Abstract
In 1763, Aḥmad ShÄh DurrÄnÄ« sent an embassy to the Qianlong emperor. The envoy caused offence by refusing to prostrate himself. Still, the Qing court fêted his embassy. It seemed the beginning of a promising relationship, but the two empires never had contact again. The Qing court presented the embassy as a tributary mission, but in the pragmatic world of Qing frontier policy, contact with the DurrÄnÄ«s was deliberately avoided. Why did no relationship develop? This attitude stemmed from Qianlongâs distrust of Central Asian rulers, and his understanding of the Afghans not as a tributary, but a rival imperial power.
Introduction
Shortly before the celebration of the New Year in February 1763, ambassadors from distant lands from within and without the Qing empire arrive in Beijing. Many have been traveling for months on end. Now, in the beating heart of the empire, each is to take part in rituals that reaffirm their respective relationships with the emperor. This year, parties from the empireâs far western frontier representing Kazakh tribes, Khoqand, and BadakhshÄn arrive with a unique and unfamiliar companion in tow: KhwÄja Mirhan, envoy of the Afghan ruler AhÌ£mad ShaÌh DurrÄnÄ« (r. 1747â73).1
The Muslim ambassadors are invited to meet the emperor for the first time in his personal quarters at the Palace of Renewed Splendor (chónghuá gÅng
KhwÄja Mirhan refuses. He has performed prostrations before, when presenting his letter upon arriving in Beijing, but will not koutou before the emperor. Incensed, several of the Qing Grand Councilors present at the reception reprimand him:
Why has your Khan dispatched you? Has your Khan not sent you to appear at an audience with the brilliance of our Great Lord? Our Great Lord is the ruler who has united All under Heaven. Besides you Afghans, as soon as people from the West, Russia, even the former Zunghars came, all of them promptly prostrated themselves before the Great Lord. He is like Heaven; do you not bow before Heaven?3
Their furious rebuke âcausing him to tremble to the point of exhaustionâ (Ma. lasihidame mohobume), Mirhan relents and performs the three kneelings and nine head-knockings. Is it enough to appease the emperor? Qianlong will later recount that the envoy went through the motions âpresenting a picture of recalcitranceâ (Ma. murin tarin i arbuÅ¡ambi), but he allows the embassy to proceed in accordance with Qing regulations.4 Mirhan is received at lavish imperial banquets and invited to attend the annual Manchu ice-skating spectacles; he joins the emperor in the Happy-Together Garden and watches impressive military performances. He drinks the imperial tea.
Reading of these events today, we know that this picture of amity was a façade. If Mirhan felt that, despite his faux pas, he was witnessing the amicable beginnings of a relationship between the Qing and DurrÄnÄ« empires, he was mistaken. After the customary diplomatic receptions and protocols, he was hustled out of the empire hurriedly, with no further fanfare or banquets. Neither the DurrÄnÄ«s nor the Qing court would initiate a single embassy again. Within five years, in 1768, DurrÄnÄ« armies invaded BadakhshÄn, the Qing vassal that separated the two empires. The BadakhshÄnÄ« ruler desperately appealed to the Qing for relief in several letters, asking, âHow long can I resist such enemies?â5 But no help came: not so much as a letter, let alone an army, was sent to the Afghans. KhwÄja Mirhanâs mission appears inconsequential: it seems to have produced no results.
Nevertheless, Qianlong made sure that the record of AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâs embassy would be long-lasting. The Afghans were recorded in the list of tribute-bearing polities. Their shÄhâs gift of horses was materially commemorated by way of calligraphed poems, paintings, and a fine cabinet. Furthermore, the embassy provided the Qing emperor with knowledge and ideas about lands beyond the westernmost reaches of his domain, informing his decision-making about affairs on the frontier. By contrast, the embassy left no trace in extant DurrÄnÄ«-sponsored sources. The British ambassador to the DurraÌniÌ court in 1808â9, Mountstuart Elphinstone, claimed that the DurraÌniÌ envoy had written an account of the trip to Beijing, but he was unable to procure it.6 However, dispatching the embassy was a significant performance of imperial status
on AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâs part. The embassyâs significance for both empires emerges when drawing out the meanings ascribed to the embassy, and the tensions of its course and outcome.
AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâs relations with the Qing are not widely studied. They have primarily been discussed in works by scholars of the Qing, rather than scholars of the DurraÌniÌs or Afghan history. Scholars with an Afghan focus who refer to the Qing at all do so in passing, foregrounding the shaÌhâs ostensibly religious motivations and alliance with other Muslim rulers, and just reference secondary literature by China scholars.7 Ê¿â Abd al-ShakuÌr RishaÌd very briefly touches on the embassy in a Pashto-language chapter on an attempted Russian embassy to Aḥmad ShÄh. While it is possible that other Afghan historians have produced studies on the topic, we have been unable to find any.8
Qing scholars offer more detail and refer to primary sources, but DurraÌniÌ-Qing relations are almost never their focus. Laura Hostetler, for example, briefly discusses illustrations and a short text concerning the Afghans in the Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributary Peoples (huáng qÄ«ng zhÃgòng tú
elements analyzed by Hostetler.10 Another detailed, but still brief, reference is found in the footnotes of Yuri Bregelâs edition of the nineteenth-century history of Khwarazm, Firdaws al-IqbaÌl. Bregel focuses on Russian primary sources relating to DurraÌniÌ-Qing relations.11 A handful of other studies briefly mention aspects of the DurraÌniÌ-Qing encounter in wider discussions about Qing policy in Central Asia.12
None of these works engages with much primary or secondary literature on Afghan history. An important contribution which does engage with Persian-language primary texts is David Brophyâs chapter on Persian letters in the Beijing Archive, which offers discussion and reproductions of original letters sent by regional rulers, several of which refer to Afghan campaigns in the region. Nevertheless the Afghans are not his focus.13 There is a single dedicated study of the relations between AhÌ£mad ShaÌh and the Qing in Chinese. Largely based on Qing primary documents, Li Xiaoâs 2013 article presents a comprehensive overview of the Afghan embassy to the Qing court, contextualizing it with reference to regional developments such as the rise of Khoqand and the perilous situation of BadakhshÄn. Li asks why the Qing court failed to confront the rising Afghan threat to its Central Asian frontier.
Liâs argument is that the Afghan attempt at diplomacy failed to be recognized as communication on an equal level, because the Qianlong emperor embraced the traditional Chinese view of himself as representative of the Heavenly dynasty.14 As the emperor ruled supreme over the world, all other polities were subordinate to him. As they participated in tributary rituals, the rulers of those politiesâand more often, their representativesârecognized the emperorâs authority. Consequently, Li reasons, the emperor could only recognize the Afghansâ embassy as a submissive tributary mission, and disregarded its requests, and decided to break off contact when a dispute about ritual emerged.15 Secondly, Li states that the Qing empire had only a minor military presence in Altishahr (present-day southern Xinjiang), rendering it unable to intervene in Central Asia. In light of the above, Li concludes that the Qianlong emperorâs stance toward the Afghans was conciliatory and aimed at preserving his tenuous hold on the newly incorporated cities of the Tarim basin with little conflict.16
Some of Li Xiaoâs arguments are at odds with the emperorâs actions, and overlook the intricacies of Qing diplomacy.17 Liâs emphasis on ritual as a decisive factor in Qing diplomacy echoes the interpretation of Qing diplomacy as channeled exclusively through the Chinese âTribute System,â an idea put forward by Jonathan Fairbank.18 In recent decades, Fairbankâs model has come under scrutiny. This model emphasized Chinaâs rigid and unilateral control of foreign relationships through the âtribute system,â whose unbending, illusory rituals of Chinese supremacy encompassed and regulated all aspects of diplomatic contact, thereby preventing energetic and resourceful engagement with others, especially European states.19
Fairbankâs model was premised on the absolute centrality of Chinese imperial ritual, based on the notion that foreign conquerors of China necessarily and rapidly became sinicized, for this was the only way they might successfully establish themselves as emperors of China. A new wave of scholarship has in recent decades challenged the idea of Qing sinicization, and concurrently drawn attention to the emperorâs engagement with various ethnic groups within and without the empire. It has revealed an array of different, nuanced diplomatic relationships between the Qing and other powers, far from the rigid constraints of âtribute ritual,â but supplemented by layered possibilities for interaction.20 Viewing the Mirhan embassy exclusively in the sinocentric terms of the tributary relationship therefore limits explanations of its events.
James Heviaâs 1995 conception of Qing guest ritual as the continuous reproduction of an inherently hierarchical Qing cosmology, in which all who visited the Qing court were included as âlesser lords,â is especially helpful to our analysis of the Afghan embassy. Through reciprocal action in ritual, in which all lords of the world could be included, the emperor together with the lesser lords reaffirmed the cosmological order.21 It provided anâthough not the soleâavenue for Afghan interaction with the Qing court. Tonio Andrade makes the important point that a degree of âdeliberate ambiguityâ was crucial when conducting diplomacy. Ambiguity helped different parties navigate distinct cosmologies, maintaining appearances that were acceptable to both while allowing for a productive relationship.22
Aligning with these developments in the study of Qing ideology and diplomacy, we at the same time look to efforts to better integrate the DurraÌniÌs into the history of empire in eighteenth-century South and Central Asia. Often, the DurraÌniÌs are treated as a preliminary episode of Afghan state-building,23 inevitably taking up less space than later, better-documented nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments. In South Asia, much focus has gone into the DurraÌniÌ invasions of northern India, and their weakening of native empires prior to major British expansion.24 Jagjeet Lally has argued that framing the DurraÌniÌs as an âexogenous shockâ reduces their âconstructive agency.â25 Especially in recent years, scholars have given greater priority to that agency by examining the empireâs construction of a bold imperial self-image.26 A study of the embassy to Beijing and its aftermath will contribute to this expanding literature.
We therefore examine the DurraÌniÌ-Qing relationship, firstly by examining the 1763 embassy in light of the two empiresâ cosmologies. We then explore the implications of Qing non-engagement during the 1768â69 Afghan attacks on BadakhshÄn. Our guiding question is why no lasting contact materialized between the two empiresâeither amicable or hostileâafter the embassy, despite a shared, contested frontier zone. We argue that, even as the formal world of the Qing court depicted the Afghans as normal tributaries for decades, the Qianlong emperor refused communication because he saw the DurrÄnÄ« empire as a rival power outside his reach and, like other Central Asian polities, as irredeemably warlike and capricious. AhÌ£mad ShÄh, meanwhile, having asserted his position and occupied with other campaigns, did not need to pursue further contact.
1 Convergence of Two Imperial Formations and Cosmologies
1.1 DurraÌniÌ Ideology and AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs Letter
Praise be to AllaÌhâwhat a court is this, which is like the heavens; what a court is this, the sanctuary of emperors [Pe. khawaÌqiÌn-panÄh], which crown- and diadem-wearing sultÌ£aÌns, kings of countries and climes consider a refuge, and send covenants and tribute, [and] emissaries.
MahÌ£mÅ«d al-HÌ£usaynÄ«, discussing a Mughal embassy to AhÌ£mad ShaÌh in 175627
We begin by approaching the 1763 embassy from the DurrÄnÄ« perspective and considering its motives. As we lack Afghan sources on the topic, DurrÄnÄ« aims are rather opaque. The choice of gifts and envoy, or other dimensions of the embassy might be fruitfully (but cautiously) analyzed, but for our purposes it is preferable to engage with the closest thing we have to an Afghan primary source for the embassy: AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs letter to the Qianlong emperor. While we lack its original text, the Qianlong emperorâs replies to it in his reciprocal letter allow us to glean something of AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs position.
An embassy allowed AhÌ£mad ShÄh to proclaim his status as a great emperor in his own right. As Waleed Ziad writes, while in contemporary Iran, Central and South Asia â[n]ew ruling houses [â¦] avoided using traditional titles like khan and shah [â¦] Ahmad Shah adopted [the] idea of universal kingship[.]â28 He and his successors made use of superlative imperial titles like âking of kingsâ (Pe. shaÌhaÌnshaÌh), âking of the worldâ (Pe. shaÌh-i jahaÌn) and âworld-possessorâ (Pe. giÌtiÌ-sitaÌn).29 A number of works have explored AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs articulation of a divine mission, tied to his personal qualities, his mystical and spiritual potency, and an exalted status for the Afghans and especially the DurrÄnÄ«s, which justified his imperial hegemony as âcrown-bestowerâ (Pe. taÌj-bakhsh) over the more established royal houses of Iran and Hindustan.30
The letter AhÌ£mad ShÄh sent to Beijing has clear parallels with the extensive letter addressed to the Ottoman sultÌ£aÌn Muá¹£á¹afÄ III in 1762, which makes for a useful comparison. In the latter, AhÌ£mad ShÄh refers to the recipient as âbrotherâ (Pe. barÄdar), a bold assertion of parity with the self-proclaimed caliph.31 In other royal correspondence, AhÌ£mad ShÄh refers to his âGod-given stateâ (Pe. dawlat-i khudÄ-dÄd) or otherwise proclaims the legitimacy of his status. Similar evocations would have adorned the letter to the Qing emperor.32
The Qing rulerâs reply to AhÌ£mad ShÄh reflects two distinct themes. One is AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs campaigns, particularly his resounding victory at Panipat (1761). â[A]s you have stated, for many years now, you have warred to and fro [Ma. ubade tubade; Ch. gèchù
Panipat, AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs single greatest battlefield victory, appears to receive the most detailed treatment, just as it did in the Ottoman correspondence. The Qianlong emperor refers to it in detail:
Furthermore, you stated in your letter that when Balaji Baji Rao, ruler of the Marathas, had heard of your conquest of the city of JahÄnÄbÄd [Delhi], he united his neighboring tribes, combining them into a force of many hundreds of thousands of mounted and foot soldiers. He led all of them to a place called Karnal to do battle with you, but when they heard of your personal presence, they became terrified and ensconced themselves inside the city of Panipat. After a siege of six months, you killed thirty-five great Begs, slaughtered over a hundred thousand troops, and obtained a tremendous amount of tools and vessels, gold, and silver. Balaji was able to assemble such a force and then did not attack, but instead retreated to the fortress-city of Panipat to sit and wait for annihilation. That is a matter I truly cannot understand.35
The timeline, and some details, are somewhat garbled. Still, this passage clearly parallels AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs retelling of the battle in his Ottoman letter, and letters to the Rajput chiefs soon after the battle.36 From these retellings, it is clear that AhÌ£mad ShÄh was producing what is known in Persian epistolary (inshÄâ) terminology as a fathÌ£-nÄma, a âletter of victory.â The fathÌ£-nÄma was meant to celebrate and inflate a kingâs military victory in lucid language, reflecting on his power and the obligation of kings to order human affairs and fight tyranny and unbelief.37
The Qianlong emperor was evidently attuned to the undertones of threat in this fathÌ£-nÄma section, for he downplays the enormity of the victory by criticizing the Marathas for irrationally âsit[ting] and wait[ing] for annihilation.â At the same time, this veiled reply indicates that the two parties were not dealing in open threats. AhÌ£mad ShÄh was playing with ambiguity and allowing his broader assertion of power and status to double as a tacit threat.
The second theme is the Qing conquest of Altishahr and its aftermath. Here, the Qianlong emperor paints a more conciliatory picture of AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs words. He presents the Afghan emperor as complimentary of Qing expansion: âyou mentioned that we are far removed from one another [â¦]. Since word had reached you that we have now subjugated all tribes, your gratification was unparalleled.â38 Perhaps more substantively, he claims that AhÌ£mad ShÄh acknowledged withdrawing from a campaign to Bukhara upon learning of Bukharaâs submission to the Qing: âThis is sufficient to illuminate the sincerity of your deference.â39
There is good reason to doubt this picture of deference, which was certainly not part of AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs image as a universal ruler. Between the lines of the Qianlong emperorâs reply, it seems clear he was responding to more pointed remarks from his Afghan counterpart. He felt the need to justify his attacks on the Zunghars and the KhwÄjas (or Khojas), two brothers and Sufi leaders. Since the seventeenth century, their powerful lineage had wielded political, spiritual, and economic power in the Central Asian territories only recently conquered by the Qing and led a revolt against the Qing in 1759. Well before the seventeenth century, Sufis of the wider Naqshbandiyya order to which the brothers belonged had held great influence in the region.40 Qianlong accused the Zunghars of âla[ying] waste to one anotherâs lands and exterminat[ing] one another,â and the KhwÄjas of âturn[ing] their backs to my graces and lev[ying] false accusations against me, their benefactor.â41 This defensive tone seems to reflect Laura Newbyâs statement that despite Qing glossing, âaccording to [AhÌ£mad ShÄh], his intention was to address the emperor on the matter of Qing rule in Central Asia and to petition on behalf of the AÌfaÌqÄ« khoja house.â42 Jin Noda cites a Russian report concerning a Kazakh envoy to Beijing, who claimed to have heard from Mirhan that AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs position was that âsuch territories claimed by the Qing Dynasty all belong to us, Muslims,â evoking the AÌfaÌqÄ«âs longstanding legitimacy in Altishahr.43
However, these statements are derived from sources separated from AhÌ£mad ShÄh by several degrees, or by decades. His letter was unlikely to be directly, or exclusively, threatening. AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs supposed expression of gladness at the gap between the two empires closing may be overstated, but we need not assume it was fabricated. Treating the occasion as an exchange between powerful monarchs served AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs interests, and inshÄâ conventions for royal letters typically include praise for the recipient and expression of desire to make contact.44 The letterâs lavish golden adornments communicated DurrÄnÄ« majesty, but also conferred honor upon the recipient.45 Furthermore, we need not doubt the reality of Qianlongâs statement regarding Aḥmad ShÄhâs abandonment of his campaign against Bukharaâeven if âthe sincerity of [Aḥmad ShÄhâs] deferenceâ may be doubted. AhÌ£mad ShÄh may have been willing to demarcate spheres of control: his letter to Muá¹£á¹afÄ III had posited a division of Iran between them, and in 1769 he negotiated the Amu Darya as a border with Bukhara.46
Once again, there are signs of calculated ambiguity. From Qianlongâs tone, it appears that Aḥmad ShÄhâs letter did express a desire for conciliation. However, certain sections, especially the fathÌ£-nÄma passages, emphasize his status and power and offer latent threat. If the more amicable overtures were not reciprocated, however, AhÌ£mad ShÄh had no need to further encourage Qianlongâs ideas of DurrÄnÄ« âdeference,â which were in principle unacceptable to him.47 Since war was on the cards, further ambiguous or friendly embassies would be unnecessary. AhÌ£mad ShÄh was also occupied on other fronts: in 1764 a Russian envoy sent to encourage an anti-Qing campaign by the Afghans turned back after reaching Herat and learning Aḥmad ShÄh was busy campaigning in Punjab, with no apparent plans to venture north.48 As we will see in the remainder of this article, the Qing response would depend on a complex interplay of imperial cosmology and on-the-ground developments in Central Asia.
1.2 Reconciling Ritual Hiccups at the Qing Court
As Qing officials stood in shock and the Councilors commanded KhwÄja Mirhan to bow, the Qianlong emperor pondered the Afghansâ intentions. The envoy did eventually prostrate himself, reluctantly, but damage had been done. Afterwards, the emperor wrote: ânow that I have witnessed such comportment on the part of [AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs] emissary, I understand that the Afghans are not a tribe who comprehend proper customs and reason at all! There is no need to send [them] an emissary to bestow even the slightest bit of favor.â49 Li Xiao analyzes this âdispute of ritualâ as the point at which the emperor decided to cut ties with the Afghans.50
Yet, no immediate rupture followed. Indeed the Qing court proceeded with all customary guest rituals and showed the Afghan envoy great favor, and long after KhwÄja Mirhan had disappeared beyond the Pamirs, the Qing continued to count the Afghans as their tributaries. At the same time, Qianlong was clearly displeased and wary, and hastily ordered precautions to be taken to secure the frontier of Altishahr.51 How and why did this contentious embassy survive and continue to be represented in the formal world of the court?
Of central importance to this question is cosmology. The cosmology of the Qing empire combined traditions of legitimacy and rulership from across China and Inner Asia, as discussed in the Introduction. The Qianlong emperorâs position at the apex of the temporal world depended upon constant reiteration and reconfirmation of relationships with all subject peoples. Emissaries participated in and conformed with a coherent collection of ritual actionsâprostrations, presenting gifts, accepting the gift of teaâinitiated by the emperor, and reciprocated properly. The emperor again reciprocated, confirming the hierarchical relationships between, as Hevia calls them, the worldâs supreme ruler and lesser lords. Because they required mutual engagement and recognition, subject to negotiation, these actions themselves constituted the production of power relations.52
The formation of these relations was constant, not momentary. Reciprocal and confirmative processes of guest ritual commenced from arrival at the border, where local authorities provided an escort. Banquets in provincial capitals, provisions and transport, housing, and protection were all a demonstration of imperial benevolence.53 Moments of transformative or confirmative ritual action, such as the emissaryâs turn to perform the koutou, were especially meaningful. Audience with the emperor was the apogee of a single ritual process.
Mirhan had already performed prostrations when he had presented his letter upon arrival in the capital, but he refused to do so before the emperor.54 This indicates that there was no confusion about the physical act of prostration. Rather, Mirhanâs refusal came when he understood the emperor was the object of his veneration. This was a grave insult to the emperorâs cosmological position. Mirhan may have operated out of religious considerations, finding the prostration explicitly before a human being rather than before Allah impermissibleâthough other Muslim emissaries had no qualms with prostration. But as the Afghan emissary to Qianlong, his refusal was tantamount to the assertion that AhÌ£mad ShÄh DurrÄnÄ« was Qianlongâs equal: an unthinkable proposition at the Qing court. Mirhan threatened to negate Qing cosmology within the most significant sanctum of imperial ritual,55 and ceased to confirm his role as tribute-bearer even though he had, in the eyes of the Qing officials and emperor, comfortably and knowingly enjoyed the imperial benevolence that accompanied this role since he entered Qing territory. Provincial governors had lavishly banqueted Mirhan in every provincial capital he passed (see map 1), and when he developed an illness of the mouth and throat due to the unbearably cold weather, the emperor ordered that warm winter clothing should be provided.56
While this understanding of Qing guest ritual deepens our sense of the offense caused by Mirhan, it also offers a partial explanation for the continuation of the tribute ritual despite it. An initial âdispute of ritualâ was unpleasant and informed the emperorâs opinion of the Afghans as unworthy, even duplicitous, but did not justify breaking off the diplomatic process. Completion of the cosmological relationship was key, and Mirhan had crossed the threshold and accepted his position as representative of a lesser lordâhowever obstinately, and regardless of whether he believed it or not.
Other factors could help ease the tension. Qianlong did not place the blame squarely on Mirhan. As James Hevia has argued, fault for any problem during guest ritual lay also at the feet of those who practiced the universalist discourse.57 All emissaries were meant to be instructed in proper ritual forms, especially the koutou, before their audience.58 Qianlong was thus able to divert some blame for the fiasco onto Mirhanâs escort, a âgood-for-nothingâ (Ma. baitakû jaka) called Lingboo, for failing to properly educate the guest.59 With culpability diverted from Mirhan, tensions over his motivations were defused. This allowed the embassy to proceed without further confrontation, and without Mirhan noticing the emperorâs ill disposition toward him and the Afghans generally. The emperor had smoothed over the ritual hiccup.
Route of KhwÄja Mirhanâs embassy from Fayzabad to Beijing, through Central and East Asia. Created by the authors using QGIS and data from Natural Earth and CHGIS
Citation: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 66, 5-6 (2023) ; 10.1163/15685209-12341605
Reconciliation was important, as continuing the embassy accomplished more than just affirming the core Qing cosmology. From both published and undisclosed documents, it is clear that Qianlong saw the Afghans as a significant power: a âgreat tribeâ (Ch. dà bùluò
Qing expansion into Central Asia in 1759 had afforded ample opportunity to similarly overawe Muslim rulers. In 1760, the rulers of Khoqand, BadakhshÄn, and Bolor (likely a region of Chitral) dispatched embassies to Beijing for the first time.63 Laura Newby writes that the Khoqandi emissaries âwere reportedly overwhelmed by the hospitality they received all along their route.â64 KhwÄja Mirhan arrived in Beijing and participated in diplomatic rituals alongside envoys of these and other powersâincluding Kazakhs, Qirghiz, and Kashgharis, as well as Begs from other Muslim cities of Altishahr, and Mongolian nobles.65 Mirhan witnessed the unquestioned humility and subservience to the emperor of myriad polities, and the representatives of those polities would in turn have witnessed his participation.
These considerations went beyond the symbolic. Alitshahr was a recently- conquered and potentially volatile region, and Qianlong prioritized its stability. Preserving the image of Qing dominance was crucial. So too was communicating that image to the DurrÄnÄ«s and integrating them into the imperial diplomatic sphere, to prevent them from undermining the carefully balanced stability among the polities of Central Asia. Furthermore, including a new and mighty power in the Qing cosmology broadened Qing imperial authority.66
The weight of all these considerations meant that Mirhanâs âdispute of ritualâ did not in itself end the formal relationship as envisioned by the court. Rather, the court chose to overlook the mishap, in favor of the relationshipâs artificial prolongation. Qing historiography disregarded any evidence of Afghan reluctance to assume a tributary role.67 Projects begun by Qianlong to illustrate, explicate, and codify the universality of Qing imperial authority, notably the Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributary Peoples,68 and administrative works such as the Gazetteer of the Great Qing Unification (dà qÄ«ng yìtÇng zhì
Poems celebrating the embassy entered Qing historiography and appeared as calligraphy on decorative fans.70 AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs royal giftsâfour excellent horsesâwere depicted by Qing court painter Giuseppe Castiglione on a three-meter long scroll painting and likewise accompanied by a poem extolling their magnificence.71 A sandalwood screen was commissioned, with the four horses rendered in a landscape relief.72 The scroll painting depicted the horses with descriptions in four languages: Manchu, Mongolian, Chinese, and finally Chaghatay. To Qianlong, Chaghatay was the quintessential language of the empireâs Muslim constituency. By purporting to address all constituencies concerned with the Central Asian frontier, the painting accomplished two goals: remembering the Afghans as tributaries, and presenting Qing imperial authority as universal. In the absence of further exchanges, these items gave physical presence to the Qing-Afghan relationship as it was envisioned by the Qianlong emperor, perpetuating the Afghansâ status as lesser lords in the Qing cosmology.
Depiction of one of the four horses Aḥmad ShÄh DurrÄnÄ« gifted to the Qianlong Emperor. Images by the National Palace Museum in Taipei
Citation: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 66, 5-6 (2023) ; 10.1163/15685209-12341605
Detail of the description in four languages. Images by the National Palace Museum in Taipei
Citation: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 66, 5-6 (2023) ; 10.1163/15685209-12341605
In this sense, despite initial problems, the embassy had proceeded as desired. AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs letter and his envoyâs comportment had still troubled Qianlong, though, and so before the emperor had said his goodbyes to Mirhan, he made plans to secure the frontier, and economized on imperial favor: âthere is no need to provide banquets on his way back.â73 There was no longer any use in impressing Mirhan. Even before the relationship had truly begun, Qianlong was pulling the plug on it. Future Qing representation of the Afghans as perpetually intertwined with the imperial hierarchy would contrast with a total lack of engagement on a diplomatic level.
2 Pragmatism on the Frontier
Sulá¹Än ShÄh was a man of great force and ardent struggle. His conflict with [the Afghans] abruptly caused his valiant yet uncouth death, and the ruin of his lands. [â¦] The enmities and bloodshed among all states of the western regions take place not to benefit their lands, but to expand their domains, not to serve their peoples, but to incorporate and register the households. They only steal their possessions and divide their loot, and think of it as profit. They seize their people and sell them off, and think of it as profit. The mighty swallow the weak, the great envelop the small, yet such is their normal condition, and we cannot blame them for it.
Qishiyi, describing BadakhshÄn in his Records of Things Seen and Heard in the Western Regions.74
AhÌ£mad ShÄhâs embassy to the Qing court was ultimately a product of Qing westward expansion. The rulers of Khoqand, BadakhshÄn, and Bolorâs rulers dispatched embassies to the Qing court to formalize ties, which the Qing court codified. Simultaneously, Qing records reflect a more voluminous exchange of envoys locally, between civil and military administrators of Qing frontier cities such as Ili, Yarkand, and Kashghar, and Central Asian rulers. There were thus two parallel registers of diplomacy: first, the imperial register, requiring formal permission, formulaic messages and codified rituals, and secondly a much more discreet and pragmatic register, making use of cooperative local intermediaries sensitive to the particularities of Central Asian politics, culture, and diplomacy.75 Both channels were equal in one respect, however: their functioning was contingent on the emperorâs approval.
Focusing on the formal register thus occludes a much more dynamic series of exchanges. Memorials to the emperor about these communications from the stalwart Manchu frontier officials, and the remarkable diversity of policies they suggested, informed the emperorâs view of the Qing-Afghan relationship. We have seen how, despite serious difficulties, the DurrÄnÄ« embassy was incorporated into the highly formalized cosmology of the court. By contrast, on the frontier, where opportunities for communication were more numerous and not as strained by continental distances, no Qing-Afghan contact developed. The emperor did not allow it. To understand why, we must turn to the small mountain emirate which formed the frontier between the Qing and DurrÄnÄ« empires: BadakhshÄn, under its ruler Sulá¹Än ShÄh (r. c.1748â1769).
2.1 BadakhshÄn and the Development of Qing Non-interference in Central Asia
Since the early sixteenth century, BadakhshÄnâs rulers (mÄ«rs or amÄ«rs) largely enjoyed independence, even when they nominally submitted to larger powers.76 During the eighteenth century, members of YÄrÄ« Beg KhÄn (d. 1706/7)âs dynasty, to which Sulá¹Än ShÄh belonged, pulled external forces into their succession struggles, including the Uzbeks of Qataghan and the Zunghars.77 However, no outside power established definite control over the region. In 1750/1, AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâs wazÄ«r (chief minister) ShaÌh WalÄ« KhaÌn apparently subjugated BadakhshÄn and imposed tribute, but Afghan rule was superficial.78 Sulá¹Än ShÄh embarked on expansionist campaigns of his own into Chitral and Qataghan at this time.79 It was contact with the Qing court which would put the BadakhshÄnÄ« ruler at greater risk from AhÌ£mad ShaÌh.
In 1759, KhwÄja JahÄn and BurhÄn al-DÄ«n, the two brothers of the AÌfaÌqÄ« Sufi lineage to whom AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâs letter referred, escaped Altishahr and crossed into BadakhshÄn as their anti-Qing revolt crumbled. Under vice-general Fude, one division of Qing troops pursued them, âthe boom of the guns sounding incessantly.â80 Fude commanded Sulá¹Än ShÄh to hand over the brothers. The mÄ«r assented, and attacked his coreligionists: KhwÄja JahÄn was fatally wounded, and BurhÄn al-DÄ«n captured. It is likely Sulá¹Än ShÄh hoped to ensure Qing military support, including against the DurrÄnÄ«s who Qing records claim were poised to invade on behalf of the holy men.81 Qing officials emphasize their role in spurring on Sulá¹Än ShÄhâs actions. However, according to the TÄrÄ«kh-i BadakhshÄn, written at the court of a later mÄ«r in 1809, Sulá¹Än ShÄh had initially welcomed them warmly, but was forced to react to their wanton plundering of BadakhshÄn.82
Whichever factor played a greater role in the mÄ«râs calculations, Qing officials remained suspicious of him, discovering that the KhwÄjas had resided in BadakhshÄn with Sulá¹Än ShÄhâs knowledge for months before their defeat.83 Furthermore, Qing records state that Sulá¹Än ShÄh felt it would be âinappropriate to deliver them [to the Qing court], due to the customs of the scripture of the Muslims.â84 Word later reached the Qing military encampment on the border that Sulá¹Än ShÄh planned to deliver the KhwÄjas to Bukhara.85 The emperor issued an uncompromising edict threatening invasion.86 It did not come to this, as on 13 April 1763 BurhÄn al-DÄ«nâs disinterred remains were conveyed to Yarkand along with three of his wives and three of his sons.87 Still, distrust over these and other offenses (as understood by imperial authorities) would become a permanent feature of Sulá¹Än ShÄhâs relationship with his notional overlord in Beijing.
While the slaying of the AÌfaÌqÄ« brothers more than likely made Sulá¹Än ShÄh unpopular with the DurrÄnÄ«s, we lack Afghan sources for the period, making it difficult to get a sense of local sentiments. Sulá¹Än ShÄh in a letter to a Qing official, Sinju, in 1763 claimed that AhÌ£mad ShaÌh was intent on taking revenge on him for the KhwÄjasâ deaths, on behalf of their young son. But the mÄ«r had pragmatic reasons to emphasize his vulnerability and the religious impropriety of his actions, frustrated as he was that the Qing did not offer concrete support and rewards for his loyalty.88 There was no immediate reckoning: AhÌ£mad ShaÌh launched no campaign in response, confining his reactions to diplomatic enquiries. He sent an envoy, SaâÄ«d Beg, to Khoqand to discuss its ruler IrdaÌna Biyâs submission to the Qing in 1763, and the dispatching of Mirhanâs embassy was organized in conjunction with Sulá¹Än ShÄh, suggesting that communication was open between their courts.89 These events, and the uneasy situation which set in for the next few years, informed the later lack of communication between the Afghan and Qing empires.
A major development was the transformation of Qianlongâs attitude towards the affairs of his regional vassals. Initially, he readily used reprimands and threats of violence to influence them. While the embassies from the DurrÄnÄ« empire and BadakhshÄn to Beijing were in full swing in 1763, Qing councilors in Altishahr sent an emissary to Sulá¹Än ShÄh to resolve his conflict with fellow tributary Bolor, whose lands his forces had occupied and pillaged.
To Qianlong, his task was to preserve a harmonious equilibrium between the lesser lords. Sinju, Qianlongâs highest representative in Yarkand, accordingly proposed invading BadakhshÄn immediately.90 Qianlong cautioned against the frivolous use of troops, and ordered Sinju to wait for Sulá¹Än ShÄh to obey his instructions: to bring the children, wives, and earthly remains of BurhÄn al-DÄ«n to Yarkand and then Beijing, and to restore the lands of Chitral to Bolor. âIf [the people of] Bolor are in distress and beg us to save them, how can we ever win over their hearts and minds if we do not interfere, against all expectations?â91 A lesser lord in need required the supreme lord to act, lest he fail to fulfill his cosmological requirements. Qianlong mediated in the same way in a conflict between the Edegene Qirghiz and Khoqand.92
Over time, however, Qianlong became increasingly irritated by the Central Asian rulers beyond his borders, whom he could not effectively control. IrdÄna Biy of Khoqand held on to the city and pasturelands of Osh, which he had taken from the Qirghiz in exchange for their pillaging of Andijan.93 Conflicts broke out between the brothers of the erstwhile ruler of Bolor, and the emperor was outraged when one requested support from imperial troops.94 In 1765, the large Altishahri city of Uch-Turfan rebelled, and quelling the revolt was an enormous effort.95 The following year, Sulá¹Än ShÄh requested Qing reinforcements because of Afghan advances against BadakhshÄn, which he had been complaining of since at least 1764.96 This was seen as an audacious overreach by the emperor.
Qing troops in Altishahr were spread thin. Instead of active military intervention and the imposition of the Qing cosmology on Central Asia, the Qianlong emperor prioritized the security of Altishahr, and sought only to maintain stable relationships with the Central Asian polities, forgoing the peaceful equilibrium between them that he had sought during Mirhanâs embassy. Qianlong would distance himself from the trepidations of Central Asian affairs, which he felt was âthe regular state of affairs amongst themâ (Ma. ceni dorgi an i baita).97 Using the example of enmity between Khoqand and the Kazakhs, he elaborated:
There is no point in interfering in their mad behavior toward one another. Ablai [the Kazakh khan] and IrdÄna [of Khoqand] pillage and plunder one another[âs territories]. As some generals and officials were still paying attention to this, I have issued an edict instructing them that they may not interfere.98
Non-interference (Ma. daci ojorakû) became emblematic of Qianlongâs approach: the incorrigible Central Asians could do as they liked, as long as they did not threaten peace in Qing-controlled territories. The emperor did not find such a threat likely: âThe mutually murderous conduct among them is all the normal state of affairs. Since the Muslim territories [Altishahr; Ma. hoise i ba] are far removed from them, they absolutely will not dare to come hither.â99 One hears echoes of the emperorâs earlier judgment of Mirhan and the Afghans: ânot a tribe who comprehend proper customs and reason at all.â
Where did that leave Qianlong cosmologically? Ambiguity played an important role. He was happy to receive Central Asian envoys and go through the guest rituals, confirming the cosmological relationships. It was clear, however, that the practical implications of those relationships were limited. At best they accomplished a tacit acceptance of the status quo: the Qing empire controlled Altishahr, but relinquished its role as mediator between Central Asian polities. The Afghan threat, looming over the jagged horizon of the Pamirs, would both demonstrate the extent of Qianlongâs non-interference policy and draw out uncomfortable realities about the imperial cosmologyâs limitations.
2.2 No More Ambiguity
In mid-August 1768, imperial agent Yunggui informed the emperor that the DurrÄnÄ« commander ShÄh WalÄ« KhÄn had invaded BadakhshÄn together with QubÄd KhÄn, ruler of Qunduz. AhÌ£mÄd ShÄhâs court history reports that ShÄh WalÄ« was appointed to this task on May 30th.100 The invading armies besieged and conquered both Sulá¹Än ShÄhâs fortress of Nuá¹£ratÄbÄd and capital of Fayzabad.101 Sulá¹Än ShÄh retreated north, but repulsed two attacks by QubÄd Khan. A merchant fleeing BadakhshÄn arrived in Altishahr shortly after, claiming that ShÄh WalÄ« had interrogated him about Qing strength in the region. Upon being told (falsely) that thirty thousand troops were stationed there, the Afghans withdrew.102 In his initial memorial Yunggui proposed action:
The lands of BadakhshÄn are subject to us, so they may not be given up in allotment to anyone else. From among the Begs of Yarkand and Kashghar, I will appoint one or two to take a message to enlighten AhÌ£mÄd ShÄh of the Afghans, explaining the benefits and drawbacks. If AhÌ£mad ShÄh, who desires to occupy the territories of BadakhshÄn, does not submit, we will invade and pacify the lands of BadakhshÄn. I will make him forget his pretensions! I will prepare a total of eight thousand troops!103
Yungguiâs logic was perfectly in line with Qing cosmology. Nevertheless, the emperor again emphasized that this state of chaos was ânormalâ (Ma. an i). Military intervention would âbe unreasonableâ (Ma. dara kooli akû). Qianlong instructed Yunggui how to respond to three hypothetical outcomes of the invasion. All three strategies were aimed at reaffirming the status of BadakhshÄnâs mÄ«r as a subservient ally in the region through diplomacy, whoever might occupy that position once the dust had settled. No scenario involved Qing military action.104 In his next communiqué to Yunggui, Qianlong wrote that âbecause we are not interfering at all with the matter of Sulá¹Än ShÄh, there is also no need to send a delegation to the Afghans.â105
That Qianlong opted for further non-interference is striking because, even though ShÄh WalÄ« had not attacked Qing domains, the Afghan advance threatened the empire. The TB and TÄrÄ«kh-i Aḥmad ShÄhÄ«, Aḥmad ShÄhâs official chronicle, do not mention the Qing at all, the latter framing the campaign as punishment of Sulá¹Än ShÄh and others who had âraised the head of rebellionâ (Pe. sar-i shuÌrish wa âinaÌd bar-aÌwurda buÌdand), and both referring to plans to seize a holy relic.106 But Qing sources tell us that the Afghans hosted a child named SarimsÄq in Qunduz, who had the potential to ignite revolt on the frontier.107
SarimsÄq (d. 1809) was BurhÄn al-DÄ«nâs fourth son, and only an infant when the ÄfÄqÄ« brothers revolted against Qing rule. While his three brothers were extradited by Sulá¹Än ShÄh to live in exile in Beijing, SarimsÄq evaded capture and became the focus of ÄfÄqÄ« resistance.108 By September 1768, Yunggui reported to the emperor that SarimsÄq was rumored to live in Qunduz.109 Qianlong feared that the heir to the lineage of ÄfÄqÄ« KhwÄjas might inspire another uprising. Reports of Muslim travelers gathering support and funds to provide for SarimsÄq in Qunduz reached the emperorâs ear; Ê¿Älim KhwÄja, a local governor, drunkenly and openly speculated about the boyâs triumphant return.110 Qianlong was determined that SarimsÄq had to go, but even the childâs presence in the Afghan armies did not induce Qianlong to act. Part of this related to the cost and strain of military operations, but he refrained even from sending so much as a reproach to AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâsupposedly his tributary.
Sulá¹Än ShÄh took back his capital and slew the Afghan-appointed governor, but felt anything but safe in anticipation of a new Afghan raid. In the winter of 1768, his desperate plea reached the Qianlong emperor. Perhaps hoping to spur Qing forces into action and intertwine his interests with Qianlongâs, he sent two emissaries who communicated his warning that âAhÌ£mad ShaÌh of the Afghans is going to invade next year to support SarimsÄq. Since I cannot withstand their might, please send ten thousand troops to aid me against him.â111
This request caused further deterioration in communications. In a harsh rebuke, Qianlong blamed Sulá¹Än ShÄh for provoking conflict with the Afghans through his own expansionism. He chastised the mÄ«r for failing to deliver BurhÄn al-DÄ«nâs last son when he had the chance, and emphasized that Sulá¹Än ShÄh did not have the provisions or livestock to support ten thousand troops. Finally, the emperor made clear that he would confront the Afghans only if they violated Qing territory.112 He dissociated himself from Sulá¹Än ShÄh because of the latterâs wanton behavior, acquitting himself of the cosmological task of protecting this particular lesser lord.
Sulá¹Än ShÄh was on his own, but he held out. A letter to Emin Khoja was received in August 1769, and showed the mÄ«râs frustration: he had expected reward and protection as a vassal, but found himself abandoned. Pointedly, he raised the threat of further Afghan advances: â[AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâs] trajectory will lead him in your direction: what tactics will you then adopt to ward off this enemy? [â¦] If you have any concern for the emperorâs territory, then now is the time to show it.â113 His ire was not reserved for imperial officials. In December 1769, a new message reached Beijing. Caustically, Sulá¹Än ShÄh accused Qianlong of failing to perform his duty as protector: âWould you enlighten us, whether we are in actuality vassals to the Afghans?â114 Qianlong, at the end of his patience, personally revised the draft reply to Sulá¹Än ShÄh in imperial red ink:
We have long known that you have previously presented gifts to the Afghans. That you now have no more options but to evade the issue just shows that you are paying tribute to the Afghans! [â¦] If you cannot protect your own lands, and wish to submit to the Afghans, then suit yourself! [â¦] If you wish to rely on our armies to serve your enmities and to subjugate your neighboring tribes, then we will under no circumstances provide you with our troops.115
This passage illustrates candidly Qianlongâs understanding of the DurrÄnÄ« empire. From the events described above, it is clear there was no indication that Qianlong still meaningfully considered the Afghans his tributaries, nor that he sought to influence them. Prior to KhwÄja Mirhanâs arrival, Qianlong had apparently been more optimistic: when an adventurer from Kashmir suggested the Qing conquer the region, the emperor wrote that â[Kashmir] is in the possession of AhÌ£mad ShÄh. He is submitting to our authority as I write, so there is no need to take action.â116 But the troubling events of the embassy, and the concomitant frustration with Central Asian rulersâ perceived moral deficiencies, meant that Qianlong never again evoked DurrÄnÄ« âsubmission.â
Indeed, his personal reply to Sulá¹Än ShÄh reveals that Qianlong had come to view the Afghan empire as a rival cosmological center, drawing tribute from his supposed subject. Through Sulá¹Än ShÄh, Qianlong had also learned that the Afghans were, as he had first suspected in 1763, a hostile imperial formation bent on supporting the ÄfÄqÄ« lineage.117 Despite the âbenevolentâ edict bestowed on him, the Afghan shÄh had never behaved like a tributary. Qianlong recognized this, and outside of Qing historiography, AhÌ£mad ShÄh was never treated like one. Instead, Qianlong suspended, and prevented, all communications. When Afghan armies invaded BadakhshÄn, rather than protecting it as the orderer of the cosmos should, Qianlong justified the Afghan invasion. Stretched garrisons, long distances, and frustrations with the regionâs powers had stayed Qianlongâs hand. In justifying his inaction, the incompatibility between the two cosmologies, left ambiguous at Mirhanâs audience, had become explicit. Now understanding Central Asia as a region of irreconcilable, incessant conflict menaced by a rival power outside his influence, Qianlong was primarily concerned with consolidating the security of the Qing hold on Altishahr. He counted on the distance and difficult terrain between the Qing oasis cities and the Afghans for their safety.
Conclusion
KhwÄja Mirhanâs visit to the Qing court had been a fateful one, never to be repeated. The DurrÄnÄ« and Qing empires had both reached the zeniths of their power, and reaching out further than ever before, they briefly touched. In due course, the DurrÄnÄ« embassy proved a transformative moment for the Qing emperorâs cosmological position in Central Asia. While historiographically embracing the Afghans as tributaries, in reality the emperor distanced himself from them, going so far as to forbid any diplomatic contact even as they attacked his vassal in BadakhshÄn.
Mirhanâs challenge to Qing ritual during the audience had provided the first impetus for Qianlongâs parochial and charged perception of the Afghans, likely also informed by his consideration of the threatening subtext of Aḥmad ShÄhâs letter. Qianlong in his reply evoked DurrÄnÄ« deference to fit Aḥmad ShÄh into the Qing cosmological framework, and so too would court historiography and artistic production for decades. But Aḥmad ShÄh never accepted a submissive tributary position. For him, it was enough that the embassy had constituted an assertion of imperial authority and legitimacy. Mirhanâs embassy and its reception had made use of a calculated ambiguity that allowed for the possibility of amicable Qing-DurrÄnÄ« relations. However, Afghan expansionism and tensions around Qing cosmology in Central Asia erased that possibility.
The dual position of BadakhshÄn as tributary of the Qing, yet firmly entrenched in the Muslim world order of Central Asia, had rendered it a proxy for the Qing-DurrÄnÄ« relationshipâa position that ultimately proved untenable, as it fomented distrust and animosity from both its powerful neighbors and led to Qing disengagement and BadakhshÄn being invaded by the Afghan empire. Qianlongâs justification of the DurrÄnÄ« capture of his own tributaryâs lands dispels any suspicion that he may have viewed the DurrÄnÄ«s as his tributaries, rather than a rival imperial formation.
He did, however, avoid stating this outright, instead decrying the supposed violent natural order of Muslim polities and professing his aversion to futile interventions in Central Asia. Such dissociations were a tacit acknowledgement of Qianlongâs inability to successfully integrate the Central Asian polities into Qing cosmology. By the 1790s, as Khoqand became the center of ÄfÄqÄ« resistance to the Qing and as Afghan power waned, the relationship between the empires dissipated entirely. No further embassies would come to Beijing; no edicts or warnings would ever reach the Afghan shÄhs. Only in the Qing court would the fictive tributary relationship live on, given form by ink, paint, and wood in records and artworksâmasking the uncomfortable realities about the empireâs limitations that Qianlong had faced decades before.
Acknowledgements
We wish to express our boundless gratitude to Niko Kontovas, who has not only brought us together, but provided advice and support throughout the duration of this project. His insights have been invaluable. Our thanks also go to JESHOâs anonymous readers for their helpful comments. We wish also to clarify that the order of our names reflects no âprimaryâ or âsecondaryâ authorship, and that we are equal authors of this article.
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Islam, Riazul. 1979. Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations, 1500â1750, vol. 1. Tehran: Iranian Culture Foundation; Karachi: Institute of Central & West Asian Studies.
Jaskov, Helena. 2019. The Negotiated Geography of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Role of the Jesuits. Late Imperial China 40/2: 45â88.
Kang, David C. 2010. Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia. Security Studies 19/4: 591â622.
Khoja, Neelam. 2020. Competing Sovereignties in Eighteenth-Century South Asia: Afghan Claims to Kingship. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 63/4: 555â581.
Kim, Hodong. 2004. Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864â1877. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Lally, Jagjeet. 2018. Beyond âTribal Breakoutâ: Afghans in the History of Empire, ca. 1747â1818. Journal of World History 29: 369â397.
Li Xiao æç. 2012. Qianlong chao Zhongya Zhengce Yanjiu ä¹¾éæä¸äºæ¿çç 究. PhD Diss., Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiushengyuan ä¸å½ç¤¾ä¼ç§å¦é¢ç 究çé¢, 2012.
Li Xiao æç. 2013. Qianlong Nianjian Qingchao Yu Afuhan Guanxi Xintan ä¹¾éå¹´é´æ¸ æä¸é¿ å¯æ±å ³ç³»æ°æ¢. Yunnan Shifan Daxue Xuebao 45/1: 121â130.
Mancall, Mark. 1968. The Châing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay. In The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinaâs Foreign Relations, ed. John K. Fairbank. Harvard East Asian Studies 32. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 63â90.
Millward, James A. 1998. Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759â1864. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Millward, James A. 2007. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mosca, Matthew W. 2013. From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Nejatie, Sajjad. 2017. Iranian Migrations in the Durrani Empire, 1747â93. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 37: 494â509.
Nejatie, Sajjad. 2017. The Pearl of Pearls: The AbdaÌliÌ-DurraÌniÌ Confederacy and Its Transformation under AhÌ£mad ShaÌh, Durr-i DurraÌn. PhD diss., University of Toronto.
Newby, Laura J. 2005. The Empire and the Khanate: a Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760â1860. Leiden: Brill.
No author. 1960. Afghanistan. Central Asian Review 8/1: 62â68.
Noda, Jin. 2016. The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian International Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Leiden: Brill.
Noelle, Christine 1997. State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826â1863). London: Routledge.
Noelle-Karimi, Christine. 2014. The Pearl in Its Midst: Herat and the Mapping of Khurasan (15thâ19th Centuries). Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.
Noelle-Karimi, Christine. 2015. Afghan Polities and the Indo-Persian Literary Realm: The Durrani Rulers and Their Portrayal in Eighteenth-Century Historiography. In Afghan History Through Afghan Eyes, ed. Nile Green. London: C. Hurst & Co.: 53â78.
Pan Zhiping æ½å¿å¹³. 2006. Haohanguo Yu Xiyu Zhengzhi ã浩ç½å½ä¸è¥¿åæ¿æ²»ã. Wulumuqi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe.
Perdue, Peter C. 2005. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.
Perdue, Peter C. 2010. Boundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing. Eighteenth-Century Studies 43/3: 341â356.
RishaÌd, âAbd al-ShakuÌr. 1382 [2003]. Da PitarzbuÌrg darbaÌr ghwasÌ£hta. In Da loy Aḥmad ShÄh BÄbÄ yÄd, ed. Sayyid MuhÌ£iy al-DiÌn HaÌshimiÌ. KaÌbul: Da AfghaÌnistaÌn âUluÌmo AkaÌdmiÌ: 1â22.
Saikal, Amin. 2012. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. London: IB Tauris.
Schorkowitz, Dittmar, and Ning Chia, ed. 2017. Managing Frontiers in Qing China: The Lifanyuan and Libu Revisited. Boston: Brill.
Sebes, Joseph S. 1961. The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689): The Diary of Thomas Pereira, S. J. Rome: Institutum Historicum S.I.
Shioya, Akifumi. 2019. The Treaty of Ghulja Reconsidered: Imperial Russian Diplomacy toward Qing China in 1851. Journal of Eurasian Studies 10/2: 147â158.
Singh, Ganda. 1959. Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.
Swen, Litian. 2021. Jesuit Mission and Submission: Qing Rulership and the Fate of Christianity in China, 1644â1735. Leiden: Brill.
Tarzi, Amin. 2015. Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi: The First History of âAfghanistanâ. In Afghan History Through Afghan Eyes, ed. Nile Green. London: C. Hurst & Co.: 79â96.
Tucker, Ernest. 2006. Nadir Shahâs Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Wills, John E. 1984. Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to Kâang-Hsi, 1666â1687. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
Wills, John E. 2011. Introduction. In China and Maritime Europe, 1500â1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions, ed. John Elliot Wills. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1â23.
Wills, John E. 1988. Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about Mid-Châing Foreign Relations. American Neptune 48: 225â229.
Wu Xueshan å´éªæ. 2017. Chonghuagong Cihua: Jianlun Guhuazhong Qianlong âWuxiâ Quan er âShiqu Baojiâ Wei Zhulu de Xianxiang éå宫èµç»: å ¼è®ºå¤ç»ä¸ä¹¾ éâäºçºâå ¨èãç³æ¸ å®ç¬ãæªèå½çç°è±¡. Gugong Bowuyuan Yuankan 1: 51â64.
Yu Xiaoliang äºå°äº® and Zhu Wanshu æ±ä¸æ. 2020. Qingdai âXinzheng Chonghuagong Chayan Lianjuâ Kaolun æ¸ ä»£âæ°æ£éå宫è¶å®´èå¥âè论. Suzhou Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexueban) 41/2: 123â130.
Ziad, Waleed. 2021. Hidden Caliphate: Sufi Saints beyond the Oxus and Indus. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
What the name âMirhanâ reflects is unclear: it is given in Chinese usually as mìâÄrhÄ
Wu X. S., âChonghuagong Cihua: Jianlun Guhuazhong Qianlong âWuxiâ Quan er âShiqu Baojiâ Wei Zhulu de Xianxiang.â Gugong Bowuyuan Yuankan 1 (2017): 54â8; Yu X. L. and Zhu W. S., âQingdai âXinzheng Chonghuagong Chayan Lianjuâ Kaolun.â Suzhou Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexueban) 41/2 (2020). T. Andrade, The Last Embassy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021): 156.
QLJXD 4:8â9.
QLJXD 4:8â9.
D. Brophy, âHigh Asia and the High Qing: Persian Letters in the Beijing Archives.â In No Tapping Around Philology: A Festschrift for Wheeler Mcintosh Thackston Jr.âs 70th Birthday, ed. A. Korangy and D. J. Sheffield (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2014): 344, 359.
M. Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and Its Dependencies, in Persia, Tartary, and India: A View of the Afghaun Nation, and a History of the Dooraunee Monarchy (London: Richard Bentley, 1839): 2:296.
See e.g. R. D. Crews, Afghan Modern: The History of a Global Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015): 55 and J. Gommans, The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire c. 1710â1780 (Leiden: Brill, 1995): 33, 64â5. Their depictions of AhÌ£mad ShaÌhâs policy toward the Qing largely mirror the account of the nineteenth-century Kazakh historian Shoqan Valikhanov: see J. and R. Michell, ed. and trans., The Russians in Central Asia: Their Occupation of the Kirghiz Steppe and the Line of the Syr-Daria: Their Political Relations with Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokan: Also Descriptions of Chinese Turkestan and Dzungaria. By Capt. Valikhanof, M. Veniukof, and other Russian Travellers (London: Edward Stanford, 1865): 189â91 for an English translation.
âA. RishaÌd, âDa PitarzbuÌrg darbaÌr ghwasÌ£hta.â In Da loy Aḥmad ShÄh BÄbÄ yÄd, ed. S. M. HaÌshimiÌ (KaÌbul: Da AfghaÌnistaÌn âUluÌmo AkaÌdmiÌ, 1382 [2003]): 13â5. Perhaps the likeliest Afghan scholar to have taken note of the topic was Ê¿â AziÌz al-DiÌn WakiÌl FuÌfalzay, in the second volume of his Aḥmad ShÄh: WÄris ̱wa mujaddid-i impirÄtÅ«rÄ«-i AfghÄnistÄn (Kabul: WizÄrat-i Iá¹á¹ilÄÊ¿Ät wa KultÅ«r, 1980). However, we were only able to access the first volume, which stops short of the relevant time period.
L. Hostetler, âCentral Asians in the Eighteenth-Century Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributary Peoples.â In Writing Travel in Central Asian History, ed. N. Green (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014): 104â5. A slightly more detailed discussion can be found in L. Hostetler, âThe Qing Court and Peoples of Central and Inner Asia: Representations of Tributary Relationships from the Huang Qing Zhigong tu.â In Managing Frontiers in Qing China: The Lifanyuan and Libu Revisited, ed. D. Schorkowitz and N. Chia (Leiden: Brill, 2017): 208â10.
M. W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013): 75, 78, 80â3.
S. M. M. Munis and M. R. A. Agahi, Firdaws al-iqbaÌl: History of Khorezm, trans. Y. Bregel (Leiden: Brill, 1999): 591â3, n. 406.
See J. Noda, The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires (Leiden: Brill, 2016): 170â2, L. J. Newby, The Empire and the Khanate (Leiden: Brill, 2005): 34â6, 43, H. Kim, Holy War in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 20â1, and J. F. Fletcher, âChina and Central Asia, 1368â1884.â In The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinaâs Foreign Relations, ed. J. K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968): 220.
Brophy, âHigh Asia.â
Li X., âQianlong Nianjian Qingchao Yu Afuhan Guanxi Xintan.â Yunnan Shifan Daxue Xuebao 45/1 (2013): 127â8.
This position is also visible in other Chinese scholarship on the Afghan embassy to Beijing; see for instance Pan Z. P., Haohanguo Yu Xiyu Zhengzhi (Wulumuqi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2006): 30â2.
Li, âQianlong Nianjian Qingchao Yu Afuhan Guanxi Xintanâ: 121â30.
There is by now a substantial body of scholarship that has departed from the sinocentric notion that the âtribute systemâ formed the sole channel of Qing diplomacy. J. E. Wills, an eminent scholar of Sino-European relations and the tribute system, has even argued that a full-fledged tribute system only functioned between 1425 and 1550. The Qing emperors inherited the Ming ideas of tribute, but applied them cautiously. See J. E. Wills, âIntroduction.â In China and Maritime Europe, 1500â1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions, ed. J. E. Wills (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 3. Qing emperors were proactive and pragmatic, and did not fail to recognize the necessity for negotiation, such as in the treaties with Muscovite Russia in 1689, and later 1727, See P. C. Perdue, âBoundaries and Trade in the Early Modern World: Negotiations at Nerchinsk and Beijing.â Eighteenth-Century Studies 43/3 (2010); J. S. Sebes, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) (Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I., 1961): 103â22, 205â303; H. Jaskov, âThe Negotiated Geography of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Role of the Jesuits.â Late Imperial China 40/2 (2019). They suspended the interconnection between trade and tribute for Europeans in 1684. See J. L. Cranmer-Byng and J. E. Wills, âTrade and Diplomacy with Maritime Europe, 1644âc. 1800.â In China and Maritime Europe, 1500â1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions, ed. J. E. Wills (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 192â3. As evidenced by the late seventeenth-century crisis in Tibet, the Chinese Rites Controversy, and troublesome BadakhshÄn in the wake of the DurrÄnÄ« embassy, Qing officials often dispatched emissaries of their own instead of awaiting tributary missions. See Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan Gugong Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui, Gongzhongdang Kangxichao Zouzhe (Taipei: Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan, 1976) 8:508â9, 605â13; L. Swen, Jesuit Mission and Submission (Leiden: Brill, 2021): 143â64; QLJXD, 4:16â7, 82â7.
See for example J. K. Fairbank, âTributary Trade and Chinaâs Relations with the West.â The Far Eastern Quarterly 1/2 (1942): 129â49; See also M. Mancall, âThe Châing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay.â In The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinaâs Foreign Relations, ed. J. K. Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968): 63â90; D. Kang, âHierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems.â Security Studies 19/4 (2010): 591â622.
J. L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995): 19. The generalized view of the tribute system still retains a presence in scholarly thinking about China. See for instance D. E. Banks, âFields of Practice, Symbolic Binding and the Qing Defense of Sinocentric Diplomacy.â International Studies Quarterly 63/3 (2019): 546â57.
Wills, âIntroductionâ; J. E. Wills, Embassies and Illusions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1984): 170â189 notably reiterates these points; see also J. E. Wills, âTribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about Mid-Châing Foreign Relations.â American Neptune 48 (1988): 225â9; Akifumi Shioya has shown also how Russian relations with the Qing were formally conducted through the tribute system, but in practice the relationship was conducted on equal footing even in the negotiations for the treaty of Ghulja. A. Shioya, âThe Treaty of Ghulja Reconsidered: Imperial Russian Diplomacy toward Qing China in 1851.â Journal of Eurasian Studies 10/2 (2019): 147â58; Ning Chiaâs work on the Court of Dependencies or Lifanyuan eminently illustrates the Inner Asian nature of the Qingâs administration of the non-Chinese parts of the empire. See N. Chia âThe Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644â1795).â Late Imperial China 14/1 (1993): 60â92; and D. Schorkowitz and N. Chia, ed. Managing Frontiers in Qing China (Boston: Brill, 2017).
Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: chaps. 1, 2, 5.
Andrade, The Last Embassy: 302â3.
See for example T. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: IB Tauris, 2012): 19â26. For two stalwart works of twentieth-century Afghan nationalist history on Aḥmad ShÄh, see FÅ«falzay, Aḥmad ShÄh, and M. G. M. âGhubaÌr,â AhÌ£mad ShaÌh BaÌbaÌ, (Peshawar: DaÌnish KitaÌb-khaÌna, 1337 [1997/8]).
A good distillation of this perspective is the concept of the DurraÌniÌ invasions as a âtribal breakoutâ unleashed on northern India, see C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World 1780â1830 (London: Routledge, 1989): 35â44.
J. Lally, âBeyond âTribal Breakoutâ: Afghans in the History of Empire, ca. 1747â1818.â Journal of World History 29 (2018): 369â97.
E.g. S. Nejatie, âThe Pearl of Pearls: The AbdaÌliÌ-DurraÌniÌ Confederacy and Its Transformation under AhÌ£mad ShaÌh, Durr-i DurraÌnâ (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2017), C. Noelle-Karimi, âAfghan Polities and the Indo-Persian Literary Realm.â In Afghan History Through Afghan Eyes, ed. N. Green (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015): 53â78, N. Khoja, âCompeting Sovereignties in Eighteenth-Century South Asia: Afghan Claims to Kingship.â Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 63/4 (2020): 555â81, and S. Nejatie, âIranian Migrations in the Durrani Empire, 1747â93.â Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 37 (2017): 494â509.
M. H. JÄmÄ«, TÄrÄ«kh-i Aḥmad ShÄhÄ«: TarÄ«kh-i tÄshkÄ«l-i awwalÄ«n ḥukÅ«mat-i AfghÄnistÄn, ed. G. Ḥ. ZargarÄ«-nizhÄd (Tehran: University of Tehran Press: 2005): 338. Henceforth TAS.
W. Ziad, Hidden Caliphate: Sufi Saints beyond the Oxus and Indus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021): 44.
These terms can be found plentifully and in numerous pro-DurrÄnÄ« sources, e.g. M. al-MÅ«sawÄ«, AḥwÄl-i aqwÄm-i chahÄrgÄna-i AfghÄn, MS, British Library, Or. 1861: 6a, Q. N. MuhÌ£ammad, Jang-naÌma, ed. G. Singh (Amritsar: Sikh History Research Department, 1939): 12â4, 126, and TAS: 338, 346.
Khoja, âCompeting Sovereigntiesâ: 550â60, 566â73, C. Noelle-Karimi, The Pearl in Its Midst: Herat and the Mapping of Khurasan (15thâ19th Centuries) (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2014): 104â7, Nejatie, âThe Pearl of Pearlsâ: 304â400, and Gommans, The Rise: 50â55. See also A. Tarzi, âTarikh-i Ahmad Shahi: The First History of âAfghanistanâ,â in Afghan History Through Afghan Eyes, ed. N. Green (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015): 94, and E. Tucker, Nadir Shahâs Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006): 108â10.
G. J. JalÄlÄ«, ed., NÄma-i Aḥmad ShÄh BÄbÄ bi-nÄm-i Sulá¹Än Muá¹£á¹afÄ s̲Älis̲ī-i Ê¿Us̲mÄnÄ« ki az rÅ«-yi nuskha-i wÄḥid-i khaá¹á¹Ä«-i ÄrshÄ«f-i salá¹anatÄ«-i IstanbÅ«l tartÄ«b shuda ast (Kabul: Anjuman-i TÄrÄ«kh-i AfghÄnistÄn, 1967): 6, n. 1 and Y. H. Bayur, âNadir Åah AfÅarâın Ãlümünden Sonra Osmanlı Devletini Ä°ranâı Ä°stilaya KıÅkırtmak için yapılan iki deneme.â Belleten 12 (1948): 419 for discussion. AhÌ£mad ShÄh did not refer to the sultÌ£aÌn as caliph.
See e.g. a letter to the Mughal emperor reproduced in TAS: 348.
JGBBSB: 20:17v. Gaozong Chun Huangdi Shilu (1807): 678:QL28.1.11
Succinctly outlined in Gommans, The Rise: 49â56.
JGBBSB: 20:16râv, GZCSL: 678:QL.28.1.11
See JalÄlÄ«, NÄma: 62â76 for the section on the battle of Panipat proper in the Ottoman letter, and S. H. Askari, âDurrani-Rajput Negotiations, 1759â61.â Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (1945): 267â9 for translations of letters to the Rajput leaders.
R. Islam, Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations, 1500â1750 (Tehran: Iranian Culture Foundation; Karachi: Institute of Central & West Asian Studies, 1979): vol. 1., 21â2.
JGBBSB: 20:14r, GZCSL: 678:QL.28.1.11
JGBBSB: 20:17r, GZCSL: 678:QL.28.1.11
J. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 86â8. For a detailed history of the Naqshbandiyya order in Altishahr, see J. F. Fletcher âThe Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China.â In Studies on Chinese and Islamic Central Asia, ed. B. F. Manz and J. N. Lipman (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1995): chap. 11, 1â46.
JGBBSB: 20:14vâ15r, GZCSL: 678:QL.28.1.11
Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: 35.
Noda, The Kazakh Khanates: 171â2.
Islam, Calendar: 11.
Fuheng, Huang Qing Zhigongtu (Beijing: Wuyingdian, 1788): tableau 61. Henceforth HQZGT.
JalÄlÄ«, NÄma: 78.
We do not, unfortunately, know how AhÌ£mad ShÄh reacted to the Qing letter. A parallel might be ventured, however, with the infamous Timur (or Tamerlane) (d. 1405), who was incensed by the Ming emperorâs reference to his âsubmissionâ following a large Timurid embassy. He retaliated by detaining a Chinese embassy in 1395, and apparently planned to invade China. See Fletcher, âChina and Central Asiaâ: 210, and 349â50 n. 22, 23 for detailed citations.
No author, âAfghanistan.â Central Asian Review 8/1 (1960): 63â4.
QLJXD: 4:9â10.
Li, âQianlong Nianjian Qingchao Yu Afuhan Guanxi Xintanâ: 128.
QLJXD: 4:10â1.
Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: 20â2, chap. 5.
Laiboo, Comprehensive Rites of the Great Qing = Qinding Daqing Tongli (Beijing: Wuyingdian, 1756): 43:1vâ2r. Henceforth DQTL.
QLJXD: 4:8; Qijuzhu ce: ID:
Hevia emphasizes the ritual importance of localities for the various spheres over which the emperor ruled. The imperial palace in Beijing was, naturally, the foremost ritual space of Chinese rulership. See Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: 32.
QLJXD: 3:406â7; GZCSL: 672:QL27.10.14
Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: 121â4, 130.
Wills, Embassies and Illusions: 31, 71, 119; Andrade, The Last Embassy: 40â3, 53â4.
QLJXD: 3:370â1 attests to Lingbooâs position as escort of the Afghan and BadakhshÄnÄ« envoys. For Qianlongâs berating remark, see QLJXD: 4:9.
Mujangga, Da Qing Yitongzhi (Jiaqing) (1842): 420:29458 lists the Afghans as the most important tribe west of the Pamirs, â
DQTL: vol. 43, which covers guest ritual, makes no mention of military demonstrations.
QJZ. ID:
JQYTZ:
Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: 45.
QJZ ID:
Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: 124â30.
As is well known, Lord George Macartney IIIâs non-conformity was not preserved in Qing court histories, and neither was Mirhanâs. See GZCSL: 677:QL27.12.29
L. Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001): 41â9. Hostetler states that the Illustrations were â[l]ike the empire that it represented in microcosmâ (p. 49). It seems to us that one might argue that the Illustrations were a collection that represented not only the empire in microcosm, but all peoples situated in the Qing cosmology, without regard for the territorial delimitation of the empire. It represented Qing imperial authority as transcending the empireâas universal.
JQYTZ:
âQing Peng Yuanrui Shu Qianlong Yuzhi Aiwuhan Sijunge.â
âQing Lang Shining Hua Aiwuhan Sijun.â
âZitanmu Bianzuo Aiwuhan Sijuntu Chaping.â Gugong Bowuyuan.
GZCSL: 879:QL28.1.24
Qishiyi, Xiyu Wenjian Lu (1777): 3:12v. Henceforth XYWJL.
James Millward has previously also argued that the Qing empire engaged with the polities beyond its northwestern borders pragmatically. J. Millward, Beyond the Pass Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759â1864 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998): especially pages 7â10, 48â9, 156â9, 197â203.
L. W. Adamec and Bhãrat, Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan, vol. 1: BadakhshÄn Province and Northeastern Afghanistan (Graz: Akadem. Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1972): 32â36; J. Grevemeyer, Herrschaft, Raub und Gegenseitigkeit: Die politische Geschichte Badakhshans 1500â1883 (Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei O. Harrassowitz, 1982): 94â5; XYWJL: 3:11r; Gommans, The Rise: 107â8.
M. S. M. BadakhshÄ«, TaÌrÄ«kh-i BadakhshaÌn, ed. M. Sotoudeh (Muâassisa-yi FarhangÄ«-yi JahaÌngÄ«rÄ«, 1367 [1988â9]): 6â23. Henceforth, TB.
JalaÌlÄ«, NaÌma: 27, C. Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826â1863) (London: Routledge, 1997): 71â3.
TB: 33â9.
Fuheng, Campaign History of the Pacification of Zungharia = Jun Gar i Ba Be Necihiyeme Toktobuha Bodogon i Bithe =
JQYTZ:
TB: 28â33. For discussion of the textâs authorship and origins, see F. U. Bezhan, âThe Enigmatic Authorship of âTÄrikh-i BadakhshÄn.ââ East and West 58 (2008): 107â21.
JGBB: 78:10vâ11r. Qing officials accused Sulá¹Än ShÄh of deliberately (Ma. jortanggi) providing passage and safe harbor to the khwÄja brothers. See also TB, 28â33.
JGBB: 79:37r. Ma. damu hoise sei nomun i doro de alibume banjinarakû. See also Qianlongâs edict on 79:40r, where he writes that it would constitute âa great deviation from the customs of your scriptureâ (suweni nomun i doro ci ambula jurcehe).
JGBB: 79:33râv.
JGBB: 79:38vâ42v. Qianlong mentions in the edict that âif he still does not deliver them, we will simply invadeâ (aika kemuni alibume benjirakû oci. uthai cooha dosimbi) and passes it off as a suggestion from his officials and generals. He himself had suggested this approach several times in previous records. In the edict, however, he presents a more merciful picture of his rulership, and invites Sulá¹Än ShÄh to accept his favor.
QLJXD: 4:82â3.
Brophy, âHigh Asiaâ: 330, 339, 355â6.
JGBBSB: 18:44v, QLJXD: 4:126â7.
QLJXD: 3:445.
JGBBSB: 19:53râv.
JGBBSB: 20:5vâ6r. See also Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: 30â1.
Ibid.
QLJXD: 5:159â60.
Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: 106â7; P. C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2005): 291â92; Li X., âQianlong chao Zhongya Zhengce Yanjiu,â (PhD diss., Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiushengyuan, 2017): 119, states that the city of Uch-Turfan appealed to the Beg of Khoqand for support. MingÅ¡ui, then general of Ili, even proposed to remove all imperial representatives and garrisons from Altishahr in the wake of the uprising, and let the Muslim cities keep their old customs. The emperor neglected this advice. See p. 163.
QLJXD: 96â7, Brophy, âHigh Asiaâ: 340, 356â7.
QLJXD: 8:289.
QLJXD: 8:290.
QLJXD: 9:132.
TAS: 645. The date given is 13 Muḥarram, 1182 AH.
QLJXD: 8:288.
QLJXD: 8:307â8. Qianlong had reservations about the veracity of the merchantâs claims, and ordered Yunggui to investigate whether he was telling the truth. We have found no record of a follow-up, but the Qing officials did rely on the merchantâs information.
QLJXD: 8:289.
QLJXD: 8:288â93.
QLJXD: 8:319.
TAS: 645.
QLJXD: 9:65.
Li, âQianlong chao Zhongya Zhengce Yanjiuâ: 123.
QLJXD: 8:292â3.
QLJXD: 9:165â8.
QLJXD: 8:422.
QLJXD: 8:422â4.
Brophy, âHigh Asiaâ: 344, 359â60.
QLJXD: 9:64.
QLJXD: 9:65â6.
GZCSL: 676:QL27.12.8
QLJXD: 4:9â11.
