Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that, in several chapters of the AsfÄr, á¹¢adrÄâs use of Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«âs al-MabÄhith al-mashriqiyya is far more extensive than what a superficial reading, focusing only on explicit quotations, might indicate, and to explore what knowing this can bring to our reading of á¹¢adrÄâs text. It analyzes what á¹¢adrÄ does with his source and examines a few examples to illustrate why it matters to know.
Readers of the al-Ḥikma al-mutaÊ¿Äliya fÄ« l-asfÄr al-Ê¿aqliyya al-arbaÊ¿a (AsfÄr) know how often á¹¢adr al-DÄ«n al-ShÄ«rÄzÄ« quotes and discusses the teachings of other authors. It is often via a thorough discussion of previous debates that á¹¢adrÄ expresses his own views. Unsurprisingly, one of the authors discussed is Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ« (544â606/1149â1210), and his oeuvre, the Sharḥ al-IshÄrÄt and the al-MabÄḥith al-mashriqiyya in particular, is heavily used and quoted.
My aim in this paper is to show that in several chapters of the AsfÄr, á¹¢adrÄâs use of the MabÄhith al-mashriqiyya is far more extensive than what a superficial reading, focusing only on explicit quotations, might indicate, and to explore what knowing this can bring to our reading of á¹¢adrÄâs text. The paper is divided in two parts: I will first show that this is the case and what á¹¢adrÄ does with his source, and examine next a few examples more closely to illustrate why it matters to know.
1 The Fact
When you read a number of passages of the AsfÄr side by side with a copy of RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith and you start highlighting what is common to both texts, you realize quickly that the MabÄḥith is used by á¹¢adrÄ in places as a framework for his own prose. An example of this can be found in the beginning of bÄb 2 of safar 4, on the substantiality of the soul (Appendix, Text 1).1
You have to choose your pages of course. This is more noticeable in parts of the AsfÄr such as the chapters on categories, where á¹¢adrÄ follows loosely RÄzÄ«âs text, and the chapters on the soul, where the two texts are closer at times. The name of Fakhr al-DÄ«n is not totally absent from these passages, and á¹¢adrÄ gives sometimes a hint indicating the author he draws from. In the chapter on the sensus communis (Appendix, Text 3 (H)), for instance, we see á¹¢adrÄ refer to the âauthor of the MabÄḥith,â without saying that the previous paragraphs were taken from this same text.2 In portions of texts where á¹¢adrÄâs use of the MabÄḥith seems more remote, RÄzÄ«âs name also shows up, sometimes abruptly, indicating that his text is indeed in á¹¢adrÄâs mind. An example can be found in bÄb 6, faá¹£l 1 of safar 4.3 This faá¹£l, on the non-corporeity of the human soul, is highly original but still follows loosely the MabÄḥith, with the name of its author appearing suddenly halfway through (âthe author of the MabÄḥith said â¦â).4 In the chapters on categories, this is also the case. The end of fann 3 in the discussion of categories, particularly the passages on âwhereâ (ayna) and on activity and passivity (an yafÊ¿al wa-an yanfaÊ¿il), appears as a close commentary on the MabÄḥith, and explicitly so: á¹¢adrÄ quotes the âauthor of the MabÄḥithâ and discusses, often to criticize, what RÄzÄ« has to say here.5 But the beginning of the chapter on categories, from the introduction that comes before fann 1 (on quantity), gains to be read against the background of the MabÄḥith. What á¹¢adrÄ writes here is often mainstream philosophical discourse and could as well be borrowed from a number of other texts. But it is still possible to determine that, even if it is undoubtedly accompanied by other tools, Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith is used here.6 In the middle of pages of summary or paraphrase of RÄzÄ«âs text, suddenly his name appears, showing that the MabÄḥith is clearly on á¹¢adrÄâs desk. For instance, in the introduction, an âImÄm al-RÄzÄ« saysâ opens a paragraph that is in fact surrounded by texts already heavily depending on RÄzÄ«.7 RÄzÄ«âs name appears again later, to introduce an objection raised against a demonstration of the finitude of dimensions, and its refutation.8 Again, the beginning of the section on the void is explicitly a quotation from RÄzÄ«,9 but it is unclear where it ends (his name appears also in the next section, on quality, a section that is often a reworked paraphrase of the MabÄḥith).10 In the section where the question of the number of categories is addressed, there is a brilliant passage when, speaking about the third question raised by RÄzÄ« (âthere is no category outside these ten [categories]â), á¹¢adrÄ refuses to quote the argument given by Avicenna, and here mentioned by RÄzÄ«, writing: âTo demonstrate this, the Shaykh gave an argument that is weak and bad, as he himself admits [the very words used by RÄzÄ« at the end of the quotation], and thus we skipped it.â11 á¹¢adrÄ skips here two full pages in RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith, before resuming his paraphrase. This shows again that á¹¢adrÄ has the text of the MabÄḥith in mind when he writes these pages.
2 What Is á¹¢adrÄ Doing with the MabÄḥith?
In the passages we are referring to, á¹¢adrÄ uses the MabÄḥith as raw material for his own text. What he does is not follow uncritically his source but rather use it, along with other texts, while remaining always attentive to his own purpose and what he wants to say. We will turn shortly to what this can bring to our reading of the AsfÄr. But first, we would like to look closer at what á¹¢adrÄ does when he uses the MabÄḥith.
The use made by á¹¢adrÄ of RÄzÄ«âs text can be divided into three main categories.
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Text 1 in the Appendix (AsfÄr 8:28â9) is an example of the first type. It follows RÄzÄ«âs text with some additions and changesâsome noticeable such as the use of âanimalâ where RÄzÄ« had âhuman beingââbut on the whole, the text is similar to that of the MabÄḥith.
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An example of the second type is Text 2 in the Appendix (AsfÄr 8:93â7): á¹¢adrÄ presents what he borrows from RÄzÄ« as the view generally held, inserting words such as yuqÄl (âit is saidâ) or Ê¿alÄ mÄ huwa l-mashhÅ«r (âaccording to what people generally holdâ) in the RÄzÄ«an discourse (Texts 2 (A) and (D)). It is often RÄzÄ«âs text that is meant when á¹¢adrÄ alludes to what thinkers âsuch as Avicenna and the likeâ hold. An example of that can be found at the end of the section on perception by external senses, where á¹¢adrÄ writes after a portion taken from the MabÄḥith: âfollowing what is recorded in the books of the qawm, such as the ShifÄʾ and the likeâ (on odors).12 This happens quite often: another example is found in the section on the relative (muá¸Äf), where á¹¢adrÄ labels what he borrows from RÄzÄ« again as âwhat can be learned from the discourse of the Shaykh and others,â adding: âand I have objections.â13 Again, on substance: âThis is what the ḥukamÄʾ say in such a place.â14 Quotations of Avicenna attributed to an anonymous author (with introductory sentences such as âOne of them writes that the Shaykh al-Raʾīs saidâ) are also often borrowed from RÄzÄ«.15
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In other passages, á¹¢adrÄ engages in a continuous discussion with RÄzÄ«, without mentioning his name, turning his discourse into a commentary on RÄzÄ«âs text of some sort. These are portions of text constructed as a dialogue (âsomeone saysâ or âone of the eminent (thinkers) saysâ ⦠âI sayâ), where the text put in the mouth of the âsomeoneâ or of the âeminentâ is that of Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«. An example is found in AsfÄr 4:242, where RÄzÄ«âs words are attributed to âone of the eminent (people)â (baʿḠal-fuá¸alÄʾ).16 Another example is what á¹¢adrÄ writes in faá¹£l 7 of the fann on quantity, on intensification, where á¹¢adrÄ discusses extensively the two arguments presented here by RÄzÄ« (faá¹£l 9 of his chapter on quantity), and introduces his words by a âThey say.â17 In a more subtle manner, there are passages where á¹¢adrÄ discusses a quotation made by RÄzÄ« (often from Avicenna) and comments on RÄzÄ«âs opinion upon it, such as this example where, after quoting Avicenna, á¹¢adrÄ concludes by saying: âThere is thus no confusion in what he says, as some of them thought,â referring again to RÄzÄ« in the MabÄḥith.18 This comes in addition to the passages where á¹¢adrÄ offers an explicit commentary of RÄzÄ«, often with his text summarized or paraphrased, as is the case at the end of fann 3 in the discussion of categories, as mentioned earlier, or a little later in the same text, in a section where objections to the supporters of the void are discussed.19
In making use of RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith, á¹¢adrÄ always appropriates the material: he reorganizes paragraphs, skips entire portions in RÄzÄ«âs text, he summarizes and paraphrases, interrupts the flow of RÄzÄ«âs discourse with a paragraph of his own, criticizes his source-text, changes the order and the wordingâin a word, uses RÄzÄ«âs text for his own purpose.
An example of alteration in the order of the text on a small scale can be seen in the treatment of the arguments for the tashkÄ«k, or the analogical character, of the concept of being: the arguments mentioned in the AsfÄr are taken in part from RÄzÄ«âs MabÄhith but presented in a different order and rearranged to fit á¹¢adrÄâs discourse.20 Another example is found in the section on the perception of particulars by the soul, where á¹¢adrÄ brings together the objections and their answer, putting the answer just after the corresponding objection, when RÄzÄ« had all the objections first, followed by the answers to each of them (with also different answers at times).21 But sometimes the modification in the organization of the text is more radical. Thus on chance (ittifÄq), we see á¹¢adrÄ rearrange portions of text from the MabÄḥith as elements for his own text, putting together paragraphs coming from different chapters in RÄzÄ«âs treatment of the question in his chapter on the final cause: in the beginning of the chapter (mabḥath 2: FÄ« l-ittifÄq), á¹¢adrÄ brings together the position attributed to Democritus and that attributed to Empedocles, presented by RÄzÄ« in faá¹£l 6 and faá¹£l 4 of his chapter on the final cause respectively, while the end of the mabḥath corresponds to the beginning of faá¹£l 4.22 There seems also to be places where á¹¢adrÄ adds portions of text coming directly from Ibn SÄ«nÄâs al-SamÄÊ¿ al-á¹abÄ«Ê¿Ä« (the part of the ShifÄʾ on physics), a text to which RÄzÄ« himself is close, as can be seen in the passage put by á¹¢adrÄ between the demonstrations in favor of chance and their refutation, that seems to be closer to the ShifÄʾ than to what RÄzÄ« writes in the MabÄḥith on similar questions.23 It seems, and this could support our claim here, that á¹¢adrÄ follows up on quotations that RÄzÄ« makes of Ibn SÄ«nÄ, for he writes after giving such a citation: âThis is what al-Fakhr al-RÄzÄ« quotes from the Shaykh, but I did not find these words in his writings.â24 This is the only case we found so far however.25
In some places, á¹¢adrÄ follows the structure of the text as presented by RÄzÄ« in the MabÄhith, but not what RÄzÄ« says. Thus in the third part of the discussion on qualities, âOn the qualities that exist in what has a soul,â while following the frame he finds in the MabÄḥith, and keeping the sequence of topics (qudra, irÄda, etc.), á¹¢adrÄ chooses to provide an entirely different content under these titles.26 He plays here with different sources as well: at the beginning of this passage, á¹¢adrÄ states that far more is said on these questions in the books of the Sufis, such as Ê¿AbdullÄh Aná¹£ÄrÄ«âs (396â481/1006â1089) ManÄzil al-sÄʾirÄ«n and the last two sections of Ibn SÄ«nÄâs IshÄrÄt, known independently as MaqÄmÄt al-Ê¿ÄrifÄ«n. But he adds that what he is going to provide here is a chapter on each of the qualities mentioned in the books that we can label as pertaining to philosophy, except for knowledge, a topic so important it needs a separate chapter.27
As for changes in the wording, these are often without consequences, like when á¹¢adrÄ uses âthose who deny the unicity of the soulâ (al-munkirÅ«n li-waḥdat al-nafs)28 where RÄzÄ« had âthose who hold that the souls are manyâ (al-mukaththirÅ«n li-l-nafs),29 or âthe arguments of those who support chanceâ (ḥujaj al-qÄʾilÄ«n bi-l-ittifÄq), where RÄzÄ« had âthe proofs of those who deny aimsâ (adillat munkirÄ« l-ghÄyÄt).30 The same holds for places where á¹¢adrÄ alters the sequence of words in propositions such as âthat which increases the dimensions of the natural body, so that it reaches the perfection of its growth according to natural proportions,â for âthat which increases the dimensions of the body according to natural proportions so that it reaches the perfection of its growthâ in the MabÄḥith (Appendix, Text 2 (C)).31 á¹¢adrÄ almost systematically avoids the precise numbers given by RÄzÄ« in his divisions, a clever practice when using another text to build oneâs own (see for example Appendix, Text 1 (A) and (Aâ)). This is often the case, as á¹¢adrÄ rarely follows all the arguments or questions listed by RÄzÄ«.32 But changes in wording may also be an expression of something more important, for instance when á¹¢adrÄ changes the words introducing paragraphs such as taḥqÄ«q dhÄlika (âthe reality of this [is shown by],â âwhat this is reallyâ), which becomes in the AsfÄr: wa-mimmÄ yadullu Ê¿alÄ dhÄlika (âone of the things that show thisâ) (Appendix, Text 2 (E)).33 Or when, speaking about what accounts for the conservation of the mix of elements, á¹¢adrÄ widens the question to include all animals by just changing one word in RÄzÄ«âs text (Appendix, Text 1 (B)).
Again, á¹¢adrÄâs use of RÄzÄ«âs text does not mean he agrees with what is said by RÄzÄ« or endorses his teaching: RÄzÄ«âs text is rather taken as the expression of the basic understanding of a topic, or the ground of a thorough critique. Thus on âwhenâ in the discussion on categories, á¹¢adrÄ writes: âThis is what has been said, and it is not correct,â followed by one page of explanation of his own point of view on the question.34 And on being in a position, after a broad definition based, but with other words, on Fakhr al-DÄ«n, á¹¢adrÄ adds âand what it is really for us is rather (â¦).â35 Again, on qualities, á¹¢adrÄ writes at the end of his paraphrase of RÄzÄ«: âWe have something higher to say than this on these sensible qualities; we will come back to it later.â36
3 Why Does It Matter to Know?
The fact that we can identify RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith as the subtext to a number of passages in the AsfÄr, besides offering a much larger textual basis for an analysis of á¹¢adrÄâs understanding and critique of RÄzÄ« than that provided by the explicit quotations, allows us to better understand what appears often in á¹¢adrÄâs text as short questions and lengthy answers. Now that we know that RÄzÄ« is á¹¢adrÄâs interlocutor or target, we can find out what is the context of the debates and understand allusions that could remain incomprehensible otherwise.
But the most interesting benefit of our reading lies perhaps in the quick access it allows to the gist of á¹¢adrÄâs thought, to what á¹¢adrÄ considers as key-notions, which is easily found in the portions of texts where he stops following, even loosely, his source-text. This is obvious in passages where he interrupts his summarized paraphrase of RÄzÄ«âs text by a paragraph entitled ḥikma mashriqiyya, as he does in faá¹£l 2 of the chapter on quantity,37 or, on a smaller scale, when he introduces a portion of text starting with a âfor usâ (as in Appendix, Text 3 (C)). But other changes are more subtle, as we will see shortly in examples taken from texts where á¹¢adrÄ remains closer to his source. At a bigger scale, the same question can be asked: why does he stop using the MabÄḥith on such and such question? What happens in the third part of the discussion on qualities, âOn the qualities that exist in what has a soul,â where á¹¢adrÄ follows, as we said earlier, the order of the topics in the MabÄḥith, but changes entirely the content: why (what is so unpalatable here for á¹¢adrÄ?) and to replace it by what, are questions worth investigating.
Reading the AsfÄr with an eye on the MabÄḥith helps also identify references made in the text. For instance, in AsfÄr 9:77, where á¹¢adrÄ had âone of the commentators of the QÄnÅ«n said,â the text of the MabÄḥith provides us with a more specific reference, for RÄzÄ« writes: âWe explained in our commentary on the QÄnÅ«n.â38
The opposite is also true: á¹¢adrÄ provides in some places more details than what is found in the MabÄḥith. An example of this is found in faá¹£l 2 of fann 1 in the categories, on quantity, âOn the distinction between dimension and corporeity,â where RÄzÄ« had just âsomeone might say.â á¹¢adrÄ is here more precise, and writes: âthe author of the Ḥikmat al-ishrÄq objected that [â¦].â39 The same happens later in the discussion on categories: âIt has been answeredâ in RÄzÄ« becomes in the AsfÄr: âIt has been answered, as appears in the ShifÄʾ.â40 Again when listing the three elements that prepare the soul to joy, á¹¢adrÄ adds the following information: âas the Shaykh mentioned in his Epistle FÄ« l-adwiya al-qalbiyya.â Here we see also á¹¢adrÄ give a much larger quotation than what RÄzÄ« had.41
A parallel reading of the AsfÄr and the MabÄḥith has thus something to offer to the reader of RÄzÄ« as well. This is also true for the edition of the texts (even if we found only minor cases so far). The examples here mentioned are from one perspective, from the point of view of á¹¢adrÄâs text, but the same must happen for the text of the MabÄḥith. One example can be seen in Text 2 (B) in the Appendix, where the editors of the MabÄḥith made a better choice than what appears in á¹¢adrÄâs text: the reading â®ØºØ§ÙØ©â¬â (goal) fits better in the sequence âform, matter, goalâ (and corresponds to the enumeration made just before in the text, where one reads: âThere is a form and a matter for this change; and for the agent, there is a goal in its actionsâ), than â®ØºØ§Ø°ÙØ©â¬â (the nutritive).42 But then again, this might be a voluntary change by á¹¢adrÄ. It might happen that some of these variants may not be in manuscripts of one of the two textual traditions, making it thus important to compare the two texts.
Reading the AsfÄr alongside the MabÄḥith clarifies also details of á¹¢adrÄâs text, such as when á¹¢adrÄ summarizes so much that something goes wrong, as in the following example where the teaching attributed to Ibn SÄ«nÄ by RÄzÄ« becomes another teaching in á¹¢adrÄ. Note that this is not the only problem in this passage, there is obviously something missing in the division: yet another example of how comparing the two texts can point to problems in the text, and direct our attention to portions of texts where it is necessary to look back at the manuscript tradition.
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MabÄḥith 2:416 |
AsfÄr 9:57 |
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Letâs now mention the teachings that are maintained on this matter and mention the proof [given] by each faction. |
Letâs now mention the teachings reported on this matter and the proof [given] by each faction. |
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[1] Some maintain that the soul is unique. They are divided in two groups: |
Some maintain that the soul is unique. They are divided in two groups: |
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[1.1] Some say that the soul makes all the actions by its essence/by itself but with the intermediacy of the different tools, |
Some say that the soul makes the actions by its essence/by itself but with the intermediacy of different tools, |
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This is what is true according to us according to what was [said] before. |
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[1.2] Others say that the soul is the principle (mabdaʾ) for the existence of multiple corporeal powers, and then |
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a specific act emanates from each specific power. This is the teaching of the Shaykh al-Raʾīs and those who are in his rank. |
a specific act emanating from each specific power. This is the teaching of the Shaykh al-Raʾīs and those who are in his rank. |
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[2] Others say that the soul is not unique: in the body there is rather a number of souls, one sentient, one cognitive, another concupiscent, another irascible. |
Others say that the soul is not unique: in the body there is rather a number of souls, one sentient, one cognitive, another concupiscent, another irascible. |
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Those who multiply the soul (al-mukaththirūn li-l-nafs) give the following argument ⦠|
Those who deny the unicity of the soul (al-munkirūn li-waḥdat al-nafs) give the following argument ⦠|
4 Examples
In the portions of text where á¹¢adrÄ follows closely RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith, the benefit of a reading attentive to both texts is even greater: we can focus on the passages where the texts are dissimilar (here even more easily apprehensible), where the important points made by á¹¢adrÄ are situated. I will explore here two examples in more details to show how this works (examples 1 and 2), followed by one example to illustrate how focusing on dissimilarities between the texts can make some passages more interesting than they initially look (example 3).
4.1 AsfÄr 8:93â7 // MabÄḥith 2:271â3 (= Appendix, Text 2)
We referred to this section earlier regarding two points. á¹¢adrÄ presents here what he borrows from RÄzÄ«âs text as that which is usually said (yuqÄl, dhukira)43 or what is commonly held (Ê¿alÄ mÄ huwa l-mashhÅ«r)44 (Texts 2 (A) and (D)). But he is careful not to endorse RÄzÄ«âs teaching too eagerly: this is the passage where we see á¹¢adrÄ prefer âone of the things that show thisâ (wa-mimmÄ yadullu Ê¿alÄ dhÄlika) when RÄzÄ« used âwhat this is reallyâ (or âthe reality of this [is shown by],â taḥqÄ«q dhÄlika) (Text 2 (E)).45
This passage deserves also our attention for what happens at the end. This follows the allusion to a first wrong supposition: that held by those who consider the nutritive power to be fire. This is already found in the FÄ« l-nafs of the ShifÄʾ,46 but the treatment of the question and the wording is clearly that of RÄzÄ« in the MabÄḥith. á¹¢adrÄ considers next another (wrong) supposition: that there is a void in the members of the body that the power of growth would fill. There, á¹¢adrÄ objects to the text by Ibn SÄ«nÄ presented by RÄzÄ« as the truth (al-ḥaqq), before giving his own explanation (Text 2 (F)).
4.2 AsfÄr 8:205â8 // MabÄḥith 2:335â6 (= Appendix, Text 3)
In the section on the sensus communis (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak) (FÄ« Ê¿ilm al-nafs, bÄb 5: On internal perceptions, faá¹£l 1), a lot of parallels with RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith are found, as in the whole section on internal senses. This is normal on such a topic. But á¹¢adrÄ could be following other texts, and even Ibn SÄ«nÄ directly here (or SuhrawardÄ« or a later IshrÄqÄ« for some aspects of what he says). But it is again RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith that is on his desk, as witnessed by the wording, and by the direct quotation given at the end of the section, yet another example of how RÄzÄ«âs name appears in the portions of text where á¹¢adrÄ takes his text as the background of his own.
What do we see when reading this passage along with RÄzÄ«âs text? First, á¹¢adrÄ presents as that which is commonly held (Ê¿inda l-jumhÅ«r), what RÄzÄ« said about the sensus communis as âlocalized in the front of the brainâ (Text 3 (B)). For á¹¢adrÄ, it is only the disposition (istiÊ¿dÄd) of this faculty of the soul that is in the front of the brain, not the faculty itself. He adds again a precision: âOr rather, in the spirit (rūḥ) that runs in itâ (Text 3 (C)), a precision given by Ibn SÄ«nÄ at the end of the section on the soul of the ShifÄʾ (maqÄla 5, faá¹£l 8).47 The caution of á¹¢adrÄ in using the proper language here explains also another change in wording (Text 3 (A)): even when relating the common view on this faculty, á¹¢adrÄ prefers to use the word âpositedâ (mÅ«daÊ¿a), and not âimpressedâ (murtasama) as Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ« had it (Ibn SÄ«nÄ used murattaba, âdisposed,â in the ShifÄʾ and the NajÄh).48 Again, the same caution can be noticed where á¹¢adrÄ speaks of âthe forms of the external sensationsâ being brought together to the sensus communis, where RÄzÄ« had âthe external sensationsâ (Text 3 (D)).
Another remarkable change of wording occurs where âcorporealâ is systematically replaced by âparticularâ when speaking of the faculty or instrument needed to perceive sensations. It is through a âparticular instrument,â not a âcorporeal faculty,â that sensible perception occurs; the external sensations come together in a âparticular perceptive faculty,â not âan internal corporeal facultyâ (Text 3 (FâF²)). And here again, á¹¢adrÄ insists on the fact that it is the intellect that ultimately judges on sensible perceptions. Where RÄzÄ« said that the judgment âthis thing that is touched is (or is not) this thing that has such or such colorâ cannot be made by the intellect, á¹¢adrÄ has rather that what makes this judgment cannot be âthe intellect alone, with no intermediary sense, because its perception of the sensible occurs only with a particular instrumentâ (Text 3 (E)). In two remarkable additions, á¹¢adrÄ makes clear what he himself claims, that is, that it is the intellect in human beings, and the estimative in animals, that brings together all the perceptive faculties and makes judgments (Texts 3 (E) and (G)).
As for the direct quotation of RÄzÄ« (âthe author of the MabÄḥithâ) at the end of this faá¹£l (Text 3 (H)), it is again made by á¹¢adrÄ to criticize what RÄzÄ« makes of a quotation (here from BahmanyÄr) in his own text (note the similarity of method with the end of the text analyzed just before, AsfÄr 8:96).
4.3 AsfÄr 3:507â19 // Fakhr al DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ al-ghayb (= al-TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r), on Quran 2:31, masʾala 8
To know the underlying layer of a passage, and to be thus able to determine quickly where á¹¢adrÄâs text is different from RÄzÄ«âs, allows us also to make the best of texts that, at first sight, seem rather unlikely to yield any interesting element. The clearest example we found so far is not related to the MabÄḥith but to another text by RÄzÄ«, his TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r. It is a list of definitions of terms that á¹¢adrÄ adds as a conclusion at the end of safar 1, marḥala 10, on knowledge, using the material he finds in RÄzÄ«âs tafsÄ«r of Quran 2:31, âHe taught Adam all the names.â49 In fact, the title of the section in the AsfÄr (âWhere one explains terms with similar meanings used in this domainâ) is that of the corresponding, and much shorter, section in RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith,50 but the content is closer to the TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r. A version of the same passage is found in the third miftÄḥ of á¹¢adrÄâs MafÄtīḥ al-ghayb, on knowledge (miftÄḥ 3, mashhad 7).51 In this latter text, the borrowing follows a section where RÄzÄ«âs TafsÄ«r is already heavily present. This is not surprising: mashhad 6 consists of quotations from the Quran and hadiths in praise of knowledge and the search for it, where á¹¢adrÄ uses what he finds in RÄzÄ«.52 Here again, á¹¢adrÄ not only reorganizes but appropriates this material: one telling example is where a saying attributed to Ê¿Umar b. al-Khaá¹á¹Äb in RÄzÄ«âs TafsÄ«r is quietly anonymized by á¹¢adrÄ, who attributes it to âone of the Companionsâ (baʿḠal-á¹£aḥÄba).53
As in other examples mentioned above, the name of RÄzÄ« is not entirely absent in the passage of the AsfÄr. It appears in two cases where á¹¢adrÄ wants to object to RÄzÄ«âs understanding of a word (under tadhakkur and fikr), as well as under dhikr, where á¹¢adrÄ clearly shows that he is here reading RÄzÄ«âs text, for he summarizes a few lines he skipped from his source and writes: âThe author of the MabÄḥith says, after repeating the objection he claims cannot be solved,â followed by an explicit quotation of RÄzÄ«.54 Note that here, á¹¢adrÄ seems to willingly try to blur his source by calling RÄzÄ« âthe author of the MabÄḥith.â In the parallel text in the MafÄtīḥ, he chose âal-Fakhr al-RÄzÄ«.â55 Likewise, under fikr, he uses âImÄm al-RÄzÄ«â in the MafÄtīḥ, but âthe author of the Mulakhkhaá¹£â in the AsfÄr.56
What does a reading of this passage with our âRÄzÄ« lensesâ bring to our understanding of what matters to á¹¢adrÄ in this list of definitions of terms related to knowledge? The terms here defined are the following (* = different but on the basis of RÄzÄ«âs text; */ = wholly different): idrÄk; shuÊ¿Å«r; taá¹£awwur; ḥafẠ(*); tadhakkur (*); dhikr (*); maÊ¿rifa; fahm; fiqh; Ê¿aql (*/); ḥikma; dirÄya; dhihn; fikr (*); ḥads; dhakÄʾ; fitna; khÄá¹ir; wahm (*); áºann; Ê¿ilm al-yaqÄ«n (*/); Ê¿ayn al-yaqÄ«n; ḥaqq al-yaqÄ«n; bidÄha (*); awwaliyyÄt; khayÄl (*); khubr; raʾy; firÄsa.
The comparison with the underlying text shows some changes in the order of the entries, and places where á¹¢adrÄ disagrees with his source. It allows to quickly determine that if we leave aside Ê¿aql and Ê¿ilm al-yaqÄ«n, where á¹¢adrÄ offers something entirely different, the notions where á¹¢adrÄ engages in a discussion with his source-text are taá¹£awwur, fikr, three terms that have to do with the notion of memory, both retentive and active (tadhakkur, dhikr, ḥafáº), and the terms wahm and khayÄl.
á¹¢adrÄ gives a short discussion on taá¹£awwur and fikr. On taá¹£awwur, he attributes to the Ê¿Ämmat al-nÄs the understanding of form (ṣūra) given by RÄzÄ«, as âthe corporeal quiddity actualized for the body with a shape,â and prefers its definition as âthat by which the thing becomes in act this thing.â57 On fikr, á¹¢adrÄ rejects the restriction here made by RÄzÄ« of this activity to assent.58
Wahm and khayÄl receive a more extensive treatment. On wahm, á¹¢adrÄ states that for him, the estimative power (al-quwwa al-wÄhima) is not separate from the intellect or imagination, but it is rather the intellect when related to the imaginative or sensitive form.59 On khayÄl, á¹¢adrÄ takes this opportunity to express his two main objections: against the idea that the imaginative forms are imprinted in one of the powers of the body, as philosophers have it; and against the idea that they are separated from the soul, in a discrete world corresponding to the Ê¿Älam al-mithÄl al-muá¹laq, rather than in the world the soul creates for itself, a position á¹¢adrÄ attributes to the IshrÄqÄ« thinkers.60
The discussion on the possibility of recalling a form that would have slipped the mind (under tadhakkur61), is for á¹¢adrÄ an occasion to reiterate his understanding of human soul as having several dimensions, or domains, of existence. RÄzÄ« wrote that the experience of recalling is a mystery (sirr), since we cannot recall that which is represented to us nor that which is not represented to us, a version of a well-known paradox, and yet recalling is an experience we share, hence the mystery. á¹¢adrÄ recognizes that in his understanding of intellective perception as âbeing only through the unification of the soul with the Agent Intellect, which is the form of the existents, or in which the forms of the existents exist,â this difficulty is even harder to solve. This compels him to think of a solution that he finds in the multiple dimensions of existence and activity of the souls, and the soulsâ scale of perfection. It is the soul intermediate in its perfectionânot so imperfect that it is restricted to the dimension of sensation (with just a faint experience of the imaginative life), but not so perfect either that one dimension would not veil it from anotherâthat experiences this ârecallingâ when, leaving its intelligible dimension, and left with a weak image of its intelligible experience and the ability to recall and join the intelligible dimension again, it recalls that which was manifested to it. I am not convinced á¹¢adrÄ would have made it as clear, had he not had RÄzÄ«âs text in front of him.62
Our reading of this passage with a focus on the sections where á¹¢adrÄ engages with RÄzÄ«âs text, allows us thus to understand that the main focus of á¹¢adrÄ in this list of definitions is wahm and khayÄl on the one hand, and terms that have to do with memory and recalling on the other. These are precisely the key notions in á¹¢adrÄâs personal contribution on internal senses. We might have seen this without knowing that the passage is written with RÄzÄ«âs TafsÄ«r as a background. But we could have missed the significance of some aspects of the discussion, and we certainly would not have grasped it so quickly.
5 Conclusion
No misunderstanding: the passages where á¹¢adrÄ does not rely on RÄzÄ« are far more extensive than the ones where he does. It is important to clarify the extent to which á¹¢adrÄ borrows from RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith (and on which topics), and to explore the ways he uses and adapts this text. But it is also important to investigate if there is some significance in his not using RÄzÄ« on subjects where the latter had something to offer (on metempsychosis, for instance).
There are several ways to consider what á¹¢adrÄ does here. Most passages are found in what can be labelled as âunavoidable sections,â where definitions are given, or well-known objections to such and such question, or again, in lists like the one we just analyzed or that of the characteristics of human beings.63 á¹¢adrÄâs use of the MabÄḥith could be interpreted as showing a lack of interest in some questions that need to be addressed in a summa but are not particularly challenging for him. But it could also be interpreted simply as a way to save time. Why âreinvent the wheelâ here instead of using a standard exposé as the basis of oneâs own text? Again, what á¹¢adrÄ does here is not to blindly reproduce his source-text, but to rework it for his own purpose. And his use of RÄzÄ«âs text does not mean that he endorses what RÄzÄ« says. About al-RÄzÄ« himself, á¹¢adrÄ has this to say: âMy God! Has there been a human being (ÄdamÄ«) in the world who reached the same point in the abundance of study and investigation, wrote as many books and was absorbed in thinking as much as he was, and was still so far from the truth?â64 As for RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith, that he uses so often as raw material for his own discourse, they are for him only âso-calledâ or âjust only said to beâ oriental (mashriqiyya).65
What I want to emphasize here is not what this tells about á¹¢adrÄâs method or aims in writing, but rather the extremely valuable tool that knowing the relationship between the AsfÄr and the MabÄḥith gives us for understanding á¹¢adrÄâs text. Reading á¹¢adrÄ against the background of RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥith allows us, as I hope I have showed, to get quicker to the points of disagreement with RÄzÄ« and, perhaps more importantly, to the core of á¹¢adrÄâs teaching, by pointing to key portions of the text. Obviously, a number of aspects could have been noticed without being aware of the borrowing from RÄzÄ«, especially in the passages introduced by a âfor usâ or âI say.â Any attentive reader will see á¹¢adrÄâs point when, on the number of categories, he adds that âtashkÄ«k for us is only in beings (wujÅ«dÄt), not in quiddities.â66 But not everything is as easily noticeable.
Appendix
A.1 Text 1: AsfÄr 8:28â9 // MabÄhith 2:239â40 (= 2:226): âThat the Animal Soul Is a Substanceâ67
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MabÄhith 2:239â40 (= 2:226) |
AsfÄr 8:28â9 |
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Section 1: That it is a substance |
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You have learned sufficiently on this [question] in what has been said before. We will add here however some explanation. And this is that |
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Some people argue that the soul is the complexion (mizÄj = mix of the elements). |
some people argue that the soul is the complexion. |
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Six arguments show the falsity of their claim. |
[Several] arguments show the falsity of their claim. |
A |
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(1) The body is |
One of them is that the body is |
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an elementary substance |
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composed of elements with opposite natures |
composed of elements with opposite natures |
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readily |
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competing with one another to get disengaged. |
competing with one another to get disengaged. |
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That which makes (j-r-r) them |
That which obliges (j-b-r) them to |
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be a mix (imtizÄj) |
be a mix (imtizÄj) |
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and to produce the complexion (mizÄj) |
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is a power other than what follows their being a mix. And after is not identical with before. |
is a power other than them. |
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Whether we say that the elements remain in their specific form, as is |
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generally held, and as it is maintained by the Shaykh and other Ê¿ulamÄʾ, or we say that they do not remain [â¦] |
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Six questions can be raised against this. |
But there are [several] questions here. |
Aâ |
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(1) Perhaps in the body of human beings, the elements are forced |
Perhaps in the body of animals, the elements are forced |
B |
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to that, |
to be joined and to produce the mix, |
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and there is no |
and it is not the case that there is something that forces them to cohere or |
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keeper to keep them, |
a keeper to keep them or to keep the mix. |
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that would be the soul. |
A.2 Text 2: AsfÄr 8:93â7 // MabÄḥith 2:271â3 (= 2:258â61): On the Power of Nutrition and of Growth
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MabÄḥith 2:271â3 |
AsfÄr 8:93â7 |
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Section 13: Where one explains what we said about the definition of the faculty of nutrition and of growth |
Section 5: On the real definition of the faculty of nutrition and of growth |
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You know from our method that definitions are sometimes for quiddities and sometimes for acts of being. The difference between the quiddity and the act of being is something we explained already. The definition |
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for the quiddity is only through its parts, like the genus and the differentia, and the definition according to the act of being is not possible through the parts, for the act of being has no part. It is thus either through the agent and the end, if it is complete, or through the action, if it is deficient. This because of what we alluded to earlier, i.e. that the definition and the demonstration of the act of being are one and the same thing, and the demonstration by the âwhyâ is stronger than that by the âthatâ. This being established, we say: due to its simplicity, each faculty is an individual instance of being. The faculties can be explained through their actions. Thus, the nutritive faculty is explained by that which comes from it, |
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We mentioned already that the nutritive |
and it is said that it |
A |
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is that which transforms food into something that is similar with that which is fed, to replace what has been dissolved. |
is that which transforms food into something that is similar with that which is fed, to replace what has been dissolved. |
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We say to explain this definition that each faculty is, no doubt (â®ÙÙ٠ا٠ÙÙ ÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙا Ùا Ù ØاÙØ©â¬â), the principle of a change. |
We say to explain this definition that each faculty is, no doubt (â®Ø§Ù ÙÙ ÙÙØ© Ùا Ù ØاÙØ©â¬â), the principle of a change in this world. |
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There is a form and a matter for this change, and a place; and for the agent, there is a goal in its action. |
There is a form and a matter for this change; and for the agent, there is a goal in its actions. |
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Here the form is the transformation into something similar to that which is fed, the matter is the food, and the goal (â®Ø§ÙغاÙØ©â¬â) is the replacement of what has been dissolved. It is as if we said: the nutritive faculty is that which does this action, in this place, for this goal. |
The form here is the transformation into something similar to that which is fed, the matter here is the food, and the nutritive (â®Ø§ÙغاذÙØ©â¬â) replaces what has been dissolved. It is as if we said: the nutritive faculty is in view of this action, in this place, for this goal. |
B |
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As for the faculty of growth, we have mentioned to define it that it is that which increases the dimensions of the body according to natural proportions, so that it reaches the perfection of its growth by means of the food that comes in it. |
As for the faculty of growth, it has been mentioned to define it that it is that which increases the dimensions of the natural body, so that it reaches the perfection of its growth according to natural proportions, an increase [that takes place] in the original parts. |
C |
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When we say: âthat which increases the dimensions of the body,â it is to keep from the artificial increases. For when the artisan takes a portion of wax, if he increases its length and breadth, its depth decreases, and if he does the opposite, the opposite happens. |
When we say: âthat which increases the dimensions of the body,â it is to keep from the artificial increases. For when the artisan takes a portion of the candle, if he increases its length and breadth, its depth decreases, and vice versa. |
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But this power makes increases in the three dimensions. |
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And when we say: âaccording to natural proportions,â it is to keep from the non-natural increases, such as edema and other swellings. |
And when we say: âaccording to natural proportions,â it is to keep from the non-natural increases, such as edema and other swellings. |
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And when we say: âso that it reaches the perfection of growth,â it is to keep from fatness. |
And when we say: âso that it reaches the perfection of growth,â it is to keep from fatness. |
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And when we say: âby means of the food that comes in it,â it is to point out the real cause, to distinguish between getting fat and growing. This because the added parts coming from food in growth penetrate the substances of the [bodily] members, and extends them and makes increases in their substance; while in getting fat, they do not penetrate in the substances of the members, but it is as if they were attached to them. |
And when we say: âan increase [that takes place] in the original parts,â it is to point out the real cause, to distinguish between getting fat and growing. This because growing is a movement in the substances of the [bodily] members, the motive faculty extends them and makes increases in their substance; while getting fat is an increase that happens through external bodies entering into the members, as if they were attached to them. |
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Know that nutrition and growth reach their completion through three things. |
Nutrition and growth reach their completion through three things. |
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(1) That parts similar in quiddity to that which is fed and to that which grows are obtained. |
(1) That nutrients similar in quiddity in potency to that which is fed and to that which grows are obtained. |
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(2) That [these parts] are attached to them. |
(2) That [these nutrients] are attached to them, |
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according to what is usually held. |
D |
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(3) That they become similar to them. |
(3) That [these nutrients] become similar to them in act. |
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If the parts that are brought to the substance of the original [bodily] members is equal to what has been dissolved, this is the action of the nutritive, and if it is more, it is |
If the amount that is brought to the substance of the original [bodily] members is equal to what has been dissolved, this is the action of the nutritive, and if it is more, it is |
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the action of the [power] of growth. |
the action of the [power] of growth. |
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Here appears the objection of someone who would say |
Someone might object here |
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that the action of the nutritive is to obtain food, to attach and to assimilate; and the action of the [power of] growth is exactly the same three things. There is thus |
that the nutritive and the [power of] growth are the same faculty, with |
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no distinction between the two, other than that the nutritive does these three things in the same amount as what has been dissolved, while the [power of] growth does more than what has been dissolved. |
no distinction between the two, other than that the nutritive does these things in the same amount as what has been dissolved, while the [power of] growth does more than what has been dissolved. |
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This being so, the [power of] growth is necessarily the same as the nutritive, since the [power of] growth if it gives more, its added part is equal to its original part, |
The difference between the two is thus a matter of perfection and deficiency. |
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and if a faculty is able to do some action, it is able to do an action similar to it also. |
For if a faculty is able to do some action, it is able to do an action similar to it. |
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Thus, if the added portion is similar to the original portion, and the nutritive faculty is able to produce the original portion, it must be able to produce the added portion. |
Thus, if the added portion is similar to the original portion, and the nutritive is able to produce the original portion, it must be able to produce the added portion, when its capacity is strong. |
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Thus the nutritive power is the [power of] growth (â®Ø§ÙÙا٠ÙØ©â¬â), except that at the beginning, it is strong, |
Thus the nutritive power is the [power of] growth (â®Ø§ÙÙ ÙÙ ÙØ©â¬â), except that at the beginning, it is strong, |
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and it is sufficient to bring both (â®Ù عÙاâ¬â) what replaces the original [portion] and an addition, while later, it becomes weaker and does not bring the addition, but [only] the original portion. |
and it is sufficient to bring both (â®Ø¬Ù ÙعÙاâ¬â) what replaces the original [portion] and an addition, while later, it becomes weaker and does not bring the addition, but [only] the original portion. |
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The reality of this [is shown by what follows] (â®ØªØÙÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâ¬â): |
One of the things that show (â®Ù٠٠ا ÙدÙ٠عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâ¬â) this |
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the nutritive power in the years of decay and fade brings less than what has been dissolved. While in the years of stand-by, it brought the same as what has been dissolved. What it brings while in stand-by is thus more than what it brings while in decay, and a single power can thus change what it brings by increasing or diminishing it. |
is that the nutritive power in the years of decay and fade brings less than what has been dissolved. While in the years of stand-by, it brought the same as what has been dissolved. What it brings while in stand-by is thus more than what it brings while in decay, and a single power can thus change what it brings by increasing or diminishing it. |
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If this is permitted, why would it not be permitted that a single faculty brings at the beginning more than what has been dissolved, and after, in the mid-period [between growth and decay], it brings what is equal to the dissolution. |
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This is an objection that one has to think about. |
This is a powerful objection. |
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I say to answer it: the distinction of the natural goals shows the distinction of the faculties. But the goal of the nutritive faculty dif- |
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fers from the goal of the faculty of growth. They are thus two distinct faculties. The explanation of this is [â¦] [12 lines] |
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Objection and instruction |
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Know that some people think (â®Ø²Ø¹Ù â¬â) that the nutritive is a fire. They give the following argument for this: the nutritive feeds itself and the fire feeds itself; the nutritive is thus a fire. |
Some people claim (â®Ø§Ø¯Ø¹Ùâ¬â) that the nutritive is a fire. They give the following argument for this: the nutritive feeds itself and the fire feeds itself; the nutritive is thus a fire. |
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Beside the fact that |
Beside the fact that |
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the form of the syllogism here is wrong, since |
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they take the conclusion from the two affirmatives in the second figure, |
the conclusion is taken from the two affirmatives in the second figure, |
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they are wrong in both premises: their proposition âthe nutritive feeds itselfâ is inept, since the nutritive is not fed but feeds other than itself, that is, the body. |
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As for their proposition âthe fire feeds itself,â it is inept, for the fire does not feed itself but it is engendered and evaporates by nature. |
their proposition âthe fire feeds itselfâ is inept, for the fire does not feed itself but it is engendered and evaporates by nature. |
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And when it evaporates, cold air takes power on it and destroys it. There is thus no one fire that is nourished here. But it is true that the action of the nutritive resembles that of the fire in that it cooks and dissolves. |
And when it evaporates, cold air takes power on it and destroys it. There is thus no one fire that is nourished here. But it is true that the action of the nutritive resembles that of the fire in that it cooks and dissolves. |
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Someone believes that there is in the members [of the body] a hole that the power of growth fills, but this is invalid, |
Someone maintains that there is in the members [of the body] a hole that the power of growth fills, but this is invalid, |
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as was indicated before, |
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because the filling of the hole does not necessitate the increase and the growth of the members [of the body]. |
because the filling of the hole does not necessitate the growth of the members [of the body]. |
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The truth is rather |
F |
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that which the Shaykh mentions in the ShifÄʾ and the MubÄḥathÄt, |
And that which the Shaykh mentions in the ShifÄʾ, |
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and is approved by one of the fuá¸alÄʾ, |
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that the power of growth separates the junction of the member and introduces in these gaps the nutritive parts. And the same goes for nutrition. |
that the power of growth separates the junction of the member and introduces in these gaps the nutritive portions and that the same goes for nutrition, |
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is not satisfactory for us. |
A.3 Text 3: AsfÄr 8: 205â8; MabÄhith 2:335â6 (= 2:323â5): On the Common Sense
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MabÄhith 2:335â6 |
AsfÄr 8:205â8 |
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Chapter 4: On the internal perceptions, in two sections Section 1: Position of the five internal faculties |
Psychology, Chapter 5: On the internal senses |
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[First] the common sense. |
Section 1: On the common sense, also called phantasia, or tablet of the soul |
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This is a faculty impressed (murtasama) in the front of the brain |
This is a faculty posited (mūdaʿa) in the front of the brain |
A |
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according to what is usually held |
B |
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but for us, it is a faculty of the soul, and it is [only] the disposition of the actualization of this [faculty] that is in the front of the brain, or rather in the spirit that runs in it, |
C |
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to which all the external sensations are brought. |
to which all the forms of the external sensations are brought. |
D |
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Compared to the [common sense], the senses are like the spies bringing information from the [different] regions to the wazīr of the king |
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They demonstrate its [existence] with three proofs. |
They demonstrate its [existence] with three demonstrations |
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(1) They say: if there were no faculty in us that perceives the touched and the colored, we could not state on these two [things] that this is that or this is not that |
(1) We state that this white is sweet or that this is not that, |
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for that which judges has to have present that on which it judges. |
and the judge on these two things has to have present that on which it judges. |
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This judgment does not pertain to the intellect for two reasons: |
This arbitrator and judge is not the intellect alone, |
E |
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with no intermediary sense, |
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first, because we will show that what is sensed is perceived only |
First, because its perception of what is sensed occurs only |
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by a corporeal faculty (quwwa jismÄniyya), |
with a particular instrument (Äla juzʾiyya) |
F |
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and second, because the animals (bahÄʾim) with no intellect possess this (kind) of judgment, |
and second, because this [type] of judgment can also occur from animals (al-ḥayawÄnÄt) with no intellect, |
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and without it life would be too hard for them, |
for without it, life would be too hard for them. |
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the smell and the shape would not be indicators for them for food, and the form of the wooden stick would not remind them of the pain, so that they could run from it. |
If the smell and the shape were not for them indicators of the form to be sought, they would not seek it, or of the form to be fled, they would not flee it. |
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It appears thus that the reunion of the external sensations is |
It appears thus that the external sensations come together |
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in an internal corporeal faculty (quwwa jismÄniyya bÄá¹ina); |
in a particular perceptive faculty (quwwa juzʾiyya idrÄkiyya); |
F1 |
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and none of the external sensitive faculties are like this. There is thus necessarily |
and none of the external senses are like this. There is thus necessarily |
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an internal corporeal faculty (quwwa jismÄniyya bÄá¹ina), |
an internal particular perceptive (faculty) (mudrik bÄá¹inÄ« juzʾī), |
F² |
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and this is what we call the common sense. |
and this is what is called the common sense. |
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This demonstration is not without weakness, for the intellect in human beingsâand the estimation in animalsâbrings together all the perceptive faculties and other [faculties]. It is that which judges what is perceived by them, and that which uses all. It suffices |
G |
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for the judgment that this white is sweet when it sees the whiteness of the sugar with its vision, and it perceives its sweetness with its taste. |
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Someone could say: when having perceived intellectually the universal human being, we see a determined human being, we state that this particular individual is that intellective universal. |
Again, when having perceived intellectually (ʿaqala) the universal human being, we witness a determined individual [man], we state that this is a human being, even though the universal human being is perceived intellectually (maʿqūl) and the particular individual is perceived by the senses (maḥsūs). |
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BahmanyÄr said: âFor me, it is not necessary that that which judges that this [thing that is] colored is that [thing] that is tasted, perceives the sensible forms [â¦]. Rather, the soul could perceive the color and the taste by the gustative [power] and vision, and then another power would judge that this taste pertains to the thing with that color.â |
BahmanyÄr said: âFor me, it is not necessary that that which judges that this color is that taste, perceives the sensible forms [â¦]. Rather, the soul could perceive the taste by the gustative [power] and the color by vision, and then another power would judge that this taste pertains to the thing with that color.â |
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I say: What he says is irreproachable. And what the author of the MabÄḥith adduces against it does not refute it. For he said: |
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This is utmost ignorance. Perhaps he forgot what he learned at the beginning of logic, that every act of assent (taṣdīq) needs two representations: he who does not |
âThis is utmost ignorance. Perhaps he forgot what he learned at the beginning of logic, that every act of assent (taá¹£dÄ«q) needs two representations: he who does not |
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have a representation of âthe worldâ and of âadvented,â how could he possibly judge that one is true of the other? |
have a representation of âthe worldâ and of âadvented,â how could he possibly judge that one is true of the other?â |
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But this [does not refute it] because what is intended by âanother powerâ when he says âand then another power would judge,â is a perceptive power, such as intellect in human beings or estimation in other animals, and what is meant is that intellect, or estimation, judges, after having been made aware of the taste by means of the gustative [power] and of the color by means of vision, that this taste is for that which has this color [â¦]. [6 lines] |
á¹¢adr al-DÄ«n ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, AsfÄr 8:28â9, parallel to Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«, MabÄhith 2:239â40 (= 2:226). All references to the AsfÄr are to the Beirut edition (DÄr iḥyÄʾ al-turÄth al-Ê¿arabÄ«, 9 vols, with various reprints; ours is the fourth edition, dated 1990). I apologize to the reader for not referring to the more recent edition made under the supervision of M. Khamenei (Tehran: BunyÄd-i ḥikmat-i islÄmÄ«-yi á¹¢adrÄ/Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 2001â2004, 9 vols), but the material I use here was collected over time on my copy of the AsfÄr. References to RÄzÄ«âs MabÄhith are to the Muḥammad al-BaghdÄdÄ« edition (Beirut: DÄr al-kitÄb al-Ê¿arabÄ«, 1990, 2 vols), followed by reference to the more easily accessible Haydarabad edition (1343 [1925]; reprinted in Qom: IntishÄrÄt-i BÄ«dÄr, 1411 [1990]).
AsfÄr 8:207, referring to MabÄhith 2:336 (= 2:324).
AsfÄr 8:260â303.
AsfÄr 8:284, referring to MabÄḥith 2:372â3 (= 2:360).
AsfÄr 4:215â9 (on âwhereâ) and 225â8 (on activity and passivity). The expression á¹£Äḥib al-MabÄḥith can be found on pp. 216, 217, 219, 225.
On the MabÄḥith as a philosophically inclined text, and its relation with the Avicennan corpus, see Ayman Shihadeh, âFrom al-GhazÄlÄ« to al-RÄzÄ«: 6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim Philosophical Theology,â Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005): 141â79, esp. 170â1; Jules Janssens, âIbn SÄ«nÄâs Impact on Faḫr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«âs MabÄḥiṯ al-maÅ¡riqiyya,â Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 21 (2010): 259â85; and Janssens, âFakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ« on the Soul: A Critical Approach,â Muslim World 102 (2012): 562â79.
AsfÄr 4:7. For the passage preceding the quotation, see MabÄḥith 1:271 and 275 (= 1:167 and 169).
AsfÄr 4:23. See MabÄḥith 1:307 (= 1:199).
AsfÄr 4:48. See MabÄḥith 1:341 (= 1:228â9).
RÄzÄ«âs name appears in AsfÄr 4:61, 62.
AsfÄr 4:6, referring to MabÄḥith 1:272 (= 1:167).
AsfÄr 4:104; for the parallel passage, see MabÄḥith 1:426 (= 1:311).
AsfÄr 4:209; for the parallel passage, see MabÄḥith 1:565 (= 1:441).
AsfÄr 4:248; for the parallel passage, see MabÄḥith 1:243 (= 1:142). See again AsfÄr 4:166 (referring to MabÄḥith 1:540â1 [= 1:416]): âThe ḥukamÄʾ use three arguments to establish the circle.â
An example can be found in AsfÄr 4:271, on the fact that substance has no opposite (in fann 4: On substance, faá¹£l 6: On the properties of substance); see MabÄḥith 1:250 (= 1:149).
See MabÄḥith 1:240 (= 1:141).
AsfÄr 4:20â1; MabÄḥith 1:296 (= 1:190). Another example can be found in AsfÄr 4:110, in the beginning of the chapter âOn the qualities that exist in what has a soul.â See MabÄḥith 1:435 (= 1:319).
See AsfÄr 8:220 (end of page), referring to MabÄḥith 2:344 (= 2:330). Quotations from Avicenna and their assessment by RÄzÄ« are not the only ones to be commented upon by á¹¢adrÄ. For an example concerning AbÅ« l-BarakÄt al-BaghdÄdÄ« and the MuÊ¿tabar, see AsfÄr 4:52 (on the void), referring to MabÄḥith 1:346 (= 1:234). á¹¢adrÄ writes that RÄzÄ« approves the objections here adduced by AbÅ« l-BarakÄt (RÄzÄ« said in the MabÄḥith: âThese are good objections raised by the author of the MuÊ¿tabarâ), and that he will explain how to counter them.
AsfÄr 4:48â58, using with important reworking MabÄḥith 1:341â58 (= 1:228â49). The name of RÄzÄ« appears in AsfÄr 4:48, 61, 62.
AsfÄr 1:35â7. See MabÄḥith 1:106 (= 1:18).
AsfÄr 8:230â41 (faá¹£l 5); MabÄḥith 2:351â7 (= 2:337â44).
AsfÄr 2:253â9; see MabÄḥith 1:653â9 (= 1:531â7).
AsfÄr 2:255 and Ibn SÄ«nÄ, ShifÄʾ: ṬabÄ«Ê¿iyyÄt: 1. al-SamÄÊ¿ al-á¹abÄ«Ê¿Ä«, ed. by S. ZÄyid (Cairo: GEBO, 1983), 62. See MabÄḥith 1:649 (= 1:526â7). See also AsfÄr 2:259 with MabÄḥith 1: 655 (= 1:532â3) and Ibn SÄ«nÄ, al-SamÄÊ¿ al-á¹abÄ«Ê¿Ä«, 70â1.
AsfÄr 8:147, referring to MabÄḥith 2:288â9 (= 2:276â7).
See also below note 41, a passage where á¹¢adrÄ gives the reference to a quotation made by RÄzÄ« and quotes more than what RÄzÄ« had.
AsfÄr 4:111â4.
AsfÄr 4:111. See MabÄḥith 1:505 (= 1:382), on qudra.
AsfÄr 9:57.
MabÄḥith 2:416 (= 2:405).
AsfÄr 2:255; MabÄḥith 1:654 (= 1:532). There are numerous examples of these changes in wording. Yet another one is baá¹alat (AsfÄr 4:179, l. 14) for lÄ tabqÄ in MabÄḥith 1:548, l. 3â4 (= 1:423, l. 17). á¹¢adrÄ can be sometimes a bit condescending with his source, like when he writes, âIn their writings, an argumentation to show [this] can be found, in three ways that they call demonstrationsâ (AsfÄr 4:249; see MabÄḥith 1:248, l. 1 [= 1:146]).
AsfÄr 8:94; MabÄḥith 2:271 (= 2:259). Another example is âNature does not deliberate (lÄ rawiya la-hÄ), how could it act for an aim?â (AsfÄr 2:254) for âHow would nature act for an aim when it does not deliberateâ (MabÄḥith 1:654 [= 1:531]).
See for another example AsfÄr 2:254 and 258 (parallel to MabÄḥith 1:654 and 657 [= 1:531 and 535]), where á¹¢adrÄ skips the third argument given by RÄzÄ«, and consistently, the answer given a little further in the text (on chance, ittifÄq).
AsfÄr 8:95, l. 11; MabÄḥith 2:272 (= 2:260).
AsfÄr 4:219â20; MabÄḥith 1:581 (= 1:454â5).
AsfÄr 4:221â2; MabÄḥith 1:581â2 (= 1:455).
AsfÄr 4:104; after MabÄḥith 1: 426 (= 1:311).
AsfÄr 4:12â3. The portions of texts from the MabÄḥith used before and after correspond to MabÄḥith 1:280 (= 1:175) and 1:284 (= 1:178).
AsfÄr 9:77; MabÄḥith 2:420 (= 2:409).
AsfÄr 4:10; MabÄḥith 1:278 (= 1:172).
AsfÄr 4:107; MabÄḥith 1:431 (= 1:317).
AsfÄr 4:152â3; MabÄḥith 1:530 (= 1:406). This could be added to elements supporting the hypothesis that á¹¢adrÄ follows up on RÄzÄ«âs quotations (see above p. 193 and note 25).
AsfÄr 8:94; MabÄḥith 2:271 (= 2:259). See translation in Appendix, Text 2 (B).
AsfÄr 8:94, l. 9 and 14.
AsfÄr 8:95, l. 1.
AsfÄr 8:95, l. 11.
Ibn SÄ«nÄ, ShifÄʾ: FÄ« al-nafs, ed. by F. Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 55.
Ibn SÄ«nÄ, ShifÄʾ: FÄ« al-nafs, 268.
Ibn SÄ«nÄ, ShifÄʾ: FÄ« al-nafs, I.5, 44; and al-NajÄh, ed. M. DÄnish-PajÅ«h (Tehran: DÄnishgÄh-i Tihran, 1364 [1985]), 328.
AsfÄr 3:507â19; Fakhr al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ al-ghayb (= al-TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r) (Beirut: DÄr al-fikr, 1401/1981), 2:222â6. A similar list appears in RÄzÄ«, al-Mulakhkhaá¹£ fÄ« l-ḥikma, MS Dublin, Chester Beatty 3576, f. 125r.
RÄzÄ«, MabÄḥith, 1:489â90 (= 1:367). In RÄzÄ«âs TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r, the section is entitled: âInvestigation on terms that are thought to be synonymous to âknowledgeâ.â
á¹¢adr al-DÄ«n al-ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ al-ghayb, ed. by M. KhÄjavÄ« (Tehran: Muʾassassah-yi muá¹ÄlaÊ¿Ät va-taḥqÄ«qÄt-i farhangÄ«, 1363/1984), 131â42. Here, á¹¢adrÄ keeps the title from RÄzÄ«âs TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r.
ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ, 117â31; see RÄzÄ«, al-TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r, on Quran 2:31, masʾala 6 (2:194â211).
ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ, 130. á¹¢adrÄâs use of elements coming from RÄzÄ«âs text to build his own is already visible at the beginning of miftÄḥ 3, in a section where á¹¢adrÄ is quoting sayings (by al-AshÊ¿arÄ«, al-BÄqillÄnÄ«, and others) meant to give an explanation of what knowledge is (ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ, 99â107 (miftÄḥ 3, mashhad 1); these are found in RÄzÄ«, al-TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r, 2:219â221 (on Quran 2:31, masʾala 7)). He does this reluctantly, it seems, for in his introductory paragraph he writes (ShÄ«rÄzÄ«. MafÄtīḥ, 99): âIt is not in the habit of someone who is searching the truth to devote his attention to the sayings of those who have no opening and no vision for the perception of realities, like the usual mutakallimÅ«n, masters in qalqala [âagitationâ], linguists and specialists in rhetoric. There is no harm however in quoting what they say to get a picture of what the words convey [â¦].â á¹¢adrÄ appears here to get fascinated so to speak by his source, but only to a certain point: at the end of the miftÄḥ (131; end of mashhad 6), he leaves aside entirely the stories and anecdotes with which RÄzÄ« concludes his section (RÄzÄ«, al-TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r, 2:211â6, on Quran 2:31, masʾala 6).
AsfÄr 3:511. The quotation is from RÄzÄ«, al-TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«r, 2:223.
ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ, 134.
ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ, 138, and AsfÄr 3:516. In á¹¢adrÄâs MafÄtīḥ al-ghayb, the specific text of RÄzÄ« is even mentioned, but in mashhad 1, where á¹¢adrÄ rebukes the âauthor of the TafsÄ«r al-kabÄ«râ for his understanding of knowledge as âthe relation (nisba) between the knower and the known,â an understanding which is meant to counter the difficulties inherent to a definition of knowledge as âthe actualized form in the soul,â but which is actually âvery foolishâ (ShÄ«rÄzÄ«, MafÄtīḥ, 107).
AsfÄr 3:508.
AsfÄr 3:516.
AsfÄr 3:517.
AsfÄr 3:518.
In AsfÄr 3:509, the heading of the paragraph reads al-dhikr and should be corrected to al-tadhakkur according to the parallel texts and to the fact that the next heading is precisely al-dhikr.
AsfÄr 3:509â11.
AsfÄr 9:78â83 (FÄ« Ê¿ilm al-nafs, bÄb 9, faá¹£l 1: FÄ« khawÄṣṣ al-insÄn). See MabÄḥith 2:421â4 (= 2:409â13). This is another example of a passage based on RÄzÄ« but with significant differences.
AsfÄr 8:65.
AsfÄr 4:283 (on accident and substance): al-Ê¿ajab min á¹£Äḥib al-MabÄḥith al-musammÄt al-mashriqiyya.
AsfÄr 4:3; MabÄḥith 1:269â70 (= 1:165).
The parallel between the two texts continues beyond the portion here translated. In what follows the text here given, RÄzÄ« is himself close to what is found in the MubÄḥathÄt of Ibn SÄ«nÄ. See Ibn SÄ«nÄ, MubÄḥathÄt, ed. by M. BÄ«dÄrfar (Tehran: IntishÄrÄt-i BÄ«dÄr, 1371/1992), §§â¯10â13 and 404â407, pp. 41â2 and 147â8.
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