Abstract
This article provides an overview and critique of John Calvin’s understanding of non-Christian philosophy and religions. I suggest Calvin’s thinking differed in three significant ways from early and medieval church belief. First, he gave a far less prominent place to the role of the demonic in religions. Second, Calvin rejected both traditional and Renaissance versions of the prisca theologia. Finally, it is noted that he explained glimmers of truth in non-Christian religion and philosophy by developing a rather unique understanding of human enlightenment as gifting from a specific role of the Logos rather than as enlightenment by the Logos per se.
1 Introduction
John Calvin is not normally considered a theologian of religions. Paramount among possible objections to such a designation would be that theology of religions, as a discipline, is typically dated as beginning in the late twentieth century.1 Additional reservations concerning the association of the title with Calvin might include Calvin’s lack of interest in other religions known in his lifetime and the fact that there is no separate specific treatment of non-Christian religions in his writings.2
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, a prominent theologian of religions, has challenged the validity of these objections, to a certain extent, and in so doing has added support to some earlier tentative assertions suggesting a theologian of religions designation for Calvin.3 On his reading, Kärkkäinen believes that Calvin can be understood to have made an “embedded, unthematic” contribution to the field.4 Turning to another significant voice in the evangelical world of theology of religions today, Harold Netland believes that the theologian of religions will address two questions (the first of these followed by a shorter, follow up question):
A theology of religions must address two basic questions: First, how do we account theologically for the sheer fact of human religiosity? Why are people incurably religious? Second, how do we account theologically for the particularities of religious expression, the many diverse beliefs and practices we find among the religious traditions?5
Those with even the most basic awareness of Calvin’s work are likely to be aware of his comments on the sensus divinitatis and semen religionis, his knowledge of and engagement with Greek and Roman religious and philosophical thought, as well as his understanding of and polemic against Roman Catholicism. While Calvin engaged minimally with Islam, he certainly engaged theologically with some aspects of his own era’s religiosity in addition to various historic forms.6 To preempt some of the findings of this study, I believe that Calvin had a considerable amount to say on Netland’s first question and its follow-up, though much less to say on the second. With this discipline-specific background in place, I suggest that a contextually sensitive consideration of Calvin’s thought on religions can yield potentially valuable insights for the discipline, in addition to furthering investigation into a rather neglected field of study in Calvin’s life and work.7
2 Parameters of the Study Derived from the Thought of the Early Church
Only a handful of studies have considered aspects of Calvin’s contribution to a theology of religions, and none, to my knowledge, has attempted the wide-sweeping critical overview I embark upon here.8 I suggest that early church thought provides a helpful deductive research framework for the study.9 Within this era the writings of the second-century apologist Justin Martyr seem particularly valuable, not only because of Justin’s standing and later influence on the church’s beliefs in this area, but also because of the fact that he wrote in a truly multireligious context.10 Calvin was acquainted with Justin’s work (along with some texts no longer considered to have been written by him), and he spoke favorably of him.11
Although there is no uniformly accepted interpretation of Justin’s thought on the subject of non-Christian religions and philosophy, a strong case can be made that three factors were critical to his thinking, two of these positive in nature and one negative.12 The negative factor is demonic influence and the two positive sources are the influence of the Logos of God and the ‘theft’ or ‘borrowing’ of God’s revelation to Israel. I will, therefore, consider Calvin’s thought under these three headings. Such an approach not only helps trace historic continuity and discontinuity in the Reformer’s understanding of religions, it has the potential to highlight material from the Calvin corpus that would not otherwise be given particular attention. Before embarking on the substance of the article, I consider how Calvin defined religion.
3 Calvin’s Definition of Religion
As Muller notes, religion—“the right worship of God”—was a fundamentally important idea for the reformers.13 Calvin defined religion in the following way: “Here indeed is pure and real religion: faith so joined with an earnest fear of God that this fear also embraces willing reverence, and carries with it such legitimate worship as is prescribed in the law.”14 Although not explicitly framed as such, Calvin’s definition should be understood to be a Christian, more specifically Reformed Christian, understanding of religion, stressing an affective element and, implicitly, a true knowledge of self.15 Religious belief and practices that were not “pure and real” are typically called “superstitions” or simply “false religions” in Calvin’s writings.16 There is no idea of a continuum in Calvin’s thinking on religion, with Christianity occupying primacy of place in an evolutionary process, or being the exemplar of a genus: for Calvin, Reformed Christianity was true religion and everything else false.17 While he appreciated the fact of religious diversity (as will be noted later), this was diversity within the realm of the false. The fact that there are such ‘deviations’ (rather than nothing) is due to the Godward-oriented nature of humankind: Calvin believed the capacity or ability to worship to be one of the two key features that differentiate humankind and the animals.18 He further stated that the root of idolatry was lack of knowledge of the true God, together with a desire for illicit knowledge.19 Capetz suggests that idolatry was just one of an ‘unholy trinity’ in Calvin’s thought on non-Christian religion, the other two elements being superstition and hypocrisy.20 Below I consider Calvin’s thought under the three headings noted earlier, starting with the demonic.
4 The Role of the Demonic in Calvin’s Theology of Religions
Eire observes that the devil played a significant role in early church and later medieval thinking about non-Christian religion.21 In considering Calvin’s thought, Eire notes that he would have been aware of Augustine’s beliefs on this subject.22 Eire summarizes Augustine’s thought (as given in The City of God) as follows: “Augustine passed on the ancient Catholic tradition that false religion was based on real experiences with demonic agents, who deceived humans into thinking that they were deities.”23 Eire believes that Calvin repudiated such a viewpoint, suggesting that he may have followed Bullinger and Zwingli in adopting this position.24 Eire terms the rejection of the demonic as the starting place of false religion, together with what he believes to be Calvin’s anthropologically oriented focus on the origin of religion, “a giant step away from Catholic Tradition.”25 He goes on to qualify this understanding somewhat, in stating that Calvin still admitted a smaller role for Satan and the demonic in religion, namely, that of tempter of humans and attempted disrupter of God’s plans.26 However, Eire makes little appeal to Calvin’s writings to support his claims on the role of demons in religion in Calvin’s thought. I suggest, therefore, that there is room for further refinement in understanding Calvin’s ideas on this subject.
Calvin believed in a personal devil and demons.27 However, he also believed that Satan’s power, including his power to deceive, is given him by God—indeed that Satan can only follow God’s decrees.28 At times, Calvin calls some gods demons or devils or the devil.29 However, by and large, Calvin described gods and idols as nothing.30 The idea that gods are not real but “the figments of … [people’s] own brains,” mirroring humanity’s image rather than God’s, seems to be a consistent element in Calvin’s description of idolatry in the Old Testament, New Testament, in pagan philosophy, and in the church of his own era.31 In Calvin’s thought humankind “creates,” more commonly, “invents” gods.32 He presented the logic for this argument on the nonentity of idols as gods by arguing that because there is only one God, an idol is, necessarily, nothing.33 Having noted this point, it is important to clarify that for Calvin the transfer of worship to a nonexistent god ends in the worship of the devil, as I discuss later.
Calvin does admit of some satanic influence and a role for the demonic in false religion. In speaking of the fallen angels Calvin states that they “became the instruments of ruin for others,” which is possibly suggestive of a role in the development of false religion.34 He also believed that Satan is responsible for obscuring the glory of God and transferring this glory either to false gods or to humans.35 The Reformer typically considered such instrumentality as secondary, that is, playing a role in conjunction with, but strictly speaking, parasitic and dependent upon humankind’s corrupt nature.36 Although occasionally Calvin suggests a prior role of Satan in confusing humanity’s thinking, generally speaking Calvin limits the role of idols and the devil to adding to humankind’s own confusion, bewitching minds (already led astray through vain ideas) seeking to obtain illicit knowledge.37
Having admitted a role for Satan in false religion, it is important to observe that Calvin did not generalize this. In his comments on Psalm 73:25 Calvin appears to classify false religion into three kinds: those involving satanic deception, those relating to a kind of self-deification,38 and finally a set relating to self-dependence. The key point to stress is that only the first has any direct satanic involvement. This classification indicating either more or less satanic involvement in non-Christian religion is not the only time that Calvin made some effort to differentiate religions, even if this was only on ‘a less bad–worse’ continuum.39 While occasionally suggesting differentiation, Calvin was not particularly interested in pursuing this subject. This may have been because Calvin did not consider polytheism any worse than a misdirected monotheism.40 Whether there were physical idols present or not, this was beside the point: Roman Catholicism, the Roman pantheon of gods, and Islam could all be considered as essentially the same stuff in Calvin’s thinking, as the end of all, whether apostate or heathen, was false worship and the blasphemous transfer of honor.41 This belief explains, in large part, Calvin’s lack of interest in answering Netland’s second major question (referred to at the beginning of the article), concerning the study and understanding of the particularities of other religions as a role of the theologian of religions. While in Calvin’s thinking the actual involvement of Satan in religions may be more or less, in terms of the result, there is no spectrum, just a single end: the worship of Satan, even though this may not have been the intention of the worshipper:42
… for when men become so vain in their imaginations (Romans 1:21) as to render divine honor to creatures, rather than to the one God, this punishment is in readiness for them—that they serve Satan. For they do not find that “middle place” that they are in search of, but Satan straightway presents himself to them, as an object of adoration, whenever they have turned their back upon the true God.43
In this sense, therefore, all idols or false gods can, in a roundabout way, be called demons or devils (because the end is false worship, involving the transfer of honor).
Why did Calvin give Satan a much less prominent role in his theology of religions compared to the early and mediaeval church? One reason may be Calvin’s understanding of the fall and his interpretation of the subsequent religious history of humanity.44 Calvin, in effect, reversed Justin’s theology of the role of demons and sin in his explanation of religions. Justin did not really hold to a doctrine of original sin—sin was, essentially, ignorance in his thinking and the role of demons was to keep people ignorant and confused.45 Calvin famously rejected the Platonic idea of sin as ignorance and viewed sin as involving culpable guilt.46 As Eire notes, “Banning the devil from the scene heightened human responsibility.”47
Another possible reason why Calvin did not want to give Satan and the demons a significant role in his thinking on religions, is that, as noted earlier, they were under God’s authority and in no way uncontrolled. He did not want to endow demons with more influence than he believed they really had. One piece of evidence supporting this is that he preferred to explain what appeared to be demonic miracles to sleight of hand and deception rather than the working of supernatural evil.48 I turn now to consider Calvin’s thought on the first of the two positive factors playing a role in non-Christian religion in the early church: the theft of truth from Israel.
5 The Theft from Israel Theory in Calvin’s Theology of Religions
5.1 Background
The ‘theft’ theory, the idea that non-Christian philosophical and religious thought contains elements of truth due to ancient ‘borrowing’ from Israel, is a theory with a considerable heritage.49 It was advocated by Aristobulos of Alexandria,50 and a version of it was also forwarded by Philo.51 It was propounded by Justin Martyr as a key explanation for why philosophies contain some of the true Judaeo-Christian ideas and beliefs that they do.52 It was also utilized by the church fathers, who found it a useful tool to assert both the ancient historicity of Christianity and its connectedness to the greats of Greek philosophical thought.53
The theft theory can be considered one version of the prisca theologia (the ancient or venerable theology, hereafter PT) tradition.54 I will designate the version of the PT described above, that developed by Justin and some of the fathers, the Hebrew source revelation-based unilinear PT theory.55 To unpack this categorization a little, this particular theory argues that religious and philosophical truth came from the fount of Hebrew knowledge (rather than Zoroaster, for example). Further, in such a view truth in religion or philosophy is due to revelation (rather than natural theology or reason). Finally, it is unilinear in that truth in other philosophies and religions is considered historically dependent on, and sourced from, this one original revelation.56
Although this traditional version of the PT was still appealed to by theological scholars during Calvin’s lifetime (most notably Bucer and Champier, as noted below), the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed the expression of alternative ideas concerning one or more of the three variable elements of the PT noted above.57 So, for example, alternative accounts to Hebrew historical primacy were advocated.58 Furthermore, appeals to the adequacy of reason in religion were made.59 Finally, hints at, or outright advocacy of, multilinear versions of the PT began to appear.60
Malusa documents three schools of thought explaining the historiography of philosophy in the Renaissance era, which he labels: “philological-humanistic” (as advocated by Marsilio Ficino), “Platonic-concordistic” (represented in the ideas of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola), and the skeptical (as argued by Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola).61 A common goal of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), and the later Agostina Steuco (1496–1548) was to seek harmonization of thought between numerous religious and philosophical beliefs and Christianity.62 Giovanni Pico’s nephew, Gianfrancesco, a key mouthpiece of the skeptical school, was a significant opponent of this shift toward syncretism. He rejected outright his uncle’s attempts at synthesis and stressed disunity and disharmony between various philosophical and religious systems and the beliefs of Christianity, stressing the uncertainty of the former.63
5.2 Erasmus and the Reformers on the Prisca Theologia
That Erasmus was influenced by some aspects of Italian humanism is not doubted, but Walker, Boyle, and Wallace all believe that Erasmus repudiated any version of the PT.64 Boyle argues, at some length, that Erasmus replaced such a theory with what might be considered a Logos-centric explanation of how truth is present in non-Christian thought outside the church.65 While Erasmus’s comments on the possible salvation of the heathen were ambiguous, he seemed to be clear on the idea of revelation of the Logos to all and was interested in making links between Christianity and various philosophies.66
Luther was aware of some of Giovanni Pico’s writings and at times he appreciated certain insights from philosophers.67 However, he did not believe that their insights were of any spiritual value.68 Williams, on the basis of Luther’s comments on Jonah 1:5,69 believes that Luther held to a kind of Adamic version of the PT, containing vestiges of “light and reason” that were transmitted through posterity. However, in referring to the same passage, Boyle argues that Luther’s main emphasis is on revelation from reason and nature and its insufficiency.70 Ziegler interprets Luther in a similar way to Boyle concerning Luther’s comments on the sailors in Jonah.71
Bucer, on the other hand, argued for the traditional version of the PT, holding the view of Plato’s dependence on Moses.72 According to Kok, Bucer found in pagan literature a “lower grade form of revelation” to that of scripture, and his argument why pagan literature was, at times, useful was because of this borrowing.73 Kok believes that a clear difference emerges between Bucer and Calvin on the status of pagan literature on this point.74
5.3 Calvin and the Prisca Theologia
Was Calvin aware of the PT tradition and the newer versions of it developed during the Renaissance? It is safe to assume that he would have been aware of the traditional PT view and of Bucer’s holding to it, as he knew him well, together with his commentary on Romans. Concerning newer variants, Muller believes Calvin’s attack on ‘Epicureans’ involved “a debate with proponents of a revived ancient philosophy.”75 It is possible that Calvin was aware of the ideas of Ficino and Pico because of their influence on French humanists who, in turn, developed their own versions of the PT.76 Calvin might have had Ficino and Pico (or their followers) in mind when he criticized certain “men of letters” with “platonic ideas in their heads.”77 His rejection of Cicero’s opinion that religion improves over time could also be interpreted as an implicit criticism of an important element of newer PT theories.78 Further, he could have had in mind Pico’s cabbalistic interpretation of scripture in his comments concerning questionable etymological exegesis.79
Given the above tentative suggestions, I turn now to Calvin’s entanglements with Servetus, which, I believe, are the clearest evidence of his awareness of newer variants of the PT and the uses to which they were being put. Walker suggests that Servetus was probably introduced to the PT by Champier, with a PT argument clearly present in Christianisti restitutio—particularly the Hermetic appeal.80 While Servetus seemed to have advocated a fairly traditional PT view, Walker traces a specific heretical belief in Servetus’s thought (the Father’s temporal priority to the Son) to Orpheus, and also points to significant Hermetic influence regarding Servetus’s pantheistic tendencies.81 In the Institutes 4.16.31 Calvin pours scorn on Servetus’s appeal to Hermes Trismegistus (and the Sibyls), calling the former—a key figure in some PT chronological schemes—a heathen, contrasting his ideas with “the authority of God.”82 An additional strand of evidence indicative of a rejection of the PT is Calvin’s dismissal of Egyptian wisdom. Calvin went out of his way to exhibit what can only be described as utter disdain for the wisdom of Egypt and flatly rejected the possibility of any transmission of light via Egypt. Indeed, he used the idea of Egyptian proximity to the people of Israel as reason for greater blame for their folly, rather than to argue for positive influence one way or the other:
The Egyptians also are an evident proof that men were willingly ignorant of things which they had not far to seek, if only they had been disposed to addict their minds to the investigation of truth; for though the lamp of God’s word was shining at their very doors, they would yet without shame propagate the rank fables of their achievements, fifteen thousand years before the foundation of the world.83
Wallace’s interpretation of Calvin’s position on the PT is that he “ignored” it.84 In Wallace’s opinion Calvin believed that the truth known by the pagans was obtained through creation.85 While his explanation is possible, given the wider historical context I believe it more likely that Calvin more purposefully rejected the PT argument, and for two main reasons.
The first of these reasons is Calvin’s relationship with philosophy, aptly termed “complex” by Nuovo.86 Calvin’s criticism of some of Plato’s ideas and of Augustine’s early Platonism is well known.87 At times Calvin sought to distance himself from Platonism; indeed, he condemned Plato.88 At the same time, the Reformed turn to Plato from Aristotle cannot be denied.89 It has been argued by a number of scholars that Calvin was essentially eclectic (rather than syncretistic) in his approach: keen to use Plato’s thought when it suited him, and not averse to dismiss his thought when it did not.90 Calvin stressed the certainty to be found in the Christian faith and emphasized the contradictions and absurdities present in philosophical thought, especially religious thought.91 In this he very much echoed the conclusions of Gianfrancesco Pico, in opposition to the syncretistic ideas of his uncle.92
It is clear that Calvin differentiated religious insights from earthly wisdom in the writings of the philosophers, and he was quite generous in what he admitted of some philosophers’ ideas in matters of science and worldly knowledge.93 Although at times he suggested total blindness in matters of religion, in reality he admitted some truth here as well.94 Calvin’s famous lightning metaphor used to explain the glimpses of religious truth present in the ideas of non-Christian thought is well known.95 However, while recognizing some religious insight, he also emphasized key doctrines not known by the philosophers, and hence the total inadequacies of their belief systems:
The ancient philosophers anxiously discussed the sovereign good, and even contended among themselves over it. Yet none but Plato recognized man’s highest good as union with God, and he could not even dimly sense its nature. And no wonder, for he had learned nothing of the sacred bond of that union.96
For as concerning other things, though the philosophers do not reason purely, yet they say somewhat. Yea, they speak much concerning eternal life and the immortality of the soul; but as touching faith, which showeth free reconciliation in Christ; and regeneration, whereby the Spirit of God doth restore in us the image of God; concerning calling upon God, and the last resurrection, not a word.97
Unlike some of his contemporaries, Calvin rejected outright a multilinear view of revelation and an independent Gentile revelation tradition.98 Given such a position, Calvin did not admit a ‘second level’ authority of revelation in his thinking, even due to borrowing.99 As noted earlier, there was patristic warrant for the traditional PT scheme; however, Calvin made it clear that he did not consider himself bound to follow the fathers blindly when he considered that they had strayed.100 Calvin was extremely wary of the ‘penetration’ of philosophical thought into Christianity and argued that the Roman church had uncritically adopted certain philosophical assumptions or insights to its severe detriment.101 Speculation was a serious weakness in any methodology, and I suggest that the PT theory was, at heart, speculative in his thinking.102
I turn now to a second reason in support of the idea that Calvin rejected the PT tradition. While Calvin did make comments on the history of religions (as he understood the field), he was more intent on establishing individual human accountability to God, as opposed to considering the societal outworking of non-Christian religion and what this meant for different individuals within these societies in history.103 Preus has rightly noted a significant difference between Zwingli and Calvin in this regard.104 He differentiates a historical or empirical approach to the study and understanding of religion from a natural or essentialist understanding. Preus placed Zwingli in the first camp and Calvin in the second. He comments: “rather than tracing the origin of religion, Calvin discussed its basis in human nature, apart from the question of historical beginning.”105 Rather than establishing humankind’s partial knowledge of God on the basis of the PT tradition, Calvin mirrors Saint Paul’s largely ahistorical approach as seen in Romans chapter 1, in the first five chapters of Book 1 of the Institutes.
I now turn to the second positive contributory factor to non-Christian philosophy and religion present in the church’s thinking, enlightenment from the Logos of God.
6 The Logos of God in Calvin’s Theology of Religions
Justin is well-known for his Logos theology, although interpretations of it are various.106 In this section I consider Calvin’s exegesis of the first few verses of chapter 1 of St. John’s gospel within its historical context and consider what he said about the Logos and his understanding of one role of the Logos in relation to non-Christian religions.
Larsson considers the polemical orientation of Calvin’s commentary on John’s gospel as being twofold: against the Roman Catholic Church (especially its metaphysical emphases) together with a major focus on reprimands (both those in the text, and also in Calvin’s application).107 He believes Calvin’s reading of John’s gospel to have been anthropocentric—focusing on man’s responsibility.108 Like Larsson, Pitkin believes “theological anthropology” to be a key hermeneutical idea for Calvin in his approach to and understanding of John’s gospel.109
In Calvin’s comments on the Johannine prologue, the Logos mediates two lights to humankind: “The light which still dwells in corrupt nature consists chiefly of two parts; for, first, all men naturally possess some seed of religion; and, secondly, the distinction between good and evil is engraven on their consciences.”110 Calvin goes on to contrast the light received by humankind with the response to it: “But, what are the fruits that ultimately spring from it [the light], except that religion degenerates into a thousand monsters of superstition, and conscience perverts every decision, so as to confound vice with virtue?”111
Calvin differentiates two ‘powers’ of the Son of God in the Johannine prologue: the first evident in “the structure of the world and the order of nature” and the second in its renewal and restoration.112 The twofold light that all humankind receives from the “the grace of the Son of God” is mediated by the Logos in the first (and only the first) of these roles or powers.113 Calvin rejected the idea that the light referred to in verse 9 of the prologue is the gospel, and while known to have respected Chrysostom, he did not follow his interpretation that gospel light was being referred to in this verse—indeed he significantly downplayed what this light was, terming it “the common light of nature.”114
Calvin’s division of the Logos roles in this passage is not developed in his thinking, and neither are its implications. The difficulties in making sense of the twofold mediation of the Eternal Son in Calvin’s thought have been recognized and discussed by a number of scholars.115 That Calvin held the two roles is clear, and I submit that the work to which he put the division in the prologue is of great significance for his view of religions.116 I believe this approach enabled him to avoid pantheism while at the same time connecting humankind to God by natural law, thereby allowing him to argue for both the presence and the inexcusability of false religion.
Concerning the rejection of pantheism, while Backus terms Cyril’s influence on Calvin’s treatment of the prologue “omnipresent,”117 I suggest this claim needs to be qualified due to Calvin’s significant shift away from Cyril’s emphasis on humankind’s participation in the Logos in this passage.118 Pitkin believes Calvin’s rejection of the idea that the Logos sheds his own light on humankind (in which we then participate in some way) to be a rather unique teaching in Calvin’s exposition.119 Rather than the Logos directly enlightening, or revealing himself, in Calvin’s thinking we receive two gifts from him.120 The Reformer’s understanding of post-lapsarian logos enlightenment is not ‘positive’ (in terms of its effects) as is the case in some more recent Logos-influenced Christian theologies of religion.121 While there is life dependence on the Logos in Calvin’s comments concerning the present condition of fallen humankind, there is no real participation.122 Participation occurs pre-fall and for redeemed humanity, but not in humankind’s fallen state in Calvin’s thought.123 I suggest he may have adopted the interpretation he did to consciously steer clear of a kind of stoic Logos pantheism or Stoic logos spermatikos idea.124
Turning to the first part of the light—the semen religionis—the seed of religion is referred to a number of times in the Institutes and in Calvin’s commentaries, with slightly different emphases.125 Why did Calvin use the seed metaphor? Horowitz notes it is one of the images commonly used to depict the source of virtue in Stoic thought (alongside “Reason,” “common notions,” and “sparks”).126 Horowitz believes that these “unit ideas,” as he terms them, show the connection between humankind and God’s law in Stoic thought.127 Calvin’s use of three of these terms in his exegesis of the Johannine prologue is suggestive, at the very least, of influence, and Eire specifically contrasts Calvin’s borrowing of the Stoic universal dissemination of the seed of religion idea with Zwingli’s rejection of it.128 However, on closer examination, the borrowing is more of the shell of the seed, rather than its kernel (to extend the metaphor reference). For Calvin, there was no possibility that reason (or the seed or indeed the spark) could guide anyone to righteousness as the Stoics believed possible.129 Unlike Stoic thought, where the seed metaphor indicated a potential for growth, typically developed through education, for Calvin post lapsum the seed of religion produces dreadful fruit.130 In Stoic thought man develops through training: in Calvin’s he slides into a thousand monstrosities of religion—as noted above.131 While Calvin mentioned the semen religionis in his discussion of the soul,132 his language stands in sharp contrast to the idea of man containing divinity within himself, an idea he explicitly rejected.133 Overall, as Williams notes, the Stoic view of humankind was essentially that of pre-lapsarian Adam, not fallen humanity, and therein lay the Stoic error in Calvin’s view.134
While Calvin, at times, seemed to use the terms semen religionis and sensus divinitatis as rough synonyms, his thought is perhaps best understood in terms of pitting the ongoing witness of the sensus divinitatis against the corrupt fruit of the semen religionis.135 The religious-anthropological tension that results is present in a number of his comments on false religion, as noted in the quotations below.
And though so soon as they begin to think upon God, they vanish away in wicked inventions, and so the pure seed doth degenerate into corruptions; yet the first general knowledge of God doth nevertheless remain still in them.136
When, therefore, men invent for themselves various gods, and when everyone is led here and there without any judgment, it is a monstrous thing; for when the subject is pressed on the attention of the rudest, they confess that there is some supreme deity, and are at length constrained to allow that there is but one true God.137
This particular understanding of his borrowing and adaptation of the two Stoic terms can, in turn, account for Calvin’s charge of hypocrisy to those involved in the practice of false religion.138 Such a charge makes most sense when the awareness of the divine is ongoing, a dim awareness of the true creator God revealed in creation, providence, and natural law still present in the midst of false religious activity.
Turning to the second of the two lights mentioned, although Calvin does not discuss to what conscience refers in making differentiations between right and wrong in his commentary, it cannot be doubted that it is God’s will for humankind, that is, natural law, that he had in mind.139 Calvin interpreted the natural law known by humans in different ways (less or more, first table versus second table knowledge) depending on his focus.140 However, the law only (lex nuda) gift, mediated by the first role of the Logos, is dreadful in Calvin’s view.141 This is because the bare law is only condemnatory, having no propaedeutic role, unlike the fuller Mosaic law (containing promise).142 Calvin equated Christ and the Law,143 emphasized the unity of the Old and New Testaments,144 and stressed that Christ was the fulfillment145 and substance of the law146 as well as its interpreter147 and mediator.148 The law with promise—the mosaic law—foreshadows Christ incarnate and crucified. However, the accomplishment of redemption is the second role of the Logos, a role that Calvin explicitly rejected as being present in the enlightenment given by the Eternal Son in the prologue.149
While the influence of Stoic thought on Calvin’s view of natural law is well documented and generally acknowledged, the influence in the Logos prologue exhibits both dependence and rejection.150 In Calvin’s view the Logos mediates the natural law to all through conscience, rather than the Stoic channel of reason.151 Another difference is that natural law is a gift in Calvin’s thinking, and, as noted earlier, this does not signify participation, as it does in Stoic thought.152 Unlike in Stoicism, in Calvin’s view it is God who gives and informs the conscience.153 A number of scholars have noted the critical role of conscience as part of God’s revelation to humankind in Calvin’s thought.154 While it may well pervert some decision-making (as Calvin notes in the Johannine prologue), he could also term it a terror, and it seems to be an aspect of God’s revelation that, even post-fall, Calvin considered to be still functioning, though not always perfectly.155
Continuing the idea of the dual roles of the Logos, I suggest that in Calvin’s thinking fallen humankind seeks the fruit of the second role or part of the Logos (the renewal and restoration role) through its own idolatrous responses to the first, to pacify conscience troubled by the lex nuda, with the goal of seeking forgiveness.156 The idea that idolatry is, in essence, the creation of false mediators rather than substitution of the true God is clearly present in Calvin’s thought,157 as the following quotations make clear:
It is the same with the Papists of the present day; they have their Baalim; not that they regard their patrons in the place of God: but as they dread every access to God, and understand not that Christ is a mediator, they retake themselves here and there to various Baalim, that they may procure favour to themselves; and at the same time, whatever honour they show to stones, or wood, or bones of dead men, or to any of their own inventions, they call it the worship of God.158
And first, indeed, superstition contrived divine honors either for the sun and the stars or for idols. Then followed ambition, which, by adorning mortals with the spoils of God, dared profane everything sacred. And although there remained the principle of worshiping a supreme Being, it was a common custom to offer sacrifices indiscriminately to tutelary divinities, lesser gods, or dead heroes. So inclined are we to lapse into this error that what God rigorously reserves for himself alone we distribute among a great throng.159
7 Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, passing allusion was made to some previous research considering Calvin as a theologian of religions. I briefly summarize the conclusions of some of the key studies here before providing my own interpretation based on the material discussed in this article. Eire argued that Calvin is best understood as an anthropological theologian of religions, stating that for Calvin “religion springs from human nature”160 and that “false religion … is … encoded in our genes.”161 Preus makes a similar comment: “Calvin discussed the source for religion in completely anthropological terms.”162 Nuovo seems to concur with these views.163 Capetz, on the other hand, believed Barth’s definition of religion to be Calvin’s, namely, “the realm of man’s attempts to justify and to sanctify himself before a capricious and arbitrary picture of God.”164
Based on the material covered in this article I suggest that Calvin is best understood as being a Logos-centric theologian of religions. His demotion of the role of Satan and demons and his rejection of the PT in his understanding of religions are clear. The Reformer’s view of enlightenment from (rather than of) one role of the Logos, when considered alongside his understanding of sin, enabled him to account for both sparks of truth and error in non-Christian thought and religion.165 I submit that the problem with an anthropological reading of Calvin’s thinking on non-Christian religions is that it suggests an innate tendency without sufficiently recognizing that religious activity is, for Calvin, a reaction or reflection (largely, though not totally, inappropriate) of gifts mediated by the Logos in his creating and sustaining capacity. When Eire states, “As Calvin saw it, whatever springs from the semen religionis comes from within the human self, not from any divine source, much less from the Logos Spermatikos,” this claim minimizes or overlooks the fact that the ultimate source of the semen religionis and natural law is the Logos in Calvin’s thought.166 For Calvin, humankind responds to God. That is, we do not initiate the ‘conversation’: humankind is involved in a continuous response to two ongoing gifts of the Logos. Conscience and religiosity are not simply one-off God-given deposits in Calvin’s thinking: they are part of God’s ongoing engagement with his creation.
I suggest that for Calvin religions are, primarily, an inappropriate response to a partial revelation from the Logos, who mediates the lex nuda, God’s will to humans, who are made in the image of God to be in communion with God. A minor, secondary element of his thought, which is not developed, concerns the acknowledgement that some Logos ‘sparks’ remain in humankind. Given this admission one would expect non-Christian thought and religion to contain reflected ‘sparks’ of order and creation (though not redemption) in Calvin’s thinking. Such reflection will be contaminated by sin, but a reflection nonetheless. Such a reading and interpretation of Calvin’s thinking is, I believe, supported when we consider the Reformer’s praise of the this-worldly wisdom evident in some philosophies. In this carefully qualified sense, therefore, false religions and philosophies (or, perhaps more accurately, elements of some of them) may be considered of some earthly value in Calvin’s thought—though I am not aware of the Reformer ever having stated this explicitly.167
It is important not to overemphasize this secondary understanding. This is because Calvin, rather than fanning the sparks of truth present outside the church so that they would combine into a larger, harmonious flame (cf. Ficino and Pico), insisted that these sparks were extinguished mid-flight. Further, he considered them to be very insignificant sparks when compared to the glory of the light of the incarnate Christ—the heart, rather than the hands and feet of the Logos.168 The rejection of the idea of redemptive universal christological mediation in his commentary on the first few verses of John’s prologue explains why Calvin was so negative about religions and philosophy in terms of their spiritual ends and goals. The tragedy, in Calvin’s view, is that the redemptive role of the Logos, the complement of the creating and sustaining role, is sought away from the face of the testimony of the Triune God: this is the heart of Calvin’s theology of religions.
See Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997), 2–3, and Harold Netland, “Theology of Religions, Missiology, and Evangelicals,” Missiology: An International Review 33, no. 2 (2005): 142.
Regarding the lack of interest claim, see Paul E. Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion’: A Study in the Theologies of Calvin and Schleiermacher (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1996), 162; P.C. Potgieter, “Calvin and Other Religions,” Acta Theologica 24, no. 1 (2004): 150; Stuart Bonnington, “Calvin and Islam,” The Reformed Theological Review 68 no. 2 (2009): 78; J. Samuel Preus, “Zwingli, Calvin and the Origin of Religion,” Church History 46, no. 2 (1977): 187.
The most important of these would include: J. Du Preez, “John Calvin’s Contribution to a Theologia Religionum,” Missionalia 16, no. 2 (1988): 69–78; P.C. Potgieter, “Calvin and Other Religions,” Acta Theologica 24 (2004): 147–167; J. Samuel Preus, “Zwingli, Calvin and the Origin of Religion,” Church History 46, no. 2 (1977) 186–202; and George Huntston Williams, “Erasmus and the Reformers on non-Christian Religions and salus extra ecclesiam,” in Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe, ed. Theodore Rabb and Jerrold Seigel (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1969). A significant study to which I return in the conclusion of this article is M.N. Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” in John Calvin and Roman Catholicism: Critique and Engagement, Then and Now, ed. Randall C. Zachman (Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008).
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen “Calvin and Religions,” in John Calvin and Evangelical Theology: Legacy and Prospect, ed. Sung Wook Chung (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 282.
Netland, “Theology of Religions,” 145.
See Jan Slomp, “Calvin and the Turks,” Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 19, no. 1 (2009): 64. A reviewer helpfully adds to this observation, the presence of ‘Mohamet’ fifteen times in the Calvini Opera Database.
In this article I do not discuss (possible) developments in Calvin’s thinking over time on the specific subjects under discussion. Accordingly, I make a few general comments here, before proceeding to note one very specific relevant issue. The role of Zwingli in influencing Calvin’s thought on religions in later editions of the Institutes has been argued (See Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” 151 and 156, and note 17, below). Additional influences that have been suggested include: Calvin’s own commentary on Romans (T.H.L. Parker, Calvin: An Introduction to His Thought [Continuum: London, 1995,] 6); Melanchthon (Randall C. Zachman, “The Style of Theology: Editions of the Institutes,” in John Calvin in Context, ed. J.C. Holder [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020], 24); and Bucer (Joseph C. McLelland, “Calvin and Philosophy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11, no. 1 [1965]: 46). While it has been argued that Calvin did not cut material from the 1936 edition in the later versions of the Institutes (Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition [New York: Oxford University Press, 2000], 134), as Potgieter, “Calvin and Other Religions,” 150–151, notes, a reference to the Saracens, specifically an appeal to religious tolerance, is made in the first edition of the Institutes (1536) that does not appear in later versions. Potgieter considers various reasons why this might have been so, including suggestions that Calvin went on to hold greater political authority and needed to delete it due to possible misunderstandings of his intentions, and that he held an initially sympathetic position to the Saracens because both Muslims and Protestants suffered persecution from the Roman Church. Potgieter concludes that while the sentiment expressed in the earliest version of the Institutes is nowhere repudiated, the excision of the reference should not be interpreted as suggesting that Calvin changed from an essentially ‘tolerant’ to ‘intolerant’ position toward Islam, given the presence of other negative comments found in the Institutes.
Muller in The Unaccommodated Calvin, 140–145 helpfully discusses the relationship between the Institutes, commentaries, and sermons in Calvin’s work.
In addition to the studies mentioned in note 3, additional relevant work would include Carel F.C. Coetzee, “Calvin’s Interpretation of the First Commandment and the Implications for Religious Pluralism and Equality of Religion,” In die Skriflig 48, no. 1 (2014); Ernst Conradie, “A Theological Re-description of the Emergence of Religion: In Conversation with John Calvin on the Semen Religionis,” Dutch Reformed Theological Journal = Nederduitse Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif 53, nos. 1/2 (2012): 13–24.
Methodological approaches that have been more inductive in nature include du Preez, “John Calvin’s Contribution,” and Kärkkäinen, “Calvin and Religions.” Being that one of my own goals is to locate Calvin’s thinking within the context of the church tradition, I have opted for a deductive approach.
On Justin’s standing and influence see Avery Dulles, A History of Apologetics (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999); Jörg Ulrich, “Justin Martyr,” in Jakob Engberg, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, and Jörg Ulrich, eds., In Defence of Christianity: Early Christian Apologists (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014): 51–66; Denis Minns and Paul Parvis, eds. Justin Philosopher and Martyr: Apologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Calvin attributes Monarchia to Justin in Institutes 1.10.3 (John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill [Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006]), although today this would be considered Pseudo-Justin. Irena Backus notes that in his disputes with Servetus on the Trinity, Calvin terms Justin an “illustrious patron” of the orthodox position. See Irena Backus, “Calvin and the Greek Fathers,” in Continuity and Change: The Harvest of Late Medieval and Reformation History, ed. Robert J. Bast and Andrew C. Gow (Leiden: Brill, 2000): 266. Note also David Jon van Houten’s comment: “Justin escaped Calvin’s censure as one of those who compromised his beliefs in favour of philosophy.” See David Jon van Houten, Earthly Wisdom and Heavenly Wisdom: Reason in the Theology of John Calvin (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1993): 253.
Ragnar Holte, “Logos spermatikos Christianity and Ancient Philosophy According to St. Justin’s Apologies,” Studia Theologica 12, no. 1: 111; David F. Wright, “Christian Faith in the Greek World: Justin Martyr’s Testimony,” Evangelical Quarterly 54, no. 2 (1982): 79.
Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Prolegomena to Theology 1 (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987): 113.
Institutes 1.2.2.
On the idea of a Reformed definition see Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 97, 316. On the affective element see Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 332. On the knowledge of self, see Cornelis P. Venema, “The ‘Twofold Knowledge of God’ and the Structure of Calvin’s Theology,” MJT 4, no. 2 (1988): 159.
An example of a ‘superstitions’ reference is found in Calvin’s Commentaries, from the Calvin Translation Society edition,
See Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” 147, and Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 113. Muller has noted research suggesting an influence of Zwingli on Calvin in developing his true and false distinction. See Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin, 124.
Institutes 1.3.3. The second is reason: see CTS, Deut. 18:9.
See Potgieter, “Calvin and Other Religions,” 156. On the seeking of illicit knowledge see CTS, Deut. 12:29 and Deut. 18:9 and 10. The idea of illicit knowledge as being humankind’s primary sin in Calvin’s thought is noted by Nico Vorster, “Calvin on the Created Structure of Human Nature: The Influence of His Anthropology on His Theology,” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 151 (2015): 180. In a sense, therefore, humankind’s religious history is similar to the error of our first parents in Calvin’s thought.
Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 144.
Eire, “John Calvin: Accidental Anthropologist,” 158.
Eire, “John Calvin: Accidental Anthropologist,” 158, 159.
Eire, “John Calvin: Accidental Anthropologist,” 159.
Eire, “John Calvin: Accidental Anthropologist,”159. For an overview of Bullinger’s “On the Origin of Error” see William Peter Stephens, The Theology of Heinrich Bullinger, ed. Jim West and Joe Mock (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019): 96–99.
Eire, “John Calvin: Accidental Anthropologist,” 162. It should be noted that Calvin rejected the argument of some within the early church that the demons were spirits of the progeny of the sons of God and the daughters of men. See CTS, Gen. 6:1.
Eire, “John Calvin: Accidental Anthropologist,” 150, n. 18.
See Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 72–73.
Partee, The Theology of John Calvin, 74. See also Institutes 1.14.17.
CTS, Deut. 32:16; Jer. 10:6; 2 Cor. 4:4.
See, for example, CTS, Gal. 4:8.
CTS, Hos. 2:13. See also CTS, Acts 17:24; Gen. 31:19; Isa. 57:6; Institutes 1.4.1. For the idea of the historic continuity of idolatry in Calvin’s thought see Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’156.
On the creation of gods see CTS, Ps. 96:4. For the nonexistence of gods see CTS, Isa. 37:18 and 19 and Ps. 115:4.
CTS, 1 Cor. 8:4.
Institutes 1.14.16.
CTS, Isa. 42:8.
See CTS, Hab. 2:19; Ezek. 20:8, and 2 Thess. 2:11. Note also a similar comment on vanity preceding being led away in Institutes 1.10.3.
See Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” 150 n. 18 on the direct role. Concerning the seeking of illicit knowledge and the role of Satan, see CTS, Isa. 19:3 and Slomp, “Calvin and the Turks,” 59. On the link between idolatry and novelty in Calvin’s thinking see Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin, 63.
On the role of kings in false religions see CTS, Dan. 3:6–7.
See Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 318.
Institutes 1.4.3.
CTS, Ps 32:1. See also Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 158, 316, and 339. On the similarity between the Roman Catholic Church and Islam in Calvin’s thought see Slomp, “Calvin and the Turks,” 56, 59. See also Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 114, who notes Calvin’s religious groupings, and Thomas Woolford, Natural Theology and Natural Philosophy in the Late Renaissance (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2011): 121.
See Carlos M.N. Eire, War Against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 227–228.
CTS, 1 Cor. 10:20.
“By contrast with Aquinas, Calvin made all human religious impulses idolatrous as a result of the fall,” Joan Pau Rubiés, “Theology, Ethnography, and the Historicization of Idolatry,” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 4 (2006): 583. See also Gratian Vandici, “Reading the Rules of Knowledge in the Story of the Fall: Calvin and Reformed Epistemology on the Noetic Effects of Original Sin,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 10, no. 2 (2016): 183.
Graham Keith, “Justin Martyr and Religious Exclusivism,” Tyndale Bulletin 43, no. 1 (1992): 61.
Institutes 2.2.22, CTS, 1 Cor. 1.21. See also van Houten, Earthly Wisdom and Heavenly, 230.
Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” 162.
CTS, Exod. 4: 22.
D.P. Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 17, nos. 3/4 (1954): 204. See also Moshe Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino and in some Jewish Treatments,” in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. Michael J.B. Allen and Valery Rees with Martin Davies (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 137–158; Norman Roth, “The ‘Theft of Philosophy’ by the Greeks from the Jews,” Classical Folia 32, no. 1 (1978): 53–67.
Roth, “Theft of Philosophy,” 63.
Roth, “Theft of Philosophy,” notes that Philo’s version of the theft theory was less direct in that Moses first learned from Egypt and Greece before exceeding them in knowledge (see p. 64). Roth goes on to note (65) that Clement of Alexandria roughly followed Philo’s version.
Justin, Apology 1:44, in Saint Justin Martyr, The First Apology, The Second Apology, Dialogue with Trypho, Exhortation to the Greeks, Discourse to the Greeks, The Monarchy or the Rule of God, The Fathers of the Church 6, trans. Thomas B. Falls (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 81.
See Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” 212 on the possible transmission mechanism and the theory’s “weighty patristic authority.” Walker notes a motivating force behind the French humanist adoption of the PT as being “a past without breaks,” 258.
Henk Jan de Jonge traces the term ‘prisca theologia’ to Ficino. See “The Sibyls in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, or Ficino, Castellio and ‘the Ancient Theology,’ ” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 78, no. 1 (2016): 11.
I take the terms ‘unilinear’ and ‘multilinear’ here, and in what follows, from Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino,” 137.
See Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino,” 139 for a simple overview of the PT mechanics.
See Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” 210–211, for the traditional view of Champier.
For example, Giordano Bruno believed Pythagorean wisdom to predate and be a source for Christianity. See Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013): 89.
See de Jonge, “The Sibyls,” 12.
See Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino,” 141.
Luciano Malusa, “Renaissance Antecedents to the Historiography of Philosophy,” in Models of the History of Philosophy: From Its Origins in the Renaissance to the ‘Historia Philosophica,’ ed. Giovanni Santinello et al. (Dordrecht: Springer Science and Business Media, 1993), 52.
On the relationship of Steuco to Ficino and Pico see Charles B. Schmitt, “Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz,” Journal of the History of Ideas 27, no. 4 (1966): 524.
See Malusa, “Renaissance Antecedents,” 39. On the relation to Empiricus see Malusa, “Renaissance Antecedents,” 48.
See Williams, “Erasmus and the Reformers,” 330 on the influence of Italian humanism. On the rejection view see Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” 255; Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, Christening Pagan Mysteries. Erasmus in Pursuit of Wisdom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 11; and Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., Shapers of English Calvinism, 1660–1714: Variety, Persistence, and Transformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 280.
Boyle, Christening Pagan Mysteries, 22 makes the following comment on the indwelling Logos in Erasmus’s thought: “Human responsibility for the decline and rise of learning is a critical theme of Antibarbari, because for Erasmus freedom of choice is a moral exercise of the indwelling Logos who inclines man to good.”
See Jan van Herwaarden, “Erasmus and the Non-Christian World,” Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook 32 (2012), 73 concerning the salvation of the heathen. See also Williams, “Erasmus and the Reformers,” 334 and 336 on the same subject. See Barbara Pitkin, “The Spiritual Gospel? Christ and Human Nature in Calvin’s Commentary on John,” Dutch Review of Church History 85 (2005): 94 on revelation to all. On the idea of making connections see van Herwaarden, “Erasmus and the Non-Christian World,” 69, and Williams, “Erasmus and the Reformers,” 328.
See Friedemann Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance and Hermeticism: Contexts and Interfaces of the Early Reformation Movement,” Reformation & Renaissance Review 20, no. 2 (2018): 118.
See Williams, “Erasmus and the Reformers,” 338.
“Luther observed that among all peoples there survives, from the primordial revelation in Paradise, a vague ‘light and reason’ with regard to the existence of God,” in Williams, “Erasmus and the Reformers,” 338.
Boyle, Christening Pagan Mysteries, 82.
Roland Ziegler, “Natural Knowledge of God and the Trinity,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 69, no. 2 (2005): 153–154.
See Williams, “Erasmus and the Reformers,” 355, and Joel Edward Kok, The Influence of Martin Bucer on John Calvin’s Interpretation of Romans: A Comparative Case Study (PhD diss., Duke University, 1993), 79.
Kok, The Influence of Martin Bucer, 78 and 79.
Kok, The Influence of Martin Bucer, 84.
Richard A. Muller, “Was It Really Viral? Natural Theology in the Early Modern Reformed Tradition,” in Crossing Traditions: Essays on the Reformation and Intellectual History in Honour of Irena Backus, ed. Maria-Cristina Pitassi and Daniela Solfaroli Camillocci with the collaboration of Arthur Huiban (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 512–513.
On Lefèvre’s exposure see Guy Bedouelle “Attacks on the Biblical Humanism of Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples” (trans. by Anna Machado-Matheson), in Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus, ed. Erika Rummel (Leiden: Brill, 2008). See also Walker, “Prisca Theologia in France,” 206 concerning Italian humanist influence in France. For Champier’s understanding of the PT see Walker, “Prisca Theologia in France,” 214–215. On the influence of Florentine Platonism on French humanism see Charles Partee, “The Soul in Plato, Platonism, and Calvin,” Scottish Journal of Theology 22, no. 3 (1969): 286.
See H.A. Enno van Gelder, The Two Reformations in the 16th Century (The Hague: I. Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 269.
Institutes 1.3.3.
See Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance and Hermeticism,” 106 on the Cabbala, and Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” 221, 223, and 224 on etymological issues surrounding the PT, along with Wallace, Shapers of English Calvinism, 116.
Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” 248.
On the traditional view see Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” 249. On the pantheistic influence, see Walker, “The Prisca Theologia in France,” 250. Walker goes on to note that Calvin did not specifically single out the Hermetic or Platonist tendencies in Servetus (256).
Institutes 4.16.19.
CTS, Gen. vol. 1, The Author’s Epistle Dedicatory to the Most Illustrious Prince, Henry, Duke of Vendome, Heir to the Kingdom of Navarre, 16.
Wallace, Shapers of English Calvinism, 116.
Wallace, Shapers of English Calvinism, 116.
Victor Lawrence Nuovo, Calvin’s Theology: A Study of Its Sources in Classical Antiquity (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1964), 1.
See Partee, “The Soul in Plato,” 294. See Calvin’s comments in CTS, John 1:3 concerning the negative influence of Plato on Augustine.
See Partee, “The Soul in Plato,” 290 on Calvin’s rejection of being considered a Platonist. See also Kok, The Influence of Martin Bucer, 77; Institutes 1.5.11, and The Author’s Epistle Dedicatory, 16.
For Calvin’s open appreciation of Plato and other philosophers see Institutes 1.8.1.
Representatives of this position would include Nuovo, Calvin’s Theology, and Partee, “The Soul in Plato,” as well as Charles Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Backus, in “Calvin and the Greek Fathers,” 276, notes Calvin’s keenness on citing ancient sources, while at the same time terming him “allergic” to philosophy, rejecting attempts at synthesis or integration.
Regarding the need for certainty see Institutes 3.2.7, 15, and 16 and CTS, Acts 17:22. On absurdities in philosophical thought see CTS, 1 Cor. 1.21.
See Malusa, “Renaissance Antecedents,” 44–45 on Gianfrancesco Pico’s criticism of the variety present in and disagreement among various philosophical schools.
Institutes 1.8.1; 2.2.13; 2.2.15, 2.2.16; CTS, Gen. 4: 2; 1 Cor. 15:33.
Institutes 2.2.18.
Institutes 2.2.18.
Institutes 3.25.2.
CTS, Acts 17:18.
See Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, trans. Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 51.
“Calvin and Melanchthon appreciate pagan literature, but they do not grant it the status of revelation, even to an inferior degree,” Kok, The Influence of Martin Bucer, 83.
CTS, Ezek. 20:18.
See Gelder, The Two Reformations, 268, and Stephen K. Moroney, “The Noetic Effects of Sin: An Exposition of Calvin’s View and a Constructive Theological Proposal” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1995, 268–280). For an overview and interpretation of Calvin’s engagement with philosophy see David C. Steinmetz, “Calvin as Biblical Interpreter among the Ancient Philosophers,” Evangelische Theologie 69, no. 2 (2009): 123–132.
On Calvin’s aversion to speculation see CTS, 1 Cor. 15:33; 1 John 2:22–23; Institutes 1.4.1.
On general comments concerning Calvin’s thought on the historical development of religion see Institutes 1.11.8; 1.12.3. On accountability see the first five chapters of the Institutes, Book 1.
Preus, “Zwingli, Calvin and the Origin of Religion.”
Preus, “Zwingli, Calvin and the Origin of Religion,” 196.
See, e.g., L.W. Barnard, “The Logos Theology of St Justin Martyr,” The Downside Review 89, no. 295 (1971): 132–141; M.J. Edwards, “Justin’s Logos and the Word of God,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 3, no. 3 (1995): 261–280.
Tord Larsson, God in the Fourth Gospel (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2001), 66–67.
Larsson, God in the Fourth Gospel, 69.
Pitkin, “Spiritual Gospel,” 190.
CTS, John 1:5.
CTS, John 1:5.
CTS, John 1:5.
CTS, John 1:5.
CTS, John 1:9. On Chrysostom’s favored status see R. Ward Holder, “Calvin as Commentator on the Pauline Epistles,” in Donald McKim, ed., The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 252. Chrysostom interprets enlightening to be the gospel on verse 9. See St John Chrysostom Commentary on St John the Apostle and Evangelist Homilies 1–47, trans. Sister Thomas Aquinas Goggin (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1957), 81.
See Julie Canlis, Calvin’s Ladder: A Spiritual Theology of Ascent and Ascension (Grand Rapids / Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010); E. David Willis, Calvin’s Catholic Christology: The Function of the So-called Extra Calvinisticum in Calvin’s Theology (Leiden: Brill, 1966); Peter Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 1996); Stephen Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Paul Cumin, Christ at the Crux: The Mediation of God and Creation in Christological Perspective (Eugene: Pickwick, 2014).
For additional references to the twofold mediation see CTS, Hos. 12:4; Gal. 3:19; Institutes 2.13.4. See also Barbara Pitkin, What Pure Eyes Could See: Calvin’s Doctrine of Faith in Its Exegetical Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 151; and Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology, 29–30, citing extracts from Calvin’s letters.
Backus, “Calvin and the Greek Fathers,” 274.
Cyril of Alexandria. Ancient Christian Texts, Commentary John on John, vol. 1, Cyril of Alexandria, trans. with intro. and notes David R. Maxwell, ed. Joel C. Elowsky (Westmont: IVP Academic, 2013); see especially pages 4, 33, 35–39 on participation.
Pitkin, “Spiritual Gospel,” 194.
Pitkin, “Spiritual Gospel,” 194.
For Calvin’s negative appraisal see Partee, Theology of John Calvin, 92: “He concludes that the light shining in the darkness is not meant as praise of fallen nature but to indicate its ineffectuality.” For a far more positive evaluation of the Logos role in religions see Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology, 51, who comments on the Johannine prologue: “It is this universal and continuous involvement of God in human history that allows for a positive approach to the religions of the world.”
CTS, Gen. 2:9. See also Vorster, “Calvin on the Created Structure,” 165. On Calvin’s rejection of the soul as being of God’s essence see Institutes 1.15.5.
On the pre-fall idea of participation see Calvin, Institutes 2.2.1. See Institutes 2.10.7 on Adam, Abel, Noah, Abraham, and other patriarchs and their participation in God: “For theirs was a real participation in God, which cannot be without the blessing of eternal life.”
On the Stoic logos spermatikos see Maryanne Cline Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man: Four Themes,” Journal of the History of Ideas 35, no. 1 (1974): 10. On Calvin’s wariness of pantheism, see Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 91.
Institutes 1.3.1; 1.5.1; 1.14.1; 1.15.6; CTS, Num. 22:5; Isa. 14:14; Isa. 46:8; Dan. 11:38, 39.
Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,” 3.
Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,”16. See also William J. Bouwsma, A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 25. See Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,” 3 for the connection.
Eire, “John Calvin: Accidental Anthropologist,” 156. See also Preus, “Zwingli, Calvin and the Origin of Religion,” 195 on the same point.
Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,” 4.
See Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,” 11, 16 on potential and Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,” 3 on education.
On the role of training see Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,” 13.
Institutes 1.15.6.
See Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,”13 on the idea of man retaining divinity within himself in Stoic thought.
Donald T. Williams, “John Calvin: Humanist and Reformer: The Influence of Calvin’s Early Humanism on His Work as a Christian Theologian,” Trinity Journal 5 (1976): 73. See also Institutes 1.15.7.
Institutes 1.3.1; 1.4.1; 1.5.1; and CTS, Isa. 14:14. See Iain McGee, “Reconsidering the Sensus Divinitatis in the Light of the Semen Religionis: John Calvin and Non-Christian Religion,” European Journal of Theology 31, no. 2 (2022).
CTS, Acts 17:28.
CTS, Jer. 10:7.
Institutes 1.4.4. See also Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 138.
The standard to which conscience refers is variously termed “the light of reason,” Institutes 1.15.8; “law righteousness,” Institutes 2.2.22; “natural law,” Institutes 2.2.23; and “natural light of righteousness,” CTS, Rom. 2:14.
See Institutes 4.20.16; 2.8.1; 2.2.24; 2.2.13; CTS, Rom. 2:15.
CTS, Matt. 12:8. See also Institutes 2.7.2; 2.7.8, CTS, Ps. 19:8 and Rom. 4:15. For comment see Moon, Byung-Ho Moon, Lex Dei Regula Vivendi et Vivificandi: Calvin’s Christological Understanding of the Law in the Light of his Concept of Christus Mediator Legis (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 2003), 106. and Michael S. Horton, “Calvin and the Law-Gospel Hermeneutic,” Pro Ecclesia 6, no. 1 (1997): 31.
On natural law in the Reformed tradition, Richard Muller comments: “this form of natural theology carries with it only the elenctical or condemnatory function of the Law, not the full usus paedagogicus,” Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 191. Moon, Lex Dei Regula Vivendi et Vivificandi, 255, comments: “We should bear in mind that when Calvin deals with the threefold use of the law, he refers to the whole law (lex tota), which is spiritual and clothed with the grace of God by Christ’s mediation of the law.” See also John I. Hesselink, “Law and Gospel or Gospel and Law? Karl Barth, Martin Luther and John Calvin,” DRTJ 53 (2012): 74.
See Institutes 2.8.7. “For Calvin there is no inconsistency in referring sometimes to the law and other times to Christ as the norm or rule of godly living and as the expression of the will of God,” I. John Hesselink, “Christ, the Law and the Christian in Readings in Calvin’s Theology,” in Readings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald McKim (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 189.
Institutes 2.9.4; 2.10.2. See Also I. John Hesselink, Calvin’s Concept of the Law (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 1992), 52; Partee, Theology of John Calvin, 142.
See Moon, Lex Dei Regula Vivendi et Vivificandi, 221; Partee, Theology of John Calvin, 142.
Hesselink, “Law and Gospel or Gospel and Law?,” 71.
See Institutes 2.8.7 and Moon, Lex Dei Regula Vivendi et Vivificandi, 9.
Institutes 2.7.12. Moon, Lex Dei Regula Vivendi et Vivificandi, comments: “Calvin gives no full definition of the law, though he mentions it in two ways, directly yet epistemologically that the law is the expression of God’s will, and indirectly yet ontologically that Christ is the truth, substance, soul, and end of the law,” 12.
“It ought to be understood that the Evangelist speaks of natural gifts only and does not as yet say anything about the grace of regeneration.” CTS, John 1:5; “Those persons, therefore, reason absurdly and inconclusively, who refer this light, which the Evangelist mentions, to the gospel and the doctrine of salvation.” CTS, John 1:9.
See Irena Backus, “Calvin’s Concept of Natural and Roman Law,” Calvin Theological Journal 38 (2003): 8, 10. See also Peter J. Leithart, “Stoic Elements in Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life. Part I: Original Corruption, Natural Law, and the Order of the Soul,” Westminster Theological Journal 55 (1993): 43; Peter J. Leithart, “That Eminent Pagan: Calvin’s Use of Cicero in Institutes 1.1–5,” Westminster Theological Journal 52 (1990): 9. An additional key commentary on law in Calvin’s thought can be found in CTS, Rom. 2:14.
See John T. McNeill, “Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers,” Journal of Religion 26, no. 3 (1946): 180. On Stoic thought see Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,” 5.
See Horowitz, “The Stoic Synthesis,”16.
See Backus, “Calvin’s Concept,” 13, 25.
See, e.g., J. Peter Pelkonen, “The Teaching of John Calvin on the Nature and Function of the Conscience,” Lutheran Quarterly 21 (1969): 77, 84; John Newton Thomas, “The Place of Natural Theology in the Thought of John Calvin,” Journal of Religious Thought 15 (1958): 127; Cornelis van der Kooi, As in a Mirror: John Calvin and Karl Barth on Knowing God: A Diptych (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 40; Constance Y. Lee, “The Spark That Still Shines: John Calvin on Conscience and Natural Law,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 8 (2019): 616.
On the functioning conscience in Calvin see Institutes 1.3.3; 2.8.1; 1.15.2; 2.2.22; CTS, Gen. 4:7; Gen. 4:9; Rom. 3:21; Isa. 57:20.
CTS, Mic. 7:18. See also Acts 17:25 and Ps. 32:1.
See, for example, CTS, Dan. 2:11; Jer. 10:7; Jon. 1:5; Isa. 10:11; Isa. 45:18.
CTS, Hos. 2:8–9.
Institutes 1.12.3.
Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” 149.
Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” 150.
Preus, “Zwingli, Calvin and the Origin of Religion,” 197.
Nuovo, Calvin’s Theology, 61.
Capetz, ‘A Seed of Religion,’ 140.
Concerning sin, note the comment of Barbara Pitkin: “Calvin’s anthropology differed from Erasmus’s in his deeper sense of the noetic and volitional effects of human sinfulness,” Barbara Pitkin, “Erasmus, Calvin, and the Faces of Stoicism in Renaissance and Reformation Thought,” in Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, ed. John Sellars (London: Routledge, 2016), 152. See also CTS, John 4:36.
Eire, “John Calvin, Accidental Anthropologist,” 157.
It is not difficult to understand why Calvin showed such little interest in developing this particular thought, given his ‘spiritual’ definition of religion (see earlier) and his larger goals. As Partee noted: “Calvin does not discuss the philosophers in terms of the two-nature Christological doctrine,” Calvin and Classical Philosophy, 46. Calvin did, however, speak of some benefits to society from Plato (see CTS, Ps. 109:4). Institutes 2.2.18 refers to philosopher awareness of God’s law and some kind of limited adherence to it.
See Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, 51.
