Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʿizz Biṭāwī, Falsafat al-Akhlāq fī l-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya: Dirāsa fī ʿIlm Qawāʿid al-Fiqh (“Moral Philosophy in the Islamic Law: A Study of the Legal Maxims”), Herndon: IIIT, 2018, 232 pp.

Does the Islamic tradition have an authentic (comprehensive) ethical theory? If so, what does it look like? These are two lines of inquiry that gradually gained academic relevance in Western and Muslim scholarly circles from the mid-twentieth century onward. Over the years, a variety of methodological approaches have been put forth, ranging from those that are more exclusive in nature, focusing on the study of the issues under scrutiny from the point of view of a single discipline,¹ to those that are more inclusive, advocating for interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches.² Muḥammad ibn Ê¿Abd al-MuÊ¿izz Biṭāwī’s work is firmly aligned with the former perspective. In five chapters, BiṭāwÄ« endeavours to trace the origins of Islamic ethical theory to the early period of Islamic juristic thinking and legal schools. According to BiṭāwÄ«, Muslim jurists have traditionally sought to apply a guiding framework in their legal judgments. When this framework is fleshed out, it can be seen to correspond to a complete ethical theory. This theory bears resemblance to some of the most well-known moral theories in Western philosophical history, such as deontology and utilitarianism. This guiding framework, meticulously devised by jurists through assiduous examination of the purposes underlying legal injunctions in scriptural texts and the jurisprudential corpus, came to be known, during the fourth/tenth century, as the science of legal maxims (Ê¿ilm qawāʿid al-fiqh). A study of the science of legal maxims, in Biṭāwī’s view, illuminates the Islamic ethical theory that has guided Muslim scholars throughout history.

Biṭāwī’s thought-provoking and well-articulated work also offers a response to the Orientalist critique, which some Muslim academics have sometimes expressed. This critique suggests that Muslims haven’t developed an authentic ethical theory, let alone a comprehensive one, except in a few rare instances where ancient Greek ethical ideas were clearly dominant.³ For these critics, no authentic Islamic moral theory ever existed. The book challenges this viewpoint by suggesting that a comprehensive definition of ethics allows the reader to recognise the science of legal maxims as a complete ethical theory. It could be proposed that the most appropriate way of defining and conceiving ethics is as a science that sets out the rules and regulations based on which the goodness and badness of human actions can be derived. This would seem to correspond to the legal maxims and an ethical framework. It can be seen that, as a stand-alone science, legal maxims are demonstrated in the book as universal principles that the objectives of jurisprudential matters in Islam must conform to. In other words, it could be said that legal maxims set the normative parameters within which human actions in Islam are judged as good or bad.

The book suggests that there may be an intricate relationship between legal maxims and the purposes (objectives) of Sharīʿa (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa). The maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, which could be identified through an inductive reading (istiqrāʾ maʿnawī) of the intended objectives behind legal injunctions in the revealed texts and juristic opinions, make the formulation of legal maxims possible. These legal maxims, in turn, help the jurist define the objectives that should always be preserved by the Sharīʿa. This enables jurists to be aware of what Islamic legal judgments must always conform to. It could therefore be argued that the objectives of Sharīʿa and legal maxims are interdependent.

This work examines the five legal maxims that primarily guide the preservation of fundamental aspects of human life, religion, intellect, progeny, and property under Sharīʿa. The five principal maxims in question are (1) matters are determined according to intention (al-umūr bi-maqāṣidihā), (2) harm shall be removed (al-ḍarar yuzāl), (3) hardship induces ease (al-mashaqqa tajlib al-taysīr), (4) what is certain cannot be removed by doubt (al-yaqīn lā yazūl bi-shakk), and (5) custom is authoritative (al-ʿāda muḥakkama).

The structural composition of the book reflects what Biṭāwī considered the three most fundamental pillars of Islamic ethics, namely, the intent of the religiously responsible person (qaṣd al-mukallaf), the intent of the Lawgiver God (qaṣd al-shāriʿ), and compliance with what is morally binding (imtithāl lil-amr al-khuluqī). The book offers a thoughtful and articulate examination of two significant challenges that any ethical theorist might seek to address: one is the conditions that any ethical framework must meet to be considered worthy of the name, the other is the aspect of demarcating one theory from rival ethical theories. In order to address these puzzles, the book puts forward the idea that the three aforementioned fundamental pillars are the necessary conditions of Islamic ethics. It then goes on to highlight three essential elements that distinguish Islamic ethics from other moral theories. These elements include the centrality of God, the objectivity of the well-being intended by Islamic ethics, and the consideration of human conditions and circumstances in upholding ethical dictates. These elements can be seen as direct outcomes of the three pillars.

The first pillar, which pertains to the intent of the mukallaf (i.e., the religiously responsible person), is discussed in the first chapter of the book entitled “al-Umūr bi-Maqāṣidihā” (“Matters are Determined according to Intention”). In this chapter, the author introduces the reader to the intentionality of ethical actions and their prerogatives. In Biṭāwī’s view, an ethical action must be intentional, that is to say, it must be the intention of the one performing it to act for its moral worth. Non-intentional, random, and actions performed merely because it is customary to perform them fall outside the purview of ethical actions. This immediately brings Biṭāwī’s conception of ethical action closer to that of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (d. 1804). Kant believed that an action is moral when it is performed exclusively according to the moral imperative. However, Biṭāwī, unlike Kant, considers two aspects essential to intention: the first is the intention of the person performing the action to act morally, and the second is the intention to act in accordance with the objective of the Lawgiver God, which is to ensure the well-being (maṣlaḥa) of the human race. In other words, intention in Islamic ethics must have two components: an inward one (willingness to abide by moral dictates) and an outward one (actualising human well-being in the real world). Hence, Biṭāwī’s conception of ethics differs from philosophies that view ethics as the dictates of societal customs, as these philosophies neglect intention as an ethical component. They also differ from any conception that reduces ethics to the application of moral dictates regardless of its worldly consequences. Biṭāwī asserts that it is the consequences that determine the ethical worth of actions.

The second pillar, corresponding to the Lawgiver God’s intent (qaṣd al-shāriʿ), establishes the underlying drive behind God’s legislation to be the preservation of the human race’s well-being. In simple terms, this means the preservation of life, religion, intellect, progeny, and property. Therefore, the ethical philosophy guiding juristic matters must gravitate towards the preservation of human well-being. The overwhelming evidence from the inductive process has shown that this is the intent of God. Consequently, chapters 2 to 5 explain how one must understand the well-being of the human race, the different rules that enable its achievement, and how to maintain it.

Based on the connection established above between God’s intent and human intention, Biṭāwī postulates that human action cannot be considered ethical within the Islamic paradigm unless it intends to align with the principles of morality. This alignment could be seen as a way of preserving the five maqāṣid and promoting their flourishing. God and the five maqāṣid are an essential part of Islamic ethics. On this note, the book critiques Western ethical thoughts’ failure to consider the divine (i.e., God) in their conception of ethics, given their appeal to the sufficiency of the human intellect (or intuition). Biṭāwī maintained that if adherence to the truth is a moral obligation, then believing in God and abiding by His legislation becomes a moral obligation too, given that the intellect has indicated the existence of God and His legislation. It is the author’s understanding, therefore, that the conceptions of ethics in Western philosophy lack an essential component – namely, their connection to the divine. However, Biṭāwī’s critique of Western philosophical thought, based on his assertion of a connection between God and ethics, raises questions about how Western moral philosophers could have established ethics otherwise. In the book, he acknowledges that these philosophers either believed in a God with almost no attributes (meaning God cannot command or prohibit) or did not believe in the possibility of knowing for certain His existence. It is impossible to construct ethical theories in such paradigms without referring to the intellect or human intuition.

The book makes it clear that the maqāṣid are central to Islamic ethics, suggesting that it offers a more objective approach than the concept of utility as conceived by Jeremy Bentham (d. 1832). Biṭāwī offers a thoughtful critique of this approach, suggesting that it is relativistic in nature. It could be argued that the objectivity of the five maqāṣid stems from the necessity to preserve them in order to ensure the human race’s perpetual survival. If humans cannot live without them, the maqāṣid always become, in themselves, a necessity for humankind at all times and in all places. Biṭāwī therefore puts forward the argument that the conception of the five maqāṣid in Islamic ethics is distinct from Bentham’s notion of utility, which is individualistic and relative to people, their time, and places. The author suggests that the preservation of these five maqāṣid (and their flourishing) can be achieved in two ways: by establishing rules that will help their promotion and by enacting laws that protect them from destruction. Legal maxims, such as (2) harm shall be removed, (3) hardship induces ease, (4) what is certain cannot be removed by doubt, and (5) custom is authoritative, help promote the five maqāṣid and alleviate human hardship. In addition to that, corporeal punishments (ḥudūd) are an effective deterrent against destroying them. Even though the ḥudūd punishments can sometimes imply inflicting pain or terminating human lives, as it is in some cases of retaliation (qiṣāṣ), they remain an essential tool in the pursuit of justice. Furthermore, the existence of legal maxims, such as (3) hardship induces ease and (5) custom is authoritative, demonstrates that, although Islamic ethics is egalitarian in the application of moral obligations, it also pays attention to peoples’ conditions and circumstances by accommodating their customs and easing their burden in the face of hardship. Biṭāwī therefore argues that, although Islamic ethics subscribes to the moral imperative theory, it takes into account the effect moral norms can have on people and adjusts itself accordingly.

Before I conclude, I must point out that BiṭāwÄ« portrays Bentham’s utilitarian moral philosophy as exceptionally individualistic. In my view, this portrayal is unduly extreme and does not accurately reflect Bentham’s philosophy. Bentham’s utilitarianism is based on the premise of maximising individual utility. Personal utility is only considered morally good if it approximates the maximum utility for other people involved in the action. Bentham’s view is clear: the overall utility of actions to all the people involved is an essential factor. Furthermore, the book fails to reflect some of the most contemporary conceptions of utilitarian philosophy. These conceptions insist on the existence of objective goods and the necessity to always preserve them.⁴ This is a significant omission, given that the book was published in 2018.

The third pillar, compliance with what is morally binding (al-imtithāl lil-amr al-khuluqī), is the match between a person’s intention and God’s intent (which is to ensure the well-being of humankind). In Islamic ethics, compliance is a fundamental aspect of ethical behaviour. It demonstrates human will and righteousness. The choice to comply or not with God’s intent affirms the existence of free will, which is an essential element of any ethical theory. A person can choose to act in a certain way for the wrong reasons, such as to impress people, or simply because they feel like it. This is not the same as acting morally. Compliance with what is morally binding allows us to differentiate between an egotistical action and a righteous one.

Throughout this book, Biṭāwī makes it clear that legal maxims and ethics are inextricably linked. In just two hundred pages, the reader is given a comprehensive account of the history of legal maxims, their significance to Islamic jurisprudence, and how they shape a sound ethical understanding in Islam. The book’s straightforward language makes it easy for the readers to grasp the various philosophical concepts. This book reassures the reader of the authenticity of Islamic ethics and its rootedness in revealed texts (Qurʾān and Sunna) and juristic opinions. The book is accessible to all, but to understand it fully, you need to have a grasp of several other ethical theories. It compares Islamic ethics derived from legal maxims with other moral theories, including deontology, utilitarianism, and Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī ethical theories. Furthermore, the book provides a comprehensive bibliography in the footnotes, offering a wealth of resources for further reading. This book is an indispensable reference for researchers seeking to grasp the interconnection between Islamic jurisprudence and ethics.