Robert K. Mertonâs tentative taxonomy of the âinstructively ambiguousâ categories of âexcellenceâ and ârecognitionâ features the Nobel Prize as an example of the couple âexcellence as performance/recognition as honorificâ.1 In this connection, Merton raises the problem of what the performance to be recognised should look like. In the sciences, he concludes, the single achievement (as opposed to âlife-workâ2) seems to be the standard, although what this means is far from self-evident.
Alfred Nobelâs three famous criteria for a prize-worthy achievement (ârecencyâ, âbenefit to mankindâ and âdiscoveryâ) have equally proven difficult to handle, requiring progressive adjustments (see the Introduction to this volume). In situations of real-life complexity, Mertonâs taxonomy of ârecognitionâ and âexcellence as performanceâ shows its analytical limit, as do Nobelâs criteria. Even in early, apparently simple, cases of undivided awards, the stumbling block of the âindividual discoveryâ had made itself perspicuous, as shown by the lengthy debate over Ivan Pavlovâs3 or Paul Ehrlichâs award,4 demonstrating how problematic the âsnapshotâ conception of discovery can be. One is here reminded of Roland Barthesâ concept of âpunctumâ,5 â[the] element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces [us]â. The âpunctumâ is what commands our attention and makes us notice an image. This event, however, can only be perceived as such within the less perspicuous framework of an educated and idiosyncratic approach, which he calls âstudiumâ, and is the âapplication to a thing [â¦] a kind of general, enthusiastic commitment, but without special acuityâ.6 Transposed to the problem at hand, the âpunctumâ can be abruptly translated as â(beneficial) discoveryâ, whereas âstudiumâ becomes the set of conditions that makes the achievement recognised as a great
In what follows, we will attempt the analysis of one famous Nobel laureate from a perspective complementary to that of the binomial excellence/recognition, namely, that of âauthorityâ. Although no less ambiguous than the couple it is intended to replace, the concept we propose is just as productive: it allows to consider the co-evolution of discovery7 (individual level) and honorific recognition (community), their articulation, the process of maturation of both the knowledge claims and technical innovations that are considered âdiscoveriesâ, and the general and local criteria that sanction them as such. In other words, we will try in this case to show the inevitable interdependence of âpunctumâ and âstudiumâ.
The case is the 1963 award given to the Australian physiologist John C. Eccles (1903â1997), with Alan L. Hodgkin and Andrew F. Huxley, âfor their discoveries concerning the ionic mechanisms involved in excitation and inhibition in the peripheral and central portions of the nerve cell membraneâ. The focus will be on Eccles, the first in the official list of the awardees, a towering figure in the history of neurophysiology and the neurosciences.8
Conversion and the Creation of Authority
Ecclesâ scientific upbringing took place between 1927 and 1937, in a Mecca of physiological science, the Oxford laboratory of Charles Scott Sherrington, where he directly participated in the completion and refinement of his masterâs life-work on spinal reflexes, rewarded with a Nobel Prize in 1932. In the eyes of his pupil, the old âfigureheadâ of British science9 was an authority in every sense, a model he tried to follow and match, also beyond the laboratory walls. Eccles borrowed the masterâs experimental approach, integrative outlook,10 and focus on inhibition as a bona fide physiological mechanism.11
As a consequence of his collaboration with Sherrington, in a series of studies on the summation of impulses at the synapse in the early 1930s, Eccles became involved13 in one of the harshest controversies in the history of neurophysiology: the dispute over the nature (chemical or electrical) of synaptic transmission, aka âthe war of the soups and the sparksâ.14 The hypothesis, championed since the 1910s by some pharmacologists, that acetylcholine played a central role in the transmission of the nerve impulse at every level (neuromyal junction and spinal neurones) had met fierce resistance from âproperâ neurophysiologists, who favoured a physical (electrical) interpretation in analogy with the mechanism of conduction along the axon.
Eccles quickly rose to the leadership of the electrical side. His knowledge of the physiology of reflexes, experimental ingenuity and pugnacity made him, in the words of a witness, âthe one to whom all the non-believers made reference when they had run out of argumentsâ.15 He approached the problem at the level of the neuromuscular junction, sensory ganglia and motor cells, piling a mountain of evidence against a hypothesis which he considered insufficient to account for the essential quantitative details (speed, summative character) of synaptic transmission. The main theatre of the dispute were the meetings of the Physiological Society, where he staged memorable fights with the leading âchemagonistâ16 and future Nobel laureate (1936) Henry H. Dale and associates, often to the embarrassment of the session chairs. The personal relations among the fighters, however, and especially those between Eccles and Dale, were not in the least harmed, as is testified by the eyewitness Bernhard Katz (1996) and the correspondence among the protagonists (fraught with military metaphors).17 Dale and his group privately and publicly acknowledged the beneficial effect of Ecclesâ criticism (forcing them to refine experimentation and theory to meet the standards of the neurophysiologists), as well as the balance and measure he displayed in the occasional role of the reviewer.18
At a most delicate juncture in his career, as the electrical theory of synaptic transmission was progressively buried under a snowfall of contrary evidence,22 Eccles came under the spell of the philosopher Karl Popper. According to his own, oft-repeated account23 Popper liberated him from the âinductive dogmaâ, persuading him of the necessity of clear-cut hypotheses, and that falsification of oneâs own theories is not a shame. With his guidance, Eccles set to work to formulate a theoretical version of his electrical hypotheses of synaptic excitation24 and inhibition,25 with predictions and possible tests, and then tried to disprove them. The inhibition theory was the first to fall under the fire âof his own Popperian architectâ,26 in a fateful summer night of 1951. The model was based on the competition between the sensory stimuli (excitatory), and the interfering action of some short-axon interneurones, the âGolgi cellsâ, which, once activated by collaterals of afferent axons, subliminally depolarized the motoneurone, making it inert to the following trains of impulses from the receptors. Critical to the testing of this hypothesis was a technical novelty, intracellular electrodes â electrical probes with a tip so fine that it could be inserted into a vertebrate neurone, allowing direct measurement of its activity. Eccles chose to âimpaleâ the large and relatively well-known spinal motoneurones innervating the quadriceps muscle of the catâs thigh, the so-called âmonosynaptic pathwayâ, characterised by David P. Lloyd in the 1940s. The electrical hypothesis predicted a depolarisation the membrane, making the internal electrode
With this sudden move, General Eccles managed to successfully change sides without losing his grades. In this case, authority and conversion stand in a relation of simultaneous contrast, mutually enhancing their respective intensity. Since âsuch a high voltage spark as Ecclesâ32 had espoused the chemical theory, then it had to be not only true, but also universal. On the other hand, having âkill[ed] his own brainchildâ,33 and so effectively, made him not only a leader of the chemical side, but also a champion of proper scientific method.
Historiographical accounts of this event have been informed by this philosophical outlook, deducing the change in epistemic strategy from the epistemological conversion, and consequently magnifying the import of the  âcrucial experimentâ. A participant observer like Bacq34 casts the end of the âwarâ as early as 1945, the year Eccles met Popper. Others set it in 1952,35 the year the experiment was published.36 To Bennett âso concluded the long saga that
This âpunctumâ (the juxtaposition of epistemological-cum-epistemic change and crucial experiment), so forcefully catching the eye of retrospective observers, is not in itself deceiving. Yet, it can engender optical (intellectual) illusions, if we do not consider the underlying âstudiumâ. An assessment of the historical meaning of Ecclesâ work to neurophysiology, we argue, is better served by shifting the focus from the question of truth (what this one experiment demonstrated) to that of productivity (what the renovated experimental system allowed). From this perspective, Borck has compellingly shown that Ecclesâ conversion to falsificationism has always remained at best partial; that the âintegra[tion of] innovative methodsâ, often contributed by collaborators41 was of greater importance than his ânovel philosophical approachâ; and that the âcrucial experimentâ42 had not determined, but at best sanctioned the demise of the electrical dead horse. All of which leads us to the issue of conversion. There is no ground for contending that, subjectively, there was no such moment. What matters is rather how this happened, how Eccles had seen it coming, how he had already progressively adjusted his views43 and, finally, how he had found in the Popperian method a second chance he was quick to seize.44 In 1951, Borck argues, our hero âwas ready to give up on electrical transmission [â¦], as his experimental system was flying on autopilot by thenâ.45
Rather than by the disproof of a particular wrong hypothesis, the decisive change was brought by the coming of age of Ecclesâ own âmachine for making the futureâ,46 just as good for generating questions as it was for providing answers, in an endless resonance among different levels (theory; models;
Within this expanding system, the true nature of synaptic transmission was at best an important detail,59 also because the microelectrode experiments falsified Ecclesâ own electrical theory, not the (still widely held) conviction that synaptic transmission is electrical, or mainly so.60 The air was not as âsuddenly clearedâ after the 1951 experiment, as a historian would have it,61 also because the sharp incompatibility of the two mechanisms was a Popperian trick introduced by Eccles, rather than anyoneâs real persuasion. Finally, a few historiographers62 have remarked how the crucial experiment, regardless of whether it proved or disproved of any particular theory, was the first experimental demonstration that inhibition is a physiological process (hyperpolarisation of the membrane), independent from â and interacting with â excitation. The cornerstone of Sherringtonâs theory had been made visible, and was to provide the horizon for almost Ecclesâ entire experimental career.
The relevant question, then, is not what the âconversionâ purportedly closed (the âwarâ), but what it opened: a decade of staggeringly productive research, and an even longer period of diffusion, refinement and evolution
Attributing Authority. The Nobel Committee and Eccles
Ecclesâ âconvertedâ research programme put him almost at once in the spotlight of the Nobel committee. In the 10 years between 1952 (year of publication of the first experiment with Brock and Coombs) and his actual awarding, Eccles received about twenty nominations.63
The first came in January 1953 from the neurologist Richard Jung, who proposed him together with Paul Hoffmann, âfor their discovery of the principles and mechanisms of the transmission of excitation in the Central Nervous System [hereafter cns]â. Eccles was credited with the discovery of the âbasic mechanism of synaptic excitation and inhibition of neurones in the cnsâ and the extension of Hodgkinâs membrane model to the vertebrate neurone. Jung put a special emphasis on the quantitative side of Ecclesâ achievement, on his success in determining the basic facts about the transmission of the nerve impulse by working on structures and problems that were not his own exclusive province. Ecclesâ older works on synaptic excitation were also mentioned.
In case of a tripartition of the prize, Jung suggested that Hodgkin be included as well, in order to award all âthe most important discoveries in the field of General Physiologyâ. Ecclesâ dossier was handed over to his old Oxford colleague Ragnar Granit, whose final judgement was articulated.64 Ecclesâ pre-1951 contributions on excitation were considered not worthy of the prize, despite the undeniable contribution they provided to the overall picture of synaptic transmission.65 The more recent experiments on inhibition66 were instead considered of Nobel calibre: despite the technique of intracellular recording not having been developed in Ecclesâ laboratory, there it was first employed in the vertebrate cns, making the elements of synaptic transmission measurable.
In 1955 Eccles was proposed (with later Nobel laureate Ulf von Euler) by the physiologist Ernst Gellhorn, who emphasized the methodological value of his work, especially the âintroduction of intracellular electrodesâ.67 The review fell on Carl Gustaf Bernhard, Professor of Physiology at the Karolinska Institute. Drawing substantially from the previous yearâs review, Bernhard dismissed Ecclesâ pre-1951 production as not worth considering for a prize, and duly contextualised his use of intracellular electrodes within the history of this technique. He admired the success in recording from spinal motoneurones, but was doubtful of the candidateâs primacy in this accomplishment. Bernhard concurred with Granit on the import of the intracellular studies, especially the measurements of the resting and action potential they afforded and the perspectives they opened to the analysis of excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms. As to Ecclesâ model of inhibition, three issues remained: (1) the anatomical pathways supposedly mediating the phenomenon; (2) the possible measurement artefacts caused by intracellular recording; (3) the unequivocal derivation of inhibition from hyperpolarisation of the membrane. On none of these three points could Bernhard find sufficient consensus within the physiological community. As to the first problem, the âconversionâ experiments of 1951 seemed to have ruled out the action of interneurones, re-introduced in subsequent work (1953â1954).68 Moreover, Ecclesâ novel enthusiasm for the chemical hypothesis had failed to convince many âelectragonistsâ, including some of his former collaborators. As to the measurement artefacts, reasons for doubt were to be found in the very work of the candidate and of others. The same held for the exclusive relationship between hyperpolarisation and inhibition. Finally, Bernhard expressed reservations on the status of chemical âtransmittersâ in the cns: a number of publications (also by the reviewer) suggested that acetylcholine functioned rather as a modulator than as a transmitter. Despite Popper, the electrical hypothesis was alive, and firing. Bernhard concluded that a prize was still premature.
In 1958, the physiologist János Szentágothai from Pécs nominated Eccles for his work on central inhibition and excitation. The pharmacologist Franz Theodor von Brücke of Vienna also proposed him âas second nomineeâ after Hodgkin, with the same motivation, plus a reference to his work on Renshaw cells.69 In the light of the quantity of new material and problems, Granit
To Granit, once again, the excitation/inhibition mechanism was the kernel of Ecclesâ claim to immortality. Problems of interpretation remained, and perhaps the evidence substantiating the model was not decisive but, Granit stressed, it was the complexity of the experimental situation (recording from whole animals, with limited control of the medium conditions) that stood in the way of an unequivocal solution.74 No conclusive evidence that acetylcholine was the immediate cause of membrane depolarisation in excitation had been adduced, and therefore this part of the system had not âreached the required degree of clarity required for Nobel-class worksâ.75 The case for inhibition was to some extent stronger. Granit doubted that membrane hyperpolarisation was the only explanation for it, but acknowledged that different mechanisms would most likely constitute an exception.76 He stressed, however, that these objections were not meant to downplay Ecclesâ achievement: in both
In 1959, nominations came from J.H.F. Brotherston, on behalf of the Edinburgh Medical Faculty, David Whitteridge (Physiology, Edinburgh) and Peter Bishop (Physiology, Sydney). The collective statement stressed the intrinsic difficulty of Ecclesâs experiments, as well as the elegant simplicity of the theoretical framework. It also credited him with having done âmuch to reconcile the quantitative evidence on the electrical processesâ of nerve function in the cns, with âideas of chemical transmission as fertile, but hitherto expressed in less rigorous termsâ.79 Finally, Ecclesâ long association with Sherrington was mentioned, together with the nerve-muscle work with Katz and Kuffler.80
Whitteridgeâs nomination was a facsimile of Brotherstonâs, but added Hodgkin as a candidate co-recipient for his âdiscoveryâ of the sodium-mechanism of membrane excitation. âHis work on the isolated axonâ, Whitteridge commented,
although more restricted than that of Eccles, is more fundamental and therefore susceptible to a more rigorous experimental approach. Indeed, it has provided the [â¦] framework for the interpretation of Ecclesâ studies on the motoneurone.81
Bishop underscored both the unitary character of the nomineeâs work in the previous seven years and his single outstanding contributions to âthe cellular
Bernhard was entrusted with the investigation, and his concluding support to the candidature was this time untainted by doubt. He found his own 1955 objections all satisfactorily settled, thanks to the effort of Eccles himself, but also of others. Some objections still survived,88 and it was not possible to understate Ecclesâ own debt with other researchers (Fatt, Katz, Hodgkin, Huxley), whose âperipheralâ results he had extended to the cns.89 Nevertheless, the strength of his candidacy laid in having opened the cns to the microelectrode analysis, thus showing that this most complex system was in fact amenable to as thorough and precise an experimental study as were the more peripheral (and easier to isolate) motor axon of the squid and myoneural junction.
In 1960, there were four nominations, one from Walter Rudolf Hess (Zurich) and three from Freiburg, but no new review.90 Nevertheless, Norrby relates of a close competition that year, between McFarlane Burnet and Peter Medawar, on the one side, and Eccles and Horace W. Magoun, on the other, proposed for their achievements on excitation and inhibition and on the reticular formation of the brain-stem, respectively.91 Burnet and Medawar prevailed by a narrow majority, and received the Prize âfor their discovery of acquired immunological toleranceâ.92
Eccles was once again nominated in 1961, by H.N. Robson (Medicine, University of Adelaide), âfor his discoveries of the physical-chemical mechanisms of neuro-muscular functionâ and by Haldan Keffer Hartline (Rockefeller Institute), âfor his discoveries elucidating the mechanisms by means of which
In view of the 1962 prize, Dale, Ecclesâ friendly foe, took the matter in his hands.103 In December 1961 he wrote Eccles a letter requesting help,104 in the form of âa brief statement of [his] works during these relatively recent years, which would seem to [him] to have a proper importanceâ, and reprints. Daleâs claim was subdivided in five sections, covering Ecclesâ production since 1951 âand still in progressâ: (1) microelectrode investigations on motor nerve cells, which elucidated the excitation mechanism; (2) Post-synaptic inhibition in its interplay with excitation; (3) Pre-synaptic inhibition (discovered elsewhere, âbut almost the whole of its subsequent development has been due to the researches of Eccles and his teamâ); (4) Chemical synaptic transmission and pharmacology, being the confirmation of âDaleâs principleâ; (5) Plasticity in the nervous system.105
Dale emphasized the âimposing continuityâ and internal consistency of Ecclesâ production, which taken together constituted an organised attack to the complexity of synaptic action in the cns. He also digressed on Ecclesâ âconversionâ, recalling how âconspicuousâ he was âamong those [â¦] conservatively resistant and scepticalâ, how useful his criticism was to the improvement of the chemical theory, and how Dale himself later became
an enthusiastic admirer of his unswerving scientific honesty, together with the exquisite skill and ingenuity, which Eccles devoted to new experiments of his own for testing the possibility, which he had found so difficult to accept.106
But Ecclesâ achievement did not coincide with his simple conversion. His extension of the chemical hypothesis, the âconvincing simplification of the approach to the solution of what may well be still regarded as one of the ultimate problems of physiology and medicineâ, had âshown a new way of access, blasted
There was no investigation on Eccles for this year. Norrby, however, points at two contextual factors, which may have played against the Australian: the changing priorities following the disciplinary explosion at the Karolinska Institute in the late 1950s-early 1960s,108 and the fact that no less than 32 physiologists were proposed that year. So, following Aarne Tiseliusâ suggestion, the prize took again the direction of molecular studies.109 The 1962 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine went in fact to Watson, Crick and Wilkins for their discovery of the structure of dna. A âdue, or even overdueâ prize, Dale acknowledged to Ulf von Euler after the announcement.110 He was nevertheless unshaken in his determination to have Eccles recognised, and inquired about the procedure to renew the nomination. Which he did the
following month,111 updating the references and sharpening the motivation: [for] his work on the physiology of the nervous system, and, especially, on the modes of transmission of the nerve impulses at the synaptic junctions of the central nervous system. âIn any caseâ, he added,
I do not think that I need emphasize the significance of this more recent evidence for the still active progress of these immensely important investigations [â¦] in which Sir John Eccles has been so illustrious a pioneer.112
That year, Eccles was also nominated by Donald F. Magee, Professor of Pharmacology at the University of Seattle (WA), for the development of âbeautiful techniques for simultaneous stimulation of, injection of drugs into, and electrical recording from single cells within the central nervous systemâ: the double-barrelled microelectrode. In the preamble to his report (this time limited to Hodgkin, Huxley and Eccles), Granit stressed that there was âhardly any need for a special investigationâ,113 the only matter of discussion being the prize distribution.114 In summarising once again the achievements of the Canberra school (clear interpretation of the mechanisms of excitation and inhibition in the cns; introduction of the double-barrelled micropipette), he only added
In order to help the committee frame the candidates within the progress of physiological science, Granit integrated the report with the fourth chapter of his biography of Sherrington,116 devoted to the great intuitions of the Master confirmed by later research. He admitted the frame fitted Ecclesâ picture better than the othersâ, but it afforded a comprehensive view of the general problem. Saint Sherrington made the miracle. In 1963, Eccles, Hodgkin and Huxley (in this order) were finally canonised in Stockholm.
The Nature of âDiscoveryâ
Ecclesâ route to the Nobel Prize elicits a few considerations about the criteria of âdiscoveryâ, and âbenefit to mankindâ. As for the latter, only one nomination (Jung 1953) established a connection between Ecclesâ basic science and its medical complement (the neurologist Hoffmann). All the others testify to a reductive interpretation of âmankindâ as meaning âphysiologistsâ, and âbenefitâ as âground-breaking advanceâ. Such a narrowing of the Founderâs original intention is perhaps expected in the 1960s, after so much genetics and molecular biology. Then, we are left with the issue of âdiscoveryâ: what was Eccles nominated and awarded for, and how was his âindividualâ contribution framed within the development of physiology? On what, precisely, could Eccles be called an âauthorityâ of Nobel calibre? The question must be answered at two levels, of the nominators and of the reviewers, reflecting different roles and rationalities. Considering the nominators, no prevalent âdisciplinaryâ motivation for the proposals emerges from the documents we could access. In 1955, the physiologist Gellhorn singled out the development of the microelectrode technique, as did the physician Robson in 1961 and the pharmacologist Magee in 1963, but all the others gave pride of place Ecclesâ model of excitation and inhibition. In
As to the definition of âdiscoveryâ, the few nominators who tried to single out one contribution mentioned the introduction of microelectrodes in the cns (in which, however, Ecclesâ priority was disputable), the measurement of membrane potentials, or the clarification of the topology of impulse spread, which taken by themselves were not considered prize-worthy by the reviewers. Bishop (1959), Hartline (1961) and Dale (1962â63) explicitly framed the new data provided by Eccles within the âsynthesisâ he had made, equating it to a discovery. By âsynthesisâ they meant the model, the theory and the techniques, which had âinitiated an entirely new approachâ. Finally, a few considerations meet the eye, pertaining to the character, charisma and credibility of the candidate.117 Dale was the most explicit, but others before also praised his readiness to adjust his thought to the evidence, as well as an uncommon determination, which allowed him to beat, in so a crowded race, research centres much more central and better staffed than his own.
The reviews add two further layers of complexity: what counts as a given in evaluating scientific performance and the hierarchy of merit in the distribution of the prize. As to the first problem, the debate-at-a-distance between Granit and Bernhard on the confirmation of Ecclesâ model is instructive. In
As to the second point, it emerged in the last two collective reviews, in which prize-worthiness was no more an issue, but primacy was. On both occasions (1961 and 1963) the reviewer was Granit, and he reiterated the persuasion that Hodgkin and Huxley deserved either chronological or order- priority, in view of the more basic and exact nature of their achievements, and the greatest experimental rigour their system allowed. This seems more an epistemological yardstick, than anything related to âbenefit to mankindâ: in the comparison between an isolated system from a phylogenetically distant model and a whole-animal vertebrate system more complicated and less elegant, but arguably closer to its possible medical target, the first is preferred for the greater control of the variables it affords.118 Such an assessment appears also to contrast with a different angle, occasionally expressed by the nominators and both the reviewers: namely, the greater difficulty of Ecclesâ problem, and the greater skill, ingenuity and physiological wisdom required to solve it.
Enacting Authority. Eccles as a Nobelist
A good ten years older than his co-recipients, Eccles had still a decade of active research after canonisation. This allows us to attempt an analysis of three more facets of authority. First is the idea, well put by Duffin in this volume, that âlaureates find themselves expatiating on topics for which they have no expertise, including philosophy and politicsâ. Second is the extent of Ecclesâ own perception of himself as belonging to a new élite, and whether this made him
We consider Ecclesâ publishing and citation behaviour in roughly two decades before and after the Nobel (between 1952 â âconversionâ and move to the anu, and his retirement in 1975), as well as the eventual changes in recognition of his own work stemming from the citation behaviour of colleagues.119 In the period covered (1952â74) Eccles published two thirds of all his works, 442 articles, books, edited books or chapters (over a total of 642 listed in Freund et al. 2011. See Figure 7.1), which confirms his fame as a mighty productive writer. As to the topics covered (Figure 7.2), the âimposing continuityâ praised by Dale is confirmed. Throughout the period, in fact, he never ceased publishing on âhisâ topics (here subsumed under neurophysiology), and the rise of papers on the brain-stem after 1964 (although here separated from the classic spinal cord work) are safely regarded as an extension of his original approach, as to theoretical framework and method. The only major change we observe, apparently supporting Duffinâs claim of post-Nobel âexpatiationâ of Nobelists, is the increase of Ecclesâ writings on Mind-body relations, as well as on cultural evolution and Popperâs philosophy (subsumed under âHumanitiesâ).
Total number of pages published by John C. Eccles (journals or books). Sources: Düsseldorf Library Catalogue. See also Pieper-Scholz et al. 2011
Yearly production, J.C. Eccles, 1952â1974. Subdivided by major areas
Nevertheless, here the quantitative approach is fruitfully corrected by qualitative considerations. If these topics only appear sporadically before 1964, it is worth highlighting that the one 1953 publication in the field was the book The Neurophysiological Basis of the Mind. The Principles of Neurophysiology , Ecclesâ first attempt at providing a system of cellular neurophysiology.120 In that book, Descartes, Sherrington and Popper alternate with membrane constants, anatomical considerations and micrographs to make the case for a dualist physiology as âScience of Manâ. It was the lack of recognition for the truly scientific character of this attempt that started what Eccles called his âLong Interregnumâ, during which, however, he kept thinking and publicly speaking about the mind/body issue.121 Our very separation of the Mind/body and Humanities categories may be regarded as artificial, as one of the consequences of Ecclesâ philosophical conversion was exactly the attempt at giving Cartesian dualism the shape of a proper scientific hypothesis, as attested by the study-week he organised in 1964 for the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum.122 The problem, here, is that his concept of the relations between religion, culture, politics and
As to the citation behaviour, we tested whether Ecclesâ post-Nobel publications contain an enhanced number of references to laureates than his earlier papers, as a possible sign of his renovated self-perception as member of an élite. Here, in addition to 80 scientific articles from the decade before, and 83 from after the prize (i.e. those present in the Web Of Science database), we directly compared a 1961 review125 on synaptic transmission with the book The physiology of Synapses, which was an expansion of it, presented on the occasion of the award ceremony,126 and which contained almost twice as many references and referenced authors (roughly one-fourth of the added references only was due to updates. See Table 7.1). Both comparisons have born essentially negative results (Table 7.2).127 There is even a decrease in citations of Nobelists, both in comprehensive reviews (columns 3â4) and in research papers (column 2 vs 5), and pioneer papers were given more credit than their recent articles. Actually, Ecclesâ post-prize production even shows a considerable decrease in individual citations of Nobelists, with slight exceptions of Adrian and Eccles himself. This self-citation behaviour, also varying between original and review articles, remains almost stable due to be the centrality of Ecclesâ group within their domain of research, as well as the complexity of the research programme, which forced the researchers to work on each and every level of the problem (anatomy, physiology, chemistry etc.) in order to provide a clear picture. It is the steady development of Ecclesâ experimental system, his own question-producing machine, what can most likely explain this behaviour.
As to Ecclesâ perception by his peers, what can be gathered from citation analysis seems to rule out any notable Nobel-effect (Tab. 7.2 column 6; compare Chan 2014).133 At least some slight enhancement and consolidation can be traced in the Web of Science: Figure 7.3 compares the citation scores (to 1997) of
Citations of articles authored by Eccles as senior Non-Nobelist 1952â62 (h-index 53) vs articles by the Nobel lab researcher 1964â74 (h-index 38) vs all citations 1929â75. Data source: Web of Science Core Collection [8.6.2017]
Conclusion
This case-study can be considered exemplary of post-wwii trends, like the enhanced perception of basic science and of its medical import, the increased difficulty in singling out a âdiscoveryâ or a âdiscovererâ following the quantitative explosion of organised research, and the constantly shifting criteria of evaluation. Nevertheless, we are left with the legitimate suspicion that similar mechanisms may have been at work before in the history of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (Sherrington would be a case to investigate more closely, as well as Golgi and Cajal), and that very little confidence can be cast on any epoch-making watershed one would care to introduce. A different, larger-scale approach would be more effective in this connection.
As to the three instances of authority (in the making; during the evaluation; after being awarded) we have argued (following Borck135) that the greatest determinant of Ecclesâ rise in authority within his communities of reference was the potential of his experimental system, and the questions it engendered were more relevant than the answers it afforded. As far as the assessment of authority is concerned, the co-evolution of the criteria with the maturation of the experimental system has emerged, as well as the complex interplay of the primary criterion (discovery benefiting mankind) with contingent standards, wherein the former is reinterpreted but not obliterated. We have shown how, even in this case, the temptation of awarding âachievementsâ in general, instead than âdiscoveryâ in particular, has been resisted. Contrary to what the otherwise excellent Casey has argued (on the basis of Daleâs 1962 nomination, only, and of a suggestion by Ecclesâ old associate William Gibson), the Nobel
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Chantal Marazia for her invaluable assistance with (and criticism of) this chapter at various stages; to Cornelius Borck for his generosity with both encouragement and criticism. Files on Eccles in the Nobel Prize archive were
kindly provided by the Nobel Committee for Physiology or Medicine.
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Coombs J.S.; Eccles J.C.; Fatt P. 1955. âThe specific ionic conductances and the ionic movements across the motoneuronal membrane that produce the inhibitory post-synaptic potentialâ. The Journal of physiology 130 (2): 326â373.
Cousins N. 1985. Nobel Prize Conversations with Sir John Eccles, Roger Sperry, Ilya Prigogine, Brian Josephson. San Francisco: Saybrook.
Curtis D.R. and Andersen P. 2001. âSir John Carew Eccles, A.C. 27 January 1903â2 May 1997â. Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 47: 161â187.
Dale H.H. 1954. âThe beginnings and prospects of neurohumoral transmissionâ. Pharmacological Reviews 6 (1): 7â13.
Dupont J.C. 1999. Histoire de la Neurotransmission. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Eccles J.C. 1937. âSynaptic and neuro-muscular transmissionâ. Physiological Reviews 17 (4): 538â555.
Eccles J.C. 1945. âAn electrical hypothesis of synaptic and neuromuscular transmissionâ. Nature 156 (3971): 680â683.
Eccles J.C. 1946. âAn electrical hypothesis of synaptic and neuro-muscular transmissionâ. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 47 (1): 429â455.
Eccles J.C. 1947. âMan and Freedomâ. Twentieth Century 2: 5â23.
Eccles J.C. 1951. âHypotheses Relating to the BrainâMind Problemâ. Nature 168 (4263): 53â57.
Eccles J.C. 1952. âThe electrophysiological properties of the motoneuroneâ. Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 17: 175â183.
Eccles J.C. 1953. The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind: The Principles of Neurophysiology. The Waynflete Lectures, 1952. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Eccles J.C. 1957. The Physiology of Nerve Cells. The Herter Lectures, 1955. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Eccles J.C. 1964a. âIonic Mechanism of Postsynaptic Inhibitionâ. Science 145(3637): 1140â1147.
Eccles J.C. 1964b. The Physiology of Synapses .Berlin: Springer
Eccles J.C. 1966. âSome observations on the strategy of neurophysiological researchâ. In Nerve as a tissue, edited by Kaare Rodahl and Bela Issekutz Jr., 445â456. New York: Harper & Row.
Eccles J.C. (ed.) 1966a. Brain and conscious experience. Study week Sept. 28 to Oct. 4, 1964, of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum. New York: Springer.
Eccles J.C. 1970. Facing Reality: Philosophical adventures by a brain scientist. Basel: Roche (in collaboration with Springer Verlag).
Eccles J.C. 1974. âThe world of objective knowledgeâ. In The philosophy of Karl Popper, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 349â370. Open Court: La Salle.
Eccles J.C. 1975. âUnder the spell of the synapseâ. In The Neurosciences: Paths of Discovery, edited by Frederick G. Worden, Judith P. Swazey; George Adelman, 159â180. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
Eccles J.C. 1976. âFrom Electrical to Chemical Transmission in the Central Nervous Systemâ. Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 30 (2): 219â230.
Eccles J.C. 1977. âMy scientific odysseyâ. Annual review of physiology 39 (1): 1â20.
Eccles J.C. 1979. The Human Mystery (Gifford Lectures 1977â1978). Berlin: Springer.
Eccles J.C. 1980. The Human Psyche (Gifford Lectures 1978â1979). Berlin: Springer.
Eccles J.C. 1982. âThe synapse: from electrical to chemical transmissionâ. Annual Review of Neuroscience 5 (1): 325â339.
Eccles J.C. 1982a. âLife in Sherringtonâs laboratory: his last decade at Oxford 1925â1935â. Trends in Neurosciences 5: 108â110.
Eccles J.C. 1987. âThe story of the Renshaw cellâ. In Neurobiology of acetylcholine. Proceedings of a symposium held in honor of Alexander G. Karczmar, June 5â7, 1985, in Maywood Ill , edited by Nae J. Dun and Robert L. Perlman, 189â194 .New York/London: Plenum.
Eccles J.C. 1994. How the Self controls its Brain .Berlin: Springer.
Feldberg W. 1977. âAcetylcholine: Reminiscences of an Eye Witnessâ. In The Pursuit of Nature: Informal Essays on the History of Physiology, edited by Alan Lloyd Hodgkin, 65â83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fillenz M. 2000. âMemories of Sir John Eccles in New Zealandâ. In Sir John Eccles in MemoriamâA Tireless Warrior for Dualism, edited by Helena Eccles and Hans-Jürgen Biersack, 11â28 .Landsberg: Ecomed.
Fillenz M. 2012. âMemories of John Ecclesâ. Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 21 (2): 214â226.
Freund Hans-Joachim, Koppitz U.; Labisch A.E. (eds.) 2011. The Legacy of John C. Eccles â Selected letters (1937â1963) and guide to the archive in Düsseldorf. Aachen: Shaker Verlag.
Garfield E. 1970. âCitation indexing for studying scienceâ. Nature 227 (5259): 669â671.
Girolami P.; Taborikova H.; Nistico G. (eds.) 1994. In Memory of Sir Henry Dale. Reana del Rojale: Chiandetti.
Granit R. 1966. Charles Scott Sherrington: An Appraisal. London: Nelson.
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Hebb D.O. 1961. âDistinctive features of learning in the higher animalâ. In Brain mechanisms and learning, edited by Alfred Fessard, Ralph Waldo Gerard, Jerzy Konorski; Jean-Francois Delafresnaye, 37â46. Oxford: Clarendon.
Jacobson M. 2013. Foundations of neuroscience. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
Karczmar A.G. 2001. âSir John Eccles, 1903â1997. Part 1. Onto the demonstration of the chemical nature of transmission in the CNSâ. Perspectives in biology and medicine 44 (1): 76â86.
Katz Bernard. 1996. â[Autobiographical Sketch]â. The History of Neuroscience in Autobiography 1: 350â381. Washington: Society for Neuroscience.
Marcum J.A. 2006. ââSoupsâ vs. âSparksâ: Alexander Forbes and the synaptic transmission controversyâ. Annals of science 63 (2): 139â156.
McIntyre A.K. 1954. âCentral and sensory transmissionâ. Pharmacological Reviews 6 (1): 103â104.
Merton R.K. 1973. âRecognition and excellence: instructive ambiguitiesâ. In RK Merton, The sociology of science. Theoretical and empirical investigations, edited by Norman W. Storer, 419â437. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Norrby E. 2013. Nobel Prizes and Natureâs Surprises. Singapore: World Scientific.
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Pieper-Scholz I.; Isberner C.; Koppitz U. 2011. âCatalogue raisonné of publications by John C. Ecclesâ. In The Legacy of John C. Eccles â Selected letters (1937â1963) and guide to the archive in Düsseldorf, edited by Hans-Joachim Freund, Ulrich Koppitz; Alfons Eberhard Labisch, 33â83. Aachen: Shaker Verlag.
Rheinberger H.J. 1997. Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press.
Robinson J.D. 2001. Mechanisms of synaptic transmission: bridging the gaps (1890â1990). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shaw F.H. 1954. âTransmission and block in sympathetic gangliaâ. Pharmacological Reviews 6 (1): 69â70.
Shepherd G.M. 2008. âEccles, John Carewâ. In New Dictionary of Scientific Biography, edited by Noretta Koertge, 329â333. New York: Charles Scribnerâs Sons.
Shepherd G.M. 2009. Creating modern neuroscience: the revolutionary 1950s. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sherrington C.S. 1932. âInhibition as a coordinative factorâ. In Nobel Lectures ,Physiology and Medicine :278â289.
Sherrington C.S. 1906. The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. New York: Charles Scribnerâs Sons.
Smith R. 1992. Inhibition: History and meaning in the sciences of mind and brain. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Smith R. 2000. âThe embodiment of value: CS Sherrington and the cultivation of scienceâ. The British Journal for the History of Science 33 (3): 283â311.
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Stuart D.G. and Brownstone R.M. 2011. âThe beginning of intracellular recording in spinal neurons: facts, reflections, and speculationsâ. Brain research 1409: 62â92.
Stuart D.G. and Pierce P.A. 2006. âThe academic lineage of Sir John Carew Eccles (1903â1997)â. Progress in Neurobiology 78 (3â5): 136â155.
Todes D.P. 2002. Pavlovâs physiology factory: Experiment, interpretation, laboratory enterprise. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Todman D. 2008. âJohn Eccles (1903â97) and the experiment that proved chemical synaptic transmission in the central nervous systemâ. Journal of Clinical Neuroscience 15(9): 972â977.
Valenstein E.S. 2002. âThe discovery of chemical neurotransmittersâ. Brain and cognition 49(1): 73â95.
Valenstein E.S. 2006. The war of the soups and the sparks: The discovery of neurotransmitters and the dispute over how nerves communicate. New York: Columbia University Press.
Merton 1973, 433.
Todes 2002, Chapter 10.
Hüntelmann 2018.
Barthes 1981, 26.
Barthes 1981, 26.
Throughout the present chapter, we will use âdiscoveryâ as a synonym of âexcellence as performanceâ in Mertonâs sense.
Smith 2000; see also Smith 1992; Smith 2001; Smith 2003.
on which see Sherrington 1906.
On the debate over the statute of inhibition (mechanism vs. simple physical consequence of the refractory period after discharge) see Granit 1961, Chapter iv; Jacobson 1993, Chapter 4; Smith 1992, Chapter 5.
Sherrington 1938; but see on this Smith 2000; De Sio 2018.
Bacq 1974, 62; For a full history of the controversy see Valenstein 2006; Shepherd 2009; Bennett 2001; Borck 2017.
âChemagonistsâ was the collective name coined by Walter Cannon (1939) for the supporters of chemical transmission. Their opponents he called âelectragonistsâ.
Partly published in Eccles 1976; Eccles 1982; Girolami et al. 1994; two letters also in Freund et al. 2011.
See Dale to Eccles 29/1/37, Eccles Archives, Medizingeschichte Düsseldorf (eamd) 2NZ-2023.
Shepherd 2009, 74.
On which, see Stuart and Pierce 2006.
For details, see Eccles 1957.
Brock et al. 1952; see also Eccles 1982.
Shaw 1954. To which statement Archibald McIntyre (Ecclesâ former associate and his successor in Dunedin) replied abruptly: â[â¦] the sudden rejection of his former creed by an old and formidable electrical antagonist seems to some a sufficient substitute for positive and substantial proof [â¦] I cannot see how Ecclesâ views on central synapses should in any way affect oneâs thinking about ganglia. If there is a case for chemical transmission in ganglia, surely it rests on its own feetâ (McIntyre 1954) .
Brock et al. 1952. From a more nuanced perspective, Robinson (2001) dates the end of the controversy in 1965.
Fillenz 2000; see also Fillenz 2012.
Todman 2008; see also Karczmar 2001.
Borck 2017, 323.
The âcrucial experimentâ is more realistically cast as the culmination of a series of carefully planned trials started in the spring of 1951. See also Stuart and Brownstone 2011.
See the example provided by Bacq 1974; see also Eccles 1946, 448.
Dupont (1999) nastily calls the Popperian conversion a âphilosophical alibiâ.
Borck 2017, 325.
A sphere with 7 cylindrical dendrites, Eccles 1952; Eccles 1953; Coombs et al. 1955; Coombs et al. 1959.
Fillenz 2011; Curtis and Andersen 2001.
The occasional but never casual correspondence between the two (preserved in eamd/2NZ-2051 and /2AU2063) amply testifies to this.
Ecclesâ appropriation of Hodgkinâs model of the membrane as an electrical resistance and acceptance of the âsodium pumpâ hypothesis further facilitated the dialogue. See Eccles 1953.
Although Eccles (1957) proposes this interpretation of such fundamental development, Shepherd 2008; Shepherd 2009; as well as Stuart and Brownstone (2011) tell a less linear story of appropriation, at the expense of Archibald McIntyre.
See one clear example in Casey 2009.
One of the reasons why Eccles found it useful to formulate an explicit theory was that, as he noted early on (Eccles 1937), there actually was no theory for electrical synaptic transmission, but just converging data supporting a widely-held persuasion. Moreover, the conversion made Eccles just as many enemies as friends, starting from a few of his former collaborators. See for instance the furious reaction of Chandler McC. Brooks (co-author of the 1945 inhibition hypothesis) in the discussion following Brock et al. 1953 and again in (Brooks 1958). See note 31 above for the reaction of McIntyre, Ecclesâ successor in Dunedin. In the usa, Ralph Gerard, Alexander Forbes, Rafael Lorente de Nó and David Lloyd (all Nobel pluri-nominees in the 1950s) remained long unconvinced (see Marcum 2006). Doubts were repeatedly expressed by McCulloch and his group (also at the forefront of microelectrode research), and Hebb (1961).
Shepherd 2009, 93.
These nominations are not registered in the Nobel nomination database online, since it to date only covers the nominations from 1901 to 1953.
We were not able to access this review, the essentials of which are however summarised in the following reports, as well as in Norrby 2016, Chapter 2.
Yearbook of Nobel Proceedings, 1955. Review Bernhard, pp. 1â3. All the citations of nominations and reviews mentioned below will be shortened to the Name/Date form, reference to the corresponding Yearbook being implicit.
Nomination Gellhorn 1955.
Bernhard 1955, 7â8; Eccles 1957.
We could not access the original texts of the nominations. They are however summarised in the opening of Granitâs 1958 review (Review Granit 1958, 1). Moreover, Norrby (2016, 95) states that âThe nominations of Eccles continued in 1956â58â. We were not able to find them, however.
Review Granit 1958, 2.
Ibid.
Ibid, 3.
Ibid.
Ibid, 8.
Ibid, 8.
Ibid, 10â11.
Ibid, 9.
Ibid, 12.
Nomination Edinburgh 1959. Gr.II.34.
Ibid. Gr.II.36.
Nomination Whitteridge 1959.
Nomination Bishop 1959. Gr.II.28.
Ibid, Gr.II.29.
Nomination Bishop 1959, Gr.II.30â31.
Ibid, Gr.II.31.
Ibid, Gr.II.32.
Ibid.
David P.C. Lloyd, for instance, still opposed Ecclesâ âfalsificationâ of direct inhibition in the monosynaptic pathway. Bernhard underscored that these doubts should not be underestimated, in view of the authority of the critic, who was member of an important institution and a pluri-nominee. See Review Bernhard 1959, 2; Eccles 1957.
Review Bernhard 1959, 7.
We could not find the nominations, and rely here on Norrby (2016, 97).
By mistake, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation leaked the news of an award to Eccles, causing a wave of excitement, soon inhibited by the broadcasterâs retraction.
Nomination Robson 1961, Gr.II.30.
Nomination Hartline 1961, Gr.II.31â32.
Ibid, Gr.II.33.
Review Granit 1961, 2.
Ibid, 12; Granit may have had some bias in this connection.
Ibid, 15â17.
Ibid, 18.
Ibid, 29â30.
Ibid.
Norrby (2016) reports of several nominations for Eccles that year, which we could not access.
Dale to Eccles, 15/12/61. rsa/93/HD35.25.24. âI need your helpâ, he opened. âI should like to have the privilege of bringing your name, and your work, to the notice of the Nobel committeeâ.
Dale to Members of the Nobel Prize Committee for Physiology and Medicine, 17/01/62, rsa/93/HD 35.25.30.
Ibid, 6.
Ibid.
Norrby 2013, 236 ff.
Norrby 2016, 99â100.
Letter Dale to U.S. von Euler, 07/11/62, rsa/93/HD 35.25.24.
Nomination Dale 1963.
Ibid.
Review Granit 1963, 1.
Ibid, 10.
Ibid.
See in this connection Bucchi (this volume), on the issue of âcommunitarian reputationâ.
One of us has observed how these remarks add one further layer of complexity to the centre-periphery relations in the history of science.
A caveat is here due about the tentative nature of our scrutiny.
Eccles 1953. The book was preceded in 1951 by an article on Nature (Eccles 1951) on his own Popperian hypothesis of mind/brain relations, which fell outside the scope of our review. On the book, Shepherd comments (arguably without irony): âFor a young medical student in the 1950s determined to become a neurophysiologist, it was, if not the tablets of Moses, something close to themâ. (Shepherd 2009, 94).
See also Cousins 1985.
Eccles 1961.
Eccles 1964.
By the way, the mentioned review article in Ergebnisse der Physiologie 1961 which cited 426 titles was cited only 159 times by other articles in the database, after a little increase there was soon stagnation and a sharp decrease since 1965. Whereas the increase eventually points at some âNobel effectâ, this review article soon came into competition with the 1964 monograph, which like almost every book not included in the Web of Science database.
Eccles 1947; Eccles 1970, 134.
Interestingly, no mention is made of Popper.
Eccles 1964.
Although an attempt to predict Nobel Prize Winners by means of Garfieldâs citation database listed Eccles on rank 22 of the most cited scientists until 1967 with just 4 Nobelists scoring higher than him (Garfield 1970, fig. 3), this effect cannot be repeated in the actual database which has grown tremendously since then, the Web of Science Core Collection lists 24.259 citations altogether and calculates Ecclesâ Hirsch-index as 86. Thus, our historical analysis was limited to the time-span of Eccles scientific life 1927â97.
Cf. also Citation Report for Eccles JC* via http://apps.webofknowledge.com (February 26, 2019).