Abstract
Can a person truly be courageous, for example, without also being just, moderate, or generous? This paper examines the medieval philosopher Godfrey of Fontaines (d. 1306) and his defense of the Aristotelian idea that practical wisdom (prudence) connects all virtues of character, such as courage and justice, in such a way that they cannot be had independently of each other. In the late 13th century, John Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298) challenged this idea. Olivi argued that prudence functions like geometry: one can master one specific part without knowing the whole subject. According to Olivi, one can have good judgment concerning courage while lacking good judgment concerning justice or generosity. Godfrey offers one of the earliest and most sophisticated responses to this challenge. He argues that true prudence is a unified and indivisible virtue. For Godfrey, just as a doctor cannot understand the health of a single limb without understanding how it affects the entire body, a person cannot truly possess one virtue of character without understanding how it relates to all the others. What counts as a virtuous action depends on how different virtues relate to each other in different situations.
1 Introduction
Being a good and praiseworthy human being has long been associated with the possession of various virtues of character, including moderation, justice, and generosity. If this is right, a key question arises concerning the relationship between these virtues and whether they can be acquired in isolation from one another. This question garnered increasing interest and sophistication within medieval scholastic philosophy.1 This paper examines Godfrey of Fontaines’s (d. 1306) defense of Aristotle’s well-known and concise argument from Nicomachean Ethics (= NE) VI 12–13 that the possession of a virtue of character in isolation from other virtues of character is impossible given that all virtues of character rely on practical wisdom or prudence.2 Godfrey’s contribution to the discussion is particularly noteworthy in that he offers one of the earliest explicit responses to a significant challenge presented by Peter John Olivi (ca. 1248–1298) to Aristotle’s original argument.3 Olivi argues that, just as we might understand some aspects of geometry without comprehending it in full, so we acquire some prudence without having acquired all of it. Thus, it might be feasible for an individual to have prudence with respect to justice but not in relation to courage, which would make it impossible for prudence to connect the virtues of character as Aristotle proposed. Godfrey contends that prudence is, in fact, an indivisible virtue and maintains that it must be unified on the grounds that prudence concerns the suitable balance among different virtues of character. I shall argue that Godfrey holds a holistic view, on which the defining aspect of any given virtue of character is its proper relationship to all the others. This interpretation offers an advantage over the view that prudence is unified through its concern with happiness as the ultimate end, as proposed by Terence Irwin. Further, Godfrey’s account is ultimately better positioned to account for the connection between virtues than the preceding account offered by such thinkers as Thomas Aquinas.
This paper is structured in four sections. In the first section, I present Godfrey’s interpretation of Aristotle’s original argument. In the second section, I examine the issue of prudence’s unity, focusing on Olivi’s objection and Godfrey’s comprehension of the challenge. In the third section, I investigate Godfrey’s solution, focusing on what I term the proportional account. Finally, in the fourth section, I draw some general conclusions regarding the nature of the problem of the connection of the virtues.
2 The Connection of the Virtues of Character
Godfrey explores the connection of the virtues of character in several texts, initially addressing the matter in Quodlibet II.114 and subsequently developing his analysis to a greater extent in numerous Disputed Questions.5 He argues that virtues of character are, in fact, connected in such a way that one cannot possess one without the other.6 It is crucial to note that medieval philosophers tend to employ the term “connection” (connexio) in a manner that is somewhat technical sense, whereby a mere relationship between two entities is insufficient to establish a connection. Rather, X is connected to Y if and only if X cannot exist without Y. For instance, in contemporary philosophy of mind, one might argue that mental states and brain states are connected in such a way that certain mental states cannot occur independently of specific brain states. The task, then, is to explain the basis on which such a connection is established.7 Similarly, medieval philosophers ask whether virtues of character are connected and, if so, on what basis. In the interest of conciseness, I shall hereafter use the term “virtues” to refer to virtues of character and “intellectual virtues” to describe prudence and other forms of knowledge.
To comprehend Godfrey’s position, it is essential to differentiate between various versions of the idea that the virtues might be connected. One might conceive of virtues as either strongly or weakly connected. In cases of Weak Connection, the possession of one virtue would necessitate the possession of other additional virtues to some degree. Strong Connection, however, implies that perfect possession of a given virtue would require perfect possession of other virtues. Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between Local and Global Connection. A virtue might be connected to only some virtues, or it might be connected to all of them. These two distinctions give rise to the following fourfold scheme regarding the virtues:
Citation: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 2026; 10.30965/26664275-bja10130
Godfrey thinks that Aristotle in NE VI. 12–13 demonstrates the Strong Global Connection. Aristotle’s argument hinges on the specific relationship between the virtues, such as courage and moderation, and the intellectual virtue of practical reasoning (prudence). In a few densely written passages, Aristotle posits that one cannot obtain the virtue of practical reasoning without the virtues of character, and similarly, no genuine virtues of character can exist without the virtue of practical reasoning. The nature of this relationship has been a subject of extensive debate in scholarly literature.8 Two main ideas are central to Godfrey’s interpretation of Aristotle’s argument.
First, a division of labor exists between character virtue and prudence in terms of ends or aims. A perfectly virtuous person possesses both an inclination (inclinatio) toward virtuous ends and the intellectual aptitude to discern which actions will be most conducive to achieving these ends. For example, a courageous person will be more inclined to risk their own life or well-being to protect their community. Godfrey contends that such inclinations may arise naturally or may be cultivated through custom and good education. However, it is with prudence that we discern what risks one should take and in which situations. Godfrey suggests that inclination is shaped by prudence, and links this to Aristotle’s idea that virtuous actions should be executed in, for example, the right circumstances (ubi), at the right time (quando), and in the right manner (quantum) (QO IV.585). According to Godfrey’s interpretation of Aristotle, the inclination toward virtuous ends is attributed to one’s possession of the virtues, while the ability to discern the appropriate means to those ends is ascribed to prudence (QO IV.70–105).
Second, Godfrey highlights the essential connection between prudence and the virtues. He posits that prudence is indispensable for defining the virtues and that, conversely, the virtues shape prudence. Godfrey has an extensive discussion as to why prudence and virtues are mutually dependent in this manner (QO IV.154–206). However, the specifics are not important for understanding how this interdependence supports the argument for Strong Global Connection.9 The central idea here is that if one has misguided ends, such as the pursuit of any conceivable pleasure, one will inevitably lack prudence, regardless of their efficiency in achieving such a goal. Similarly, a person has true virtue only if they are guided exclusively by noble goals, such as risking their own safety for the community’s well-being, while also understanding which actions are conducive to achieving such ends. Moreover, such individuals cannot be said to be genuinely courageous if their actions are not appropriately timed or correctly executed. Mere inclinations without prudence are what Aristotle terms “natural virtues” and are not the actual virtues (QO IV.70–105).
The fundamental idea here is that if a person possesses a virtue, then they also possess prudence. However, they can be said to possess prudence only if they already possess all the other virtues. In the Latin translation, Aristotle articulates this view as follows:
[the] same person is not ideally suited for all virtues, which is why one may know a certain virtue but not acquire another. This happens according to natural virtues (naturales virtutes), but it does not occur with those virtues by which a person is said to be good unconditionally. For when prudence, as one disposition, exists in an individual, all virtues will inherently coexist.
Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI.13, trans. Grosseteste, 492–49310
We shall henceforth refer to this as the dependence argument.
3 Is Prudence Unified?
In the final decades of the thirteenth century, Olivi explicitly employed the idea of specific forms of prudence as a means of articulating an objection to the dependence argument.11 Both John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio III.36) and William Ockham (De Connexione Virtutum, II.34–51) would later adopt similar positions. Olivi proposes that a particular prudence exists for every virtue, thereby dismissing the notion that the virtues are interlinked through a unified prudence.12 This paper will focus on Olivi’s argument not only because it potentially serves as a foundational source for Godfrey’s examination but also because it aptly underscores the specific problem that Godfrey seeks to address.13
Olivi presents Aristotle’s argument as one possible explanation for the connection of the virtues and faithfully recapitulates it (Quaestiones de Virtutibus (= QV) 6.275). He does not agree that the relationship between prudence and the virtues establishes any form of connection among the virtues. Rather, Olivi contends that prudence may be divided in accordance with the various virtues:
Others respond to the first question, that just as virtue of character contains within itself many virtues of different species, and numbers, so too does prudence contain within itself many prudences or many partial habits. And just as the science of geometry or metaphysics contains within itself many scientific habits of different conclusions and principles, so too does temperance have its own prudence attached to it, as well as its own justice, and so on for the other virtues.
Olivi, QV 6.277
Prudence, in its entirety, is divided in terms of its relationship to justice, moderation, generosity, and so forth (QV 6.277). Olivi argues that the belief that prudence differs fundamentally from other forms of knowledge lacks any solid foundation and that it possesses no greater unity than, for example, geometry. Just as one can comprehend a specific conclusion within geometry without grasping all of them, so too can one acquire a particular aspect of prudence without mastering all its elements.
If Olivi is correct, Aristotle has not provided an argument demonstrating anything beyond a dependence between a specific virtue and a part of prudence (QV 6.277). We may refer to this problem as the divisibility challenge.
Following Olivi’s argument, we must recognize two ways in which prudence might be perceived as a unified virtue. On the one hand, we might assert that prudence is unified if we can accurately refer to it as a singular virtue. This may be termed the singularity requirement. On the other hand, prudence might be considered unified in a more robust sense if it cannot be further subdivided such that one can acquire one part without obtaining another. This may be termed the indivisibility requirement.14 For example, Aquinas upholds that sciences have a formal unity. Nevertheless, he notes,
there is this difference between knowledge (scientia) and virtue: since it is not part of the notion of knowledge that it actually embraces all objects, there is no need for someone knowledgeable to know everything that can be known. However, it is part of the notion of virtue that someone acts virtuously in every respect. That is why knowledge can be increased or decreased both concerning the number of its objects and concerning how intensively the subject possesses it. But virtue can be increased only in one of these ways.
Aquinas, QDVirt 1.11.ad10, trans. Atkins, modified
Aquinas differentiates between the two ways in which a disposition may be intensified: either it covers a broader range of things, or one becomes more inclined to act in accordance with it. To clarify this point, we can gain knowledge in two ways. First, if someone is not initially aware that there is no largest prime number, apprehension of this fact constitutes a gain in knowledge in one sense. Second, if an individual comprehends Euclid’s proof that there cannot be a largest prime number, they will be less likely to forsake this true belief, thus acquiring knowledge in another sense.
Aquinas maintains that no similar distinction exists in which virtue might be gained. A virtue, for example courage, pertains to all instances in which a person takes action in the face of significant risk to their own life. The extent of one’s courageousness depends on how they would act in all such situations and not only those situations that they have already experienced. Consequently, one cannot be partially courageous with respect to certain significant risks, such as encounters with dangerous snakes.
This analysis is far from uncontroversial in the context of this debate, as Scotus will present an alternative analysis in which dispositions or any accidental forms grow by acquiring parts, something that Godfrey denies (QO XVIII).15
However, the challenge that both Aquinas and Godfrey face is the obligation to consider prudence as an intellectual virtue and to explain why prudence (as an intellectual virtue) functions differently from other forms of intellectual virtues. Godfrey presents the problem of the unity of prudence as follows:
It is argued that prudence is not one in species because prudence is concerned with the human good, but the human good is not one in species. This is evident since the human good concerning a moderate act is not the same as the human good concerning a brave act, and similarly in other cases. Ergo, etc.
Godfrey, QO III.ob13 (PB.14 121)
The challenge for Godfrey arises from his belief that the method he considers suitable for distinguishing between various virtues also justifies the belief that there may exist multiple distinct “prudences” or discrete parts thereof that may be acquired independently. Godfrey acknowledges that goodness can be manifested in numerous ways, for example through acts of generosity, courage, justice, and so on. If this human good is not singular but rather is composed of various parts, it raises the question as to why no corresponding separate “prudences” exist?
One common explanation focuses on how virtues often overlap and reinforce one another. For instance, Aquinas contends that prudence is unified, differing from skill overall because:
Moral principles, on the other hand, are mutually ordered, so that a failure in one leads to failures in others. For example, those who fail to hold to the principle, which is part of moderation, that they should not chase after sensual desires, will from time to time, by doing just that, end up acting unjustly and therefore violating justice.
Aquinas, QDVirt, 5.2ad4, trans. Atkins, modified
However, this line of reasoning does not demonstrate that prudence is unified in a pertinent sense. Namely, the sense that prudence is indivisible. Aquinas merely shows that in order to possess prudence perfectly related to one virtue, one needs prudence, to some extent, with regard to the other virtues. Once we recognize that the dependence argument necessitates that prudence be indivisible, the interdependence between virtues will never be sufficient to render prudence unified in the relevant sense.16 Godfrey acknowledges this, arguing that if one fails in one virtue owing to lacking another, one fails only in what he terms “particular” prudence as distinct from universal prudence (which will form the basis for his response to the divisibility challenge). The idea that possession of one virtue assists in the acquisition of others merely supports that which Godfrey calls a “supportive connection”, which, as he understands it, holds to varying degrees concerning different virtues. Thus, it does not support Strong Global Connection. From Godfrey’s perspective, the usefulness of a virtue in acquiring other virtues is not part of Aristotle’s original argument (QO V.100–110).
In response to an argument advanced by John McDowell (1979), which shares similarities with Aquinas’ position mentioned above, Gary Watson introduces a more advantageous approach (1984, 59–61). Rather than focusing on the attainment of prudence or the mutual support individual virtues provide, Watson suggests that a particular account of moral understanding connects the virtues. This line of argument is not dependent on the ways in which individuals acquire and maintain prudence in relation to specific virtues; rather, how grasping the requirements of a particular virtue inherently entails an understanding of the requirements of all virtues. Although Watson himself does not endorse this idea as a credible account of moral understanding. However, persuasive textual evidence suggests that Godfrey does.
4 Godfrey’s Argument
Godfrey’s approach is centered on the identification of a unified object for prudence. He notes that prudence may pertain to the human good in both its proper aspect (ratio propria), which is unique to each specific virtue, and its common aspect (ratio communis), which is applicable to all virtues (QO III.3 (PB.14 130)). Furthermore, Godfrey considers the latter to guarantee that prudence possesses a singular object and constitutes a unified virtue, all while acknowledging the plurality of virtues. Godfrey seeks to uphold prudence as a unified virtue while acknowledging “[…] great diversity in human actions according to which a person is called good or bad, both in terms of the thing itself and in terms of its species, and as they are considered in themselves […]” (QO III.3 (PB.14 130)). He argues that it is with prudence that we examine individual virtues under their proper aspects and contemplate what is unique to each virtue, such as what would be considered courageous or moderate. However, a prudent person is capable of comprehending all virtues under a common principle: namely, that the “human good is to be done in some way” (QO III.3 (PB.14 130)). This carries noteworthy consequences, as Godfrey asserts:
Under the same aspect, whereby prudence has to consider the human good in relation to chastity, it also has to consider the human good in relation to generosity. This is because the quality of human good primarily belongs to neither of these virtues but to each of them equally. Therefore, each of them is equally relevant to the consideration of prudence.
Godfrey, QO III.3 (PB.14 130)
In other words, universal prudence concerns a certain equality with respect to the common aspect of the good, as no single specific good associated with any virtue can constitute the human good in itself or primarily. Moreover, when a prudent person examines the common aspect of the good, various particular goods are assessed analogically (analogantur) in relation to one another (QO III.3 (PB.14 130)). Godfrey thus observes that “A unity of the object is required for a unity of disposition, not according to a univocal unity of genus and species, but through a notion of analogy” (QO III.3 (PB.14 129)). This notion of analogy or proportion serves as the foundation for Godfrey’s response to the challenge that prudence lacks substantial unity (indivisibility). While we may examine a situation from the standpoint of each individual virtue, we must also examine what is good when all virtues are considered in relation to one another.
A seemingly straightforward interpretation might suggest that particular prudence concerns that which is virtuous in specific situations, while universal prudence considers that which is good more generally. Irwin suggests that Godfrey’s account might be interpreted as making explicit certain assumptions to which he believes Aquinas is committed. He proposes that Godfrey’s concept of universal prudence constitutes what he terms “macro-prudence” (Irwin 1997, 206–213). According to this interpretation, universal prudence is concerned with the ultimate goal of human happiness, while particular prudence addresses the good as it pertains to each virtue in specific situations. It is through that which Irwin designates as “macro-prudence” that we deliberate and decide to act in accordance with particular virtues as a means of attaining human happiness, for example, by opting to foster bravery in certain circumstances. Macro-prudence is juxtaposed with what Irwin labels “micro-prudence,” through which we discern what a particular virtue requires of us in specific situations. For Irwin, this implies that a virtuous agent must comprehend or articulate a unified account of happiness as the ultimate goal toward which all virtues are directed. Prudence, therefore, is a unified virtue as it involves viewing the distinct virtues as means to the final end of happiness. Furthermore, given that a prudent individual would then choose from among the virtues based on a single account of the ultimate goal of happiness, it would arguably be impossible to possess prudence with respect to a specific virtue without possessing it in relation to all of them.
However, a closer inspection of the text reveals a different picture. In his exploration of the unity of prudence, Godfrey uses the ancient metaphor that compares prudence to medicine, portraying it as the remedy for the human soul.17 Similarly, just as medicine is concerned with the well-being of the body, namely health, prudence focuses on the good of the soul, namely virtue. Moreover, medical practitioners do not attend solely to the health of individual body parts, such as the hands, heart, or lungs, but must also consider the well-being of the entire body holistically (QO III.3 (PB.14 129–130)). In a similar vein, Godfrey contends that “it is not sufficient to merely consider the condition of one part, but rather to take into account the state of any part whatsoever and the relationship between the parts.” (QO V.264–265). Just as a physician assesses the body’s discrete components in relation to the whole, a prudent person must consider the interplay among these distinct virtues. This metaphor, which compares health with virtue, highlights prudence’s indivisibility. It is impossible to possess only a single aspect of prudence since its scope includes understanding proportional relationships in particular situations. This approach to the unity of prudence may be termed the proportional account.
The proportional account challenges the idea that one can fully possess only a part of prudence, on the grounds that considering a situation solely from the standpoint of a single virtue yields an inherently limited perspective. If courage were the only relevant virtue in a given situation, prudence would suggest taking action C. Meanwhile, if generosity were the paramount virtue in a different situation, prudence would advocate for action G. In certain situations, however, one cannot pursue both actions C and G. As Godfrey explains, no specific virtue holds greater importance than another when it comes to the human good. Hence, it is not always the case that courage trumps generosity, for instance. This prompts the question of how, for Godfrey, the truly virtuous action is determined when such dilemmas arise. The answer to this question is that it depends on how each virtue relates to others. To view a situation solely from the perspective of generosity, for example, is to adopt a narrow viewpoint. As Godfrey points out, understanding the good of a foot requires consideration of the entire body’s well-being. Similarly, recognition of what is genuinely generous in a given situation requires an understanding of how generous actions correlate with other virtuous deeds. We might speak of “particular prudence” when referring to prudence concerning a specific virtue, but in strict terms, we cannot fully discern what one virtue requires without understanding the demands of all virtues. This illustrates that prudence is not merely a single virtue but is, in fact, inherently indivisible. From this perspective, the essence of that which is courageous depends on its relationship to the collective of all virtues. We might term this position virtue holism.
However, some might argue that virtue holism binds Godfrey to a problematic interpretation of virtue. Here, let us briefly explore two potential issues.
Some might assert that if every virtuous act hinges on a holistic understanding of the right course of action in all scenarios, the very notion that virtues are distinct is called into question. However, Godfrey underscores the existence of various, unique virtues. While the holistic perspective might suggest that all virtues essentially converge into one, it does not directly follow. Take, for instance, holism as it pertains to linguistic meaning. That a word’s meaning depends on a larger network does not mean that all words share the same meaning. Similarly, Godfrey can argue that actions such as those in which one bravely risks one’s own safety and chooses to selflessly give to those in need are discrete kinds of virtuous deeds, each of which contributes uniquely to a good life.
The implication of virtue holism generates another challenge: it appears that nobody can truly embody any virtue. This perspective undoubtedly sets a lofty bar for the achievement of ideal virtue. Why should this be inherently problematic, however? Godfrey might argue that he is merely laying out what it genuinely means to possess any virtue in its true form. We can still label someone as exceedingly brave or remarkably kind even if they do not fully embody these virtues in a perfect sense. Marilyn McCord Adams notes that Scotus seems to assert that virtues, in reality, evolve together. Philosophically, however, they do not possess intrinsic linkages (1996, 505). Ultimately, for Scotus, the possession of one virtue without possessing another is merely a logical possibility. We might say something similar as far as Godfrey is concerned: most good people have a greater degree of one virtue compared with another. However, Godfrey offers an analysis of how virtues should be understood in principle. According to his view, even God could not create a perfectly courageous person who lacks other virtues.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the proportional account, the concept of happiness does not play a direct role in Godfrey’s argument for the connection of virtues. Rather, universal prudence aims to discern the appropriate course of action in specific situations, rather than contemplating the nature of happiness. This, I believe, is a welcome feature of Godfrey’s account. It is important to note that all virtues, which share a common purpose or end, cannot establish their connection on their own. For example, we may conceivably construct a sound foundation for a house prior to erecting its walls, even though the nature of a good foundation is also wholly dependent on the definition of a good house. Hence, the mere fact that individual virtues can serve as a means to attain happiness is never sufficient to support the Strong Global Connection. This point was not lost on Olivi, who rejected the idea that virtues are connected through prudence while simultaneously affirming that they are oriented toward a common end.18 Nonetheless, if each virtue could be autonomously aimed toward the ultimate goal, without requiring the involvement of the other virtues, prudence would then be divisible.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Godfrey’s intellectualism concerning human freedom is not incompatible with the proportional account.19 Considering the possibility of true self-sacrifice, Godfrey makes clear his conviction that “I cannot want or love anything unless this entails that it is good for me,” however, when a person sacrifices themselves for the greater good, they gain “a better existence because it is a virtuous existence” (Quodlibet X.6 (PB IV. 322)). According to this perspective, happiness is attained by concentrating on the preservation of that which is considered valuable, for example, by safeguarding one’s community. This aligns with intellectualism, which posits that individuals are incapable of desiring anything that is not perceived to some extent as beneficial to their well-being. Notably, this does not imply that Godfrey subscribes to the idea that a comprehensive reflection on life as a whole is necessary for attaining happiness or engaging in prudential reasoning.
Furthermore, the emphasis on happiness may misconstrue the nature of the debate surrounding the connection of virtues. As previously noted, later philosophers such as Scotus advanced innovative conceptions of how dispositions work, whereby virtues gain distinct parts. By contrast, Godfrey sought to uphold that virtues and prudence are indivisible and cannot be fragmented. The debate concerning the connection of virtues is not centered around the function of happiness in ethics, despite this being a crucial topic in medieval ethics, but rather centers around the fundamental nature of moral dispositions.
In conclusion, Godfrey provides a rich and nuanced explanation of how, within an Aristotelian framework, one can preserve the idea that different virtues are connected through prudence. While happiness remains central to Aristotelian ethics, in Godfrey’s account it is the role of comparative reasoning in particular contexts that unifies prudence.
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Szlachta, M. 2020. Godfrey of Fontaines on the Moral Imputability of Exterior Acts. History of Philosophy Quarterly 37(4), 331–349.
Watson, G. 1984. Virtues in Excess. Philosophical Studies 46(1), 57–74.
Wippel, J. F. 1981. The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.
Wood, R. 1997. Ockham on the Virtues. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
The thesis that virtues cannot be acquired in isolation from one another is frequently referred to in philosophical and historical scholarship as the “unity of the virtues” (see, for example, Badhwar 1996; Cooper 1998). However, this designation can be somewhat misleading. The issue under consideration is not whether apparently distinct virtues are, in fact, a singular unified virtue. Medieval scholars tended to explore the interrelations of virtues under the term “connection” (connexio) rather than “unity” (unitas). Moreover, in this paper, I intend to confine the term “unity” to the inquiry as to whether prudence is a single and unified virtue.
For an overview of Godfrey’s work and life, see Wippel 1981, xv–xxxv; König-Pralong 2011.
Godfrey’s account has received little scholarly attention apart from Odon Lottin’s broad overview (1954, 576–596) and brief reference by Terrance Irwin (1997, 201 n41). Nonetheless, Godfrey’s discussion of this matter exerted a historical influence. His account is central to late medieval discussions of virtue as he is one of the main interlocutors with respect to Scotus’s influential account (Dumont 2009, 117–123). The discussion leading up to John Buridan’s influential commentary on NE was shaped by Godfrey’s focus on the unity of prudence (Lambertini 2008, 336–344). Interest in Godfrey’s ethics is growing: on Godfrey’s conception of justice, see Fuchs 2017, 199–212; Kempshall 1999, chs. 8–9; Kent 2001; on Godfrey’s conception of rights, see Mäkinen 2001, 124–136; on Godfrey’s conception of happiness, see Osborne 2005, 138–150; Neumann 1958; and on action theory, see Szlachta 2020; on Godfrey’s concept of conscience, see Leone 2017.
It dates from Easter 1286 (Wippel 1981, xxvii). I shall refer to the page numbers of the edition of Godfrey’s text in Les Philosophes Belges (= PB) in parentheses when applicable.
Quaestiones ordinariae (= QO) III, IV, V.
Godfrey and Aquinas adopt similar approaches to these matters, examining whether the perfection of one virtue necessitates the presence of another. Although Godfrey’s discourse is heavily influenced by that of Aquinas, it delves deeper and is more comprehensive in its analysis. Nonetheless, Godfrey’s discussion is more straightforward and omits the reference to Aquinas’ argument based on Augustine and Gregory the Great (Summa Theologiae (= ST), I.II.65.1). In Godfrey, we do not confront the question of which argument should take precedence (Porter 1993). Moreover, Godfrey does not use the concept of cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, moderation, and courage) in his analysis. Consequently, the issue that Bonnie Kent raises regarding the connection of virtues of character being exclusive to cardinal virtues is absent in Godfrey’s work (2012, 2014). In addition, Godfrey perceives the role of charity in connecting virtues as distinct from that of prudence (QO V.186–204), in contrast to Aquinas, who frequently compares prudence and charity in this context (Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus (= QDVirt) 5.2). This difference is linked to Godfrey’s divergent analysis of how God bestows virtues upon us, as compared to Aquinas (ST I.II.63.3; QDVirt 1.10). Godfrey disputes the existence of any infused virtues of character (QO XI.516–519; QO XIX.114–122). Furthermore, Godfrey does not engage with the concept of virtue equality, unlike Aquinas (ST I.II.66.2; QDVirt 5.3).
In the context of contemporary philosophy, one might refer to a connection of this nature as a kind of supervenience between brain states and mental states. For an overall examination of related matters, see Leuenberger (2008).
The question of why one requires the virtues of character to achieve good ends is a matter of considerable disagreement within Aristotelian scholarship. For an excellent discussion of this debate, see Moss (2011). Further, Christopher Bobier and I have examined this problem in Aquinas (2020).
For a detailed account of this argument, see Halper (1999).
All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
For an overview of Olivi’s discussion, see Wood (1997, 51–53). Henry of Ghent appears to have been the first within this context to use the notion of particular prudence (Quodlibet, V.17, 198). For a detailed analysis, see Porro (2013).
For a detailed discussion of Ockham and Scotus, see Adams (1996).
We cannot know with any certainty whether Godfrey ever read Olivi’s QV. We also have no precise date for when QO III was written, although it probably dates from five to ten years after QV in the late 1280s (Lottin 1954, 504). I assume that Godfrey was familiar with Olivi’s argument, but it may also be the case that both he and Olivi drew on discussions of prudence at the University of Paris in the 1270s and 1280s.
In her otherwise excellent overview of the medieval debate, Rega Wood does not acknowledge this particular difference.
Stephen D. Dumont provides an excellent and detailed discussion of the relationship between Godfrey’s account and John Duns Scotus’s respective theories of forms (2009).
For a discussion of the unity of prudence, focusing specifically on its acquisition, see Annas (2011, 84–98). This approach appears to encounter a similar issue to that of Aquinas’ suggestion. It appears that we cannot establish anything more than a partial unity of prudence, and consequently, we can establish only a Weak Global Connection at best.
Godfrey, who adopts this metaphor from Eustratius of Nicaea, is not alone among thirteenth-century philosophers in focusing on the relation between prudence and medicine. For example, Albert compares prudence to medicine, noting that prudence is a single disposition in the same way that medicine is a single science (Ethica, VI.X.536).
Wood offers an insightful treatment of this in her discussion of Olivi (1997, 52).
For a comparison between Godfrey and his contemporaries, see Eardley (2006).
