Abstract
Evangelicals are usually seen as a homogeneous subcultural group with conservative political beliefs. This paper challenges this idea by studying the political attitudes of different types of evangelicals. Using survey data from more than 1,100 Dutch evangelicals, it is shown that different types of evangelicals also hold different attitudes towards political issues like: the reduction of income differences, the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships. Orthodox evangelicals are more conservative with regard to these issues, while liberal evangelicals are more progressive. Furthermore, additional multivariate analyses reveal, that evangelical type is a more important predictor for the political attitudes of these evangelicals than their religious socialization experiences, their involvement in socio-religious networks or their socio-economic status. Thus the conclusion is drawn that evangelicals do not constitute one homogeneous subcultural group. As far as the Netherlands is concerned, evangelicals hold different religious beliefs, which also affect their political beliefs.
1 Introduction
Evangelicalism is often seen as a reactionary and conservative movement. Although its theological roots date back to eighteenth century English puritanism, the present-day emergence of the evangelical movement is mostly associated with the formation of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) in 1942 in the United States. The formation of the NAE was a reaction to the theological liberalism of mainline Protestantism and a response to the societal isolation that characterized fundamentalist Protestants. Instead, evangelicals again sought to engage with society on the basis of orthodox Christian beliefs (McGrath 1995; Smith 1998). Today, however, their conservatism not only pertains to their religious beliefs, but also to their political attitudes. In line with their support for the Republican Party, evangelicals in the United States are not only culturally conservative, as witnessed by their opposition to, for instance, abortion and homosexuality (see for instance Hunter 1984; Putnam and Campbell 2010, 384–388; Schmalzbauer 1993; Thomas and Olson 2012), but economically conservative as well. The latter is exemplified, for instance, by their growing opposition to government interference in the economy or to welfare spending (Deckman et al. 2017; Steensland and Schrank 2011). But such a depiction of evangelicals as religiously orthodox and economically and culturally conservative may be too general and need not pertain to evangelicals in other societal contexts.
Following the formation of the NAE in 1942, evangelicals established an institutional infrastructure of parachurch organizations and rapidly spread around the globe. Evangelicals nowadays find themselves in different socio-cultural contexts, which also affects their political attitudes. Especially when it comes to their economic attitudes context matters. McAdams and Lance (2013) compared the political attitudes of evangelicals in the United States with the attitudes of Brazilian evangelicals and found Brazilian evangelicals to be significantly less conservative on economic issues, while they found no differences with respect to their cultural attitudes. Similarly, Bean (2014a, 2014b; see also Hoover et al. 2002) compared American and Canadian evangelicals and again found differences regarding their attitudes towards economic issues with Canadian evangelicals being less conservative in this respect. Bean (2014a, 112–132) attributes these differences to the anti-welfare state sentiment in the United States, which makes evangelicals perceive government aid to the poor as a threat to the public role of religion in alleviating poverty. But such an anti-welfare state sentiment does not exist in Canada; nor in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands the role of charitable organizations and churches in alleviating poverty has been marginal as a result of the rapid expansion of the welfare state after the Second World War (Van Oorschot 2006). The idea that the state should care for the poor and should guarantee a social minimum is widely accepted in the Netherlands and is not perceived by religious bodies as a threat to their public role. As a result, Dutch evangelicals do not oppose the government taking actions to alleviate poverty or to reduce income differences (Stoffels 1990, 104–106). What’s more, Vermeer and Scheepers (2018a) even found that Dutch evangelicals are more in favor of the government taking actions to reduce income differences than mainline Protestants, Catholics and even the religious nones. In view of their attitudes towards the reduction of income differences, Dutch evangelicals are better called progressive than conservative.
But also within a given societal context attitudes among evangelicals may differ. Studying the political attitudes of Dutch evangelicals, Stoffels (1990) already distinguished four categories of evangelicals on the basis of their conservative and partly also progressive stances towards economic and cultural issues. Evangelicals thus may show a certain level of heterogeneity, but this internal diversity is often overlooked in studies into the political attitudes of evangelicals. For example, studies consider evangelicals in general (Lewis 2016; McAdams and Lance 2013), compare evangelicals as a whole to mainline Protestants and/or Catholics (Perry and Whitehead 2016; Starks and Robinson 2009; Steensland and Schrank 2011; Vermeer and Scheepers 2018a), focus solely on white evangelicals (Deckman et al. 2017) or at best distinguish between black and white (Hoover et al. 2002) or traditionalist and non-traditionalist evangelicals (Smidt 2013). Of course, it is not wrong to treat evangelicals as one homogeneous group. Considering the possible diversity among evangelicals may not fit the research questions being addressed and there may also be limitations to the available data. Still, treating evangelicals as a more heterogeneous group, like Smith and Johnson’s (2010) study into the political attitudes of young and old evangelicals in the United States or Castillo, Contreras-Guzman and Henzi’s (2023) more recent study into the different responses of conservative and progressive evangelicals to the constitutional process in Chile, may result in a more nuanced picture of the relationship between evangelicalism and conservatism within a specific societal context.
Based on these considerations, I aim to offer a more nuanced picture of the political stances of Dutch evangelicals by considering the political attitudes of different types of evangelicals following a typology Glas and I (Vermeer and Glas 2024) constructed earlier. Analyzing recently gathered survey data from more than 1,100 Dutch evangelicals, Glas and I identified five types of evangelicals on the basis of their core theological convictions and religious orientations. Using the same data set, I will now further explore possible political differences between these types by addressing the following research questions: (1) Do different types of evangelicals also hold different political attitudes on economic and cultural issues? and (2) Which additional factors determine the political attitudes of evangelicals in this respect besides type of evangelical? In this way, I intend to show how subgroups within the Dutch evangelical movement may respond differently to the secular, societal context they find themselves in and offer a more nuanced picture of the alleged political conservatism of Dutch evangelicals.
However, before addressing these research questions, I would first like to situate evangelicals within the broader socio-cultural context of the Netherlands and present the aforementioned typology. This is also a necessary step in explaining why it is plausible at all to assume that different types of evangelicals hold not only different theological convictions but also different political views.
2 Evangelicals in Dutch Secular Society
To begin with, it is important to note that Dutch society is a very secular society. With more than half of the Dutch population identifying as atheists or agnostics (De Hart, Van Houwelingen and Huijnk 2022, 11–16), the Netherlands ranks among the most secular countries in Europe (Inglehart 2021, 86–99; Reitsma et al. 2012). This is also reflected by declining rates of church membership and church attendance. Between 1966 and 2024, church membership dropped from 67% to less than 27% and weekly church attendance from 57% to 14% of the Dutch population aged 17 years and older. But not only are the Dutch increasingly secular also church members themselves are less committed to their religious communities. In 2024, only 35% of the Catholics and 60% of the members of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands, the two largest Christian denominations in the Netherlands, attended church regularly or sometimes (Kregting, Van Lieburg and Vermeer 2025, 40, 63). Against this background, Dutch evangelicals form a subcultural niche. With approximately 400,000 to 500,000 evangelicals living in the Netherlands (Kregting and Wijma, 2023), they only make up a small part, i.e. 2.3 to 2.9%, of the Dutch population. But this small part is also a far more religious segment of the Dutch population. Although nationwide, representative figures regarding the religious practices of Dutch evangelicals are not available, one can assume that they attend church more often and also read the Bible more frequently than Catholics and mainline Protestants. In surveys held in the Netherlands evangelicals are usually labelled as ‘orthodox Protestant’, together with the membership of several other smaller, orthodox Protestant denominations, and these religious Dutch consistently display higher levels of church attendance and a higher frequency of Bible reading than Catholics and mainline Protestants (Kregting, Van Lieburg and Vermeer 2025, 63, 67). As a subcultural or religious niche, Dutch evangelicals clearly differ from the secular majority as well as from Dutch Catholics and mainline Protestants.
But forming a subcultural niche does not make Dutch evangelicals immune to cultural influences. In an attempt to explain the relative success of American evangelicals, Smith (1998) developed a so-called subcultural identity theory. According to this theory, American evangelicals thrive, because they actively engage with the wider society and at the same time uphold a distinct religious, subcultural identity. This engagement with the wider society confronts evangelicals with cultural and religious plurality, which, in turn, offers them the opportunity to distinguish themselves from other religious groups and to construct a clear identity of their own. But this openness towards the wider society may also affect the beliefs and attitudes of evangelicals themselves. Especially in the Netherlands, the dominant secular culture may urge evangelicals to question or reconsider some of their core convictions. To explore this possibility, Glas and I (Vermeer and Glas 2024) thus recently studied the intra-religious diversity within the Dutch evangelical movement and identified five types of evangelicals basically reflecting an orthodox – liberal continuum.
As mentioned already, this typology is based on survey data regarding the core theological convictions and religious orientations of Dutch evangelicals. In line with the hallmarks of evangelical faith, as mentioned, for instance, by Bebbington (1995) and McGrath (1995), these convictions concern the following seven beliefs: the Bible is God’s infallible word, God created the earth in six days, Christianity offers the only road to salvation, Christ will soon return to this world, Biblical prophecies are real, Christians are called to evangelize and the belief that speaking in tongues, prophecy and faith healing are important in the Christian community. In addition to these seven beliefs, this typology is also based on the way Dutch evangelicals experience their faith, whether it is an intrinsic aspect of their lives or whether it serves other extrinsic goals, and how they value having religious doubts. As it turned out, these Dutch evangelicals differed in the extent to which they accepted these beliefs and also displayed differences regarding their religious orientations. This resulted in the identification of the following types of evangelicals:1
Proclaiming Orthodox (13% of the sample): these evangelicals consider the Bible the infallible word of God, believe that God created the world in six days and consider Christ the only road to salvation. They also emphasize the necessity of proclaiming the Gospel to non-believers. Furthermore, religion is an intrinsic aspect of their life and they do not value having religious doubts and uncertainties.
Engaged Orthodox (23% of the sample): these evangelicals also hold orthodox beliefs concerning the Bible, creation and the uniqueness of Christ, but contrary to the proclaiming orthodox they do not emphasize spreading the Gospel to non-believers. For them, evangelization is all about social involvement in the local community.
Spiritual Orthodox (26% of the sample): these evangelicals are somewhat less orthodox when it comes to their views on the Bible or creation. Instead, they emphasize the importance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, like prophecy and healing.
Seeking Orthodox (25% of the sample): they are again consistently less orthodox than the proclaiming, engaged and spiritual orthodox when it comes to their core beliefs. Furthermore, religion is also a less intrinsic aspect of their lives and they are also more open to religious doubts and questioning religious beliefs.
Questing Liberals (14% of the sample): these are the least orthodox and most liberal evangelicals. They display the lowest support for evangelical core beliefs, strongly emphasize community involvement as a means of evangelization and are the most open to religious doubts.
Dutch evangelicals do not constitute a homogeneous religious group, but display internal diversity. Moreover, Glas and I (Vermeer and Glas 2024) also found that the questing liberals are significantly younger than the other types, which could point at a possible cohort effect. That is to say, younger Dutch evangelicals may be more liberal, because they have been raised in a far more secular, societal context. Or to put this otherwise, their engagement with the wider society may especially urge younger evangelicals to question their religious beliefs.
Now, following this notion of a cohort effect, especially in view of the political attitudes of evangelicals another societal development is interesting as well. Dutch society not only became more secular over time, but also the values of the Dutch shifted fundamentally. As documented by Inglehart (2018, 77–101), during the past decades several high-income countries experienced a shift from so-called pro-fertility norms to individual-choice norms. This shift led to a growing acceptance of abortion, homosexuality and divorce and a growing resistance to traditional gender roles. As a result, also in the Netherlands a majority of the population of 17 years and older nowadays approves of abortion, homosexuality and divorce and rejects traditional gender roles (Kregting, Van Lieburg and Vermeer 2025, 130–138). Consequently, younger Dutch evangelicals not only have been raised in a more secular environment, but in a culturally less traditional, or more progressive, environment as well. It is not unlikely, therefore, that these socio-cultural developments not only affected the religious beliefs of evangelicals, but their political stances towards certain cultural issues as well.
This fundamental value shift thus makes it worthwhile to explore if, and to what extent, the aforementioned typology of evangelicals also reflects political differences. In this way, then, looking for political differences is actually an additional test of the discriminant validity of this typology as it shows to what extent variations in evangelical identity go hand in hand with variations in political attitudes. And since this value shift is also occurring in several other high income countries, the way it influences the political attitudes of Dutch evangelicals, may be exemplary for evangelicals living in other societal contexts as well. While the focus of this study is on Dutch evangelicals, its implications may thus extend beyond the Netherlands.
3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
The political differences among evangelicals I will explore concern conservative stances regarding the economic and the cultural domain. To define conservatism, and its opposite progressiveness, I follow the ideal-typical distinction made by Middendorp (1991). Basic to this distinction is the appreciation of freedom and equality, which differs for the economic and the cultural domain. Economic conservatism emphasizes freedom at the cost of equality. That is to say, individual entrepreneurship and the free market is highly valued, while the socio-economic inequality that may result from the pursuit of profit is neglected or considered an inevitable by-product of economic growth. Conversely, a more progressive economic stance favors restrictions to regulate the free market and measures to promote equality like welfare provisions or measures taken to reduce income differences.2 Within the cultural domain this appreciation of freedom and equality is exactly the opposite. Cultural conservatism relates to moral conservatism and entails the restriction of individual freedom and the promotion of equality. In view of, for example, a civil liberty like the freedom of speech, pro-life issues like abortion or euthanasia or individual sexual behavior such as homosexuality, conservatives want to restrict individual freedom and want all individuals to equally conform to existing, traditional norms, while progressives strongly support individual choice and do not demand uniform conformity to traditional norms.
Given these different appreciations of freedom and equality it is important to distinguish between economic and cultural issues when studying political conservatism, or progressiveness, among evangelicals. Consequently, I focus on attitudes towards the reduction of income differences as far as the economic domain is concerned and on attitudes towards the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships in view of the cultural domain.
When it comes to the political attitudes of Dutch evangelicals, I only expect differences concerning the cultural domain. While there may be a link between orthodox Protestantism, evangelicalism and economic conservatism in the United States (see for instance Bean 2014a; 2014b; Deckman et al. 2017; Hoover et al. 2002; McAdams and Lance 2013; Smith and Johnson 2010; Steensland and Schrank 2011), I do not expect to find this link in the Netherlands. Above, I already referred to the far more positive appreciation of the welfare state and the role of the government in alleviating poverty in the Netherlands also among religious bodies. As a result, the link between religion and economic conservatism has been weak or even non-existing in this country. Among the Dutch economic conservatism is a matter of social class and education and barely a matter of religious affiliation (Scheepers, Peters and Felling 2000, 144). This was confirmed by a more recent study of Vermeer and Scheepers (2018a) among Dutch evangelicals, which showed that the religious beliefs and practices of these evangelicals are unrelated to their attitude towards the reduction of income differences. Thus, given this weak or even non-existing relationship between religion, and more specifically evangelicalism, and economic conservatism in the Netherlands, I do not expect the aforementioned five types of evangelicals to display different attitudes towards the economic domain.
However, I do expect to find differences regarding the cultural domain. As shown already in a previous study by Vermeer and Scheepers (2018a), the attitudes of Dutch evangelicals towards pro-life issues or homosexuality are strongly related to the beliefs that the Bible is God’s infallible word and that Christ is the only possible road to salvation. This happen to be two of the seven religious beliefs underlying the typology Glas and I (Vermeer and Glas 2024) constructed. And since the appreciation of these beliefs differs among evangelicals, as exemplified by our typology, I do expect to find differences regarding the cultural domain. Moreover, because these beliefs are valued most by the more orthodox evangelicals (Vermeer and Glas 2024, 379), I also expect orthodox evangelicals to be more culturally conservative than liberal evangelicals. In view of my first research question, then, I test the following hypotheses: Different types of evangelicals will hold different views on the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships, but they will not hold different views on the reduction of income differences (H1) and Orthodox evangelicals are more culturally conservative than liberal evangelicals (H2).
In view of my second research question, I test three additional hypotheses relating to socialization theory and subcultural identity theory. These hypotheses concern factors that may also affect political attitudes next to type of evangelical. The first additional hypothesis relates to socialization theory. Religious and political convictions are to a large extent the result of childhood socialization experiences in the family (Troll and Bengtson 1979). When it comes to religion, being raised by religious parents in an overt religious family climate is almost a necessary (see for instance Day 2022, 39–50; Myers 1996; Vermeer, Janssen and De Hart 2011), though not sufficient, condition for religious commitment in later life. Likewise, children in part also adopt their political convictions as well as their adult voting behavior from their parents. In the Netherlands, this link was, for instance, established by Need (1997), who also discovered that this link is strongest among orthodox Protestants. In addition, Vollebergh, Iedema and Raaijmakers (1999) found, that Dutch parents who frequently attend church also hold conservative views on cultural matters like cohabitation and homosexuality, which, in turn, results in conservative stances towards these issues among their children. This suggests that there may be a relationship between being raised in a religious family and holding conservative attitudes concerning the cultural domain, especially among orthodox Protestants like evangelicals.
However, not every family context is equally effective in this respect. In line with Bandura’s (1971) social learning theory, socialization research has shown that the intergenerational transmission of religion basically occurs through modeling. Parents are more successful in transmitting their religious commitment and related values to their children, if they serve as models who display overt, religious behavior for their children to observe and imitate like prayer, Bible reading or attending church. Merely discussing religious matters at home is a less powerful socialization experience than actually observing and participating in religious practices (Vermeer, Janssen and De Hart 2011). Combined with the notion that religious socialization experiences may also affect political attitudes, these insights translate into the following hypothesis: Childhood religious practices advance conservative views on the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships besides type of evangelical, but these practices do not affect evangelicals’ views on the reduction of income differences (H3).
Two subsequent hypotheses relate to the socio-religious network evangelicals are part of. The importance of this socio-religious network has been elaborated by Smith (1998) in his aforementioned subcultural identity theory. As I already explained above, evangelicals’ openness towards and engagement with society enables them to construct an identity of their own vis a vis other religious groups. This idea is reminiscent of Tajfel’s (1981; 1982) social identity theory, which states that social groups construct their own identity on the basis of a comparison with positive and negative reference groups. Thus, this identity is confirmed and strengthened to the extent subcultural groups orient themselves towards their own in-group. The latter evangelicals can do in two distinct ways.
First, evangelicals may strengthen their subcultural, religious identity by conducting religious practices like attending church, reading the Bible or by being involved in their congregation. As Vermeer and Scheepers (2018b) showed in their study into the membership of six thriving, evangelical congregations in the Netherlands, evangelicals are more committed to their local congregation and spend significantly more time on church activities and church groups than Catholics and mainline Protestants. Being committed to the Christian community and reading the Bible not only are two important evangelical distinctives (McGrath 1995, 53–85), but these practices also show that evangelicals are involved in dense socio-religious networks of like-minded fellow-believers who share and mutually reinforce core beliefs and convictions (Stroope 2012). Among evangelicals, then, conducting religious practices is an important means of establishing and confirming their subcultural identity. This results in my fourth hypothesis: Current socio-religious practices advance conservative views on the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships besides type of evangelical, but these practices do not affect evangelicals’ views on the reduction of income differences (H4).
Secondly, evangelicals may also orient themselves to parachurch organizations to strengthen their subcultural identity. As Smith (1998) explains, part of the success of the evangelical movement in the United States has been its ability to establish several parachurch organizations, like theological seminaries, publishing houses, newspapers and broadcasting organizations. These parachurch organizations helped in spreading and endorsing evangelical beliefs and in this way enhanced subcultural persistence. A similar development took place in the Netherlands, culminating in the establishment of the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization in 1967 (Boersema 2005). As a result, an evangelical ‘pillar’ arose in the Netherlands, which helped evangelicals to maintain a subcultural identity. To strengthen and confirm their subcultural, religious identity, evangelicals thus may also orient themselves to certain parachurch organizations like a broadcasting company or a newspaper. Furthermore, among orthodox Protestants in the Netherlands such an orientation towards parachurch organizations has also been found to affect their political attitudes (Hippe and Lucardi 1998). Following these insights my fifth hypothesis reads: Being a member of the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization and/or reading a Christian newspaper advances conservative views on the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships besides type of evangelical, but these aspects of evangelical identity do not affect evangelicals’ views on the reduction of income differences (H5).
Finally, I test a sixth hypothesis concerning the effect of socio-economic status. Socio-economic status may mitigate the relationship between evangelicalism and conservatism. Evangelicals with a higher education or a higher income probably are more exposed to the liberalism and secularism of the wider society and may find it difficult to uphold the conservatism of their religious subculture. This idea was tested by Schmalzbauer (1993), who, for the cultural domain, found that evangelicals with a higher socio-economic status are indeed somewhat less conservative than lower class evangelicals on a pro-life issue like abortion; although they are as conservative with regard to homosexuality. Similarly, Deckman et al. (2017) found that evangelicals with a lower income are also less conservative on economic matters, although they become more conservative as their income increases. Therefore, apart from a link with religion, cultural and economic conservatism may also be related to socio-economic status. As I already mentioned above, such a link has also been found in the Netherlands by Scheepers, Peters and Felling (2000), who demonstrated that higher educated Dutch are less culturally conservative and more economically conservative than lower educated Dutch. My sixth and final hypothesis, therefore, reads: Having a higher education and/or a higher income advances less conservative views on the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships and more conservative views on the reduction of income differences irrespective of type of evangelical (H6).
While testing these hypotheses, I will control for gender and age. Controlling for gender is necessary, because as from the 1970s Dutch women have become persistently less conservative on both economic and cultural issues than men (Vollebergh, Iedema and Meeus 1997). When it comes to age, Glas and I (Vermeer and Glas 2024) tested the discriminant validity of the typology we constructed and found the Questing liberals to be significantly younger than all other types of evangelicals. Since I use the same typology of evangelicals in this paper, this makes it worthwhile, if not necessary, to also control for age.
4 Method
4.1 Sampling and Data Collection
To answer the above research questions I use the dataset ‘Evangelical Protestants 2020’. This dataset contains the answers to a wide variety of survey questions of 1,112 Dutch who self-identify as evangelical. Adopting a purposive sampling strategy, these respondents were gathered with the help of several evangelical organizations in the Netherlands, like the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization, institutions for higher education affiliated with the Protestant-evangelical tradition and ecclesial bodies which can be considered evangelical such as the Union of Baptist Churches and the Church of the Nazarene. These national organizations and associations could not provide membership lists from which random samples could be taken, but they published a link to an online questionnaire on their websites, internal news bulletins and social media platforms, while some also forwarded this link to their online communities.3 The online questionnaire started with a brief introduction into the aim of the research in which it was also explicitly stated that only those are invited to fill in the questionnaire who are 18 years or older and who self-identify as evangelical. This way of targeting respondents via national organizations and associations instead of local congregations is appropriate given the fact that evangelicalism is a trans-denominational movement and so people cannot be identified as evangelical solely on the basis of their denominational affiliation or congregational belonging. However, a drawback of this approach is that several more independent migrant and Pentecostal churches were in this way missed. Consequently, since the respondents were not selected at random and probably also do not originate from migrant and Pentecostal churches this sample cannot be considered representative for all Dutch evangelicals.
The data were collected between October 2020 and January 2021 by the Center for Applied Research on Religion and Society (KASKI) of the Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies of Radboud University (www.ru.nl/kaski). A total of 1,112 respondents of 18 years or older finally completed the online questionnaire.
4.2 Description of the Sample
To provide a general description of the sample, I compare these evangelicals with data on the Dutch population as a whole regarding general demographics such as education, income, gender and age (see also Table 3 in the appendix).4 First, these evangelicals are highly educated. Three-quarters (75%) has a university of applied science degree, a university degree or higher, but for the Dutch population as a whole this is only 32%. In terms of income, 35% of these evangelicals earns between 3,000 and 5,000 euros per month. Their income is comparable to that of the Dutch population as a whole of whom 32% earns 40,000 euros per year. In terms of gender, men are only slightly overrepresented with 51% men compared to 49% men in the Dutch population. Finally, these evangelicals are slightly older. While 50% is between 40 and 65 years old and 20% is between 65 and 80, for the Dutch population as a whole these figures are 33% and 15%, respectively. Overall, then, their higher educational level is particularly striking.
4.3 Dependent Variables: Political Attitudes
The attitudes towards four political issues, one relating to the economic domain and three to the cultural domain, serve as dependent variables. These attitudes were measured using previously validated measures (Middendorp 1991, 98–103; see also Felling and Peters 1986; Vermeer and Scheepers 2018a).
The attitude towards the reduction of income differences concerns the economic domain and was measured with the help of two questions. The first question inquires after the respondents’ opinion towards the reduction of income differences with the following response categories: (1) income differences should decrease, (2) should stay the same and (3) should increase. The second question asks if the government should take drastic measures to reduce income differences. Here, response categories were: (1) in favor, (2) no opinion (3) and against. For each respondent a score was calculated by counting all conservative responses; i.e. the responses not in favor of the reduction of income differences (response categories 2 and 3). Thus the scale runs from (0) not a single conservative response to (2) two conservative responses. The association between the two items is strong (Cramérs V = 0.37, p<.001).
The respondents’ attitudes towards the freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships relate to the cultural domain. Regarding the freedom of speech, respondents were asked if people should be (1) free or (2) restricted to say what they want in public, to write what they want in public, to demonstrate and to criticize the royal house. A score was calculated by counting the times a respondent chose to restrict the freedom of speech as an indicator of their conservative stance on this issue. The scale for the attitude towards the freedom of speech runs from (0) not a single conservative response to (4) four conservative responses (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78).
The attitude towards pro-life issues concerns: abortion, suicide and euthanasia. With regard to abortion, they were asked if a woman should have the right to abortion with the following response categories: (1) no, (2) yes and (3) do not know. Similarly, they were asked if people have the right to commit suicide and have the right to euthanasia with four response categories: (1) no, (2) sometimes, (3) never and (4) do not know. Concerning these pro-life issues an overall score was calculated by counting all conservative answers; i.e. the number of times a respondent answered ‘no’ (1) and thus denied people one of the aforementioned rights. The scale for the attitude towards pro-life issues runs from (0) not a single conservative response to (3) three conservative responses (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.64).
The respondents’ views on traditional relationships were measured with the help of six questions concerning: cohabitation, marriage, remarriage, divorce, premarital sex and homosexuality. Respondents were asked to indicate on a five point Likert scale to what extent they consider these practices (1) acceptable or (5) unacceptable. These items were combined into a single scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91) and for each respondent a mean score was calculated. A higher mean score reflects a more conservative stance on traditional relationships.
4.4 Independent Variables: Childhood Religious Practices
Childhood religious practices concern juvenile church attendance, Bible reading and prayer in the home. Juvenile church attendance was measured with the help of the following question: “How often did you attend church services when you were 12 to 15 years old?” Respondents could indicate their level of juvenile church attendance on an eight point Likert scale running from (1) never to (8) more than once a week. In view of Bible reading and prayer respondents could indicate to what extent these were regular practices in their homes when they were 12 to 15 years old on a scale running from (1) never to (7) several times a day.
4.5 Independent Variables: Current Religious Practices
Current religious practices also concern church attendance, Bible reading and prayer. Church attendance was measured by asking: “Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic how often did you attend church services?”5 Respondents could again provide an answer on an eight point Likert scale running from (1) never to (8) more than once a week. Bible reading and prayer was measured by asking: “Do you sometimes read in the Bible/pray? If so, how often?” Respondents could answer on a five point Likert scale running from (1) no to (5) yes, several times a day.
4.6 Independent Variables: Pillarization
To determine to what extent the respondents are oriented towards their own evangelical pillar, they were asked if they are a member of the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization. In addition, they were also asked if they read a Christian newspaper. There are three major Christian newspapers in the Netherlands two of which, viz. Nederlands Dagblad (Dutch Newspaper) and Reformatorisch Dagblad (Reformed Newspaper), specifically target an orthodox Protestant and evangelical audience. If the respondents indicated to read one of these two newspapers or both, they were labeled as reading a Christian newspaper.
4.7 Independent Variable: Socio-economic Status
Socio-economic status refers to the respondents’ income and level of education. Income is the current net household income excluding allowances. Respondents could answer on a scale running from (1) less than 150 euros a month to (12) more than 10,000 euros a month. Responses were collapsed into four categories: lowest (less than 1,500 euros a month), intermediate (between 1,500 and 3,000 euros a month), high (between 3,000 to 5,000 euros a month) and highest (5,000 euros a month or more). However, 120 respondents (almost 10 percent of the entire sample) did not answer this question. To include these respondents in the analyses, I added an additional category for missing values on income. Education refers to the highest level of education respondents have completed. The original twelve point scale, running from (1) no education completed to (12) PhD, was again collapsed into four categories: lowest (highest education is lower vocational school), intermediate (highest education is pre-college), university of applied science and university+.
4.8 Controls
Gender was coded (0) for male and (1) for female. Age is 2020 minus the respondents’ year of birth. The descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 3 in the Appendix.
4.9 Analytical Strategy
I take two analytical steps. In view of the first research question, and in order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, I compare the mean scores of the five types of evangelicals on four political issues to see if the means differ significantly between the five types. This is done with the help of a one-way ANOVA and a Scheffé test as posthoc analysis. In view of the second research question, and to test hypotheses 3 to 6, I conduct a stepwise, linear regression analysis for each political attitude in which I estimate two models. In a first model, I estimate the effect of type of evangelical and control for gender and age. Partly similar to the ANOVA, this model shows to what extent the proclaiming, engaged, spiritual and seeking orthodox hold more conservative attitudes than the questing liberals; the questing liberals I take as the reference category in the analyses. In a second model, I add all other variables to the equation to see if there are additional factors, besides type of evangelical, that might explain the political attitudes of these evangelicals. The latter is the case, if these other variables have a significant effect and at the same time reduce the effect of a particular type of evangelical (Davis 1985, 40).
5 Results
5.1 Mean Scores Political Attitudes
Concerning the first research question, Table 1 displays the mean scores of the different types of evangelicals on four political issues. When it comes to the attitude towards the reduction of income differences, the issue relating to the economic domain, the evangelicals participating in this study are not very conservative. Nevertheless, there are differences between the five types. The proclaiming orthodox are the most conservative. They are the least in favor of reducing income differences and they are also the least supportive of the government taking measures to decrease income differences. The spiritual orthodox and questing liberals are the least conservative in this respect, while the engaged and seeking orthodox score in between the other types. Additional post-hoc analysis shows, that the proclaiming orthodox differ significantly from the spiritual orthodox, the questing liberals as well as from the seeking orthodox, but not from the engaged orthodox. The engaged orthodox, in turn, differ significantly from the spiritual orthodox and the questing liberals (F (4, 1.107) = 11.218, p < .001). These Dutch evangelicals thus also differ significantly from one another concerning their political attitudes towards the economic domain, which is not in line with my first hypothesis. Still, as expressed by the magnitude of the Eta coefficient (.20), the relationship between type of evangelical and a conservative attitude towards the reduction of income differences is rather weak.
Means of political attitudes concerning income differences, freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships for five types of evangelicals (SD)
Citation: Journal of Empirical Theology 2026; 10.1163/15709256-20240036
Also when it comes to the valuation of the freedom of speech, a political issue regarding the cultural domain, these evangelicals are not that conservative. This time the engaged orthodox are the most conservative followed closely by the proclaiming orthodox. However, their respective mean scores of. 73 and .71, on a scale running from 0 (not conservative) to 4 (very conservative), clearly indicate that even these most orthodox evangelicals barely support the restriction of the freedom of speech. Nevertheless, the engaged and proclaiming orthodox are still significantly more conservative than the spiritual orthodox and the questing liberals. Thus also with respect to the valuation of the freedom of speech certain types of evangelicals do differ significantly from one another (F (4, 1.107) = 7.834, p < .001), although the Eta coefficient of .17 again shows that this relationship is weak.
More pronounced differences come forward regarding the attitudes towards pro-life and traditional relationships. With respect to these cultural issues, type of evangelical really matters. This is also clearly confirmed by the Eta coefficients of .52 and .63, which show, that the relationship between type of evangelical and conservative attitudes towards pro-life and traditional relationships is very strong. The proclaiming orthodox are the most conservative with respect to pro-life issues such as abortion, euthanasia or suicide. They mostly consider these practices unacceptable, while the questing liberals are far more permissive in this respect. In between, then, are the engaged, spiritual and seeking orthodox. In addition, nearly all these differences are also statistically significant with the exception of the difference between the proclaiming and the engaged orthodox (F (4, 1.107) = 90.649, p < .001). The differences between the attitudes towards traditional relationships, i.e. attitudes towards cohabitation, marriage, remarriage, divorce, premarital sex and homosexuality, are even more pronounced. Again, the proclaiming orthodox are the most conservative, while the questing liberals are the most permissive. In between are the engaged orthodox, the spiritual orthodox and the seeking orthodox, which all differ significantly from one another (F (4, 1.038) = 170.147, p < .001).
As mentioned already, these results are not in line with my first hypothesis. Not only with respect to the cultural domain, but also with respect to the economic domain significant differences do come forward; although the differences with respect to the cultural domain are more pronounced. However, my second hypothesis finds more support. Not only are the two most orthodox types, i.e. the proclaiming and engaged orthodox, consistently the most conservative, when it comes to the attitudes towards pro-life and traditional relationships each successive type, from the questing liberals to the proclaiming orthodox, is slightly more conservative than the previous type. This confirms the discriminant validity of this evangelical typology and also shows that ideological differences between the various evangelical types pertain not only to theological controversies, but also to political controversies regarding pro-life issues and traditional relationships.
5.2 Multivariate Analyses
Different types of evangelicals also have different political views on economic and cultural issues. But are these differences mainly due to type of evangelical or are other and perhaps more decisive factors also at work here? Table 2 displays the results of the regression analyses and provides an answer to this question.6 The results concerning the attitude towards the reduction of income differences again disconfirm the first hypothesis. Also with respect to this economic issue, type of evangelical matters and this effect barely changes when additional religious and non-religious factors are taken into consideration (Model 2). Besides type of evangelical, a conservative stance on the reduction of income differences is also the result of having been raised in a family in which Bible reading was a regular practice, of church attendance and of reading the Bible less regularly. In addition, this attitude is also an effect of income, with evangelicals in the highest income category being more economically conservative than evangelicals in the lowest category, and age with younger evangelicals being less economically conservative. But adding these religious and non-religious factors to the equation only turns the effect of being a seeking orthodox evangelical into non-significance and does not affect the effect of being a proclaiming or engaged orthodox evangelical. Although the explained variance is rather low (R2 adj. = .053), this result, nevertheless, suggests that the economic conservatism among these two latter types is part and parcel of their specific evangelical identity.
Stepwise OLS regression analyses for political attitudes concerning income differences, freedom of speech, pro-life issues and traditional relationships (β ).
Citation: Journal of Empirical Theology 2026; 10.1163/15709256-20240036
The attitude towards the freedom of speech is related to four factors: type of evangelical, gender, age and education. As Model 1 shows, proclaiming and engaged orthodox evangelicals are significantly more in favor of restricting the freedom of speech than the questing liberals and this also goes for female and older evangelicals. All other additional factors have no effect with the exception of education (Model 2). Evangelicals with a university degree or higher are significantly less conservative in this respect than evangelicals with lower vocational school as their highest level of education. Moreover, including education into the equation also slightly reduces the effect of being a proclaiming or engaged orthodox evangelical. This suggests that the conservative stance towards the freedom of speech among these two evangelical types is also the result of their lower level of education. However, it should be noted that the explained variance is again very low (R2 adj. .047). This indicates that the aforementioned factors barely explain the conservatism of evangelicals in this respect and that other, as yet unknown, factors thus are more important.
As we have seen already, there is a strong relationship between religion and a conservative attitude towards pro-life issues. Model 1 confirms that the proclaiming, engaged, spiritual and seeking orthodox evangelicals are more conservative in this respect than the questing liberals, while female evangelicals tend to be less conservative when it comes to pro-life issues. Moreover, additional religious factors now are also of importance and reduce the effect of being a proclaiming, engaged, spiritual or seeking orthodox evangelical by 31%, 35%, 42% and 78% respectively (Model 2); and also add 9 percentage points to the explained variance (R2 adj. .355). This suggests that to the extent these latter four evangelical types were raised in families in which church attendance and Bible reading were regular practices as well as to the extent they nowadays attend church and read the Bible and a Christian newspaper more often, they are also more conservative on pro-life issues than the questing liberals. What is more, by adding these additional religious factors to the equation the difference between the seeking orthodox and the question liberals even becomes non-significant. This shows that the conservatism on pro-life issues among the seeking orthodox is more a matter of these additional religious factors than of their typological distinctives.
The results regarding the attitude towards traditional relationships are mostly similar to the results concerning the attitude towards pro-life issues. Again there is a strong effect of evangelical type, while female evangelicals and now also younger evangelicals tend to be less conservative when it comes to traditional relationships (Model 1). Additional religious factors, which now only concern current practices of church attendance, Bible reading and reading a Christian newspaper (Model 2), are also of importance and reduce the effect of being a proclaiming, engaged, spiritual or seeking orthodox evangelical by 22%, 24%, 32% and 37% respectively and increase the explained variance by 5 percentage points (R2 adj. .442). Hence, to the extent these latter four evangelical types attend church and read the Bible and a Christian newspaper more often they also hold a more conservative attitude towards traditional relationships. Still, type of evangelical remains the most important predictor for a conservative stance towards traditional relationships.
To recapitulate, my findings disconfirm the first hypothesis. Different types of evangelicals not only hold different political views concerning the cultural domain, but also concerning the economic domain. My second hypothesis, in contrast, finds more support. Especially when it comes to the attitudes towards pro-life issues and traditional relationships the typology of evangelicals not only reflects an orthodox – liberal continuum, but also a conservative – progressive continuum. The effect of religious socialization experiences, as predicted by my third hypothesis, again is weak and marginal. Childhood religious practices advance a conservative stance towards pro-life issues, but they do not affect attitudes towards the freedom of speech and traditional relationships, while they, contrary to my expectation, do have an effect on the attitude towards the reduction of income differences. Thus also this third hypothesis is barely supported by my findings. My fourth hypothesis finds more support. Current practices of Bible reading and to a lesser extent church attendance indeed advance a more conservative stance towards pro-life issues and traditional relationships. But, contrary to my third hypothesis, these practices are unrelated to the attitude towards the freedom of speech, while they are related to the evangelicals’ views on the reduction of income differences with church attendance endorsing a more conservative and Bible reading a less conservative stance on this issue. Support for my fifth hypothesis concerning pillarization is also weak. Being a member of the Evangelical Broadcasting Organization is unrelated to the conservative attitudes of these evangelicals, while reading a Christian newspaper has a moderate effect on their conservative stance towards pro-life issues and a weak effect on their conservatism regarding traditional relationships. Finally, also my sixth hypothesis concerning the effect of socio-economic status, i.e. education and income, is barely supported by my findings. Education only affects the attitude towards the freedom of speech with evangelicals with a university degree being more supportive of the freedom of speech than evangelicals with lower vocational school, while evangelicals in the highest income category are more opposed to the reduction of income differences than evangelicals in the lowest income categories. Given the overall poor support for these hypotheses, one can conclude that type of evangelical is what matters most when it comes to the conservatism of these Dutch evangelicals.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
In the foregoing I considered the political attitudes of Dutch evangelicals in view of the following research questions: (1) Do different types of evangelicals also hold different political attitudes on economic and cultural issues? and (2) Which additional factors determine the political attitudes of evangelicals in this respect besides type of evangelical? These questions may now be answered as follows. Different types of evangelicals do indeed hold different political attitudes on cultural and even on economic issues. What is more, especially in view of their attitudes regarding the cultural domain, the typology of evangelicals evens seems to reflect a clear conservative – progressive continuum. Still, besides their typological distinctives, the different political attitudes these evangelicals hold are also determined, though clearly to a lesser extent, by their juvenile, religious socialization experiences and/or their involvement in socio-religious networks. To conclude this paper, I will offer three reflections on this overall result.
My first reflection concerns the attitudes towards cultural issues and more specifically the differing attitudes towards pro-life issues and traditional relationships these evangelicals display. In my opinion, these differing attitudes reflect the reversed relationship between religion and social norms Inglehart (2021, 56–62) is referring to. As mentioned already above, within various high-income countries individual choice norms have gradually replaced pro-fertility norms. Pro-fertility norms endorse traditional gender roles and emphasize the reproductive function of sexual behavior against abortion, homosexuality or divorce. In less secure, developing countries marked by high rates of infant mortality and lower levels of life expectancy pro-fertility norms are vital to societal persistence and are traditionally backed by religion. But in more secure high-income countries with low rates of infant mortality and high levels of life expectancy pro-fertility norms are less important and gradually give way to individual-choice norms which are more alien to religion; like norms supporting gender equality and tolerance towards abortion, homosexuality and divorce. Inglehart (2018) calls this fundamental value shift a ‘cultural evolution’, which has reversed the relationship between religion and social norms. In less secure, low-income countries religion helps sustain pro-fertility norms. In high-income countries, however, this shift in values has reached a tipping point, where norms of individual choice have become dominant in society. This development is also evident in the Netherlands, where a majority of the population now approves of abortion, homosexuality, and divorce and rejects traditional gender roles (Kregting, Van Lieburg and Vermeer 2025, 130–138). This situation exerts social pressure on the religious segment of the population to also conform to these more progressive norms. In this latter case, then, social norms affect religion. That is to say, the societal dominance of individual-choice norms urges religious people to reconsider their previous attitudes towards pro-life issues and traditional relationships. Now, the latter, I believe, is also reflected by my findings.
As my findings show, evangelicals hold different attitudes towards pro-life issues and traditional relationships and these differences are mainly the result of differing theological beliefs. With respect to all four political attitudes examined here, but especially for the attitudes towards pro-life issues and traditional relationships, type of evangelical is the strongest predictor for a conservative stance towards these issues (see Table 2). And since this typology is based on differences regarding core evangelical beliefs concerning the Bible, creation, religious plurality and the like, it is safe to conclude that these theological beliefs are the main determining factors of the cultural conservatism of these Dutch evangelicals. This insight is also in line with the earlier findings of Vermeer and Scheepers (2018a), who found that the conservative stances of Dutch evangelicals towards pro-life issues and homosexuality are in large part the result of their literal understanding of the Bible and the belief that Jesus Christ is the only road to salvation. Thus, while certain types of evangelicals, most notably the proclaiming and engaged orthodox, resist the societal pressure to conform to popular norms and let their religious convictions inform their political attitudes, other types of evangelicals, most notably the younger questing liberals, may be more susceptible to cultural influences and, as a consequence, conform to popular norms and become less strict in their religious convictions. An explanation which is also supported by the fact, that the conservatism of the proclaiming and engaged orthodox is also the least mediated by other religious factors (see Table 2).
My second reflection focuses on the economic domain. Contrary to my first hypothesis, I also found differing attitudes towards the reduction of income differences. This comes as a surprise. Traditionally, the link between religion and economic conservatism has been weak in the Netherlands (see for instance Scheepers, Peters and Felling 2000), while the aforementioned study of Vermeer and Scheepers (2018a) even showed no relationship at all between evangelicalism and economic conservatism. But this current study into the political attitudes of different types of evangelicals also reveals differences concerning the economic domain. Although the differences are modest, both the proclaiming and engaged orthodox are significantly more conservative, i.e. they are less in favor of reducing income differences. Furthermore, as the regression analysis shows (see Table 2), type of evangelical is again the strongest predictor for a conservative stance in this respect. This suggests that the economic conservatism of these two most orthodox types is in part also the result of their religious convictions. Thus, what we see here, is a smaller segment of Dutch evangelicals, who not only let their religious convictions inform their political attitudes towards the cultural domain, but towards the economic domain as well.
Exactly how religious convictions inform the economic conservatism of these orthodox evangelicals is hard to tell on the basis of this study. Although the Dutch welfare provisions nowadays put more emphasis on individual responsibility instead of collective solidarity, there is still widespread support in the Netherlands for the idea that those in need deserve the protection of the state. Furthermore, when it comes to income, the Dutch welfare system is characterized by a certain degree of corporatism, whereby wages are settled by collective labor agreements between workers and employers (Van Oorschot 2006). The role of religious bodies or charity organizations has traditionally been marginal in this respect. It is unlikely, therefore, that the economic conservatism of these more orthodox, Dutch evangelicals is influenced by a strong anti-welfare state sentiment. Probably, it is more an expression of a traditional Calvinistic work ethic. This traditional work ethic stresses one’s individual responsibility for earning a living (see 2 Thessalonians 3, 10: “Anyone unwilling to work should not eat.”) and is a key-principle of English puritanism as one of the roots of contemporary evangelicalism. But unlike American evangelicals, as Bean (2014a, 112–132, 160–162) has shown, among Dutch evangelicals this image of a ‘disciplined self’ probably has not resulted in a kind of economic individualism which makes man solely responsible for his economic success and failure. Still, whether this interpretation is correct, calls for further research into the economic conservatism of Dutch evangelicals.
My third and final reflection concerns the fluidity of evangelical identity. These respondents all have in common that they self-identify as evangelical and they are all involved in, or familiar with, various evangelical organizations and communities. Otherwise, the invitation to participate in this study would not have reached them. But despite this shared background, my findings also show that Dutch evangelicals do not constitute one homogeneous subcultural group. Especially when it comes to cultural issues like pro-life or traditional relationships, some are conservative and others are progressive. This is further evidence, I believe, of an ongoing process of cultural homogenization in the Netherlands (Becker et al. 1995), whereby secular and religious people alike gradually become more progressive towards cultural issues like the appreciation of the freedom of speech, abortion, euthanasia, cohabitation or homosexuality. As a small minority Dutch evangelicals are constantly challenged to position themselves vis-à-vis Dutch secular society and to reconsider their identity and even, as Klaver (2010) explained, their theology. In their pursuit of academic recognition, Dutch evangelical theologians have sought to conform to academic standards by adopting hermeneutical principles and so gradually developed a different view on the authority of the Bible and reconsidered traditional notions of biblical inerrancy. Also this aspect shows, I believe, that Dutch evangelicals are aware of and responsive to their societal context and that evangelical identity is fluid.
This study of Dutch evangelicals thus clearly shows that evangelicals do not necessarily constitute one homogeneous subcultural group and researchers should be careful, therefore, to automatically equate evangelicalism with conservatism. However, my assumption that this diversity is due to the secular environment Dutch evangelicals find themselves in and to the social pressure they experience as a religious minority still needs further empirical testing. In this respect, this Dutch case study also calls for additional, cross-national comparative research between Dutch evangelicals and evangelicals in less secular environments and/or evangelicals in a majority position.
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Appendix
Descriptive statistics
Citation: Journal of Empirical Theology 2026; 10.1163/15709256-20240036
Source: Evangelical Protestants in 2020For detailed information concerning the construction of this typology, like the measures used and the statistical analyses we conducted, see Vermeer and Glas (2024).
Of course, this ideal-typical distinction of economic progressiveness as opposed to economic conservatism ignores more nuanced or in-between positions of, for example, anarchists who may be critical of existing income differences but who would at the same time also reject interventions of a higher authority like the state.
More detailed information regarding this survey and the data can be found here: https://doi.org/10.34973/denb-3734.
This concerns the data of the Dutch population on January 1, 2021. The data are from Statistics Netherlands: StatLine.
At the time the data were gathered (October 2020–January 2021) Dutch society was in partial lockdown to prevent the spread of the Corona virus. Although church services were not officially forbidden most religious communities stopped holding physical gatherings. For this reason, respondents were asked to report their frequency of church attendance prior to the out-break of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Given the strong association between type of evangelical and the attitudes towards pro-life and traditional relationships (see Table 1), I also checked for multicollinearity. In the four regression analyses the VIF’s are below 10 and the tolerance never reaches a value below 0.1, which indicates that the regression models are not biased by multicollinearity.
