1 Introduction

The objective of this paper is to propose a study of the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ’s (fl. third-fourth/ninth-tenth centuries) eco-cosmological thinking, which is based on the concept of “universe as a great human being.” The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ developed this concept as part of their holistic view of the universe as an expression of ecological wisdom.¹ Ecological wisdom is defined as ecological consciousness that espouses the belief that the universe is alive, spiritual, and deserving of reverence. The ontological foundation of this view is rooted in their recognition of a hierarchical structure of existence, originating from God Almighty as the source of all entities, followed by spiritual-metaphysical entities, and concluding with physical entities. Accordingly, the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ’s perspective encompasses not only a physical and material understanding of the universe, but also a metaphysical and spiritual dimension.

This study of Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s eco-cosmology is significant in that it restores a picture of the universe as a whole, which is perceived as having intrinsic value. This perception of the universe is one in which it is seen as a living entity, possessing a soul and intellect. This represents a constructive effort to challenge the prevailing perspective of the modern world, which views the universe as an inanimate entity. Indeed, the universe is often regarded as a vast machine, which gives rise to the perception that human interactions with the universe are arbitrary. This is the root cause of the ongoing ecological crisis.

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, a group of philosophers who lived in Baṣra, Iraq, in the third-fourth/ninth-tenth centuries, played a pivotal role in the development of Islamic scientific thought. Their contributions are exemplified in their masterpiece, Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ (“Epistles of the Brethren of Purity”), which represents a significant effort to systematize philosophical themes within the Islamic scientific tradition. This volume represents an early scientific encyclopedia in the Islamic world, alongside al-Fārābī’s (d. 339/950) Ihṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm (“The Enumeration of the Sciences”) and Abū Ḥātim Muḥammad Ibn Ḥibbān al-Bustī’s (d. 354/965), Kitāb Waṣf al-ʿUlūm (“The Description of the Sciences”). Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ represents the third scientific encyclopedic work to be produced within the Islamic scientific tradition (Zakī 1890, 13–14). Subsequently, a plethora of encyclopedic scientific-philosophical works were written by Muslim scientists and philosophers, including Ibn Sīnā’s (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) Kitāb al-Shifāʾ (“The Book of Healing”). In 52 epistles, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ construct a comprehensive scientific system and framework, grounded in a rigorous epistemological foundation.

In Islamic civilization, the sciences, including philosophy and natural sciences, were developed within the context of an Islamic worldview that had been shaped in earlier periods. The Greek sciences were integrated and naturalized in accordance with the theological principles of Islam (Daiber 2012, 58–59). The most significant of these is the concept of tawḥīd, or the Oneness of God (Bakar 2008, xix, 2–3), as outlined in the sacred text, the Qurʾān (Daiber 2012, 44). As Abdelhamid Ibrahim Sabra (d. 2013) observed, the transmission of ancient science to Islam would be more accurately described as an act of appropriation performed by the Islamic world in the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries (Sabra 1987, 225).

The translation movement of the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries facilitated the introduction of Greek, Persian, Syriac, and Indian sciences to the Arab-Islamic world (Sabra 1987, 230). This led to a shift in the intellectual landscape of the Muslim community, with a growing dominance of religious sciences. The process of applying Islamic principles in science and in cosmological doctrines can be described as the “Islamization” of these fields (Bakar 2008, 239). Moreover, Nasr posits that the objective of Islamization is to generate outputs that are authentically Islamic. This entails a process of adaptation, whereby knowledge derived from non-Islamic and Persian traditions is contextualized within the Islamic tradition, aligning with the Qurʾānic doctrine of divine unity (tawḥīd) (Nasr 1964, 5).

This process of Islamic appropriation is exemplified by the concept of the “Universe as a Great Human Being,” as understood by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ. It was incorporated into the doctrine of tawḥīd. This divine unity can be understood at various levels of the universe and among the various entities found therein; the reality of manifold substances is derived from and originates with the One Reality. The concept of tawḥīd as the unity of God serves as the foundation for the view of the unity of the cosmos or the unity of the universe. It also provides the basis for the concept of the unity of living species on earth and of the unity of the human body (Bakar 2007, 25). This chapter suggests that the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s conceptualization of the universe as a great human being reflects an ecological commitment, and will investigate their views based on the following questions:

1. What is the precise concept of the universe as a great human being, as espoused by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ?

2. How do the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ perceive the existence of derivative entities, such as minerals, plants, and animals?

3. What is the significance of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s concept of plants as nurturing mothers for animals and humans?

4. To what extent does the modern concept of animal rights align with the traditional understanding of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ? Are there equal rights for humans and animals? Are there any constraints on this equality?

2 The Universe as a Great Human Being

The assumption that the universe is a great human being does not originate with the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ themselves. They draw upon the work of earlier philosophers, employing phrases such as “the meaning of the view of philosophers that the universe is a great human being” (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:212). In another instance, they discuss “an explanation of the philosophers’ opinion that the universe is a great human being” (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:24). Such statements exemplify the intellectual honesty of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, who openly acknowledge the contributions of earlier philosophers’ ideas.

A review of classical Greek cosmology reveals that this concept originated with Plato (d. 347 BCE). In order to prove the existence of God, he describes the universe in Timaeus (Plato 2000, 30b) as an all-inclusive living creature (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 1:146), a mega-zoon that is endowed with a soul (psyche) and an intellect. The macrocosm that exhibits life-like characteristics assumes the form of a sphere that encompasses all living entities (El-Bizri 2006, 5). George Periggo Conger (d. 1960) makes a passing reference to the fact that, around 400 CE, a Roman philosopher named Macrobius (d. 430 CE) also made the observation that certain philosophers likened the world to a large man and man to a small world (Conger 1922, 14). Nevertheless, Conger acknowledges that it is exceedingly uncommon for writers and philosophers to examine the universe from a human term and perspective:

It should be noted also that the Brethren [Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ] have something more than a mere mention of the universe as a large man. Most of the writers have estimated man in terms of the universe but have not gone far in describing the universe in terms of man; even where the two have been set in parallel, the direction of emphasis has been chiefly toward man rather than away from him.

Conger 1922, 51

In the Rasāʾil, one can find multiple explanations of this theory in both Epistles 16 and 34. In Epistle 16, the chapter Fī Bayān Maʿrifat Qawl al-Ḥukamāʾ (“Explaining the Knowledge of Sages”) states that the universe is akin to a great human being (al-ʿālam insān kabīr). This perspective aligns with the earlier philosophical view that the universe is a great human being. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ elucidate that the universe is comprised of the seven heavens (orbits), the expanse of the earth, and all entities that inhabit them. These forms are collectively referred to as the “great human” (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:24–25). This perspective is predicated on the assumption that the universe can be conceived as a unified entity. It is postulated to be a unified entity comprising all the orbits, the composition of the heavens, the elements, and the organisms on the earth’s surface. Moreover, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ posit that the universe is not merely a physical entity, but is also endowed with a soul that pervades its entirety. This entity is designated the “universal soul” (al-nafs al-kulliyya).

It is crucial to underscore that the universe is sustained by the conjunction of two principal substances, the absence of which would preclude the existence of the universe. These are the universal physical body, which is material (al-jasad al-jismānī), and the universal soul of the spiritual universe (al-nafs al-rūḥāniyya). The two are inextricably linked. According to the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, if the universal soul were to be uprooted and separated from the universal body, this would signify the advent of a great doomsday (al-qiyāma al-kubrā), which may be understood as the resurrection of the universal soul from the universal body. Should the universal soul be separated from the universal body, the universe would inevitably cease to exist, as the fundamental elements that sustain its existence would be dispersed (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:49–50). The body of the universe is also referred to as the universal body (al-jism al-kullī), which can be defined as the aggregation of the entire universe, comprising a multitude of entities situated at the pinnacle of the outermost orbit and extending to the extremity of the center of the earth.

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ confirm the existence of the entire and complete universal body (jism al-ʿālam bi-asrih) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:213). The soul of the universe is unified with the universal body. This soul is sustained by divine power (al-quwwa al-ilāhiyya), which is designated as the universal intellect (al-ʿaql al-kullī). With the support of divine power, the soul of the universe has forces that act on all the physical objects of the universe. This power is referred to as the universal law of nature (al-ṭabīʿa al-kulliyya). The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ assert that the law that applies to the body of the universe also applies to the body of a human or an animal. The law that applies to the soul of the universe is analogous to the law that applies to the soul of a human being (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:213–214). Furthermore, the existence of the universe predates that of humans and is the fundamental cause of human existence. Similarly, the universe possesses the attributes of spirit, life, and knowledge, which are also inherent to humans. An alternative interpretation is that the universe is a being that is obedient to its Lord (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:88, 3:294; Ibn ʿAbd Allāh 1974, 346).

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ also underscored the notion that the concept of the universe as a vast entity, akin to a great human being, implies a profound interconnectedness between its constituent elements, thus constituting a unified whole. In their statements, they asserted that:

It is evident to the early philosophers that all universal entities are in a state of flux (aʿyān ghayriyyāt). They exist in a hierarchical structure akin to a series of numbers. All entities are interconnected (mutaʿalliqa) and interrelated (murtabiṭa) between one part and another in the eternal (baqāʾ) and continuous (dawām) process originating from the Prime Cause (al-ʿilla al-ūlā), namely God the Almighty Creator. The interconnection of all these universal entities is analogous to the interconnection of numbers (ka-taʿalluq al-aʿdād), and the bond between one part and another part of this universe is analogous to the bond contained in the theory of numbers.

Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 1:404

3 Minerals as Living Entities

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ provide a comprehensive account of the interconnectivity between the diverse entities that comprise the universe, encompassing both the orbital and the sublunar realms. The relationship is structured in an orderly and hierarchical manner, with the initial point of contact aligning with the ultimate conclusion. On the sublunar plane, a hierarchical relationship exists among minerals (maʿādin). A more detailed examination can be found in a dedicated chapter of Epistle 18, entitled Fī Takwīn al-Maʿādin (“On the Formation of Minerals”) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:87–131). The initial or lowest level of the mineral hierarchy is intimately associated with dust (turāb) and water (māʾ), which are two of the four fundamental elements. In contrast, the pinnacle of mineralogy is linked to and intersects with the lowest level of plants (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 4:276). According to the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, the lowest grade of mineral, which is more akin to dust, is gypsum (jiṣṣ), while the mineral most closely resembling water is salt (milḥ). The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ posited that gypsum is a sandy dust that has been subjected to a process of exposure to water (rain) and subsequent processing, resulting in the formation of solid rock. The process of forming salt, on the other hand, involves the mixing of water with sand (al-turba al-sabkha) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:224). It is postulated that the highest level of the mineral kingdom is analogous to the lowest level of the plant kingdom, namely fungi (faṭar) and mosses (kamʾa). This type of organism is formed from dust, as are mineral objects, and then begins to grow in humid environments during the rainy season, similar to the growth patterns observed in plants (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:225). However, it should be noted that this organism does not produce leaves or fruit. Consequently, if this species is classified within the plant kingdom, it would represent its most basal position. For the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, this type of organism is considered to resemble a mineral object due to its origin from dust, yet it is regarded as analogous to a plant due to its capacity for growth.

The objective of the aforementioned explanations is to elucidate the interconnectivity between the organisms that populate the universe. The interconnectivity between disparate parts of the universe gives rise to the unified whole of the universe. In light of these considerations, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ posit the unity of all entities, including those situated at a lower level of the biological hierarchy, such as minerals, which are believed to play a pivotal role in the formation of this web of life, particularly within the sublunar domain. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ posit that the existence of minerals and the process of their creation have significant benefits for animal life, particularly humans (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:114–115). Nevertheless, this does not imply that minerals can be employed as objects of arbitrary human exploitation. Given that the process of their creation is part of God’s wisdom and that their existence provides numerous benefits to humans, it is imperative to ensure their preservation for the continuation of life. In Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s perspective, minerals are understood to be substances that originate from – and are formed within – the subterranean depths of the earth (bāṭin al-arḍ), the oceanic abyss (qaʿr al-biḥār), and the mountainous terrain (jawf al-jibāl). These minerals manifest in various forms, including gaseous, liquid, and solid rock states (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:188; ʿAbd Allāh 1989, 309). The most prevalent mineral among these is the solid rock that formed from the soil. These minerals originate from a combination of soil, water, air, and fire. The soil element plays a significant role in the formation of this mineral. However, some minerals are composed of liquid and gas (air). The category of minerals represents the initial entity to emerge from (muwalladāt) the action of the universal power (ṭabīʿat al-kullī) in the sublunar realm. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ provide a comprehensive account of this process, encompassing both the vast array of minerals and their diverse characteristics. According to this theory, the number of minerals is vast, and only a small fraction of them have been identified and classified by humans. A minimum of 900 distinct mineral types have been identified (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:104). It can be observed that minerals exhibit a range of properties and characteristics, including variations in shape, color, taste, smell, a combination of advantages and disadvantages, and a multitude of other qualities. The establishment of the fundamental tenets of mineralogy within the Islamic scientific tradition is ascribed to the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ. During the period of the Greek civilization, this field of study did not receive significant attention from philosophers and scientists. It is documented that Theophrastus (d. ca. 288 BCE) was the only notable mineralogist of the era, having made significant contributions to the advancement of this discipline. Wajīh Aḥmad ʿAbd Allāh asserts that some of Theophrastus’ writings on minerals align with the explanations provided by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ in the epistle Fī Takwīn al-Maʿādin (ʿAbd Allāh 1989, 309–310).

In order to explain minerals, the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ employ a religious approach, thereby establishing a close relationship between their views as well as a spiritual perspective. Minerals are understood to possess two distinct aspects, physical and spiritual. Although minerals are primarily regarded as physical entities, they are also imbued with a spiritual quality, referred to as spiritual power (al-quwwa al-rūḥāniyya), which is analogous to the spiritual essence attributed to humans, animals, and plants. These spiritual forces facilitate the movement and generation of life in a variety of minerals. This is what is referred to as nature (á¹­abÄ«Ê¿a).² In the view of the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ, the spiritual forces of this universe are the agents that govern the existence of these mineral substances (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:123). These universal forces are those of the universal soul, which flow and pervade the entire sublunar realm and act upon all the natural substances contained therein. In religious thought, these forces are often referred to as “angels” (tusammā bi-l-lafẓ al-sharÊ¿Ä« al-malāʾika) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:63, 124).

This spiritual vision is firmly established within Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s diverse interpretations of the universe and its constituent elements. In their view, angels are universal forces, divinely appointed to safeguard the universe (ḥifẓ al-ʿālam) and oversee the maintenance of all creation (tadbīr al-khalāʾiq) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:63). The angels are responsible for the rotation of celestial bodies (idārat al-aflāk), which they accomplish by exerting forces that flow through the stars (jarayān al-kawākib) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:190), the nurturing of plants (tarbiyat al-nabāt), facilitation of animal reproduction (tawlīd al-ḥayawān), and assisting in the formation of minerals (takwīn al-maʿādin) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:152). Carmela Baffioni observes that this perspective underscores the significance of minerals in Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s investigation beyond merely substantiating the existence of God the Creator (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:115). Moreover, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ posit that the diverse characteristics and properties exhibited by minerals were designed to introduce the concept of universal forces (ṭabīʿa/nature) as the governing agents of these substances (Baffioni 2008, 184). The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ state that minerals, plants, and animals serve as instruments of a “spiritual agent,” whose function is to animate and move diverse objects within this world. This spiritual agent is a specific soul that originates from the universal soul. In light of these considerations, it can be assumed that these forces are the particular souls that inhabit the bodies of animals, plants, and minerals. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ are more explicit in their designation of these entities as “embodied particular souls” (al-nufūs al-juzʾiyya al-mutajassida) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:124) and believe they are servants of the universal soul. The conclusion of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ is that, given the existence of a particular soul in this mineral world, it is necessary to recognize and explore the life forms present in the mineral kingdom, which manifests in various types of minerals. In other contexts, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ tell that this life is merely the utilization of the body by the soul, and that death is simply the cessation of such utilization (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 1:287). The presence of a particular soul in mineral bodies thus indicates the existence of life in the world of minerals. The cessation of this life, or death, will occur when the particular soul has departed from mineral bodies or other objects in this universe.

The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ consistently attest to the constant existence of both physical and spiritual elements in these minerals. The physical element is essentially an inanimate object, serving only to facilitate the existence of the spiritual element, while the spiritual element imbues the physical element with life. The spiritual elements thus serve as the primary agents of movement, regulation, and action within these minerals. To elucidate the distinctive quality of diamonds that enables them to fracture other rocks, or to delineate the magnetic attribute of iron that causes two proximate pieces to adhere to each other (iltaá¹£aqa wa-amsaka), the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ invoke the metaphor of lovers (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:110–111, 125–126). They posited that this phenomenon was attributable to the influence of spiritual agents operating outside the mineral bodies. The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ state that the agent responsible for creating this situation originated from á¹­abÄ«Ê¿a, which is driven by the universal soul. In the same way that the human body is essentially an inanimate entity, so too are minerals. However, a specific soul flows through both, rendering them both animate and capable of movement. It is therefore evident that a holistic view of existence in this universe must acknowledge the integration of two aspects, including those found in minerals, plants, animals, and humans.³ In their epistle on minerals, the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ articulate a concept of worship (Ê¿ibādat Allāh) that transcends cultural boundaries and aligns with the overarching principle of preserving the universe. Baffioni refers to this as the esoteric (bāṭin) aspect of worship as presented by the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ (Baffioni 2008, 188). The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ assert that:

Know, my brother, that worship of Allāh is not only in the form of prayer and fasting but in a balanced and comprehensive way to maintain religious life (ʿimārat al-dīn) and the world (dunyā) as a whole because God wants them to be full. Whoever strives to do good for one or both of them, his reward is due from God. He has full control over both of them, all people are His servants, and the most beloved of His servants to Him is the one who strives to do good and protect the two worlds entirely. The servants who are most hated by Him are those who always do damage to the lives of the two worlds or one of them, as Allah states in His word in sūrat al-Māʾida [Q 5]: 33.

Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:125

The unambiguous intent of this statement is to convey that the responsibility of safeguarding and sustaining the universe is an act of worship and that it is incumbent upon humans to fulfill this duty if they aspire to be exemplary servants of God. The concept of worship is no longer limited to the exoteric (outward) interpretation as evidenced by practices such as prayer and fasting. An equally important aspect is maintaining a balance within the world, which can be achieved by upholding a respectful and benevolent relationship with nature and the environment as part of esoteric worship (inner worship). This message is explicitly directed towards the human being, who is entrusted with the role of khalÄ«fa fÄ« l-arḍ,⁴ tasked with maintaining nature in an orderly and systematic manner (maḥfūẓan Ê¿alā l-tartÄ«b wa-l-niẓām) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 1:297), and commended to ensure the sustainability of the environment. The universe will thus remain perpetually in a state of completeness and in accordance with the objective of perfection (li-yakÅ«n al-ʿālam bāqiyan Ê¿alā atamm ḥālātih wa-akmal ghāyatih) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 1:297). While the Qurʾān only states that worship is part of the purpose of the creation of the jinn and humans (Q 51:56),⁵ for the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ, the motion of life that occurs in various mineral substances is likewise regarded as an act of worship of their Creator. Furthermore, their existence is perceived as evidence of the existence of God (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 4:210). The same can be said of animals and plants (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 4:211). It can be argued that worship is not reserved for humans and the jinn; a variety of mineral, plant, and animal species may also engage in acts of worship and obedience directed towards their Creator, Almighty God. When a mineral object accepts its form with sincerity, this is regarded as an act of worship, obedience, submission, and devotion to its true Creator (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 4:211). The primary ecological concept of the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ is the proposition that minerals and humans are analogous in terms of character and other accidental traits. Similarly, minerals are believed to possess intrinsic characteristics, including a capacity for subjective experience (shuÊ¿Å«r khafiyya) and a discernible sensitivity (ḥiss laá¹­Ä«f). Baffioni referred to these properties as “sensitive powers” or “spiritual” properties of mineral substances (Baffioni 2008, 191). Accordingly, the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ claim that minerals foster sentiments of love and longing, hatred and enmity. This should have implications for how we perceive and interact with an object:

A fundamental quality of minerals is the capacity to demonstrate compassion (taʾlaf) towards other natural forces. One of the natural forces is associated (tunāsib) with another. One of the aforementioned natural forces is in a state of attachment (talṣaq) to the other. One of the natural forces is amicable (taʾnas) with others, and there is also a force that subdues (taqhar) other forces. One of the aforementioned natural forces is characterized by the quality of strengthening (taqwā ʿalā) the other. Another of the natural forces is characterized by a capacity to weaken (tuḍʿif) the others, while yet another displays a propensity to burn (tulahhib) the other forces. One of the natural forces is characterized by a loving (tuḥibb) nature, seeking to benefit and nurture others. Another natural force is inclined to please (taṭīb) and satisfy another entity. In contrast, there is a destructive force that seeks to harm and destroy (tufsid) the other. A whitening force (tabyaḍḍ), on the other hand, seeks to purify and cleanse the other. Finally, there is a force that turns things red (taḥmarr), representing a force of destruction and chaos. There are additional characteristics that can be observed. One of these is the tendency to avoid contact (tahrub min) with others. Another is the inclination to harbor negative feelings (tubghiḍ) towards others. Finally, there are instances where natural forces interact with others in a way that can be described as mixing (tumāzij).

Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:110

4 The Role of Plants as Maternal Sources for Animals and Humans⁶

The study of the world of flora also received considerable attention from the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ; it will be demonstrated that they have a highly developed and sophisticated understanding of plants and their role in the ecosystem. One of the tenets of their belief system is the concept of the plant as a “mother” entity, which they believe provides life to animals and humans. This point will be elaborated upon in the following pages. To initiate this discussion, it is first necessary to reaffirm the framework that forms the onto-axiological basis of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s approach to the scientific subjects with which they were involved, including botany. For them, the study of the various living entities in the universe is inherently a search for the reality of the Creator, who is behind them all. Similarly, the reality of plants is explained as one of the webs of derivative organisms (muwalladāt) found in the sublunar realm.

The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ employ a creationist framework to substantiate their comprehension of the botanical domain. Their theory posits that the axiomatic existence of creation implies the existence of a wise Creator (anna l-maá¹£nÅ«Ê¿ al-muḥkam yadull Ê¿alā l-ṣāniÊ¿ al-ḥakÄ«m) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:152). In light of these considerations, it can be concluded that plants are a creation that exists in a clear and empirically verifiable manner. For them, the existence of diverse plant species with distinctive attributes serves as compelling evidence of a divine Creator and Sustainer of the universe. However, in their view, God is not the immediate cause (al-Ê¿illa al-fāʿila al-qarÄ«ba). Instead, they call God the cause of a series of causes (Ê¿illat al-Ê¿ilal). In this context, God is regarded as the most remote active cause (al-Ê¿illa al-fāʿila al-baÊ¿Ä«da) of the existence of plants and various entities in this sublunar realm. For the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ, the proximate or immediate cause is the spiritual power designated as á¹­abÄ«Ê¿a (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:152). They also employ the term “particular souls” in their discourse. These serve as God’s representatives on earth, bearing the responsibility of nurturing (tarbiya) the life of animals, plants, and minerals. The argument is made that God does not interact directly with physical objects, as the notion of divine direct action in the domain of corporeal reality and corporeal motion is not a tenet of Islamic theology.⁷

In this context, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ draw an analogy between this perspective and the work of historical kings and leaders. These people are said to have constructed impressive edifices, but in reality they did not undertake every aspect of the process themselves: they directed their employees to design these structures and carry out the building work (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:128–129, 152–153). Similarly, Pharaoh is credited with the construction of a pyramid, yet it was the builders who were responsible for the actual construction. It is recorded that Alexander, the ruler from Macedonia, constructed the strongholds of Gog and Magog, and according to tradition, king Solomon is credited with the construction of the Īliyā mosque (al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf in Jerusalem) while caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 136–158/754–775) constructed a city intended to serve as a haven of peace and stability. This evidence demonstrates that the construction of these buildings was carried out in accordance with the directives, intentions, and the delegation of responsibilities to the personnel under their authority. It is clear that these leaders did not undertake the entirety of the construction process independently.

In the view of the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ, the movement of orbital bodies caused a mixing and unification of the basic elements, which then resulted in the formation of plants and other organisms, such as minerals and animals. This illustrates the profound impact of celestial bodies on the genesis of life in the sublunar realm. In a subsequent passage, the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ assert that all celestial movements are permitted by Allāh and occur in accordance with His benevolent wisdom. The Islamic tradition attributes to God the creation of celestial orbits, the arrangement of the constellations, the formation and circulation of the planets, and the sending of souls as their representatives into the life of this universe. The role of spiritual power in the existence of plants is referred to by philosophers and scientists as á¹­abÄ«Ê¿a (natural force), while religious people and theologians call it the work of angels.⁸ The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ specifically depict this power as a particular soul (al-nafs al-juzʾiyya) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:152) or the soul of the plant (al-nafs al-nabātiyya) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:156). In accordance with the teachings of the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ, such souls are furnished with the requisite strength and fortitude through the agency (al-quwwa al-faʿʿāla) of seven active forces (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:156–157). These forces are comprised of an attracting force (al-quwwa al-jādhiba), a holding force (al-quwwa al-māsika), a digestive force (al-quwwa al-hāḍima), a driving force (al-quwwa al-dāfiÊ¿a), a nutritional force (al-quwwa al-ghādhiya), a power to form (al-quwwa al-muá¹£awwira), and a power to grow (al-quwwa al-nāmiya) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:157–158). The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ declare that all processes occurring in the world of flora are a result of the influence of the plant-soul’s roles and actions, in a manner analogous to that observed in the bodies of animals and humans. The same can be said of their organisms, which are also moved and imbued with life by the soul that flows through their bodies. Another significant perspective articulated by the Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ in their Rasāʾil is the notion of plants as nurturing entities for animals and humans (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:180). This perspective places emphasis on the central role of plants as intermediaries (wasÄ«la) through which humans and animals gain access to the essence of life, which is derived from the four fundamental elements of life (fire, air, water, and earth) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:158, 180). In this understanding, plants are conceptualized as maternal figures for animals (al-nabāt ka-l-wālida lil-ḥayawān). The existence of a mother precedes that of her child. The mother serves as the conduit for the child’s existence; without her presence, the child cannot exist in this world, and no child is born without the presence of a mother. Similarly, in the animal kingdom, every animal offspring is born from a female parent, as the result of her mating with a male. The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ place significant emphasis on the pivotal role of the mother (parent). The assertion that plants serve as maternal figures for animals and humans underscores the significance of plants for the survival and existence of animals, including humans.

The notion of plants existing prior to animals can be conceptualized in a manner analogous to that of a mother preceding her child. Plants are the primary prerequisite for the existence of animals, and serve as the primary material for their formation as well as providing nourishment as they grow. Plants absorb moisture and fine essences from various components of the soil through their roots, subsequently transporting them to the core of animals’ bodies. In this way, plants provide animals with leaves, fruit, and seeds, which serve as a soft, delicious, and beneficial food source for their survival. The provision of sustenance and nourishment by the plant is analogous to the role of a mother in the rearing of her offspring. Similarly, plants provide nourishment for animals and humans in a manner analogous to the role of a mother in the biological family unit. A mother’s body absorbs a variety of nutrients to produce milk, which is then given to her child. This is the manner in which plants interact with animals and humans. In the words of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ: “In the absence of plants, animals would have been forced to subsist on mud and dust, which would have significantly impeded their ability to survive” (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:180). It can be argued that plants act as intermediaries for animals and humans, facilitating the absorption of the essence of the four basic elements. Plants absorb the essence of the four elements through their roots, subsequently digesting, ripening, and softening them. The seeds, skins, leaves, fruit, sap, and flowers that are created as a result of the process described above provide sustenance for animals (and humans). This evidence substantiates the existence of the plant soul, which performs these actions as a service to animal souls (al-khādima lil-nafs al-ḥayawāniyya) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:158). For the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, all this constitutes evidence of God’s love and support for His creatures.

5 Animals as Beings with Moral Rights

The ecological wisdom of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ is clearly evident in their perspective on animals. In their longest treatise, Epistle 22 (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:178–377; Goodman and MacGregor 2009), they put forward the concept of animal rights, which has subsequently been proposed by environmentalists and animal liberationists in contemporary discourse. However, long before these theories were articulated by people in modern times, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ had already conveyed and gradually developed a robust argument in favor of this perspective. The discourse on equal moral rights for animals and humans presented by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ can be understood to have two aspects.

Firstly, it can be argued that animals and humans have the same capacity to sense, move and live (ḥayāt) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:131). The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ also elucidate that there are multiple additional similarities between animals and humans, which serve to reinforce the argument that animals should not be discriminated against. These similarities include the capacity for growth, sexual desire, ingestion of sustenance, matrimony (sexual intercourse), endurance of pain, and the experience of pleasure (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:131–132). The defining characteristic of humanity is the capacity for reason, discernment, and intellectual power, which is absent in animals (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:132). Nevertheless, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ indicate that certain animals are capable of thought (fikr) and discernment (tamyīz), citing bees (naḥl) and ants (naml) as examples (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:132). The argument is that bees and ants demonstrate a capacity for collective action, including the formation of colonies, the establishment of social structures, and the provision of mutual assistance. They engage in collective action when constructing their nests and shelters, as well as when accumulating food reserves for the winter. Moreover, they have been observed to live for an extended period of time (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:185, 270–271).

Second, both humans and animals are subject to four fundamental accidents: the experience of pain (ālām), the acceptance of factors that can damage the body (dawāʿī ʿaṭab abdānihā), the feeling of mental suffering (shaqāwat al-nufūs), and the destruction of the bodily structure (halāk hayākilihā). The reason for the existence of these four characteristics is to ensure the survival of offspring (li-baqāʾi naslihā) and to enhance the quality of life (ṣalāḥ maʿāshihā) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:364), as they enable humans and animals to avoid various dangers that could result in the destruction and even extinction of their species. To illustrate, both humans and animals experience pain and stinging sensations when their hands are burned by fire. In the absence of the sensation of pain, the fire would have the effect of destroying them, reducing them to ashes. It is similarly crucial for humans and animals to abstain from inflicting psychological violence, as they are both vulnerable to mental anguish (shaqāwat al-nufūs). For the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, the fulfillment of various desires (al-shahawāt al-mukhtalifa), particularly hunger and thirst, has the potential to cause physical and mental suffering for humans and animals. Therefore, it is imperative to avoid such desires. In this way, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ have proposed a rationale for the criteria that should be met for the moral equality of rights between animals and humans.

In contemporary discourse, this perspective is advanced by those who advocate for animal liberation. The argument is made that animals are “sentient beings,” that is, beings that experience pleasure and suffering (Warren 1983, 109). Given the rights they possess, it is only appropriate that they be included within the scope of human moral responsibility. Others regard this perspective as unduly radical. Those who espouse the animal liberationist perspective unequivocally denounce the mistreatment of animals, including the killing of animals for meat consumption and the use of animals in scientific experiments. These practices are opposed not only on the grounds that they could potentially damage habitats and the environment, but more fundamentally, because they cause suffering and even death to these sentient beings.

Peter Singer (b. 1946), a prominent figure in the field of animal rights advocacy (Warren 1983, 110), announces that all animate beings, whether human or animal, should be regarded as ethically equivalent. This implies that their diverse interests must be considered on an equal footing. He posits that “sentience,” or the capacity to experience pain, suffering, and pleasure, should serve as a threshold for determining how we treat beings that possess it (Singer 2002, 7–9; Warren 1983, 111). Singer suggests that animals should be afforded rights based on their capacity to experience pain and suffering, irrespective of their intelligence. Other theorists have taken this position further: Aldo Leopold (d. 1948) is regarded as the first contemporary scientist to have effectively articulated the concept that not only humans and animals but also plants and natural habitats possess moral rights (Warren 1983, 109). He asserts the necessity for a novel ethical system that will address our relationships not only with other human beings and with human society, but also with the land, the environment, and other non-human inhabitants of the universe.

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ engaged in a comprehensive examination of the divergent perspectives on the moral rights of animals in their Rasāʾil. In a 200-page treatise on animals titled Fī Aṣnāf al-Ḥayawānāt wa-ʿAjāʾib Hayākilihā wa-Gharāʾib Aḥwālihā (“On the Kinds of Animals, the Wonders of their Shapes, and the Strangeness of their Conditions”), known in English as The Case of the Animals versus Man before the King of the Jinn (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:178–377; Goodman and McGregor 2009), the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ employ the device of fables to illustrate the sagacity of animals. The authors present a series of protests and complaints made by a group of animals in response to perceived human cruelty. The animals’ grievances were presented to the king of the jinn, who was renowned for his wisdom. This fable addresses the moral status of animals in relation to humans. The question thus arises as to whether animals possess the same fundamental rights as humans, and thus whether it is justifiable to spare them from discrimination, injustice, oppression, and usurpation by humans. Although the dialogue in the trial described in this fable does not provide a definitive conclusion regarding the equal moral rights of animals and humans (Loevy 2019, 327), it offers a valuable model for understanding the relationship between humans and animals and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s commitment to treating animals with greater wisdom, fairness, and compassion. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ present a discussion of the human stance towards animals. This fable provides further elaboration on the demands of animals for the right to life and how human activity uproots these rights in a hegemonic and arbitrary manner. The fable conveys a compelling message about the necessity of non-discrimination with regard to the various rights that animals possess. It is illogical and unjustifiable for humans to treat animals cruelly and violently, as has been the case historically. The subjugation of animals by humans has been a long-standing practice, particularly in the case of livestock and other vulnerable species whose strength and bodies are exploited for human benefit. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ questioned the justice of this situation, asking what gives humans the right to treat animals arbitrarily. This includes confining them in cages, which limits their freedom and right to live in the wild; putting reins on them; employing these animals for the benefit of humans; making them means of transportation; transporting goods; cultivating land; and various other forms of labor (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:203–204; Goodman and McGregor 2009, 99–100; Nasr and Aminrazavi 2001, 257–258).

In this context, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ share the perspective that was subsequently espoused by animal liberationists, which asserts that moral equality exists between humans and animals on the grounds that they are both sentient beings. “Those animals have flesh and blood, and thus are subject to the same moral considerations as humans.” “They are capable of experiencing pleasure (taḥuss) and pain (tataʾallam)” (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:237). In this case, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ encourage people to be kind to animals (al-iḥsān ilayhā), alleviate their suffering (al-takhfīf ʿanhā), care for them (al-rifq bihā) and love them (al-taḥannun ilayhā wa-l-raḥma bihā) (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:237).

The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ state that humans have instrumentalized animals as slaves (khawal and Ê¿abÄ«d) (Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ 1984, 2:206; Goodman and McGregor 2009, 103), a relationship that allows for their arbitrary and cruel treatment by who position themselves as their masters. The Ikhwān al-á¹¢afāʾ employ the device of imaginary dialogues in the course of a fable to challenge this conventional slave-master relationship between animals and humans. In the aforementioned fable, a series of arguments are presented in the form of dialogue. For example, an argument is put forward that justifies the treatment of animals as servants by humans. This argument draws upon anthropocentric religious views found in sacred texts, as evidenced by the following verses from the Qurʾān:⁹

Numerous other verses in the Qurʾān, the Torah, and the Bible also assert that animals were created to serve human needs.

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ challenge the prevailing interpretation of these verses, however, asserting that they have been misinterpreted and taken at face value. They contend that religious circles with a tendency to anthropocentrism have misapplied these verses in order to provide a rationale for their discriminatory and cruel treatment of animals, and assert that the purpose of creating humans as vice-regents on earth is to enhance the planet’s prosperity and increase its population, without any intention of wastefulness. This suggests a responsibility to ensure the well-being of animals on earth and to utilize their existence prudently, avoiding any form of mistreatment, exploitation, or killing. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ argue that none of the aforementioned verses can be used as a legitimate basis for the unjust treatment of animals as slaves (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 2:207–208; Goodman and McGregor 2009, 106). It is imperative that human behavior towards animals be grounded in the principle of maximizing general benefit for all creatures, while taking measures to avoid the elimination and degradation of animal life to the greatest extent possible. The treatment of animals by humans must be grounded in the principle of general benefit to all creatures, while implementing measures to avert the elimination and degradation of animal life wherever feasible. In a particular discussion, the notion that animals (including humans) possess the right to procreate and enhance their quality of life is advanced (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ 1984, 3:364). In this regard, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ place equal emphasis on the right to life of humans and animals.

6 Conclusion

In Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s teachings, eco-cosmology emerges as a prominent concept, positing the universe as a living entity endowed with qualities such as a soul, mind, and spirit. Accordingly, the universe is regarded as a living entity, capable of thought, worship, and motion. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ conceptualize nature (ṭabīʿa) as a faculty of the universe (ʿālam), likening it to a great human being (insān kabīr) endowed with reason, soul, spirit, and various characteristics typically ascribed to humans. The genesis of the living universe is attributed to the union of two fundamental substances, without which its existence would be impossible. These elements are the universal physical body, which is material (al-jasad al-jismānī), and the universal soul of the spiritual universe (al-nafs al-rūḥāniyya). The transposition of this message into contemporary times holds the potential to mitigate the arbitrary nature of our current treatment of the environment.

The conceptual framework of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ gives rise to several noteworthy inquiries, including the notion that minerals are living entities that possess life, characteristics, and advantages; the assertion that plants serve as “the mother for human and animal,” functioning as a food provider for both animals and humans; and the introduction of the concept of proto-“animal rights.” According to the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, minerals are characterized by dual aspects: physical and spiritual. While they are predominantly physical entities, they possess a spiritual dimension referred to as spiritual power (al-quwwa al-rūḥāniyya), a quality that is also exhibited by humans, animals, and plants. These spiritual forces, as understood by Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, are instrumental in bringing about life in various minerals. This phenomenon is collectively referred to as “nature.” According to their theory, the spiritual forces of the universe are the agents that govern the existence of mineral substances.

Plants are not merely perceived as living entities; rather, they are regarded as a fundamental element in the chain of causation that leads to the existence of life, including that of animals and humans. It is evident that plants serve as the fundamental prerequisite for the existence of animals. They serve as the fundamental material for the formation of animals and provide sustenance for their growth. Through their root systems, plants extract moisture and essential nutrients from the soil, subsequently transferring these substances to their internal tissues. This process enables the production of leaves, fruits, and seeds, which serve as a soft, delicious, and nutritious food source for animals, contributing to their survival and propagation. This symbiotic relationship underscores the profound contributions of plants to animal survival, akin to the nurturing actions of a mother towards her offspring.

Their perspective on animals was progressive and far ahead of its time. Animals are regarded as “sentient beings” that possess the same moral rights as humans. The argument is advanced that, given animals’ capacity to experience pleasure and suffering, it is incumbent upon humans to treat animals in a manner consistent with their own preferences.

The concept of the universe as a great human being, as well as several derived concepts, serve as the foundation for this Islamic eco-cosmology. This theory, as presented in the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s writings, aims to inspire a more holistic perspective on the universe as a whole. The theory encourages humans to develop a more respectful attitude towards the preservation of nature and the universe.