiplomatic Quarter in Peiping,â 205â209; Zhou Yong and Zhang (Chang), ZouÂxiang pingdeng, 19, 280.
These were the only two powers represented in Chinaâs diplomatic body that had already lost their extraterritorial rights. Zhou Yong and Zhang (Chang), Zouxiang pingdeng, 19, 280â281.
The ten diplomatic missions seated in Beiping were those of Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Great Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United States. Domiciled at Shanghai were the diplomatic missions of Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Two were headquartered in Nanjing. Many embassies and legations also had branch offices or permanent representatives at one or more of these cities (Beiping, Shanghai, Nanjing) other than where they were headquartered. Ibid.
When shortly after his arrival in China, Thorbecke expressed his intention to pay regular visits to the capital in order to keep in close contact with Chinaâs political leaders, the Dutch foreign minister urged him to limit the number and duration of his trips to Nanjing to reduce costs. Letter (no. 2044/376) dated 16 November 1931 from Thorbecke to the Dutch minister of foreign affairs at The Hague, A.C.D. de Graeff, and the latterâs reply (no. 5314/194) dated 3 December 1931 (NNA 2.05.90/155).
Letter dated 8 November 1934 from Thorbecke to Xu Mo (NNA 2.05.90/159).
In December, Bos took temporary lodgings at Dafang Xiang 大æ¹å··, no. 4 Sitiao Xiang åæ¡å··; letter (no. 17/7) dated 4 December 1934 from Bos to De Vos van Steenwijk (NNA 2.05.90/159).
Duyvendak, De hangende drievoet, 146â147.
The original lease contract signed between owner Zhang Guangqi å¼ å å» (Kuangchi C. Chang) and the Dutch legation has been preserved in NNA 2.05.90/159.
Letter (no. 327/11) dated 31 July 1935 from Bos to De Vos van Steenwijk (NNA 2.05.90/159).
Letter (no. 1535/181) dated 13 June 1935 from De Vos van Steenwijk to De Graeff (NNA 2.05.90/159).
Letter (no. 2/2) dated 25 September 1931 (NNA 2.05.19/277; 2.05.90/155).
Cable (no. 1442) dated 27 August 1931 from De Vos van Steenwijk to Batavia (NNA 2.05.90/155).
The consortium was founded in 1934 as a Dutch public limited liability company under the name N.V. Maatschappij voor Internationalen Handel, also known as the InterÂnationaal Handelsconsortium. The company was dissolved in 1939. Baart, âAktiviteiten van het Nederlands bedrijfsleven in China,â 36, 45n37. See also HIA 68042, Jin Wensi Papers, box 1, folder 2, interview no. 41.
After her marriage to Thorbecke, she would publish several books and photographic works on China and Hong Kong under the name Ellen Thorbecke. For her 1935 book, People in China, featuring 32 close-up portraits of Chinese people, Willem Thorbecke wrote a brief introduction on Chinese history and society.
W. Thorbecke, One of the Greatest Generation, 6â8; De Graeff and Klaassen, âVoor u persoonlijk,â 16n19, 23n40.
Letters dated 17 February, 19 February, and 1 March 1935 from De Graeff to his friend Count J.P. van Limburg Stirum, who then served as the Dutch minister in Berlin; De Graeff and Klaassen, âVoor u persoonlijk,â 85, 87â88.
De Graeff and Klaassen, âVoor u persoonlijk,â 85, 87â88. See also ibid., 23â24n40.
W. Thorbecke, One of the Greatest Generation, 9; De Graeff and Klaassen, âVoor u persoonlijk,â 115n194.
Note dated 28 March 1935 from Thorbecke to Wang Jingwei (AH 020000006397A, 100â101; NNA 2.05.90/155); letter (no. 828/19) dated 28 March 1935 from Thorbecke to the Dutch legation secretary at Nanjing, H. Bos (NNA 2.05.90/941).
âNew Netherlands Envoy Appointed,â Peiping Chronicle, 27 April 1935 (NNA 2.05.90/941); âHelan xinren zhu Hua gongshiâ è·èæ°ä»»é§è¯å ¬ä½¿, Zhongyang ribao ä¸å¤®æ¥å ±, 27 April 1935 (NNA 2.05.90/155).
For details, see NNA 2.05.90/154.
Cable dated 13 April 1935 from Bos to the legation at Beiping (NNA 2.05.90/941).
âNew Netherlands Minister Arrives in Shanghai,â Central News Agency, 11 August 1935 (NNA 2.05.90/941).
Letter (no. 2727) dated 12 August 1935 from Groenman to Bos; âXin He shi jinri jin Jingâ æ°è·ä½¿ä»æ¥æ京, clipping from unidentified Chinese newspaper, 13 August 1935 (NNA 2.05.90/941).
âNew Netherlands Minister Here Tomorrow,â Central Daily News, 13 August 1935; âNetherÂlands Minister Arrives in Nankingâ and âNetherlands Minister Calls on Hsu Mo,â Central Daily News, 14 August 1935 (NNA 2.05.90/941).
Report by De Vos van Steenwijk dated 21 August 1935, attached to letter (no. 2990) dated 4 September 1935 from the new consul general at Shanghai, G.W. Boissevain, to Bos (NNA 2.05.90/941).
Apart from De Vos van Steenwijk, these envoys included the first German ambassador, Oscar P. Trautmann, who presented his credentials on 14 September, and the first American minister, Nelson T. Johnson, who did the same on 17 September. Chinese Yearbook, 1936â37, 1525.
Letter dated 6 September 1935 from De Vos van Steenwijk to Bos (NNA 2.05.90/941).
Bosch van Drakestein had been transferred because his term had been fully served. Foreign Minister De Graeff was happy to remove him from his post in Beijing, as rumors had been circulating in diplomatic circles about alleged promiscuity and misbehavior on the part of the Dutch secretary and his superior. Bosch van Drakestein divorced his first wife and remarried in Beijing in 1934. De Graeff and Klaassen, âVoor u persoonlijk,â 77.
Letter (no. 363/115) dated 3 September 1935 from Bos to De Vos van Steenwijk (NNA 2.05.90/941).
A copy of the letter of credence, dated 25 May 1935, signed by Queen Wilhelmina and countersigned by Foreign Minister De Graeff, has been preserved at the Academia Historica (AH 020000006397A, 55). For a copy of the letter and details of the ceremony, see also NNA 2.05.90/858; Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao, 1935, vol. 2, 561â562.
AH 020000006397A, 71â75; Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao, 1935, vol. 2, 561â562.
Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao, 1935, vol. 2, 561â562.
Letter dated 11 June 1936 from De Vos van Steenwijk to Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Qun å¼ ç¾¤ (NNA 2.05.90/160; 941).
In 1658 the Dutch republic was the first European state to codify its consular system, having sent its first consul overseas as early as 1584; Muij-Fleurke and Plantinga, âHulp in het buitenland,â 124, 331n2.
Kersten and Van der Zwan, âThe Dutch Consular Service,â 279.
Letter (no. 2551/356) dated 21 October 1935 from De Vos van Steenwijk to De Graeff (NNA 2.05.90/160), 1.
Kersten and Van der Zwan, âThe Dutch Consular Service,â 290â293.
Van Dongen, Tussen neutraliteit en imperialisme, 62â63, 360.
Ibid., 360, 366.
Ibid., 366â368.
Staatsalmanak, 1901, 59.
Staatsalmanak, 1915, 63.
For an overview of the historical development of the Dutch consulate general at Hong Kong, also containing valuable information on the Dutch consular representation in (South) China, see Van der Zwan, âDe geschiedenis van de Nederlandse consulaire vertegenwoordiging in Hong Kong.â For original documents on the Dutch consulates in Hong Kong and Macao, see NNA 2.05.90/27, 29, 186â187, 706, 708; 2.05.27.01.
Van der Zwan, âDe geschiedenis van de Nederlandse consulaire vertegenwoordiging in Hong Kong,â 14, 16â17, 23â24.
If one does not count Dutch consular representation in European countries, the Dutch government maintained a larger number of consulates only in Brazil, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union; Staatsalmanak, 1928, 79â93; Staatsalmanak, 1938, 81â97.
Chinese Year Book, 1935â36, 425â427; Chinese Year Book, 1940â41, 800â803.
Letter (no. 2551/356) dated 21 October 1935 from De Vos van Steenwijk to De Graeff (NNA 2.05.90/160).
Muij-Fleurke and Plantinga, âHulp in het buitenland,â 130â131; Kersten and Van der Zwan, âDutch Consular Service,â 295.
Letter (no. 36794) dated 9 January 1936 from De Graeff to the Dutch minister of colonies, H. Colijn; letter (no. 6685/41) dated 18 March 1936 from De Graeff to De Vos van Steenwijk (NNA 2.05.90/160).
Its full name was Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen (Office of the Affairs of All Countries).
Chinese Year Book, 1937, 280â282. See also Zhou Yong and Zhang (Chang), Zouxiang pingÂdeng, 21, 283â284.
Strauss, Strong Institutions, 152â153, 167â178.
Ibid.; Dikötter, Age of Openness, 55â56.
Chinese legations were established in the following capitals: London, Paris, Rome, AmsterÂdam, Berlin, Vienna, Bern, Brussels, Madrid, Lisbon, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Warsaw, and Prague in Europe; Washington, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Mexico City, Havana, Panama City, and Santiago in the Americas; and Tokyo in Asia. Zhuwai shilingguan zhiyuan lu, 1932 (AS).
New legations had been established in Helsinki and Ankara. The legations in Rome, Tokyo, London, Berlin, Washington, and Paris had been successively upgraded to embasÂsies. Chinese Year Book, 1936â37, 1520â1524; C.C. Chu, âDiplomatic Quarter in Peiping,â 209â211.
Zhu and Yang, Zhonghua minguo shi, vol. 4, 330.
Ibid., 335.
Diplomatic note (no. 461) dated 16 June 1928 from the Chinese legation at The Hague to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NNA 2.05.18/399).
The relevant archives do not reveal how the Dutch government responded to the note. It seems plausible that only a confirmation of receipt was sent to the Chinese legation, in line with the suggestion previously offered by Oudendijk; letter (no. 1247/207) dated 10 August 1928 from Oudendijk to Beelaerts in reply to the latterâs letter (no. 22497/113) dated 24 July 1928 (NNA 2.05.18/399).
âDe Chineesche gezant,â Vaderland, 12 October 1927, 11; âDe Chineesche gezant de Den Haag,â Rotterdamsch nieuwsblad, 14 December 1927, 13.
âDe Nationalistische regeering,â Algemeen handelsblad, 25 June 1928, 2.
âDe Chineesche nationale feestdag,â Nieuwe Rotterdamsche courant, 11 October 1928, 1.
âHerdenkingsfeest op de Chineesche legatie,â Vaderland, 10 October 1928, 11.
Letter (no. 280/59) dated 8 February 1929 from Oudendijk to Beelaerts (NNA 2.05.18/399; 2.05.90/133).
Note (no. 514) dated 6 March 1929 from Dai Mingfu to Beelaerts (NNA 2.05.18/399); âDiplomatieke diensten,â Algemeen handelsblad, 4 July 1929, 5.
Since 1921, the chancery of the Chinese legation had been located at no. 18 Bezuidenhout. In August 1929, the offices were moved to no. 45 Koninginnegracht. In April 1931, the chancery was shifted to no. 54 in the same street. Untitled notification, Vaderland, 28 May 1921, 2; âChineesche legatie,â Algemeen handelsblad, 14 August 1929, 2; âDiplomatie,â Vaderland, 16 April 1931, 1.
HIA 68042, Jin Wensi Papers, box 1, folder 1, interview no. 1.
Letter (no. 1315/185) dated 29 May 1933 from Thorbecke to De Graeff (NNA 2.05.18/399); âDe nieuwe Chineesche gezant,â Vaderland, 8 September 1933, 1.
Letter (no. 1315/185) dated 29 May 1933 from Thorbecke to De Graeff (NNA 2.05.18/399); âDe nieuwe Chineesche gezant,â Vaderland, 8 September 1933, 1.
Jin Wensi, Waijiao gongzuo, 23. See also âChinaâs zaak voor den Volkenbond,â Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië, 22 September 1932.
Letter dated 20 April 1933 from Foreign Minister Luo Wengan to Thorbecke; cable (no. 17) dated 24 April 1933 from Thorbecke to The Hague (NNA 2.05.90/133).
Letter (no. 1315/185) dated 29 May 1933 from Thorbecke to De Graeff; note (no. 778) dated 29 May 1933 from Dai Mingfu to De Graeff (NNA 2.05.18/399; 2.05.90/133).
HIA 68042, Jin Wensi Papers, box 1, folder 1, interview no. 1; Jin Wensi, Waijiao gongzuo, 24; âDe Chineesche gezant,â Algemeen handelsblad, 12 August 1933, 2.
For a detailed account of Kingâs credentials presentation ceremony, see HIA 68042, Jin Wensi Papers, box 1, folder 1 (âAudience with Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, September 2nd, 1933, at 5 oâclock p.m., at the Palace du Noordeinde, The Hagueâ); Jin Wensi, Waijiao gongzuo, 26â28. See also âOntvangst van gezanten ten hove,â Algemeen handelsblad, 3 September 1933, 5; âTwee nieuwe gezanten,â Algemeen handelsblad, 4 September 1933, 4 (containing pictures).
For the full text of Kingâs address as well as the queenâs reply, see NNA 2.05.18/399 and HIA 68042, folder 1.
The original handwritten letter of credence, dated 15 June 1933, signed by President Lin Sen and countersigned by Foreign Minister Luo Wengan, as well as a French translation and other related documents, has been preserved at the Netherlands National Archives (NNA 2.05.18/866).
HIA 68042, Jin Wensi Papers, box 1, folder 1, interview no. 5; âDe heer Wunsz King naar Genève,â Algemeen handelsblad, 26 September 1933, 5; âGezant van China terug uit Genève,â Algemeen handelsblad, 30 October 1933, 13.
âDiner bij de Chineesche legatie,â Vaderland, 31 January 1934, 6.
During the first stages of the War of Resistance against Japan, General Yang Jie was sent to Moscow to secure military aid. He subsequently served as Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union.
âChineesche autoriteiten bij Fokker,â Vaderland, 4 April 1934, 2.
The exhibition later moved to the Hague Municipal Museum; see âTentoonstelling Chineesche kunst,â Vaderland, 3 June 1934, 9.
The works were on display in Amsterdam for about one month. In early June, the exhibition was moved to the Hague Municipal Museum. âExpositie van hedendaagsche Chineesche schilderkunst,â Telegraaf, 19 April 1934, 2; âTentoonstelling Chineesche kunst,â Vaderland, 3 June 1934, 9.
âHedendaagsche kunst van China,â Telegraaf, 6 May 1934, 5; âModerne Chineesche schilderkunst,â Vaderland, 6 May 1934, 2.
A 13-page typed copy of the full text of Kingâs address (in English) has been preserved in the Special Collections of the Leiden University Library (TLVKL, D H 1821). For a synopsis in Dutch, see âOnze economische betrekkingen met China,â Vaderland, 7 May 1934, 1.
âChinaâs taak tot unificatie door wederopbouw,â Algemeen handelsblad, 7 May 1935, 2; âNederland en China,â Vaderland, 7 May 1935, 13.
âTooneel en Chineesche thee,â Algemeen handelsblad, 12 September 1935, 9.
âDe geborduurde bal,â Algemeen handelsblad, 14 September 1935, 6.
âOntvangst in de Chineesche legatie,â Vaderland, 11 October 1935, 5; âReceptie in de Chineesche legatie,â Telegraaf, 11 October 1935, 10.
âChineesche legatie in de residentie,â Banier, 14 February 1936, 4.
âEen interview met den Chineesche gezant,â Het nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië, 2 September 1936, 22. See also HIA 68042, Jin Wensi Papers, box 1, folder 2, interview no. 64.
Ministry of Information of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, China Handbook, 1943, lxiii.
F.T. Cheng, East and West, 116.
L.P. Xia, âChinaâs Consular Service Reform,â 199.
Chinese Year Book, 1935â36, 1928â1936.
Zhu and Yang, Zhonghua minguo shi, vol. 4, 333, 339â342; L.P. Xia, âChinaâs Consular Service Reform,â 200.
Li Enhan, Dongnanya huaren shi, 329.
Staatsalmanak, 1913, 56.
Staatsalmanak, 1917, 54; Staatsalmanak, 1928, 71.
Annexes to letter (no. 289) dated 21 November 1922 from the Minister Oudendijk to the Dutch minister of foreign affairs (NNA 2.05.90/133); Staatsalmanak, 1924, 66. During the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Dutch-Chinese treaty of 1945, described below in chapter 4, one of the members of the Dutch negotiation team noted that âit is unclear pursuant to which agreement China had a consul in Amsterdam.â See âVergelijking van Chineesch met Nederlandsch Ontwerp-Verdrag,â undated memorandum (est. March 1943) from the Dutch consul general at Shanghai, G.W. Boissevain (NNA 2.05.80/1098), 3.
Staatsalmanak, 1931, 67; Zhuwai shilingguan zhiyuan lu, 1932, 27 (AS).
The four powers were Britain, including its many dominions and colonies worldwide, where the Chinese government maintained 16 Chinese consulates; the Soviet Union, with a number of Chinese consulates varying between 6 and 13; the United States, with 9; and Japan, with 8â9. See Zhuwai shilingguan zhiyuan lu, 1932 (AS); Chinese Year Book, 1935â36, 1928â1936.
These were Belgium and France. Britain, Germany, and Denmark had the same number of consulates in the East Indies as China. See Staatsalmanak, 1932, 67â77; Staatsalmanak, 1936, 71â81.