“What am I doing here, anyway?” is a question I have frequently asked myself in recent years. In addition to philosophy, I also studied political science, sociology, and didactics of economics as part of my undergraduate degree. My master’s degree—so I had decided—should only be about philosophy. It was by coincidence that I was drawn to work as an academic assistant to the German Research Foundation’s research group “Need-Based Justice and Distribution Procedures,” where not only philosophers but also psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, and economists dealt with questions of need-based justice. This debate took place on a theoretical level, of course, but at the same time it also involved an empirical approach, and the declared aim was to synthesize the two. So it happened that I—at some point no longer as an academic assistant, but as a PhD candidate—returned to the methods that I thought I had left behind together with my undergraduate studies. Before I knew it, I found myself working as an experimenter in social science laboratories. At first, I didn’t have a name for what I was doing. I couldn’t place it in any of the philosophical pigeonholes I knew until then. It was only later that I learned that there was a name for it. They call it “experimental philosophy.”
Experimental philosophers use empirical research methods to shed new light on the questions they examine. Rather than relying solely on the research results of other sciences, experimental philosophers conduct their own empirical research. The possibilities of such research on philosophical questions are countless. A common, though not the only,1 approach is to present laypeople with hypothetical scenarios and ask them about their intuitions. In an experiment that has since become a classic, Joshua Knobe, e.g., presented his subjects with the following vignette, among others:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.”
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.”
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed. (Knobe 2003, 191)
Knobe then asked his subjects how much they agreed with the statement that the chairman had intentionally harmed the environment. In a variation of the vignette presented to other participants, the new program helped the environment rather than harming it. Again, the chairman was indifferent: “I don’t care at all about helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can.” Here, the participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the statement that the chairman had intentionally helped the environment. Interestingly, in the first case, the majority believed the damage was intentional, whereas in the second case, despite its structural similarity, things looked quite different. And before we know it, we have found ourselves in the midst of philosophical questions about morality and intentionality.
“Are there any up-to-date questions in philosophy at all,” Anja Leser (2018) asked a few years ago. Isn’t it rather the case that philosophers have been revolving around the same questions again and again century after century without—as malicious gossip has it—actually getting anywhere? The question of philosophy’s content is one issue; its methods are another. Regarding the second question, it becomes clear that “up-to-date” philosophical methods do exist. Modal logic makes syllogistics look dusty; Socrates would probably be amazed if Rudolf Carnap explained concept explication to him, and now there are things like conceptual engineering—or experimental philosophy. Regarding the latter, some philosophers ask in astonishment: “Is this still philosophy?” (cf. Sorell 2018, see also Sytsma and Livengood 2019)
This question is somewhat puzzling. One might assume that empirical methods were once en vogue in parts of philosophy, but that they—according to a common narrative—moved away again with the emergence of individual sciences. Because philosophy was (and is) perceived as separate from these individual sciences, its subject area as well as its repertoire of methods became increasingly narrow until all that was left for it to do was sit and brood in the armchair.
Of course, the primacy of Being over beings2 (and thus perhaps also that of a priori over a posteriori and that of the armchair over the laboratory) was not only established with the emergence of modern science; rather, it can be traced back to Plato (1979, 485a–486b), e.g., when he states:
We may take it as established that philosophic natures always love the learning which reveals something of the essence that always is, that never wanders through generation and decay.3
Or to Aristotle (1928, Book
There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do.
Despite such early restrictions, we also find rather broad conceptions of philosophy throughout the course of history, e.g., in Descartes (1985, 186), who compares the entire field of philosophy to a tree, the “roots [of which] are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences.” Diderot (1961, 394) may also come to mind here, when he concludes in an article for the Encyclopédie:
The name philosophy always remained indeterminate and in its broadest sense encompasses not only the knowledge of divine and human things, but also the knowledge of laws, medicine and even the various branches of scholarship, such as grammar, rhetoric, and critique, while not excluding history and poetry.
For Kant (2009, 539), science was also at least an “organ of wisdom.” This organ, according to Kant, is “indispensable” for wisdom, “so that one may well maintain that wisdom without science is a silhouette of a perfection to which we shall never attain.”
And indeed, before modern natural sciences were termed physics or chemistry, they were known as natural philosophy. What we know today as experimental physics, e.g., was consistently referred to as experimental natural philosophy. The emerging scientific instruments of the 17th century, by the way, were still called “philosophical instruments” (Zuidervaart 2013, 4). Experimental philosophy in this historical sense marks the “origins of autonomous scientific development” (Böhme, Daele, and Krohn 1977).
Against this background, the reluctance felt by some contemporary philosophers when it comes to modern experimental philosophy and its adaptation of methods from the individual sciences seems somewhat puzzling. After all, there is no reason to fear that it might try to get the better of the other philosophers (or that it might even want to). Some questions simply are not accessible to the instruments of empirical research. Moreover, every empirical method itself needs a justification, every result an interpretation, every concept some form of definition and criticism. Thinking does not become obsolete by carrying out an experiment.
In addition to these essential theoretical questions, however, there are also questions that can be investigated empirically, and I would argue that these too can be philosophical questions. And there are arguments and theories—undoubtedly genuinely philosophical ones—that are also based on premises that can be tested empirically. Franz von Kutschera (1988, 670), e.g., very aptly stated: “If the conception of man that our ethical maxims presuppose cannot be maintained, then these maxims must also be revised.”
Moreover, it can be safely assumed that such arguments and theories generally do not arise without cause. They are conditioned by the way our mind works and by the individual psychological constitution of the person conceiving them. On the one hand, this implies exploring “the hidden history of philosophers, the psychology of their great names” (Nietzsche 2007, 4). On the other hand—and this is certainly one of the ambitions of experimental philosophy—it also involves exploring the patterns revealed by our intuitions in order to better understand the conditions of our theory formation and how our mind works (cf. Knobe and Nichols 2008, 12). Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007) call this experimental descriptivism.
In general, such theory building is often—as far as its building material is concerned—limited to the intuitions of the theorists and perhaps those of their peers. However, as Bauer and Meyerhuber (2020, 18) write, with the results of experimental philosophy,
empirical research could extend the sample size of introspections (Bar-Hillel and Yaari 1993). Moreover, one can turn the theoretician herself into a research object and thus seek to explore the conditions for the emergence of normative theory contained in the human factor. This may concern, e.g., the development of intuitions that are commonly used as justifiers and raises questions about the nature of intuitions, such as whether they are interculturally and interepochally valid.4
Here, experimental philosophy—this time under the name of experimental analysis—is able to make a contribution to the philosophical project. On the other hand, it may also—within the framework of experimental restrictionism—act as a genuine critic of this project by using its insights about our intuitions to problematize their role in philosophy.
With all this, experimental philosophy does not attempt to replace the reflection in the armchair, since it also relies on it. Rather, it reopens the window next to the armchair by pulling aside the heavy, dusty drapes with which it was covered, so we philosophers can actually see the world in view of which we reflect (and to let in a little fresh air).
Karl Popper (2002, XIX) once said that there is “no method peculiar to philosophy.” However, at least the epistemic premises of a particular epoch of philosophy can be deduced from the methods which its representatives employ. This is what makes experimental philosophy so exciting for me, in addition to its content: It marks a contemporary discourse in philosophy about itself. This concerns nothing less than our self-assurance as philosophers, and the question that each of us should perhaps ask ourselves from time to time: “What am I doing here, anyway?”
References
Aristotle (1928): “Metaphysica,” in: Aristotle: The works of Aristotle, vol. 8, ed. and trans. by Ross, W. D., Oxford: Clarendon.
Bar-Hillel, M., Yaari, M. (1993): “Judgments of distributive justice,” in: Mellers, B., Baron, J. (eds.): Psychological perspectives on justice. Theory and applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55–84.
Bauer, A. M. (2020a): “‘Was mache ich hier überhaupt?’. Experimentelle Philosophie zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor,” https://www.philosophie.ch/2020-06-08-bauer/.
Bauer, A. M. (2020b): “‘Was mache ich hier überhaupt?’. Experimentelle Philosophie zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor,” https://www.praefaktisch.de/experimentelle-philosophie/was-mache-ich-hier-ueberhaupt-experimentelle-philosophie-zwischen-lehnstuhl-und-labor/.
Bauer, A. M. (2024): Empirische Studien zu Fragen der Bedarfsgerechtigkeit, Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg Press.
Bauer, A. M., Kornmesser, S. (eds.) (2023): The compact compendium of experimental philosophy, Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter.
Bauer, A. M., Meyerhuber, M. I. (2019): “Zwei Welten am Rande der Kollision. Zum Verhältnis von empirischer Forschung und normativer Theorie, insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der Ethik,” in: Bauer, A. M., Meyerhuber, M. I. (eds.): Philosophie zwischen Sein und Sollen. Normative Theorie und empirische Forschung im Spannungsfeld, Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 13–37.
Bauer, A. M., Meyerhuber, M. I. (2020): “Two worlds on the brink of colliding. On the relationship between empirical research and normative theory,” in: Bauer, A. M., Meyerhuber, M. I. (eds.): Empirical research and normative theory. Transdisciplinary perspectives on two methodical traditions between separation and interdependence, Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 11–33.
Böhme, G., van den Daele, W., Krohn, W. (1977): Experimentelle Philosophie. Ursprünge autonomer Wissenschaftsentwicklung, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Descartes, R. (1985): “Principles of philosophy,” in: id.: The philosophical writings of descartes, vol. 1, ed. by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., Murdoch, D., trans. by Cottingham, J., Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 177–291.
Diderot, D. (1961): “Philosophie,” in: id.: Philosophische Schriften, vol. 1, ed. and trans. by Lücke, T., Berlin: Aufbau, 385–389.
Kant, I. (2009): “The Jäsche logic,” in: id.: Lectures on logic, ed. and trans. by Michael Young, J., Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 521–629.
Knobe, J. (2003): “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language,” Analysis 63(3), 190–194.
Knobe, J., Nichols, S. (2008): Experimental philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kornmesser, S., Bauer, A. M., Alfano, M., Allard, A., Baumgartner, L., Cova, F., Engelhardt, P., Fischer, E., Meyer, H., Reuter, K., Sytsma, J., Thompson, K., Wyszynski, M. (2024): Experimental philosophy for beginners. A gentle introduction to methods and tools, Cham: Springer.
Leser, A. (2018): “Aktualität in der Philosophie. Gibt es überhaupt ‘aktuelle’ Fragestellungen in der Philosophie, wenn doch manche Themen seit der Antike immer wieder diskutiert werden?,” https://www.philosophie.ch/2018-09-03-leser/.
Nadelhoffer, T., Nahmias, E. (2007): “The past and future of experimental philosophy,” Philosophical Explorations 10(2), 123–149.
Nietzsche, F. (2007): Ecce homo. How to become what you are, ed. and trans. by Large, D., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plato (1979): The republic, ed. and trans. by Larson, R., Wheeling: Harlan Davidson.
Popper, K. (2002): The logic of scientific discovery, London and New York: Taylor & Francis.
Sorell, T. (2018): “Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26(5), 829–849.
Sytsma, J., Livengood, J. (2019): “On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy. A reply to Sorell,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27(3), 635–647.
von Kutschera, F. (1988): “Empirische Grundlagen der Ethik,” in: Henrich, D., Horstmann, R.-P. (eds.): Metaphysik nach Kant? Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongreß 1987, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 659–670.
Zuidervaart, H. (2013): “Cabinets for experimental philosophy in the Netherlands,” in: Bennett, J., Talas, S. (eds.): Cabinets of experimental philosophy in eighteenth-century Europe, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1–26.
This preface was translated by Konrad Vorderobermeier. A slightly modified version of this text originally appeared as a blog post on www.philosophie.ch and www.praefaktisch.de (see Bauer 2020a, b). While compiling Bauer (2024), I was reminded of it and found it fitting.
An overview and introduction to a wide range of methods used in experimental philosophy is provided by Kornmesser et al. (2024). Additionally, see Bauer and Kornmesser (2023), for an overview of the numerous topics and questions investigated in experimental philosophy.
Translator’s note: In the original it is “Primat des Seins vor dem Seienden.” This relates to a distinction famously made by Heidegger, namely that between “Sein” and “Seiendes,” often rendered in English by capitalizing the former term and using the latter in the plural, hence: Being vs. beings.
Translator’s note: For quotes from classical works, the English standard editions listed in the bibliography have been used (as, e.g., in this case Plato 1979). All other translations of quotations from German are mine.
Translator’s note: The original quote comes from the (slightly different) German version of the chapter referred to above and may be translated as: “empirical data can be used to extend the total set of introspections that are reflected upon. Since such intuitions continue to be used as essential justifying criteria, such reflection seems particularly important” (Bauer and Meyerhuber 2019, 21).