1 Introduction

Medieval Muslim literature on ethics and politics emphasizes and recognizes the significance of the notion of reverence, hayba. We can encounter this concept in Sufi contexts where fear of God, reverence of the saint or the awe of the esoteric moment are all described as instances of hayba.¹ Furthermore, haybat al-sulṭān (the awe of the state or the ruler) appears in some works of political ethics and history to describe the prestige of the state or its agents who were associated with awe-inspiring power such as rulers, commanders and enunuchs.² Yet, there is a third aspect of hayba, that of the awe of the religious scholar, which was a crucial component of the Sunni cleric’s professed religious authority. This idea has been frequently re-appropriated in contemporary Salafi and Islamist discourses. The latter assert that because of their awe, clerics are entitled to high popular esteem and political influence. It is also interesting to note the connection between the authority of the religious scholar and that of the political leader established in this literature, whereby if one falters, the other does too. Additionally, haybat al-Ê¿ulamāʾ should dissuade anyone from criticizing the religious scholars. Last but not least, some discourses caution religious scholars against utilizing social media because it can diminish their awe. However, scholarship in Islamic studies has largely ignored the awe of the religious scholar with regard to the status of the medieval or modern Ê¿ulamāʾ. Few historians have acknowledged the importance of this element although it is emphasized in medieval Muslim literature on politics and ethics.³

This article covers first the notion of haybat al-ʿulamāʾ in Muslim mediaeval resources in order to provide a succinct but essential context for this idea as it developed in contemporary Islamic ethics. Subsequently, I analyse six discourses produced by prominent salafi (Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn, Sayyid Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Ghanī, Saʿd al-Burayk) and Islamist scholars (Muḥammad al-Ṣaghīr, ʿAlī al-Ṣallābī, Hāni Muḥammed Yūsuf al-Sibāʿī) in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya. Lastly, I will discuss how the awe and authority of the religious scholar relate to the framework of salafi and Islamist thought on the status of the religious scholar. I will also approach the way in which the awe of the religious scholar complements or competes with that of the state (haybat al-dawla), examining some aspects of the interactions between political power and religious authority.

2 The Awe of the Sunni Scholars (haybat al- ʿulamāʾ)

Haybat al-ʿulamāʾ, although an important part of the Sunni cleric’s claimed religious awe (or veneration), is not often studied. The idea that symbolic authority is superior to military or political power was highly esteemed by Muslim scholars of the Middle Ages.

First, let us examine what the term “hayba” means in classical Arabic. According to the lexicographer Murtaḍā al-ZabÄ«dÄ« (d. 1790) in his Tāj al-ʿ⁠arÅ«s min Jawāhir al-QāmÅ«s hayba signifies respect (makhāfa), dread (taqiyya), and prestige (ijlāl). In his view, hayba is a fear that originates from a spiritual force that is possessed by someone whose heart has been filled with God, not from a physical force. People actively seek out these revered persons rather than avoiding them. He uses a tradition credited to Ê¿Ubayd b. Ê¿Umayr to illustrate this point: belief inspires awe (al-Ä«mān hayÅ«b). This tradition is based on the idea that believers are feared by non-believers because they fear God.¹⁰ And so, ordinary people view religiously committed individuals as possessing a divine spirit.

I suggest now to look closer at the hayba of a specific scholar in classical Sunni ethics. Hagiographers of Mālik b. Anas (d. 795), the Muslim jurist and founder of the MālikÄ« school of law, maintain that a crucial component of his legitimacy is his mahāba, or the respect he inspires in others. For instance, Ziyād b. YÅ«nus, an Egyptian student of Mālik, claims that he never saw a scholar, a worshipper, an ascetic, or a governor who inspires more reverence (ahyab) than Mālik. SaÊ¿Ä«d b. AbÄ« Maryam, an Egyptian traditionalist (d. 839) claimed that Mālik had greater reverence than the sultan and that he had never seen someone who inspired more reverence than Mālik. Al-ShāfiÊ¿Ä« (d. 820), himself a student of Mālik and a Muslim jurist who founded the shāfiÊ¿Ä« school of law, acknowledged that when he looked at Mālik, he never felt more reverence for anyone else. Sufyān al-ThawrÄ« (d. 778), a major Iraqi jurist and traditionalist, adds in his testimony that he observed how people revered Mālik b. Anas while Mālik himself revered religious knowledge during his council sessions he organized for public audiences: People sometimes ask questions from Mālik, but they did not press him because they respected him; al-ThawrÄ« believed that because Mālik possessed the authority and morals of reverence, people were afraid of him despite his lack of political power.¹¹

What Mālik’s hagiographers teach us is that religious scholars are revered in a manner similar to that of the ruler or the state, but it is distinct in that it is based on dread of symbolic authority or power rather than fear of physical force. It balances physical power without claiming to be able to match it. These hagiographers also tell us that the religious scholar’s students and followers are the ones who construct first the awe of the scholar before it becomes a public reputation. The authority of education – the prestige of the teacher – is one aspect that is emphasized here, and there is also the authority of a leader – someone who people look to for moral guidance – on the other.

In his Siḥr al-balāgha wa-sirr al-barāʿ⁠a, AbÅ« Manṣūr al-ThaʿālibÄ« (d. 1039) states that the fear of God is the source of a scholar’s awe, and that people fear him even in the absence of powerful rulership or overwhelming force.¹² Al-Thaʿ⁠ālibÄ« wants to emphasize that piety, not power, is the source of the scholar’s awe. People hold religious individuals in high regard because they represent virtue and humility in contrast to those in positions of political and military power, who represent vice and haughtiness. Additionally, Ibn Ḥazm in al-Akhlāq wa-l-siyar asserts that “if knowledge had no other merit than to make the ignorant fear and respect you, and scholars love and honour you, this would be good enough reason to seek after it”.¹³ The argument put forth by Ibn Ḥazm here underscores the distinction between the scholar and the ignorant, so highlighting the symbolic nature of knowledge and its effects on social interactions. It specifically uses the division between the khāṣṣa, or elite, and the ʿ⁠āmma, or commoners, as a boundary that separates social categories in Muslim societies.

The concept of hayba was also used in Islamic political lexicon to denote the authority or prestige of the state in addition to its application in valuing religious authority. That is why the term “haybat al-sulṭān” (also known as “haybat al-dawla”) has been used in reference to the second Rashidun caliph Ê¿Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (reigned between 634 and 644), whose “hayba” Tayeb El-Hibri characterized as a presence possessing an awe-inspiring quality.¹⁴ The Umayyad caliphate’s founder, Muʿāwiya I (reigned between 661 and 680), likewise used the need for people to be in awe of the grandeur of Islamic rule [fa-lā budda lahum min haybat al-sulṭān] to justify his displays of visible authority.¹⁵ Although it eventually points to the state’s coercive power, the state’s prestige is more about outward displays of fear-inspiring visibility than it is about actual physical force. The state’s awe is a fear that envelops kingly power;¹⁶ a rival power that exhibits prestige could make the primary authority contested.¹⁷ Even if the monarch is Mamluk, the act of speaking to him in his court has a terrifying and awe-inspiring presence (hayba muhwila).¹⁸

3 The Awe of the Sunni Scholars in Salafi Discourses

In his Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, the prominent Saudi salafī scholar Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn (1929–2001) discards the criticism of religious scholars as being only knowledgeable about Islamic law and lacking in knowledge about reality. He claims that

disparaging the stature of scholars who are well-established in their legal knowledge and who are renowned for their faith and solid understanding of religious disciplines is a misdeed, not only because it is directed against these scholars personally but also because it is an offense against the law of God Almighty.¹⁹

He adds that “the awe of scholars will decline if their social standing and worth decline, which will lead to less people who are keen to learn from them which causes the repeal of sharia, in the whole or in part; this is a serious offense both to Muslims and to Islam”.²⁰ Al-Ê¿UthaymÄ«n, thus, believed that the religious scholars’ authority originated from the divine law’s authority, which they upheld, disseminated, and instructed. On the other hand, the reverence of religious scholars determines the legitimacy of religious law; the religious scholars are the keepers of tradition, following a typical argument put forward by traditionalists in any debate on authority. Religious scholars have a holy worth because of the revealed and heavenly knowledge they claim to preserve. Besides, al-Ê¿UthaymÄ«n argues that since religious scholars represent Islam and the Muslim community who value sharia, any challenge to their authority is an assault on Muslims and Islam as a whole. However, he also wishes to support a hierarchy of authority to offer religious scholars a higher status than that of other figures of authority who deal with practical matters.

As is typical of the salafi traditionalist position, al-Ê¿UthaymÄ«n does not view the authority of the religious scholar as opposed to the political authority of the state. For this reason, he issues a warning against utilizing the mistakes of the ruler to incite people and turn them against those in positions of political authority, contending that this kind of thinking is cause of major harm and one of the primary reasons for social unrest, conflict, mayhem, and evil.²¹ Conversely, he likens instigating people to rebel against rulers to denigrating the status of religious scholars and the sharia they defend, so much so that that if someone tries to undermine the awe that religious scholars have and the state’s prestige, then sharia and security are lost. Disrespect for the ruling class and religious authorities breeds disbelief in the opinions of the religious experts and leads to rebellion against the state, which nurtures corruption and wickedness.²² It is crucial to think about how the salaf (early pious figures of Sunni Islam) treated people in power, he maintains, and how one should practice self-control, be conscious of the consequences, and realize that anyone who rebels against the ruling class is supporting the enemies of Islam.²³ For him, wisdom, not revolution or emotion, is the source of virtue. By wisdom, he does not mean to ignore an error; rather, he means to address it and make the necessary corrections, not alter the circumstances since the one speaking to make corrections, not changes, is the actual advisor.²⁴

Al-ʿUthaymīn is concerned that the discourse of religious scholars and the value of Islamic law would be compromised if the religious scholars were openly denigrated. This is particularly the case when errors made by religious scholars are exploited to incite defamatory campaigns against them. In a similar vein, the rulers’ political authority is weakened when they are devalued due to these errors. In this way, for al-ʿUthaymīn, public image is essential to the maintenance of authority. Additionally, al-ʿUthaymīn, similarly to other figures of traditionalist salafism, upholds an alliance of the state and religion. As a conservative discourse, salafism is worried about public criticism because it adheres to the idea of closing the gate (sadd al-dharā’iʿ), which holds that everything will fall apart if we permit public criticism of the rulers and scholars.

The mockery of religious scholars in public, particularly in popular culture and media shows, bothers the Egyptian Salafi scholar Sayyid SaÊ¿Ä«d Ê¿Abd al-GhanÄ« as well. In his ḤaqÄ«qat al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, he argues that public ridicule of Ê¿ulamāʾ undermines Islamic awakening by trivializing religion and authentic Islamic thought.²⁵ A component of this plot involves, according to him, making fun of religious people’s appearances and letting the public laugh at them.²⁶ As he puts it, this approach actually undermines the awe of religious scholars in the eyes of ordinary people as well as their respect for practicing Muslims in general.²⁷ If the widespread perception of religious scholars fostered by popular culture is one of contempt, then people will treat religious scholars with disrespect, refrain from looking up to them as role models, and reject them altogether.²⁸

Although mocking religious scholars is not a modern invention in Islamic cultures (rather, it is an undeniable feature of Medieval Arabic literature), Sayyid SaÊ¿Ä«d Ê¿Abd al-GhanÄ« opposes the negative branding of religious scholars in popular culture because it would diminish the prestige religious scholars claim to have. The prevalence of comedic television and film productions, particularly in Egypt, on religious scholars worries Salafi thinkers about how the public may react to them. It is also important to remember that the Muslim world has generated a large number of television shows and motion pictures that honor different Islamic scholars throughout history.²⁹

The discourse of Saudi scholar Saʿd al-Burayk will serve as a third illustration of a Salafi perspective on the awe of religious scholars. Al-Burayk compares the status of religious scholars in Saudi Arabia and Egypt as follows:

Secularists in Saudi Arabia wanted to follow the same path as in Egypt, and to weaken the prestige of religious scholars and their authority in order to make the religious scholar becomes a mockery in the eyes of the people, and until the seeker of knowledge becomes one of the mercenaries for whom a few dinars and pounds and the like are sufficient, but in the Saudi society they failed. The seeker of knowledge is dear, you will find him working in the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice day and night, and does not want more, and does not ask for compensation for the extra-time they work or the additional tasks they perform or the support they provide. People serve this religion with their eyes, serve this society with their souls. So if the situation of Egyptian society is in a time when the image of religious knowledge and religious scholars is shaken, we, in Saudi Arabia, are now – and praise be to God – witnessing a rally around the religious scholars, and a unity between the scholars and rulers, the likes of which history has never witnessed, thanks to God Almighty. If such is our situation, we should know that this is a source of strength, pride, trust and reassurance.³⁰

Al-Burayk expands here on al-ʿUthaymīn’s remarks previously discussed, adding three points. Firstly, secularists tried to marginalize Islamism by discrediting religious authorities and scholars. While they were successful in Egypt, it didn’t appear like this worked well in Saudi Arabia. Secondly, a religious scholar ought not to pursue a career that depends on pay or employment for profit. This turns him into a hired gun and lessens his sense of duty. Thirdly, al-Burayk highlights the role that a religious scholar ought to play in providing care and service; a true religious scholar is one who serves both his community and religion. As far as al-Burayk is concerned, the foundation of a religious scholar’s authority is limiting financial dependence and providing service. As a result, in his optimistic view, Saudi society continues to uphold the awe of a religious scholar and ensure his status.

4 The Awe of the Sunni Scholars in Islamist Discourses

In an interview with the program “Sharia and Life” on Aljazeera, Dr. Muḥammad al-á¹¢aghÄ«r, an Azhari-Islamist key scholar and the Secretary of the International Committee for Supporting the Prophet of Islam, answered questions about the preservation of the religious scholars’ awe (Kayfa naḥfaẓ haybat al-Ê¿ulamāʾ?).³¹ He particularly highlighted the need to maintain their reputation, and prepare them to speak truthfully for the sake of God. Al-á¹¢aghÄ«r discussed the Prophet Muḥammad’s role in preparing and rearing scholars. He asserted that the Prophet Muḥammad used to identify the Companions’ skills and nurture them from the start, and that he directed his education and wisdom toward all societal groups, including women, by setting aside a day on which he preached to them. Then, he went on to say that Islam’s early scholars were methodically schooled rather than making things up as they went along, and that the companions shared interest in grounding themselves in knowledge.³²

Al-á¹¢aghÄ«r also addressed the phenomena of scholars who collide with the rulers, or the so-called the sultan’s scholars. He stated that the sultan’s scholars are universal phenomena that exist in all nations as those who falsified the revealed books were scholars and not rulers. In the Muslim world, the sultan’s scholars appeared with the rise of reprehensible partisanship and fanaticism of opinion. Al-á¹¢aghÄ«r emphasized that true religious scholars should utilize social media as a weapon to preach Islam and confront hypocritical religious scholars who obtain quick support (from rulers) while true religious scholars are facing restrictions. Al-á¹¢aghÄ«r made the observation that there is a group of people that entered the field of religious knowledge in an effort to rise in status and prominence. They use hypocritical behavior to keep themselves in the forefront, but this group has since fallen and relapsed.³³

Finally, al-á¹¢aghÄ«r differentiates between true and false religious scholars explaining that the scholars who oppose unjust rulers and find themselves in prisons or detention centers are those who are firmly rooted in knowledge; these are scholars who speak the truth in front of an unjust ruler and stand against the heretical and misguided groups. For al-á¹¢aghÄ«r, the religious scholars who are trained and prepared to be the voice that expresses the interests of the unjust ruler are the deviants (khawārij) from the true scholars, even though there are no specific trustworthy government programs that seek to train religious scholars.³⁴

To comprehend the fundamental premise of this specific discourse – that is, that the awe of the religious scholars should challenge the authority of the state – we must contextualize it. In general, Aljazeera supports a narrative that defies institutional Islam throughout the Arab world, especially in Egypt. Aljazeera has also launched a campaign to undermine the Arab regimes that oppose Islamist movements, during the past few decades, and particularly in the so-called Arab Spring.³⁵ Religious scholars who back the governments in Gulf countries and Egypt are particularly targeted as “scholars of the sultans”.

Conversely, the idea of haybat al-dawla, or the prestige of the state, has been heavily mobilized in Egypt and Tunisia to reinstate authoritarian power following the short-lived reign by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates in these two countries.³⁶ This is another contextual factor to be considered here. As a result, Aljazeera and al-á¹¢aghÄ«r see haybat al-Ê¿ulamāʾ as a priority, seeking to elevate religious scholars’ stature as a force that challenges official power. This discourse assumes that the state and the awe of the religious scholars are at odds. It is also implied that the religious scholar’s genuine religious authority depends on his independence from the state.

In the same context, Libyan religious scholar and Islamist activist ʿAlī al-Ṣallābī gained notoriety following the so-called Arab Spring (partly thanks to Aljazeera and Qatar). In his book, al-Khawārij: Nash’atuhum wa-ṣifātuhum, ʿaqā’iduhum wa-afkāruhum, he denounces targeting activist religious scholars. He describes a peculiar campaign and phenomena that assaults the reputation of activist religious scholars, stabbing them with the daggers of deviation and misguidance. As he puts it:

Numerous instances of these campaigns – which have caused the most harm to the Islamic community by splintering the society, dividing its members, and intensifying the already-deepening discord – have been documented in newspapers, books, essays, seminars, and classrooms. There are undoubtedly reasons why some criticize scholars, such as pursuing one’s desires, misinterpreting some of the statements made by religious scholars, learning religious knowledge without a teacher, and envy. Some young people have turned to a poor behaviour that involves pointing the flaws and errors of religious scholars, capitalizing on their statements, and twisting their words to mean something different. This was done to defend their ruthless campaign of discrediting both ancient and contemporary scholars who differed from them and disapproved of their less-than-moderate methods. Whether they realize it or not, those who disparage activist religious scholars are furthering Zionist, despotic, and intelligence agendas. Those who persist in defaming religious scholars in this way have turned their backs on the Sunni community’s methodology. Tell those who belittle the community’s activist scholars that God has a known tendency of assaulting those who detract religious scholars, and that the meat of scholars is poisoned. It is unacceptable to waste the authority and standing of the religious scholar in the eyes of Muslims. In the event of attacks on the scholars, who will stand up for the Islamic community? Will young men who are incompetent in classical Arabic and lack expertise in many Islamic studies, and who are only good at reciting the Quran, serve as references?³⁷

Al-Ṣallābī’s argument is aimed at young Salafis, who typically organize campaigns of defamation against religious scholars who either adopt the agendas of Islamists (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood) or engage in close contacts with them. As a result, the focus of this attempt to support religious scholars is on those who are militant (al-Ṣallābī himself is an Islamist-religious scholar). But this reverence should also be protected from the denigration by youth because, ultimately, undermining religious scholars serve the interests of Israel, the Arab authoritarian regimes, and the secret agencies of powerful nations (the US in particular). Thus, al-Ṣallābī argues for the maintenance of the status of religious scholars in the name of Sunni unity, the upholding of sharia, and the assertion that religious scholars are the umma’s guardians.

Hāni Muḥammed YÅ«suf al-Sibāʿī’s (born in 1961), an Egyptian Islamic scholar and member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, discourse on the awe of the religious scholar is a last example of an Islamist stance. In his al-á¹¢irāʿ bayna al-mu’assasāt al-dÄ«niyya wa-l-anẓima al-ḥākima, he charges Egyptian governmental power with erasing the populace’s reverence for religious scholars. In this regard, political power replaced the traditional shaykhs who serve as moral guides and fatwa references with PhD holders, some of whom studied in the West. These new Azhari scholars then justified the laws and decisions taken by Egyptian governments as Islamic law, defending the rulings of these non-Islamic regimes. Furthermore, the Egyptian government obtained the authority to choose the Shaykh al-Azhar since Nasser, thus subordinating this institution to political power and diminishing its social significance. The Shaykh al-Azhar is merely an employee of the state; he obeys directives from the government and enjoys no administrative or financial freedom. Thus, the religious scholars’ awe in the face of political authority as well as the general public was lessened by the modernization of the status of the religious scholar at al-Azhar and the bureaucratization of this religious institution.³⁸

Al-Sibāʿī’s argument that the awe of the religious scholar ought to be a counter-authority of political power is typical of the Islamist argument. In addition to having financial and managerial autonomy, the religious scholars should uphold their reputation with the general public, act as an example of morality to others, and support scholarly autonomy. He also criticizes the Egyptian religious scholars’ involvement in supporting the Khedivate of Egypt, the French colonial rule, and later Nasser and al-Sadat’s power (albeit he commends the revolutionary religious scholars in Egypt dating back to the 18th century). Al-Sibāʿī identifies states as having a major role in defining religious discourse and reveals how in Egypt, for the most part, religious authorities have supported state objectives during the past 200 years.

5 Discussion: The Sunni Scholar between Power, Charisma and the Public

Let us now review the Salafi discourse on the religious scholars’ awe in brief. The cooperative link traditionalist Salafi authors perceive between the state’s and religious scholars’ awe is a significant aspect of this discourse. They view an essential partnership between the prestige of the religious scholar and the state, which upholds law and order, in addition to not condoning confrontation between religious authority and political power. When there is a bad perception of a religious scholar, secularists, agitators, the media, popular culture, etc. are to blame. According to Salafi authors, these opposing operatives are not backed by the government, but they make a conscious effort to undermine the religious scholar’s authority. Furthermore, the Salafi discourse expresses concern that demeaning the stature of religious scholars will lead to laypeople giving up on sharia and Muslim tradition – that is, the sources of religious authority. Salafi discourse is especially concerned that the public admiration of religious scholars should be shielded from mockery and criticism lest they inspire skepticism and disobedience to Islamic law among the general populace. In their claimed capacity as defenders of the Muslim faith, religious scholars’ public perception is on par with that of Islam. This is not simply a traditional aspect of Salafi thought, but it also goes against humor, discourse ethics, and modern critical thinking culture; it is dangerous to criticize them because of the connection they make between religion itself and the religious scholars.

Regarding the Islamist discourse on the reverence for the religious scholar, it is structured around two dichotomies: religious authority versus political power and activist religious authority versus traditionalist religious authority. According to the first dichotomy, religious scholars’ reverence should be upheld against the political power that consistently poses a threat to it. The status of the state and religious scholars are in competition with one another. Religious scholars should have independence from the government when it comes to their beliefs, resources, and management. When faced with oppression and the absence of Islamic law, a religious scholar ought to rebel against the government if necessary. The opposition between activist and traditionalist religious authority is a further duality that structures Islamist thought around the reverence for religious scholars. Islamists view the role of religious authority as political action, which includes speaking out against repressive governments, engaging in public affairs, and serving as the representative of the people. However, the traditionalist religious authority of Salafis and institutional Islam – that is, the religious scholars employed by state-controlled religious universities or ministries of religious affairs – refuses to take on this role and disparages Islamist religious scholars on the grounds that they are ignorant, err, and rebel. Islamist religious scholars delegitimize their opponents for not bowing to this perspective on authority, viewing political action as a crucial form of legitimacy.

That being said, the Salafi understanding of the awe of the scholar complements political power rather than opposes it. They regard each of them as independent and complimentary, therefore maintaining law and order requires respecting political power. This view holds that any kind of government that upholds law and order should be feared and revered, and not only the Islamic state or the ideal state (a caliphate). Contrarily, Islamism views no state as legitimate if it does not recognize the authority of religious scholars and Islamic law. As a result, in contemporary times, when the majority of states do not adhere to Islamist policies, the respect accorded to religious scholars competes with and seeks to subvert political power.

Because of the ease of communication and access to media, Salafi and Islamist religious scholars undoubtedly enjoy more appeal among the general public. A prominent religious scholar is always in the public eye, followed, criticized or revered. However, Salafism promotes discretion and denounces the media for trivializing the reverence for religious scholars. For traditionalist salafism, the general population ought to take a backseat, pay attention to the religious scholar, and honor his reputation. Conversely, Islamists see the public as having an active voice when they emphasize their desire for religious leaders to guide them in the face of repressive governments. The general population is perceived as another victim of the false religious experts employed by autocratic governments.

At this point, we could draw the conclusion that the Islamic scholar’s awe is viewed by conservative Salafis as a matter of status. That is, respect was due to the religious scholar because of his authority as a transmission source. He was inspired with this awe because there is a hierarchy of respect, with God and his law at the top, which religious experts are charged with upholding and disseminating to the wider public. The state of affairs remains mostly unchanged. People should appreciate the charisma and the prestige of a man who has gained peer recognition as a religious scholar. However, Islamist religious scholars emphasize function as they defend the legitimacy of action. For them, practicing the tradition and opposing corruption is more important than merely demonstrating one’s understanding of it. Specifically, a religious scholar is just as dangerous as the unjust ruler himself if he utilizes his knowledge to justify injustice. Participating in the political, regional, and international concerns that Muslims find vital is a prerequisite for action’s legitimacy. Additionally, the legitimacy of action ought to shield religious scholars from criticism; a religious scholar needs to be free, active, and capable of spearheading the community when necessary.

6 Conclusion

All things considered, the ultimate purpose of Islamic discourses on the awe of religious scholars appears to be protective and preventive. For Salafis, it upholds the legitimacy of religious organizations in the community and the continuation of tradition. The awe ought to serve as a deterrent to breaking religious precepts. In the same way, the religious scholars who adhere to traditionalism enjoy the status of protectors of tradition and an elite role that they perceive as enhancing rather than undermining the prestige of the state. In a different sense, Islamists see the reverence for religious scholars as protective and preventive since it keeps the state from acting in an oppressive manner. Using the arguments of discourse and vox populi, religious authority should primarily serve as a counter-authority, balancing the power of the state. In this instance, the religious scholar’s role as the oppressed people’s voice against tyranny is crucial.