Abstract
Recent scholarship on Avicenna and Avicennism has tended to focus on the spread and dissemination of his ideas in the early centuries. However, the later readings and contestations of Avicennism especially from the Safavid period onwards have been broadly neglected. In this paper on the most important philosopher of eighteenth-century Iran, MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, I provide a case study of the enduring significance of Avicennism, but one which has been transformed by MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs critical reading of Avicenna. NarÄqÄ« demonstrates how Avicenna had been transformed and how the metaphysical debates between Avicennism and MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ had led to new synthetical positions.
A somewhat cursory intellectual history of Islamic philosophical traditions that focuses on the hegemonic authority of schools might yield the following threefold periodisation. The first would be an early âgolden ageâ beginning with the translation movement and the engagement with Neoplatonising Aristotelianism, critiquing but building upon the tradition of the commentators on Aristotle and on Plotinus, culminating in Avicenna.1 This would be followed by an age of the âpandémie avicennienne,â both the perpetuation and development of the Avicennian tradition starting with the first generation of his student BahmanyÄr (d. 458/1067) and consolidating with the appropriation of Avicennism by the kalÄm tradition and the articulation of the thought of Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-ṬūsÄ« (d. 672/1274), as well as the critiques of Avicenna by ShahrastÄnÄ« (d. 528/1153), from an Ismaili apophatic perspective, SuhrawardÄ« (d. 587/1191) from a more Platonic perspective, and Averroes (d. 595/1198) from a more âorthodoxâ Aristotelianism.2 The final stage (before the modern eclipse of âtraditionalâ philosophy in the Islamic world) would thus be the replacement of Avicenna with MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ Å Ä«rÄzÄ« (d. 1045/1636) as the dominant philosopher of the Islamic traditions from the Safavid period, spreading even to the Ottoman and Indian contexts.3 Of course, it is entirely possible for each period to have differing and rival conceptions of philosophy debating among themselves. My concern in this paper is to nuance this third period and consider the perpetuation and transformation of the differing modes of Avicennism. The contention is that MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«âs espousal of Avicenna and critical engagement with MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ signalled less a doctrinaire espousal of Avicennism and more a promotion of a highly transformed Avicennism that was already influenced by a Sadrian reading of the work of the master.
Considered from the perspective of contemporary Islamic philosophy in Iran, it seems that the thought of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ Å Ä«rÄzÄ« (d. 1045/1636) is dominant. The plethora of comparative studies in which MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ represents Islamic philosophy as a dominant, triumphal figure, with any number of modern European thinkers seems to suggest as much.4 MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ is championed as the Kant of Iran, and like Thomas Aquinas in the Catholic tradition is analyticised, made more continental, is exegetically glossed, and is read for different purposes in identity politics.5 Similarly, an examination of philosophical traditions in the Qajar period demonstrates the first stage of his dominance when it was the study of his texts that displaced Avicenna from the core of the curriculum.6 However, it took some time for the hegemony of the Å Ä«rÄzÄ« thinker to become established and his work and key ideas were contested from a number of perspectives; for example, his views on the possibility, indeed the necessity for motion (and quantity and quality) to pertain to the category of substance (ḥaraka ǧawharÄ«ya, against Avicenna) which was an important corollary of his theory of the ontological priority of existence (aá¹£Älat al-wuǧūd) and its modulation (taÅ¡kÄ«k), were widely disputed.7 In this paper, I will examine an important episode of Avicennian engagement with the thought of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, as expressed in the work of the eighteenth-century thinker MahdÄ« b. AbÄ« Dharr NarÄqÄ« (d. 1209/1795) as an Avicennian philosopher inspired by MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs reading of Avicenna but also critical of his more mystical intuitions about ontology. But first let us begin with the consideration of the Avicennian tradition in the Safavid period and the earliest such responses to MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ to make sense of the Avicennisms that NarÄqÄ« inherited.
1 Disputing Avicenna in the Safavid Period
These disputations began in the immediate generation of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs students including Ê¿Abd al-RazzÄq LÄhīǧī (d. 1072/1661) who, on the basis of a defence of Avicennism, rejected the two key elements of á¹¢adrian ontology in his work.8 But in particular, it was the âschoolâ of Raǧab Ê¿AlÄ« TabrÄ«zÄ« (d. 1080/1669) which rejected the á¹¢adrian theory of existence often on the grounds that there could be no analogy between Creator and createdâthey preferred a more apophatic approach to philosophy as one can see in TabrÄ«zÄ«âs two main texts on the nature of God, Proof of the Necessary (IṯbÄt-i vÄǧib) and the Fundamental Principle (Aá¹£l al-aṣīl).9 In the latter text, TabrÄ«zÄ« posits four objections. First, he rejected the analogy between the term âexistenceâ posited for the contingent and for the necessary based on the Arabic Neoplatonic axiom ex uno non fit nisi unum.10 Second, he critiqued the ontological priority of existence by arguing that quiddities are instantiated without existence, and hence they are âmadeâ (maǧʿūla) by God directly without any need for existence.11 This broadly follows the position of ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n DawÄnÄ« (d. 908/1502) on maǧʿūlÄ«yat al-mÄhÄ«ya, although TabrÄ«zÄ« does not invoke his authority.12 Third, he rejected the á¹¢adrian position of motion in the category of substance. Fourth, he denied a mental mode of existence (wuǧūd á¸ihnÄ«)âan issue that was broadly accepted in the Avicennian tradition stemming from Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-ṬūsÄ« (d. 672/1274).13 However, he did accept the á¹¢adrian position on the infallibility of knowledge by presence.14 DawÄnÄ«âs positions were broadly eclipsed from the Iranian milieu in this period, which may account for why the tendency associated with TabrÄ«zÄ« did not survive.15 In this sense, the Essence of Philosophy (Ê¿Ayn al-ḥikma) of MÄ«r QawÄm al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ« al-ṬihrÄnÄ« (d. 1093/1683), despite being more philosophically sophisticated and Avicennian than that of his teacher TabrÄ«zÄ«, was the last gasp of the school that rejected á¹¢adrian innovations in metaphysics and insisted upon the radical ontological and semantic distinction between God and the cosmos.16 The exception were the ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«s in the seventeenth century whose positions on existence were reminiscent of DawÄnÄ«. It was thus left to the mainstream Avicennian tradition to adapt to Sadrian positions and to retain a critical attitude.
Therefore, most of the critiques of the metaphysics of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ came from the mainstream Avicennian tradition in their commentary cultures on the Cure (al-Å ifÄʾ) and Pointers and Reminders (al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt), and via the commentary tradition on the pithy kalÄm text Sublimation of Belief (TaǧrÄ«d al-iÊ¿tiqÄd) of Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-ṬūsÄ«, and its two commentaries, the âoldâ by Å ams al-DÄ«n al-Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« (d. 749/1348) and the ânewâ by Ê¿AlÄ« al-Qūšǧī (d. 879/1474). That âorthodox Avicennianâ tradition was unhappy with the á¹¢adrian shift towards a more thoroughly neoplatonising and mysticising approach to philosophy, moves which were arguably part of the Safavid mainstream through its embrace of the pseudo-Aristotelian Theologia Aristotelis and works attributed to al-FÄrÄbÄ« (d. 339/951) associated with the dossier of Plotinus, Proclus and others in Arabic Neoplatonism.17 The Safavid period was one attuned to the conscious revival of classical heritages, Hellenic and Å Ä«Ê¿Ä«, the former because all philosophy was ultimately a prophetic revelation and inheritance and the latter because it was the direct legacy of prophecy.
Thus far, as El-Rouayheb observed, we have tended to ignore the critics of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, especially from the Avicennian tradition, in the intellectual history of the early modern Islamicate East.18 Therefore, we need to re-examine that tradition especially in light of the challenge of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ. He fundamentally undermined Avicenna and Avicennism in a number of ways: he displaced Avicennian substance metaphysics and its hylemorphism with a more process oriented metaphysics of existence in which category theory became redundant; he shifted epistemology away from the binarism of what the external and internal senses perceive and the distinction within intellection between abstraction from sense data and reception of the universals from the transcendental active intellect towards a more monistic reading of knowledge as states of existence and faculties of the soul; and he set aside the Avicennian compromise on the spiritual resurrection of the person sitting alongside the scriptural account of corporeal resurrection with his own hybrid theory of the body of the afterlife being âcreatedâ by the human soul as instrument of the divine. His ideas and method were radically different, even when located in Avicennian paradigms and questions.
As Wisnovsky has shown, MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ inherited a reading of Avicennaâs Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ and al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt that was mediated in the first case by the Å Ä«Ê¿Ä« tradition of Ê¿AllÄma Ibn al-Muá¹ahhar al-ḤillÄ« (d. 725/1325) and the Safavid thinkers and in the latter case by the dual heritage of Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-ṬūsÄ« and his influential commentary Resolving the Difficulties in the Pointers (Ḥall muÅ¡kilÄt al-iÅ¡ÄrÄt) and Faḫr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ« (d. 606/1210) and his more critical adoption of Avicenna in his own commentary on Pointers and his other works.19 In fact, it was the impact of the latter upon the kalÄm traditions, both SunnÄ« and Å Ä«Ê¿Ä« that defined Avicennism in the early modern period.20 For the later tradition in the East, al-ṬūsÄ« is a pivotal figure since it was his twin contribution to the reading of Avicennaâs metaphysicsâthe postulation of a mode of existence called the mental (á¸ihnÄ«) and that existence is said of in many ways in a graded or modulated manner (taÅ¡kÄ«k al-wuǧūd)âthat was taken up in the language of ontology.21 However, it was MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ who transferred these key notions into commitments to a particular vision of realityâthe modulated singularity of existence (ḥaqÄ«qa wÄḥida muÅ¡akkaka) was not just about the semantics of the term âexistenceâ but constituted a description of an actual metaphysics.22 The Pointers tradition was then filtered down through the âadjudicationâ (muḥÄkama) of al-ṬūsÄ«âs student Quá¹b al-DÄ«n TaḥtÄnÄ« (d. 766/1365), favouring his teacher, followed by the influential glosses of MÄ«rzÄǧÄn BÄÄ¡nawÄ« (d. 994/1585). The other important strand of the Avicennian tradition came through the TaǧrÄ«d of al-ṬūsÄ« and the Glosses of al-Å arÄ«f Ê¿AlÄ« ǦurǧÄnÄ« (d. 816/1414) on the âoldâ commentary of Å ams al-DÄ«n al-Iá¹£fahÄnÄ«, the two Glosses of á¹¢adr al-DÄ«n DaÅ¡takÄ« (d. 903/1497) and the three of ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n DawÄnÄ« (d. 908/1502) in response on the ânewâ commentary by Qūšǧī, and then the Glosses of Å ams al-DÄ«n ḪafrÄ« (d. 957/1550) on the proof for the existence of God section (al-maqá¹£ad al-ṯÄliṯ fÄ« iṯbÄt al-á¹£ÄniÊ¿) of the ânewâ commentary.23 ḪafrÄ« was an influential confluence of the two strands because he also wrote a set of glosses on TaḥtÄnÄ«âs adjudication on Pointers.24 These internal debates in Å Ä«rÄz were particularly vehement on the first section of the TaǧrÄ«d on the ontology (especially whether God could be characterised by âabsolute existenceâ or wuǧūd muá¹laq) and on the third section on the divine attributes. We see glimpses of the DaÅ¡takÄ«-DawÄnÄ« debates in the work of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ himself, but certainly in the many subsequent marginalia of the later Safavid period on two Glosses: Glosses on DawÄnÄ«âs âolderâ Gloss (ḥÄÅ¡iya qadÄ«ma) starting with the generation of the students of DawÄnÄ« all the way through to the post-Safavid period, broadly divided into those who defended DawÄnÄ«âs positions (earlier and then moving beyond Iran) and those who criticised or went further (especially later and among those who remained in Iran), and Glosses on ḪafrÄ« throughout the seventeenth century between students of MÄ«r DÄmÄd and MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, including those who perpetuated the DawÄnÄ«-DaÅ¡takÄ« debates. Often commentaries and independent treatises on the same topic cluster around one another as texts are creatures of conversations. Before one can have a fuller intellectual history of the reception of Avicennism through kalÄm commentaries, one would have to study these texts that on the whole are extant in multiple copies.
The Avicennian tradition in the Safavid period could not ignore the impact of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs glosses on al-Å ifÄʾ. Most of the Avicennian works in the period before were focused on the commentary cycles of al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt and the TaǧrÄ«d. The revived interest in the Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ of Avicenna began in Å Ä«rÄz with Cure for the Hearts (Å ifÄʾ al-qulÅ«b) of Ä iyÄṯ al-DÄ«n DaÅ¡takÄ« (d. 949/1542), who devoted most of his glosses to the definition of philosophy and ontology of book 1 (he wrote a larger set of glosses entitled Gardens of pleasure [RiyÄḠal-riá¸wÄn] prior to Å ifÄʾ but it does not seem to be extant),25 and ran on through the glosses of MÄ«rzÄǧÄn BÄÄ¡nawÄ« Å Ä«rÄzÄ«, a student of the philosophers of Shiraz, MÄ«r DÄmÄd (d. 1040/1631), and his student Sayyid Aḥmad Ê¿AlawÄ« (d. c. 1060/1650); in fact it would not be an exaggeration to say that MÄ«r DÄmÄd and his students, taking on the mantle of the DaÅ¡takÄ«s, defined the Avicennian tradition for the period.26 The popularity of both the Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ and al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt is well attested in the sources that mention many teachers of these texts and marginalia and commentaries. There were even translations into Persian of these texts by Sayyid Ê¿AlÄ« b. Muḥammad al-Ê¿Urayá¸Ä« al-ImÄmÄ« (d. 1120/1708) who had studied with Ḥusayn ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«.27
However, the glosses of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ were well known, extensive, widely attested and posed a challenge.28 Extant in the manuscript libraries of Iran, there are a number of codices from the seventeenth century including an acephalous holograph (MS MarÊ¿aÅ¡Ä« Qumm 914).29 His commentary runs to the end of chapter 5 of book 6 of the Metaphysics on causality and providence, hence missing out the following books on the proof for the existence of God as the necessary existence, on governance and on eschatology. He also consistently continues the commentary tradition in the East of al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt by defending al-ṬūsÄ«âs reading and criticizing al-RÄzÄ«âs objections. By contrast, the Key to the Cure (MiftÄḥ al-Å¡ifÄʾ) of Ê¿AlawÄ«, an extensive commentary by the son-in-law of MÄ«r DÄmÄd, has seven extant codices from the 17th century including the holograph (MS Maǧlis-i Å¡Å«ra-yi IslÄmÄ« Tehran 1789) but is barely cited in the commentary tradition of subsequent generations.30 This could also be because he defends Avicennian positions attacked and rendered irrelevant (insofar as they were little discussed afterwards since the debate had moved on) by MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ such as his defence of Avicennian eschatology from book 10, a minimalist reading of divine simplicity in chapter 4 of book 8, and his defence of Avicennaâs theory of Godâs knowledge of particulars in chapter 6 of book 8, which MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ sets aside for his use of the identity theory of knowledge (within a discussion on knowledge by presenceâÊ¿ilm ḥuá¸Å«rÄ«).31 Since he was writing around the same time as MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, it is also quite likely that he was not aware of his reading or did not consider it significant enough to engage.
An example of the influence of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs glosses can be seen soon after his death in the glosses on the Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ by Muḥammad BÄqir SabzawÄrÄ« (d. 1090/1679), a leading court theologian and himself a student of Ḥusayn ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«, MÄ«r AbÅ«-l-QÄsim FindiriskÄ« (d. 1050/1641), and of other students of MÄ«r DÄmÄd, as well as being a leading court jurist under Ê¿AbbÄs II.32 Eight manuscripts are extant of his commentary that runs to book 8 of the Metaphysics. SabzawÄrÄ« consistently cited MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ as âone of the scholarsâ (baʿḠal-fuá¸alÄʾ) or âchief of the great scholarsâ (á¹¢adr al-afÄá¸il). At the same time, he criticised his brother-in-law and teacher (or at the very least fellow student of FindiriskÄ«) ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« on a number of points and supported the positions of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ. On some points he tried to adjudicate between the two; for example, on whether existence that is the subject of metaphysics is an abstract concept (âabsolute existenceâ or âbeing qua beingâ), or whether it primarily refers to substance (ǧawhar) or whether to God as the ultimate referent for existence, SabzawÄrÄ« suggested that the difference between the two was really a semantic squabble (munÄqiÅ¡a lafáºÄ«ya).33 SabzawÄrÄ« approvingly quoted MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ arguing that metaphysics does not just study substances but being qua being and secondarily provides the subjects of all the other sciences, a position that is critiqued by ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« to whom SabzawÄrÄ« responds.34 Most importantly, SabzawÄrÄ« considers ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«âs objections to be misplaced because they seek to defend Avicenna by sticking faithfully to the text as an exegetical exercise. According to him, ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« fails to appreciate that MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs glosses are concerned with the philosophical meaning and explanation of the issues that Avicenna discusses and not of Avicenna himself (lÄ tafsÄ«r á¹£arīḥ al-lafáº).35 SabzawÄrÄ« did not study directly with MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ or even with any of his students as far as we know; however, it is clear through his copious citations of the Å Ä«rÄzÄ« thinker that he considered him to have fundamentally altered the Avicennian traditionâaway from the legacy of MÄ«r DÄmÄdâand to have presented a novel and critical way of reading Avicenna. It was this new reading to which ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« and others objected.
It might be useful to catalogue the challenge that MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs reading posed by considering some of the key issues of dispute with Avicenna in his major works, the Transcendent Philosophy of the Four Journeys of the Intellect (al-Ḥikma al-mutaÊ¿Äliya fÄ«-l-asfÄr al-Ê¿aqlÄ«ya al-arbaÊ¿a) completed in 1037/1628, and his Gloss on the Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ completed some time between 1041/1631 and 1044/1634, in which he often refers back to the former work. As such, they are works that represent his mature thought, and it is possible that the incompleteness of his glosses may be due to the fact that he died in 1045/1636.
There are three broad areas in which his position was at odds with Avicenna. The first concerns the nature of the structure of existence and its modulation. Whilst allowing for modulation of the concept of existence, Avicenna denies that modulation pertains to the reality of existence or even is an essential feature of existence.36 Al-ṬūsÄ« goes further by allowing for that semantic modulation to cover the intensification and debilitation of existence, and MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ cites these three ways in which modulation occurs: by precedence, by priority, and by intensity (al-awlawÄ«ya, al-aqdamÄ«ya, al-aÅ¡addÄ«ya).37 MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ therefore critiqued Avicenna for failing to see through the logic of the semantics of modulation. In his critique of the Avicennian position, he once again stipulates that âexistence is a simple reality and nature that differs in varying degrees of perfection and imperfection and intensity and debility and priority and posteriority, all of which pertain to its very essence. [â¦] It is the principle of realities and their essence. [â¦] If you have realised this, and your heart has opened to it and you have practised your reason on this, then many further subjects of knowledge will be disclosed to your heart.â38 Therefore, realising the modulated nature of existence opens the ways for resolving many other philosophical aporiai.
Second, he took Avicenna (and his followers) to task for failing to understand the nature of the soul and its rational faculty, and in particular for understanding that intellection involves a process of union between the intellecting substance and what is intellected.39 He cites the important passages in Pointers and in the De Anima (fÄ« l-nafs) of al-Å ifÄʾ on the denial of the identity thesis.40 Avicennaâs confusion arises from a mistaken conception of the union of the two as well as espistemological infallibilism. As elsewhere, MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs inspiration comes from the Neoplatonic Theology of Aristotle.41
Third, his position on the essential nature of motion as a feature of existence was contrary to Avicenna. The controversy of motion in substance was recognised early on along with a classic Avicennian criticism that the accidental motion of bodies in this sublunary sphere is an effect of the eternal motion of the celestial spheres. This is pre-empted along with the affirmation that motion in the category of substance is an essential feature of the renewal of natural bodies insofar as they are existent. The very definition of substance goes beyond Avicenna; substances are not just primary referents of existence that exist by virtue of themselves and do not exist in any other substrate, but rather are units of becoming in the hierarchy of contingency that are qualified by the receptivity to change and are constantly in flux.42 MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ put forward at least nine arguments in favour of motion in the category of substance.43 Three should suffice to demonstrate the critique of Avicenna, since most of the arguments revert to these. The first and most important relates to how substance is the subject, ground and cause of change. All accidental change is predicated on the changing nature of the substance, since it is the substance that is consistently renewing: âThe proximate cause for motion must be the ever-renewing existing thing of a fixed essence, and the proximate cause of every type of motion can only be nature that is a substance constituted by the body and occurrent by a species. [â¦] Therefore it is clear that every body must be an ever-renewing existence.â44 The point about the ever-renewing nature of existence is tied to his notion of the constant ârenewal of creationâ (ḫalq ǧadÄ«d) that he draws from Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ«.
The second is that all accidental qualities pertain to the individuated substance that is the referent for the corporeal essence and its changing qualities: âThe existence of every corporeal nature is essential to it such that the substance that is continuous, changing, temporal and locational is so by that essence. So quantities and colours and places must be changeable by the existence of the particular individuated corporeal substance and that is motion in substance.â45 A parallel argument to this is based on the notion of time and its course.
The third relates to the nature of change and how the graduated nature of change as opposed to once and for all discrete changes requires the substrate of that change to be a stable essence of an existent substance in flux, and the ultimate substrate is prime matter.46 Once again he appeals to something beyond analytic argument by saying that all those with sound mystical intuition recognise that motion must pertain to the substrate before it affects the accidents.47 The arguments on motion show that MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ has little utility for categoriology or for substance metaphysics as such. The link between his arguments for motion in substance and modulation in existence is clear: any change and differentiation in the structure of existence must be predicated on the simple fact that the essential nature of existence is in flux and differentiation but also a principle of unity. This goes flatly against the metaphysical pluralism of Avicenna and his Aristotelian substance metaphysics. á¹¢adrian monism in a sense overwhelms all other considerations as these three challenges show. Insisting upon metaphysical pluralism motivates most of the Avicennian responses.
2 MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«
2.1 Life
Muḥammad MahdÄ« b. AbÄ« á¸arr NarÄqÄ« (d. 1209/1795) was arguably the most important philosopher of the eighteenth century and a prolific thinker who engaged critically with the work of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ as well as continuing the Avicennan tradition through his commentaries especially on the Metaphysics of al-Å ifaʾ.48 In particular one might say it was MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs monism that irked him most. Born in NarÄq around 1146/1732, he initially studied in KÄÅ¡Än (where he later returned to teach), and then trained in Iá¹£fahÄn with two thinkers with a reputation for philosophy. The fact that he studied with renowned teachers in Iá¹£fahÄn some twenty years after the Afghan occupation suggests the recovery of the cityâs intellectual milieu and the uninterrupted teaching, transmission and debate on philosophical arguments from the late Safavid period.
His teachers in philosophy were primarily two. The first was Muḥammad IsmÄÊ¿Ä«l b. al-Ḥusayn MÄzandarÄnÄ« ḪwÄǧūʾī (d. 1173/1760), who is often invoked in a lineage that connected the philosophers of Isfahan in the Safavid period with an establishment of á¹¢adrian philosophy in the QÄǧÄr period, despite the fact that most of his works are very much of a juristic and theological nature.49 On the question of the creation of the cosmos he sided with MÄ«r DÄmÄdâs notion of creation at the mediate level of perpetuity (ḥudūṯ dahrÄ«, albeit on scripturalist grounds) and not MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ in his treatise on the Invalidity of Imaginary Time (Ibá¹Äl al-zamÄn al-mawhÅ«m).50 That text is a direct response to ǦamÄl al-DÄ«n ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«âs own defence of imaginary time and critique of MÄ«r DÄmÄd.51 As one manuscript (MS Princeton New Series 749) suggests, it began life as a gloss on ḪafrÄ«âs gloss on the ânewâ Å arḥ al-TaǧrÄ«d. Even his Persian text on existence reflects a critical rejection of monism on scripturalist grounds (being incompatible with the true teachings of the Qurʾan and the Imams), rejecting MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs position on the ontological priority of existence (without naming him), and asserting that the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wuǧūd) cannot be philosophically reasoned.52 Most of ḪwÄǧūʾīâs works are scripturalist and theological in nature, but in one case, a treatise entitled the Guidance of the Heart to Elements of the States of the Afterlife (á¹®amarat al-fuʾÄd ilÄ nabaḠmin aḥwÄl al-maÊ¿Äd), he defended MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs eschatology of the different bodies of the afterlife, created and re-created by the power of the human soul corresponding to those bodies, as an implicit critique of Avicennism.53 He similarly responded to the standard critique of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ that accused him of believing in metempsychosis (tanÄsuḫ) by another method.54 He did demonstrate his knowledge of the Avicennian tradition, especially the commentary cycle on the TaǧrÄ«d al-iÊ¿tiqÄd of al-ṬūsÄ«, but he tied those discussions closely to ḥadīṯ to elucidate his points. ḪwÄǧūʾī represented a certain tendency, influenced by MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, that considered the teachings of certain key ḥadīṯ on ontological and cosmological matters to be entirely homologous with philosophical doctrines, usually of Neoplatonic provenance. Interestingly, MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ is nowhere mentioned in the text.55 NarÄqÄ« referred to ḪwÄǧūʾī as âour teacher the verifierâ (ustÄá¸unÄ al-muḥaqqiq) in his ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr.56 A contemporary source quoted him as having either studied or read or taught the Metaphysics of the Å ifÄʾ at least thirty times and having memorised the entire text.57 Another contemporary source remembered him as foremost a philosopher (ḥakÄ«m) and theologian (mutakallim).58 Nevertheless, it is clear that as a philosopher, his student eclipsed him.
The second teacher was probably Muḥammad ZamÄn KÄÅ¡ÄnÄ« (d. c. 1172/1759).59 He had iǧÄzas from Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn ḪÄtÅ«nÄbÄdÄ« (d. 1151/1739) dated 1147/1734, MullÄ Ê¿Abd al-Raḥīm b. ǦaÊ¿far (d. 1154/1741) the grandson of Muḥammad BÄqir SabzawÄrÄ« who had briefly served as Å ayḫ al-IslÄm of Iá¹£fahÄn under NÄdir Å Äh (r. 1736â1747), and MÄ«rzÄ Muḥammad BÄqir b. Ê¿AlÄʾ al-DÄ«n Muḥammad GulistÄna (d. after 1120/1708).60 We do not know much about KÄÅ¡ÄnÄ« but some of his philosophical writings have survived. He wrote a gloss on ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«âs supergloss on ḪafrÄ«âs gloss on the Å arḥ al-TaǧrÄ«d of Qūšǧī. Other works of his included treatises in law and a short critique of Sunni traditionalist hermeneutics known as the balkafa (âwithout asking howâ on the modality of properties ascribed to God) entitled Guidance of the Righteous and Errors of Those Who Do not Ask How (HidÄyat al-mustarÅ¡idÄ«n wa-taḫá¹iʾat al-mubalkafÄ«n) dated 1166/1753, which, on closer scrutiny, is probably more of a critique of ḪwÄǧūʾīâs scripturalist approach to theology.61 In his major work entitled MirʾÄt al-zamÄn dated 1162/1749, he defended the position of the notion of âimaginaryâ time (al-zamÄn al-mawhÅ«m), an issue of debate in his time starting with ǦamÄl ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« in the generation before him in his commentary on the DawÄnÄ« gloss on the Å arḥ al-taǧrÄ«d of Qūšǧī, and then by his contemporary IsmÄÊ¿Ä«l ḪwÄǧūʾī who criticised it in his Ibá¹Äl al-zamÄn al-mawhÅ«m.62
From these teachers, we can deduce that NarÄqÄ« had a decent grounding in Avicennian thought, tinged with influences from MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, and a desire to connect that study with broadly theological and jurisprudential concerns, as was often the case in the early modern period in which philosophy was rarely compartmentalised from other disciplines in the Islamic East. As a polymath who wrote on a variety of issues and genres, NarÄqÄ« was described by his student as one who âunifies in himself the rational and the scripturalâ (ǧÄmiÊ¿ al-maÊ¿qÅ«l wa-l-manqÅ«l).63
Spending his final years teaching in KÄÅ¡Än, NarÄqÄ« died on 8 Å aÊ¿bÄn 1209/28 February 1795, according to the biography written by his son Aḥmad in 1227/1812. His body was transported to Naǧaf and buried near the shrine. There was no student with a significant standing to take on his legacy, despite the fact that his philosophical ideas and influences were the most interesting in the early QÄǧÄr period (and demonstrated a deep knowledge of the thought of philosophers who came before). He achieved fame at a time when KÄÅ¡Än was flourishing but Iá¹£fahÄn had recovered and the centre of culture and power was gravitating further north. NarÄqÄ« represented the culmination of an Avicennan tradition. While his commentary on al-Å ifaʾ was read, it seems a á¹¢adrian reading of Avicenna prevailed. The success of his contemporary Ê¿AlÄ« NÅ«rÄ«âs establishment of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ at the heart of the curriculum meant that at least for two generations Avicennism was eclipsed from the intellectual landscape of Iran until late in the QÄǧÄr period; the only Gloss on the Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ, and that too a rather brief one on book 1, was written by MÄ«r Muḥammad Ḥusayn ḪÄtÅ«nÄbÄdÄ« who explicitly sought to revive the reading of ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« albeit perhaps in vain.64 Certainly, that school of Avicenna seemed long gone by the time of NarÄqÄ«âs death.
2.2 Works
NarÄqÄ« taught for many years in KÄÅ¡Än and was a prolific writer including a series with the title âFriend ofâ (AnÄ«s) that he wrote in Persian to make theology and Å Ä«Ê¿Ä« law comprehensible to the merchant classes. At a time of the increasing dominance of the school of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, he remained an important Avicennian voice and followed the work and philosophical method of ṬūsÄ«, writing a number of studies in astronomy and mathematics including al-Mustaqá¹£Ä fÄ« Ê¿ulÅ«m al-hayʾa, a large and comprehensive text on astronomy in Arabic in four chapters, Muḥaṣṣal masÄʾil al-hayʾa, six chapters on astronomy, TaḥrÄ«r (Persian explanatory translation) of ṬūsÄ«âs version of the Sphaerics of Theodosius of Bithynia (d. c. 100â¯BCE), Tawá¸Ä«á¸¥ al-iÅ¡kÄl, a Persian translation of ṬūsÄ«âs work on Euclid (TaḥrÄ«r UqlidÅ«s), and some Glosses on the Almagest (al-Maǧisá¹Ä«) of Ptolemy.
In philosophy and theology, his major works included the following, starting with the commentaries on Avicenna and the Avicennian tradition. His commentary on the Metaphysics of al-Å ifaʾ of Avicenna covers the most glossed sections of the first two books (maqÄla) ending in chapter 4 of book 2. He demonstrated an excellent understanding of the Avicennian tradition through his critical use of the views of BahmanyÄr, Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-ṬūsÄ«, Faḫr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ« and Quá¹b al-DÄ«n TaḥtÄnÄ« RÄzÄ«.65 He deployed Faḫr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ« as a representative of the Avicennian traditionâjust as MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ did beforeâthrough his Eastern Discussions (al-MabÄḥiṯ al-maÅ¡riqÄ«ya); for example, when he wished to cite an Avicennian authority on the principle that once a thing becomes non-existent, it cannot return to its prior state (iÊ¿Ädat al-maÊ¿dÅ«m).66 He also cited the Å Ä«rÄzÄ« philosophers, Sayyid á¹¢adr al-DÄ«n (often just named as al-Sayyid) and Ä iyÄṯ al-DÄ«n (Ä iyÄṯ al-ḥukamÄʾ) DaÅ¡takÄ«, as well as Å ams al-DÄ«n ḪafrÄ«; in fact there is a strong sense in which he might be citing their views via al-AsfÄr of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ. Often it seems that he adjudicates between the ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«s and MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ preferring the former at times, supporting the latter as well; this is at times done through a defence of the Å Ä«rÄzÄ« philosophers against ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« (since MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ supported the positions of the Å Ä«rÄzÄ«s).67 He consistently refers to MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ as the Å Ä«rÄzÄ« mystic (al-Ê¿Ärif al-Å Ä«rÄzÄ«).68 Further, he demonstrates his own independence from the á¹¢adrian and Avicennian traditions, criticising al-ṬūsÄ«âs position on explaining the empirical nature of causality, or Avicenna himself rejecting taqlÄ«d, or claiming at times that MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ failed to understand Avicenna.69
His other major philosophical commentary was Compendium of Thoughts and Critique of Opinions (ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkar wa-nÄqid al-anáºÄr), completed in KÄÅ¡Än in RabÄ«Ê¿ I 1193/1779, on the proofs for the existence of God and Avicennian metaphysics. Although it appears to be an independent treatise that is incomplete, it is in effect a gloss on the commentary cycle of TaǧrÄ«d al-iÊ¿tiqÄd. In Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n completed in 1182/1768, NarÄqÄ« said that he wrote ǦÄmiÊ¿ on the commentary cycle on Avicennaâs al-IÅ¡arat wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt.70 This suggests that the ǦÄmiÊ¿ was probably commenced more than a decade before its completion date. Although the cycle of al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt is mentioned often (but not as frequently as the Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ), he stated in the introduction that he would discuss the nature of God and his attributes following the commentaries on the âNew Commentaryâ (Å¡arḥ ǧadÄ«d) on the TaǧrÄ«d al-iÊ¿tiqÄd by Ê¿AlÄ« al-Qūšǧī.71 As we mentioned above, the third section (al-maqá¹£ad al-ṯÄliṯ) of the TaǧrÄ«d on the proof for the existence of a creator (iṯbÄt al-á¹£ÄniÊ¿) was a much glossed text that reflected the Avicennian tradition; most of the Safavid and later glosses built upon the one by ḪafrÄ« who focused his analysis on the three attributes of power (which includes how God creates and the relation between God and the cosmos or the eternal and the mutable), knowledge, and speech, along with an Avicennian proof for divine simplicity.72 NÄrÄqÄ« followed these emphases: his work is divided into three sections (abwÄb)âthe first two on kataphatic affirmations of Godâs power and knowledge, and the third on apophatic denials of what God is not that follows the analysis of divine simplicity. These are prefaced by the long discussion on establishing the existence of God which examines some of the key assumptions in the Avicennian argument: the impossibility of an infinite regress, the nature of causality, the process of preponderance whereby a cause brings into existence something that was previously indifferent to existence and non-existence, and the different ways in which philosophers, theologians and Sufis demonstrate the existence of God.73 If one keeps in mind the typology of arguments that are mentioned by al-ṬūsÄ« in his Å arḥ al-iÅ¡ÄrÄt, then the naturalistic argument from motion is missing.74
He wrote a few independent treatises. Cooling of the Eyes (Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n), a treatise on existence and essence that attracted the critical attention of Ê¿AlÄ« NÅ«rÄ« and Shaykh Aḥmad al-AhsÄʾī, was completed in RabÄ«Ê¿ II, 1182/1768 and in some ways acts as a companion work to ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr.75 There are fourteen discussions ranging from the ontological priority of existence and the modulation of existence to how it is existence that is emanated from God, but it also contains an important critique of the views of DawÄnÄ« on existence (section twelve) and a refutation of the monist doctrine of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wuǧūd) in section thirteen.76 It is precisely those last few chapters on the unity of existence that mark out the distinction of this treatise, and they constitute the longest section of the text. His critique actually drew on MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs criticism of the position of á¹¢adr al-DÄ«n QÅ«nawÄ« (d. 673/1274) via that of Ê¿AlÄʾ al-Dawla al-SimnÄnÄ« (d. 736/1336), and he provided seven ways of making sense or âcorrectingâ the concept of the unity of existence.
He also has a trilogy of texts in Arabic in descending complexity of argument and length of discussion that all begin with an ontological preliminary on the nature of existence and essence. The first is Flashes from the Divine Empyrean (al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya).77 In the introduction he announced five sections: on existence and essences (general ontology), on the attributes of God and divine agency, on the nature of his creation and the emanation of the cosmos, on the nature of the human soul and its activities, and on prophecy and resurrection. However, the text seems incomplete as it finishes with the discussion on MÄ«r DÄmÄdâs notion of perpetual creation at the end of section three. The second section overlaps with elements of ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr and the first section is his most detailed exposition of his general ontology where the broad influence of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs tripartite doctrine of the ontological priority of existence, its modulation and its emanation is clear (aá¹£Älat al-wuǧūd, taÅ¡kÄ«k al-wuǧūd and maǧʿūlÄ«yat al-wuǧūd).
Then its epitome is Divine Flash on Transcendental Philosophy (al-LumÊ¿a al-ilahÄ«ya fi-l-ḥikma al-mutaÊ¿Äliya) on the á¹¢adrian tradition.78 It is divided into five sections (bÄb) with each further divided into flashes (lumÊ¿a): existence and essence (including the á¹¢adrian arguments for the ontological priority and modulation of existence and the chain of existence as the direct creation of God); proof for the existence of God (following the Avicennian model of the Necessary existence) and his properties, especially knowledge, power and speech; emanation and cosmogony including the á¹¢adrian notion of nobler possibility (imkÄn aÅ¡raf), Platonic forms and the nature of the creation of the cosmos (ḥudūṯ al-Ê¿Älam); the nature of the soul and its lives, including a refutation of metempsychosis, and affirmation of the ontological status of the realm of similitudes (Ê¿Älam al-miṯÄl); and prophecy and his mission (but there is no discussion of the imamate).
Finally, the shortest version is its epitome Pithy Words (al-KalimÄt al-waǧīza),79 which is divided into six sections: existence and properties of essence, including a discussion of the nature of creation, on individuation, on the analogy of existence and the different considerations (iÊ¿tibÄrÄt) of essence; on the existence of God, his knowledge, agency and speech; on emanation and cosmogony, including the nature of the creation of the cosmos and how the argument of MÄ«r DÄmÄd is better than either the notion of imaginary time (al-zamÄn al-mawhÅ«m) or the Sadrian notion of motion in substance;80 on the nature of the soul and refutation of metempsychosis; on prophecy; and on the imamate and its rational incumbency based on the principle of divine facilitating grace (luá¹f).
2.3 Thought
NarÄqÄ« was a thoughtful critic of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, following him on some issues and not on others. For example, a question that was of debate in the Safavid period following the philosophers of Å Ä«rÄz was the consideration of the God-world relationship through the existence-essence distinction that pertained to contingents in the Avicennian tradition. NarÄqÄ« sided with MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ on two related points here: when considering contingent beings which were conceptual composites of existence and essence, it was the former that was ontologically prior, the á¹¢adrian doctrine known as the ontological priority of existence (aá¹£Älat al-wuǧūd); concomitantly therefore, what is produced by God is existence and not essence (maǧʿūlÄ«yat al-wuǧūd).81 The ultimate referent for existence, on the basis of which we have a derivative concept of existence and which we then apply to contingents, is God insofar as he is a simple reality (ḥaqÄ«qa basÄ«á¹a) devoid of an essence (muǧarrad Ê¿an al-mÄhÄ«ya).82 The mind then analyses the two aspects of each contingent as its existence (the derivative concept of it) and its essence, holding them to be mentally and conceptually distinct.83 He seems to hold that the conceptual distinction of essence and existence in the phenomenal world does not map onto reality; like Mulla Sadra, he does not think that essences exist in extramental reality.84 If it were essences that were ontologically prior, that would entail an infinite regress of non-existent things and nothing would exist.85 Essences insofar as they are universals do not exist in re and that by which something is what it is in its individuation is due to existence and not essence.86 Concomitantly, he holds that the different existents are related to one another through the semantics of modulation; existence is said of in many ways arranged in a modulated manner (muÅ¡akkaka).87 On a related issue of ontology, he agrees with MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs presentation of nobler possibility which is the manner in which causality works in the hierarchy of existence whereby the nobler causes what is lesser, and the lesser desires the nobler; this is ultimately a proof for the intelligible realm and the hierarchical nature of emanation.88 Yet, he recognises, like others before him from the Avicennian tradition that MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ was not an âorthodoxâ adherent of Avicennism, and he consistently refers to him as the Shirazi mystic (al-Ê¿Ärif al-Å¡Ä«rÄzÄ«).89 One further point on which he differs with Avicenna and broadly agrees at one level with MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ is in his affirmation of the reality of Platonic forms drawing upon SuhrawardÄ« as well as the Theology of Aristotle, thus in a sense defending what he considers to be âorthodoxâ Aristotelianism against Avicenna.90
He upheld the Sadrian infallibilist position on epistemology, which is based on the identity thesis (ittiḥÄd al-Ê¿Äqil wa-l-maÊ¿qÅ«l) and âknowledge by presenceâ (Ê¿ilm ḥuá¸Å«rÄ«).91 Consistent with Mulla Sadra and other thinkers of a broadly Platonist persuasion in the Safavid period, but contrary to Avicenna, he affirms the existence of an ontological realm known as the âworld of imagesâ (Ê¿Älam al-miṯÄl).92
Nevertheless, he is critical of a number of á¹¢adrian positions. First, while he adopted the notion of modulation in existence (taÅ¡kÄ«k al-wuǧūd), following ṬūsÄ«, he considered it to be merely a logical concept and not something that pertains to actuality, nor is it something which is essential to the reality of existence, and in fact in doing so he might be reflecting a more âorthodoxâ Avicennism stemming from Naṣīr al-DÄ«n ṬūsÄ«.93 He explicitly ruled out the possibility of a singular but modulated reality of existence, not least because of his opposition to ontological monism.94
Second, his most important disagreement lies in the issue of the hypostatic unity of existence. While accepting the possibility of a mystical intuition for the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wuǧūd), he does not think it can be rationally demonstrated or known.95 He asserts that the Sufi contention that God is absolute existence (wuǧūd muá¹laq) and that existence is something singular, simple and undifferentiated (amr basÄ«á¹ Å¡aḫṣī) both violate our common sense observations (muÅ¡Ähada), intellect (Ê¿aql) and intuition that, in actuality, there is a multiplicity of existents in reality.96 This is, as he says, despite the fact that âall great Sufisâ agree that the intellect should decide such matters.
But it is not just the simple notion of the unity of existence that is undifferentiated and that seems to come from QÅ«nawÄ« that he criticises. He critiqued MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs version of monism as well as Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ«âsâthat is the main thrust of his treatise the Cooling of the Eyes. He argues concomitantly that the issue of the simple reality being all things (basÄ«á¹ al-haqÄ«qa kullu l-aÅ¡yÄʾ) is not established.97 He did not approve of the extension of Avicennaâs point about divine simplicity in a monist direction. It seems that his own sympathies lay with a metaphysical exposition that is a more Avicennian version of Mulla á¹¢adrÄ. To critique the point, he posited the following argument. Consider the concept of Zayd and the concomitant concepts that we may haveâthat Zayd is a human, that he is a writer and that he is not a horse. All of these cannot be at the same level united as one, because the law of the excluded middle does not allow for Zayd to be some existence (a writer) and some non-existence (not-horse) at the same time.98 With Avicenna, he affirms the actual plurality of contingent existents.99 He cited previous critics of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ on the issue of unity, drawing upon ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« and Muḥammad TunikÄbunÄ« known as FÄżil-i SarÄb (d. 1124/1713); he also cited ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«âs contention that the Sadrian position reflects the dominance of poetic language over rational content.100 And in an implicit critique of the á¹¢adrian equation of knowledge and existence, he contended that the fallacy of the unity of existence reverts to the conflation of ontology and epistemology.101
NarÄqÄ« suggested that MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ has been misled by ḪafrÄ« and quoted in detail the latterâs position that only God exists and everything else is merely a mental conceptualisation that we have from the conceptualisation of Godâs existence; and that God is hidden and contingents are the manifest, but in actuality they are indistinct since the hidden and manifest are aspects of the same thing.102 NarÄqÄ« cannot accept such dissolution of the ontological distinction between the creator and the created. He summarises the position in the following manner:
The doctrine of the Sufis and explicit sayings of many recent scholars is that existence and the existent are one but that this singular existence is taken in different considerations whereby the levels of that existence are only considerations posited in the mind because reality across all levels is one. The mentally posited distinction is sometimes negatively conditioned (bi-Å¡ará¹ lÄ-Å¡ayʾ), sometimes unconditioned (lÄ bi-Å¡ará¹) and sometimes conditioned (bi-Å¡ará¹ Å¡ayʾ) due to the descent of existence from the highest level to the remainder. [â¦] Contingent existences are conceptualisations in the mind, manifestations and disclosures of the Real existence and rays of his light and shadows of his illumination.103
Part of the problem for NarÄqÄ« is MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs claim that he knows this on the basis of a mystical intuition and not on the basis of rational proof; and the fact that he uses poetical language by describing contingents as mirrors of the divine.104 But more significantly, although á¹¢adrÄ does not say so explicitly, in effect the Sufi position of unity makes the totality of existence into an essence that can be conditioned in three ways and seems to point towards the ontological priority of essence (aá¹£Älat al-mÄhÄ«ya). Furthermore, it conflates two possible senses of âabsolute existence,â the former being a concept abstracted from oneâs observation of contingent essences and the other being the actual pure existence of the divine.105 This is one of the reasons why he rejected MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs appropriation of the modalities of essence for an analysis of existence. MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ takes the three considerations of essence (lÄ bi-Å¡ará¹, bi-Å¡ará¹ lÄ Å¡ayʾ, bi-Å¡ará¹ Å¡ayʾ) from the Metaphysics of al-Å ifÄʾ and applies them to the three ways in which to consider existence while retaining its unity, and which he calls absolute (muá¹laq), delimited (muqayyad) and deployed existence (munbasiá¹).106 NarÄqÄ« summarised his objection:
As for these three levels of existence, I mean reality taken negatively conditioned, reality unconditioned and reality with a condition, either they must be distinct in actuality (fÄ« l-wÄqiÊ¿) and the fact itself (nafs al-amr) or they must be distinct simply in the mind and in consideration. If it is the former, then unity of existence is not realised because the existence of the Necessary is one thing, and the existence of contingents another. And that third mode of existenceâexistence deployed (munbasiá¹) is another thing again. But none of the Sufis claim this nor does the mystic [MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ] claim so as is clear in the passages presented. If it is the latter, as seems to be explicit in the writings of Sufis and resembles what is quoted above from the mystic [MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ], then there is no distinction between these levels in actuality but only in mental consideration, and thus one could apply Real existence to the first level or to the second or any, and how can one grasp one thing from these differences?107
The problem is that Sufisâand he cites Ibn Ê¿ArabÄ« as well as MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs approvalâsometimes use unconditioned reality of existence and sometimes negatively conditioned reality of existence to apply to God. This reverts to the old problem of the conflation of two senses of absolute existence mentioned.
Third, on the incipience of the soul, NarÄqÄ« rejects the Sadrian doctrine that the soul is corporeal in its incipience and argues for its spiritual incipience (rūḥanÄ«yat al-ḥudūṯ) consistent with the Avicennian tradition.108 In fact, the radical distinction between body and the soul and the fact that the soul does not become corrupted or non-existent with the corruption of the body means that its origins and its final state are non-material and non-corporeal in reality. Part of the reason is that one thing cannot become anotherâand NarÄqÄ« rejected motion in substance.109
Furthermore, on the question of the incipience of the cosmos, he sets aside MullÄ á¹¢adrÄâs theory of motion in substance as a means for reconciling an eternal cosmos with Godâs creative agency, and opts instead, following his teacher Ḫwaǧūʾī, for MÄ«r DÄmÄdâs notion of perpetual creation (ḥudūṯ dahrÄ«).110 In the Flashes from the Divine Empyrean, he begins by setting out three positions: the philosophers hold that the cosmos is posterior to God in a purely logical sense insofar as it is preceded only by the very essence of God; the theologians hold that the cosmos is posterior to God in time and hence it is preceded by non-existence in time; and the third is a recent positionâand he means that of MÄ«r DÄmÄdâthat the cosmos begins in perpetuity (dahr) so that it is properly preceded by non-existence and there is a separation (infikÄk) from the divine essence.111 He deals with various objections to the theory of MÄ«r DÄmad. Consider the following two. First, the divine essence insofar as it is a perfect cause is sufficient for the cosmos; positing any separation either by time or by perpetuity would violate the notion of the perfect cause. Second, God is the most perfect thing that can be conceived and therefore it would not be appropriate to consider when divine agency and causation began and when it ended. In both cases, positing a separation between God and the cosmos is considered to be a postulation of deficiency in God. NarÄqÄ« responds by saying that the separation defends the contingency of the cosmos since it is precisely that contingency which constitutes a relative deficiency. It is therefore not the perfection of God that is at stake but ensuring the contingency of the cosmos.112 Finally, in his summary of why this is the best way to understand the incipience of the cosmos, he appeals to the authority of the Theology of Aristotle: the foundations and pillars of the cosmos, such as the celestial spheres and the elements, do not exist in time (zamÄn), rather they exist in perpetuity (dahr).113
3 Conclusion
NarÄqÄ« represented a developed and transformed Avicennism and provides further evidence for the dossier of how commentatorial traditions do not simply defend doctrines but developed them in dynamic ways. NarÄqÄ« saw MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ as a reasonable reader of Avicenna but he was critical of some key issues, not least of metaphysical monism, returning to the text of Avicenna and his earlier commentators. Significantly, he perpetuated the reading of Avicenna on creation that considered MÄ«r DÄmÄdâs solution of creation at the level of perpetuity to be the most reasonable understanding of Avicennaâs insistence on the contingency and necessity of the cosmos as well as the denial of the theological doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in time. Nevertheless, NarÄqÄ« represented in some ways the last moment of the significance of the Avicennian tradition as it was being replaced by MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ. In later generations, the critiques of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ were broadly ignored by the mainstream of the seminarian study of philosophy and even in the philosophy departments of the Iranian universities. Similarly, when one looks at the works of contemporary Avicennians such as YaḥyÄ YaṯribÄ« or those editing and writing on the Avicennian tradition such as ḤasanzÄda ÄmulÄ«, it is clear that they have been extensively influenced by the Sadrian traditionâand this was already clear in the work of NarÄqÄ«. The case study of the thought of MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ« shows how Avicennisms were constantly in the process of changing and shiftingâand it demonstrates one of the key insights of the late Pierre Hadot about how the history of philosophy often develops through processes of creative misreadings of the forebears.
Ulrich Rudolph et al (eds.), Philosophy in the Islamic World, Vol. 1 8thâ10th Centuries, (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
Jean R. Michot, âLa pandémie avicennienne au Vie/XIIe siècle,â Arabica, 10.3 (1993): 287â344; Ahmed al-Rahim, The Creation of Philosophical Tradition: Biography and the Reception of Avicennaâs Philosophy from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century AD (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2018).
Henry Corbin, La philosophie iranienne islamique aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Buchet Chastel, 1981); Christian Jambet, Quâest-ce que la philosophie islamique? (Paris: Gallimard, 2011); Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Mehdi Aminrazavi (eds.), An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, Vol. 5: From the School of Shiraz to the Twentieth Century (London: Tauris, 2015), esp. 119â528.
For example, Muḥammad FanÄʾī AÅ¡kivarÄ«, MaÊ¿qÅ«l-i ṯÄnÄ«: taḥlÄ«lÄ« az anwÄÊ¿-yi mafÄhÄ«m-i kullÄ« dar falsafa-yi islÄmÄ« va Ä¡arbÄ« (Qum: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i muʾassasa-yi ÄmÅ«zÄ«Å¡ va pažhÅ«hiÅ¡Ä«-yi ImÄm ḪumaynÄ«, 1387 Å /2008); Alparslan Açikgenç, Being and Existence in Sadra and Heidegger: A Comparative Ontology (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993).
Sajjad H. Rizvi, MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being (London: Routledge, 2009), 4â14. On the reception of Kant, see Roman Seidel, Kant in Teheran: Anfänge, Ansätze und Kontexte der Kantrezeption in Iran (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014). There are plenty of works that pit MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ against Kant. See the works of MurtaÅ¼Ä Muá¹ahharÄ«, such as his four volume commentary on the text of MullÄ HÄdÄ« SabzavÄrÄ« (d. 1298/1873), Å arḥ-i mabsÅ«á¹-i manáºÅ«ma (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i Ḥikmat, 1363 Å /1985), and his notes on the lectures of Ê¿AllÄma ṬabÄá¹abÄʾī published in five volumes as Uṣūl-i falsafa va-raviÅ¡-i riʾÄlizm (Qum: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i á¹¢adrÄ, 1382 Å /2003). Muá¹ahharÄ« and ṬabÄá¹abÄʾī are known for their deployment of MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ against modern European philosophyâsee Urs Gösken, Kritik der westlichen Philosophie in Iran. Zum geistesgeschichtlichen Selbstverständnis von Muḥammad Ḥusayn ṬabÄá¹abÄʾī und MurtaÅ¼Ä Muá¹ahharÄ« (Munich: Walter de Gruyter, 2014).
Sajjad H. Rizvi, âḤikma mutaÊ¿Äliya in Qajar Iran: Locating the Work of Mulla Hadi Sabzawari,â Iranian Studies, 44.4 (2011): 473â96; and idem, âÊ¿AlÄ« NÅ«rÄ«,â in Philosophy in Qajar Iran, ed. by Reza Pourjavady (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 125â78, as well as the other contributions in the same volume.
Ê¿AlÄ«-RiÅ¼Ä áºakÄvatÄ« QarÄÄ¡uzlÅ«, âSayrÄ« dar naqd-i afkÄr-i MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ dar ÄahÄr qarn-i aḫīr,â ÄyÄ«na-yi pažūhiÅ¡ 10.57 (1378 Å /1999): 14â21.
Ê¿Abd al-RazzÄq LÄhīǧī, Gawhar-i murÄd, ed. by Zayn al-Ê¿ÄbidÄ«n QurbÄnÄ« LÄhīǧī (Tehran: Daftar-i tablÄ«Ä¡Ät-i islÄmÄ«, 1388 Å /2009), 192â6; idem, Å awÄriq al-ilhÄm fÄ« Å¡arḥ TaǧrÄ«d al-kalÄm, ed. by Akbar Asad Ê¿AlÄ«-zÄda (Qum: Muʾassasa-yi ImÄm á¹¢Ädiq, 1391 Å /2012), I, 143â60, 221â4, III, 171â180; idem, al-Kalima al-á¹ayyiba, ed. by ḤamÄ«d Ê¿Aá¹Äʾī NaáºarÄ« (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pažūhiÅ¡Ä«-yi ḥikmat va falsafa-yi ĪrÄn, 1391 Å /2012), 130â2, 133â6; Corbin, La philosophie iranienne islamique, 103â9.
Raǧab Ê¿AlÄ« TabrÄ«zÄ«, IṯbÄt-i vÄǧib, in MuntaḫabÄtÄ« az ÄṯÄr-i ḥukamÄʾ-yi ilÄhÄ«-yi ĪrÄn, ed. by Sayyid ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ« (Qum: Daftar-i tablÄ«Ä¡Ät-i islÄmÄ«, 1378 Å /1999), I, 239â58; Raǧab Ê¿AlÄ« TabrÄ«zÄ«, Aá¹£l al-aṣīl, ed. by Ê¿AzÄ«z ǦavÄnpÅ«r HiravÄ« and Ḥasan Akbar Bayraq (Tehran: Anǧuman-i mafÄḫir va ÄṯÄr-i farhangÄ«, 1386 Å /2007); Nasr and Aminrazavi (eds.), An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, 285â304; Corbin, La philosophie iranienne islamique, 83â95.
TabrÄ«zÄ«, Aá¹£l al-aṣīl, 26â9. The axiom is best known through Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, ed. and tr. by Michael Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), book IX, chapter 4, 328; and al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt maÊ¿ Å¡arḥay, ed. by MaḥmÅ«d Å ihÄbÄ« (Qum: NaÅ¡r al-balÄÄ¡a, 1375 Å /1996), III, 122; and his student BahmanyÄr, KitÄb al-taḥṣīl, ed. by Murtaá¸Ä Muá¹ahharÄ« (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1375 Å /1996), 531â2. Cristina dâAncona has suggested that the roots of the axiom lie in the Arabic Plotinus and Proclusâsee âEx uno non fit nisi unum Storia e preistoria della dottrina avicenniana della prima intelligenzia,â in Per una storia del concetto di mente, ed. by Eugenio Canone (Firenze: L.S. Oschki, 2007), 29â55. There are other earlier echoes, for example in the possibly apocryphal FÄrÄbian commentary on the âso-called treatise of Zeno:â Å arḥ risÄlat ZÄ«nÅ«n, ed. by ḤÄmid NÄǧi Iá¹£fahÄnÄ«, in Ganǧina-yi BahÄristÄn Ḥikmat II, ed. by Ê¿AlÄ« AwǧabÄ« (Tehran: KitÄbḫÄna, mÅ«za va markaz-i asnÄd-i Maǧlis-i Å Å«rÄ-yi IslÄmÄ«, 1387 Å /2008), 128. For a study that questions the attribution of this text to FÄrÄbÄ«, see Josep Puig, âUn tratado de Zenón el Mayor. Un comentaria atribuido a al-Farabi,â La Ciudad de Dios 201 (1988): 287â321.
TabrÄ«zÄ«, Aá¹£l al-aṣīl, 55â60, 68â9.
Reza Pourjavady, âJalÄl al-DÄ«n al-DawÄnÄ« (d. 908/1502), Glosses on Ê¿AlÄʾ al-DÄ«n al-QÅ«shjÄ«âs Commentary on Naṣīr al-DÄ«n al-ṬūsÄ«âs TajrÄ«d al-iÊ¿tiqÄd,â The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. by Khaled el-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 415â37, esp. 422â3, 428â9; Ä ulÄm-Ḥusayn IbrÄhÄ«mÄ« DÄ«nÄnÄ«, ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n DavÄnÄ«: fÄ«lsÅ«f-i á¸awq al-taʾalluh (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i Hirmis, 1395 Å /2016), 18â20, 59â90.
TabrÄ«zÄ«, Aá¹£l al-aṣīl, 60â6.
TabrÄ«zÄ«, Aá¹£l al-aṣīl, 86â9.
Pourjavady, âJalÄl al-DÄ«n al-DawÄnÄ« (d. 908/1502),â 433â5; contra Robert Wisnovsky, âAvicennaâs Islamic reception,â in Interpreting Avicenna, ed. by Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 190â213, esp. 209.
MÄ«r QawÄm al-DÄ«n al-ṬihrÄnÄ« RÄzÄ«, Ê¿Ayn al-ḥikma wa-taÊ¿lÄ«qÄt, ed. by Ê¿AlÄ« AwǧabÄ« (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i kitÄbḫÄna, mÅ«za va markaz-i asnÄd-i Maǧlis-i Å Å«rÄ-yi IslÄmÄ«, 1378 Å /1999); Corbin, La philosophie iranienne islamique, 206â18. His contemporary did much the sameâsee Ê¿AlÄ«-qulÄ« b. QaraǧġÄy ḪÄn, IḥyÄʾ-yi ḥikmat, ed. by FÄá¹ima FanÄ, 2 vols. (Tehran: MÄ«rÄṯ-i maktÅ«b, 1377 Å /1998).
Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, âAn Eastern Renaissance? Greek Philosophy under the Safavids,â Intellectual History of the Islamicate World, 3 (2015): 248â90.
Khaled El-Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 361.
Robert Wisnovsky, âAvicennism and Early Exegetical Practice in the Commentaries on the IshÄrÄt,â Oriens 41 (2013): 349â78; idem, âAvicennaâs Islamic reception;â Jon McGinnis, âNaṣīr al-DÄ«n al-ṬūsÄ« (d. 1274) Sharḥ al-ishÄrÄt,â in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. by el-Rouayheb and Schmidtke, 326â47; Ayman Shihadeh, âAl-RÄzÄ«âs (d. 1210) Commentary on Avicennaâs Pointers,â in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. by el-Rouayheb and Schmidtke, 296â325.
Robert Wisnovsky, âOne Aspect of the Avicennian Turn in SunnÄ« Theology,â Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004): 65â100; Heidrun Eichner, The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tradition and Islamic Orthodoxy: Philosophical and Theological Summae in Context, Habilitationsschrift, Halle, 2009; eadem, âHandbooks in the Tradition of Later Eastern AshÊ¿arism,â in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. by Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 494â514.
ṬūsÄ« did not invent these concepts in the Avicennian tradition; however, he emphasised their centrality to reading Avicennian metaphysicsâsee Avicenna, al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt maÊ¿ Å¡arḥay, III, 6â7, 17â8.
Wahid Amin, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and the Avicennan Tradition: Metaphysics and Mental Existence, D.Phil. dissertation, Oxford, 2016.
Å ams al-DÄ«n Muḥammad ḪafrÄ«, TaÊ¿lÄ«qa bar IlÄhÄ«yÄt-i Å¡arḥ-i TaǧrÄ«d-i MullÄ Ê¿AlÄ« Qūšǧī, ed. by FirÅ«za SÄÊ¿atÄÄ«yÄn (Tehran: MÄ«rÄṯ-i maktÅ«b, 1382 Å /2003).
Å ams al-DÄ«n Muḥammad ḪafrÄ«, ḤÄÅ¡iya al-muḥÄkama bayn Å¡arḥay al-iÅ¡ÄrÄt, ed. by Ê¿Abd AllÄh NÅ«rÄnÄ« in Ganǧīna-yi BahÄristÄn: Ḥikmat I, ed. by Ê¿AlÄ« AwǧabÄ« (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i kitÄbḫÄna, mÅ«za va markaz-i asnÄd-i Maǧlis-i Å Å«rÄ-yi IslÄmÄ«, 1379 Å /2000), 137â99.
Ä iyÄṯ al-DÄ«n Manṣūr DaÅ¡takÄ«, Muá¹£annafÄt, ed. by Ê¿AbdullÄh NÅ«rÄnÄ« (Tehran: Anǧuman-i mafÄḫir va ÄṯÄr-i farhangÄ«, 1386 Å /2007), II, 377; idem, Å ifÄʾ al-qulÅ«b wa-taǧawhar al-aǧsÄm, ed. by Ê¿AlÄ« AwǧabÄ« (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i kitÄbḫÄna, mÅ«za va markaz-i asnÄd-i Maǧlis-i Å Å«rÄ-yi IslÄmÄ«, 1390 Å /2011); ÄqÄ Buzurg ṬihrÄnÄ«, al-á¸arÄ«Ê¿a ilÄ taá¹£ÄnÄ«f al-Å Ä«Ê¿a (Beirut: DÄr al-aá¸wÄʾ, 1983), XI, 325.
DaÅ¡takÄ«, Muá¹£annafÄt, II, 377â490; Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-Å ifÄʾ (al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt): maÊ¿ taÊ¿lÄ«qÄt á¹¢adr al-mutaʾallihÄ«n, MÄ«r DÄmÄd, al-Ê¿AlawÄ«, al-ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«, al-SabzawÄrÄ«, MullÄ SulaymÄn, MullÄ AwliyÄʾ wa-Ä¡ayrihim, ed. by ḤÄmid NÄǧī Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« (Tehran: Anǧuman-i mafÄḫir va ÄṯÄr-i farhangÄ«, 1383 Å /2004); Ahab Bdaiwi, ShiÊ¿i Defenders of Avicenna: An Intellectual History of the DashtakÄ« Philosophers of Shiraz, Ph.D. dissertation, Exeter, 2014; Robert Wisnovsky, âAvicennism and Early Exegetical Practice.â This is not to deny the influence of DawÄnÄ« on MÄ«r DÄmÄd, but rather to indicate that the DaÅ¡takÄ«s ushered in a âÅ iÊ¿i Avicennismâ whose leadership MÄ«r DÄmÄd adopted.
Sayyid Aḥmad al-ḤusaynÄ«, TalÄmiá¸at al-Ê¿AllÄma al-MaǧlisÄ« wa-l-muǧÄzÅ«n minhu (Qum: KitÄbḫÄna-yi ÄyatullÄh MarÊ¿aÅ¡Ä« NaǧafÄ«, 1410/1989), 44; Muḥammad RiÅ¼Ä ZÄdhÅ«Å¡, DÄ«dÄr bÄ fÄ«lsÅ«fÄn-i SipÄhÄn (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pažūhiÅ¡Ä«-yi ḥikmat u falsafa-yi ĪrÄn, 1391 Å /2012), 161; Ivana Panzeca, âOn the Persian translations of Avicennaâs IlÄhiyyÄt,â Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 28 (2017): 553â67.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ Å Ä«rÄzÄ«, Å arḥ wa taÊ¿lÄ«qÄt Ê¿alÄ IlÄhÄ«yÄt al-Å ifÄʾ, ed. by Naǧaf-qulÄ« ḤabÄ«bÄ« (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i BunyÄd-i ḥikmat-i islÄmÄ«-yi á¹¢adrÄ, 1382 Å /2003).
Muá¹£á¹afÄ DirÄyatÄ« (ed.), FihristvÄra-yi dast-niviÅ¡t-hÄ-yi ĪrÄn [DinÄ] (Qum: Al-HÄdÄ«, 1389 Å /2010), IV, 308â9.
DirÄyatÄ«, FihristvÄra, IX, 1037â8.
Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ê¿AlawÄ«, MiftÄḥ al-Å ifÄʾ, in MuntaḫabÄtÄ«, ed. by ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ«, II, 39â54, 73â90, 115â43; MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ Å Ä«rÄzÄ«, al-Ḥikma al-mutaÊ¿Äliya fÄ«-l-asfÄr al-Ê¿aqlÄ«ya al-arbaÊ¿a, ed. by Sayyid Muḥammad ḪÄminihÄ« et al. (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i BunyÄd-i ḥikmat-i islÄmÄ«-yi á¹¢adrÄ, 1383 Å /2004), IX, 199â223, VI, 91â97, VI, 184â217, 251â67, III, 339â47, 481â529.
al-Ḥurr al-Ê¿ÄmilÄ«, Amal al-Ämil fÄ« Ê¿ulamÄʾ Ǧabal Ê¿Ämil, ed. by Sayyid Aḥmad al-ḤusaynÄ« al-AÅ¡kiwarÄ« (Naǧaf: al-Maá¹baÊ¿a al-Ḥaydariyya, 1966), I, 250â2.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, Å arḥ, I, 23â4; SabzawÄrÄ«, ḤÄÅ¡iya, in MuntaḫabÄtÄ«, ed. by ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ«, II, 550â1; ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«, ḤÄÅ¡iya, in MuntaḫabÄtÄ«, ed. by ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ«, I, 377.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, Å arḥ, I, 49â50; ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«, ḤÄÅ¡iya, I, 378; SabzawÄrÄ«, ḤÄÅ¡iya, II, 566â7.
SabzawÄrÄ«, ḤÄÅ¡iya, II, 574â5 and 581â2, citing MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, Å arḥ, I, 50.
Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-Å ifÄʾ: ilÄhÄ«yÄt, ed. by Ǧ. AnawÄtÄ«, SaÊ¿Ä«d ZÄyid, IbrÄhÄ«m MadkÅ«r et al. (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-miá¹£rÄ«ya al-Ê¿Ämma li-l-kitÄb, 1960), I, 34; MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, Å arḥ, I, 129â31.
Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt maÊ¿ Å¡arḥay, III, 32â4; MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, Å arḥ, I, 129.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, Å arḥ, I, 499â500.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, III, 339.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, III, 347â51, citing Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt, III, 292â296, and Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-Å ifÄʾ: fÄ« l-nafs, eds. Ǧ. AnawÄtÄ«, SaÊ¿Ä«d ZÄyid, IbrÄhÄ«m MadkÅ«r et al. (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-miá¹£rÄ«ya al-Ê¿Ämma li-l-kitÄb, 1960), 212â3.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, III, 343, citing (ps.-)Aristotle, UṯūlūǧiyÄ, in AflÅ«á¹Ä«n Ê¿ind al-Ê¿arab, ed. by Ê¿Abd al-RaḥmÄn al-BadawÄ« (Cairo: Lââ¯Institut français, 1947), mÄ«mar VIII, 117.
Avicenna, The Physics of the Healing, ed. and tr. by Jon McGinnis (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2009), book III, II, 260â1; MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, V, 6â10.
Ê¿Abd al-RasÅ«l Ê¿UbÅ«dÄ«yat, Dar ÄmadÄ« bih niáºÄm-i ḥikmat-i á¹¢adrÄʾī (Qum: Muʾassasa-yi ImÄm ḪumaynÄ«, 1391 Å /2012), I, 323â7. See MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, III, 61â2, 101â2, 104, 177â8, IV, 274, VII, 290â2, VIII, 11â2, and al-Å awÄhid al-rubÅ«bÄ«ya fÄ«-l-manÄhiǧ al-sulÅ«kÄ«ya, ed. by Sayyid Muá¹£á¹afÄ Muḥaqqiq DÄmÄd (Tehran: BunyÄd-i ḥikmat-i islÄmÄ«-yi á¹¢adrÄ, 1382 Å /2003), 108.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, III, 74â5.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, III, 113.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, IV, 459.
MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, IV, 457.
A recent study is probably the best introduction to his philosophy: Reza Pourjavady, âMullÄ MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«,â in Philosophy in Qajar Iran, ed. by Pourjavady, 36â65. For his biography, see MÄ«rzÄ á¸¤asan ḤusaynÄ« ZunÅ«zÄ« (d. 1218/1803â4), RiyÄḠal-ǧanna: min al-rawá¸a al-rÄbiÊ¿a, ed. by Ê¿AlÄ« RafÄ«Ê¿Ä« (Qum: KitÄbḫÄna-yi ÄyatullÄh MarÊ¿aÅ¡Ä« NaǧafÄ«, 1370 Å /1991), IV, 567â74; MÄ«rzÄ Muḥammad b. SulaymÄn TunikÄbunÄ« (d. 1302/1885), Qiá¹£aá¹£ al-Ê¿ulamÄʾ, ed. by Muḥammad Riá¸Ä BarzigÄr ḪÄliqÄ« and Ê¿Iffat KarbÄsÄ« (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i Ê¿ilmÄ« u farhangÄ«, 1389 Å /2010), 168â70; Sayyid Ḥasan al-á¹¢adr (d. 1354/1935), Takmilat Amal al-Ämil, ed. by Ḥusayn Ê¿AlÄ« MaḥfÅ«áº, Ê¿AlÄ« al-DabbÄÄ¡ and Ê¿AdnÄn al-DabbÄÄ¡ (Beirut: DÄr al-aá¸wÄʾ, 1986), V, 492â6; ÄqÄ Buzurg ṬihrÄnÄ« (d. 1391/1970), ṬabaqÄt aÊ¿lÄm al-Å Ä«Ê¿a, ed. by Ê¿AlÄ«-NaqÄ« MunzawÄ« (Beirut: DÄr iḥyÄʾ al-turÄṯ, 2009), XII, 543â4; Ä ulÄm-Ḥusayn ḪudrÄ«, TaʾmmulÄ« bar sayr-i taá¹awwurÄ«-yi ḥukamÄ va ḥikmat-i mutaÊ¿Äliya (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pažūhiÅ¡Ä«-yi ḥikmat u falsafa-yi ĪrÄn, 1391 Å /2012), 319â3; ZÄdhÅ«Å¡, DÄ«dÄr bÄ fÄ«lsÅ«fÄn-i SipÄhÄn, 212â4.
Sayyid Muḥammad BÄqir MÅ«sawÄ« al-ḪwÄnsÄrÄ« (d. 1313/1895), Rawá¸Ät al-ǧannÄt fÄ« aḥwÄl al-Ê¿ulamÄʾ wa-l-sÄdÄt (Beirut: al-DÄr al-islÄmiyya, 1991), I, 114â9; MÄ«rzÄ Muḥammad Ê¿AlÄ« Mudarris-i TabrÄ«zÄ« (d. 1373/1954), RayḥÄnat al-adab fÄ« tarÄǧim al-maÊ¿rÅ«fÄ«n (Tehran: ÄÄpḫÄna-y Å afaq, 1954), II, 105â6; ÄqÄ Buzurg ṬihrÄnÄ«, ṬabaqÄt aÊ¿lÄm al-Å Ä«Ê¿a, IX, 62â4; ḪudrÄ«, TaʾmmulÄ« bar sayr-i taá¹awwurÄ«-yi ḥukamÄ va ḥikmat-i mutaÊ¿Äliya, 274â81.
IsmÄÊ¿Ä«l ḪwÄǧūʾī, Ibá¹Äl al-zamÄn al-mawhÅ«m, in ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n DavÄnÄ«, SabÊ¿ rasÄʾil, ed. by Sayyid Aḥmad TÅ«ysirkÄnÄ« (Tehran: MÄ«rÄṯ-i maktÅ«b, 1381 Å /2002), 241â83.
ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n DavÄnÄ«, SabÊ¿ rasÄʾil, 229â237.
IsmÄÊ¿Ä«l ḪwÄǧūʾī, RisÄla fÄ« waḥdat al-wuǧūd, ed. by RahÄ«m QÄsimÄ«, in MÄ«rÄṯ-i ḥawza-yi Iá¹£fahÄn: daftar-i avval (Isfahan: UstÄnlarÄ«-yi Iá¹£fahÄn, 1383 Å /2004), 138â41.
ḪwÄǧūʾī, á¹®amarat al-fuʾÄd, in MuntaḫabÄtÄ«, ed. by ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ«, III, 229â306.
ḪwÄǧūʾī, á¹®amarat al-fuʾÄd, in MuntaḫabÄtÄ«, ed. by ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ«, III, 264â89.
ḪwÄǧūʾī, á¹®amarat al-fuʾÄd, in MuntaḫabÄtÄ«, ed. by ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ«, III, 294â5.
MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr wa-nÄqid al-anáºÄr, ed. by Maǧīd HÄdÄ«-zÄda (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i ḥikmat, 1381 Å /2002), I, 210.
Shaykh Ê¿Abd al-NabÄ« al-QazwÄ«nÄ« (d. c. 1197/1783), TatmÄ«m Amal al-Ämil, ed. Sayyid Aḥmad al-ḤusaynÄ« al-AÅ¡kiwarÄ« (Qum: KitÄbḫÄna-yi ÄyatullÄh MarÊ¿aÅ¡Ä« NaǧafÄ«, 1986), 67â8.
ZunÅ«zÄ«, RiyÄḠal-ǧanna, II, 72â3.
ḪwÄnsÄrÄ«, Rawá¸Ät al-ǧannÄt, VII, 119â21; ḪudrÄ«, TaʾmmulÄ« bar sayr-i taá¹awwurÄ«-yi ḥukamÄ va ḥikmat-i mutaÊ¿Äliya, 269â70; ZÄdhÅ«Å¡, DÄ«dÄr bÄ fÄ«lsÅ«fÄn-i SipÄhÄn, 189â90.
Sayyid MahdÄ« RaǧÄʾī, al-IǧÄzÄt li-ǧamÊ¿ min al-Ê¿ulamÄʾ wa-l-fuqahÄʾ wa-l-muḥaddiṯīn (Qum: KitÄbḫÄna-yi ÄyatullÄh MarÊ¿aÅ¡Ä« NaǧafÄ«, 1386 Å /2008), 19â28; al-ḤusaynÄ«, TalÄmiá¸at al-Ê¿AllÄma al-MaǧlisÄ«, 93; ZÄdhÅ«Å¡, DÄ«dÄr bÄ fÄ«lsÅ«fÄn-i SipÄhÄn, 189; ÄqÄ Buzurg ṬihrÄnÄ«, ṬabaqÄt aÊ¿lÄm al-Å¡Ä«Ê¿a, IX, 94â5, 198â200, 426.
Muḥammad ZamÄn KÄÅ¡ÄnÄ«, HidÄyat al-mustarÅ¡idÄ«n wa-taḫá¹iʾat al-mubalkafÄ«n, MS Maǧlis-i Å¡Å«rÄ-yi islÄmÄ« Tehran 1966, fols. 17aâ32b, completed 1166/1752.
Muḥammad ZamÄn KÄÅ¡ÄnÄ«, MirʾÄt al-zamÄn, ed. by MahdÄ« DihbÄÅ¡Ä« (Tehran: Anǧuman-i mafÄḫir va ÄṯÄr-i farhangÄ«, 1384 Å /2005).
Muḥammad ǦaÊ¿far KabÅ«darÄhangÄ« âMaǧá¸Å«b Ê¿AlÄ« Å Ähâ (d. 1238/1823), MirʾÄt al-ḥaqq, ed. ḤÄmid NÄǧī Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i MawlÄ, 1383 Å /2004), 70.
MÄ«r Muḥammad Ḥusayn b. Ê¿Abd al-BÄqÄ« Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« ḪÄtÅ«nÄbÄdÄ«, ḤÄÅ¡iyat al-Å ifÄʾ, MS MarÊ¿aÅ¡Ä« Qum 4838, autograph, foll. 1â2.
MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt min kitÄb al-Å ifÄʾ, ed. by ḤÄmid NÄǧī Iá¹£fahÄnÄ« (Qum: HamÄyiÅ¡-i MullÄ NarÄqÄ«, 1380 Å /2001), I, 363, 449, 457, 724, 25, 417, 523, 737, 332, 327, 764.
NarÄqÄ«, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt min kitÄb al-Å ifÄʾ, I, 459, citing Faḫr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«, al-MabÄḥiṯ al-maÅ¡riqÄ«ya fÄ« Ê¿ilm al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt wa-l-á¹abÄ«Ê¿Ä«yÄt (Tehran: Maktabat al-AsadÄ«, 1966), I, 47â8.
NarÄqÄ«, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, I, 764â8.
NarÄqÄ«, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, I, 147, 151, 165.
MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, I, 63, II, 809, I, 154, 194.
MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n fÄ«-l-wuǧūd wa-l-mÄhÄ«ya, ed. by Ḥasan al-Ê¿UbaydÄ« (Beirut: al-Maḥaǧǧa al-bayá¸Äʾ, 2009), 54.
NarÄqÄ«, ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr, I, 1.
ḪafrÄ«, TaÊ¿lÄ«qa bar IlÄhÄ«yÄt, 99â155, 169â99, 207â19.
NarÄqÄ«, ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr, I, 4â148; see also Firouzeh Saatchian, Gottes WesenâGottes Wirken: Ontologie und Kosmologie im Denken von Å ams al-DÄ«n Muḥammad al-ḪafrÄ« (gest. 942/1535) (Berlin: Franz Schwarz Verlag, 2011), 128â96.
Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-IÅ¡ÄrÄt wa-l-tanbÄ«hÄt, III, 66â7.
The newer edition by al-Ê¿UbaydÄ« includes the glosses on BÄ«dÄbÄdÄ« responding on the question of monismâsee NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 263â73.
MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, ed. by Sayyid ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ« (Tehran: Institute of Philosophy, 1978), 138â60, 161â235.
MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, ed. by Ê¿AlÄ« AwǧabÄ« (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i kitÄbḫÄna, mÅ«za va markaz-i asnÄd-i Maǧlis-i Å Å«rÄ-yi islÄmÄ«, 1381 Å /2002).
MahdÄ« NarÄqÄ«, al-LumÊ¿a al-ilÄhÄ«ya wa-l-kalimÄt al-waǧīza, ed. by Sayyid ǦalÄl al-DÄ«n ÄÅ¡tiyÄnÄ« (Tehran: Institute of Philosophy, 1978), 51â129.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LumÊ¿a al-ilÄhÄ«ya, 133â55.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LumÊ¿a al-ilÄhÄ«ya, 148.
NarÄqÄ«, ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr, I, 439; idem, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 19â22; idem, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 57â60.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 5.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 8â9.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 54â8.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 6.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 9.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 23.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 403â13.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 109, 121, 178, 190, 196, 197, 201.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 446â55; MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, VI, 178â228.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 76â8; NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 12â4.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 111â5.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 22â5; idem, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 65â70; idem, al-LumÊ¿a al-ilÄhÄ«ya, 79; idem, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, I, 426â9.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 30â1.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 218â21; idem, ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr, I, 138â41.
NarÄqÄ«, ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr, I, 139â41.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 205.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 202.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 115â20.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 234â5.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 217.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 181â3; ḪafrÄ«, Sitt rasÄʾil fÄ« iṯbÄt wÄǧib al-wuǧūd bi-l-á¸Ät wa fÄ« l-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, ed. by FirÅ«za SÄÊ¿atÄÄ«yÄn (Tehran: IntiÅ¡ÄrÄt-i kitÄbḫÄna, mÅ«za va markaz-i asnÄd-i Maǧlis-i Å Å«rÄ-yi islÄmÄ«, 1390 Å /2011), 152â3.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 185â7.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 190.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 172.
Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-Å ifÄʾ: al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, I, 213â9; MullÄ á¹¢adrÄ, AsfÄr, II, 15â6, II, 330â2, 346â7.
NarÄqÄ«, Qurrat al-Ê¿uyÅ«n, 175â8.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LumÊ¿a al-ilÄhÄ«ya, 96â101.
NarÄqÄ«, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, II, 730â754.
NarÄqÄ«, ǦÄmiÊ¿ al-afkÄr, I, 178â243; idem, Å arḥ al-ilÄhÄ«yÄt, 92â5.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 468â9.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 470â1.
NarÄqÄ«, al-LamaÊ¿Ät al-Ê¿arÅ¡Ä«ya, 484.
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