This chapter outlines the book’s primary subject: the Shia religious rituals currently practiced in Iran. Here, “Shia religious rituals” mainly refers to Hossein’s mourning ritual (marāsem-e ʿazādārī-ye hosseinī).1 In 1951, the orientalist Gustav Edmund von Grunebaum noted the following regarding the Shia: “The inclination of [Shiism] to theological extremism may have weakened during the last centuries, when persecution ceased, but the nervous climate of the [Shia] is still that of a suppressed sect, even where not only political recognition but political sovereignty has been achieved” (von Grunebaum 1951: 85). Alongside Islamic obligations shared with Sunnis—confession of faith,2 praying five times a day,3 giving charity, fasting in the month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Macca (Hajj)—Shias are also strongly compelled to perform rituals associated with respect for the Prophet Muhammad’s lineage. Additionally, Shia Islam’s development from the Safavid period (1501–1736) is indispensable for a clear historical understanding of present-day Iran. Therefore, it is necessary to review developments in both Shia practices and the region at large to best understand the significance behind how they are currently practiced.
This chapter begins by addressing Shiism’s formation and its associated religious rituals. It then reviews the historical reception of Shiism in Iran and the development of its ritual practices, before introducing the notion of a heyʾat, a social group that serves as a primary organizer of these rituals. Building on this foundation, the chapter considers the history of Tehran—where many of the rituals examined in this book take place—through the lens of heyʾat formation and the implementation of the Shia religious rituals. Finally, drawing
Mourning Rituals and Their Development in Iran
The mourning rituals for Imam Hossein trace their origins to the early formation of Shiism, one of two major sects of Islam.4 The word “Shia” means “party” in Arabic (Eickelman 1998; Aghaie 2004); crucially, this faction claimed that Ali ibn Abi Talib5 and his descendants were legitimate leaders of the Muslim community (ʾumma). According to Shia belief, during the Prophet Muhammad’s final pilgrimage to Macca in 632, he stopped at Ghadir Khumm and delivered a sermon designating Ali as his successor.6 However, a majority of Muslims—those who would later be identified as Sunnis—did not accept this claim and instead recognized Abu Bakr, elected by consensus, as the first caliph7 after the Prophet’s death. He was followed in succession by Umar and Uthman. In 656, Ali was eventually chosen as the fourth caliph. His leadership was short-lived, as he was assassinated in 661. Following his death, Muawiya, a prominent opponent of Ali, declared himself caliph and assumed sole leadership. Upon Muawiya’s death, his son Yazid succeeded him, inaugurating the hereditary Umayyad dynasty (661–750)—more fiercely contested by the supporters of Ali’s lineage. This dispute was further inflamed by the political rivalry between the inhabitants of Kufa (in present-day Iraq), where Ali had established his base, and those of Damascus, the Umayyad capital.
A pivotal event in the formation of Shia identity is the Battle of Karbala, which took place on 10 October 680 (10 Muharram Hijra 61), and is commemorated annually on the Day of “Ashura”, meaning the tenth in Arabic. This event marks the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, the second son of Ali and the third Shia Imam. In response to call for leadership from the people of Kufa, who opposed the Umayyad rule, Husayn (hereafter referred to by its Persian form, “Hossein”) set out with a small group of family members and companions
Kinship chart of the fourteen infallibles in Twelver Shiism
As the succession to the caliphate by the Umayyads continued within the broader Muslim community, the lineage of Ali Zain al-Abidin—a fortunate survivor who had not participated in the Battle of Karbala—also persisted. Although Shiism later splintered into multiple sects, often due to political disputes over succession, the descendants of Ali have continued to be revered as Imams by successive generations. Twelver Shiism (davāzdah-emāmī), which is the official state religion of the Islamic Republic of Iran, holds that the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, went into occultation (ar., ghayba) following the death of his father, the Eleventh Imam. Twelvers believe that he will soon return as a messianic figure who will establish justice and equity in the world.8
Several scholars note that the “tragedy of Karbala” has transcended the realm of historical memory to become a narrative framework within Shiism.9 As mentioned in the introduction, Fischer conceptualizes this as the “Karbala Paradigm,” which encapsulates Hossein’s defiance and martyrdom in the face of Yazid’s tyranny (satamgarān) and injustice (ẓolm). According to Fischer, the Karbala Paradigm is “expandable to be all-inclusive of history, cosmology, and life’s problem” (2003: 27). In this view, the story functions as a moral and interpretive lens through which Shia adherents, regardless of time and space, evaluate their own socio-political reality. Those living within this paradigm often superimpose contemporary adversaries—whether Sunni authorities or Western powers—onto the figure of Yazid. The Karbala Paradigm thus encompasses two paradoxical dimensions: the passive endurance of suffering and the active resistance against injustice (Keddie 1983; Ram 1996). Later, Ali Shariati, a seminal thinker of the Iranian Revolution, encapsulated this ethos with the slogan “Every day is Ashura, every place is Karbala.” For Shariati, the true tragedy of Karbala lies in the perpetuation of injustice in everyday life, and he urged followers to emulate Hossein by confronting oppression in all its forms.
Rituals, in all their varied forms, play a central role in the internalization of Karbala Paradigm among Shia followers. Mourning rituals, in particular, which are inherently tied to grief and remembrance, have evolved over time as communal means to commemorate and pass on the tragedy of Karbala.10 The historian Yitzhak Nakash categorizes Hossein’s mourning rituals into five
A final but crucial note: participation in Hossein’s mourning rituals constitutes a fundamental aspect of the Shia Islam doctrine. Rituals such as visiting the mausoleum of a revered saint or celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (ar., mawlid) are also observed by Sunnis. As a result, these practices have been subject to anthropological debate, particularly regarding the differences between the practices of more populous Islamic groups and those of the elite. Sunni ulama (scholars) and intellectuals are divided on the acceptability of such rituals. On the one hand, some advocate outright excluding such rituals on the grounds that they violate the Islamic prohibition of idolatry, and on the other, some take a more moderate stance, allowing them because they have been practiced since the time of the Prophet. Anthropological research has thus focused on the tension between the two.
For the Shia, however, such questions vanish. In the Twelver Shia tradition, for example, visiting the mausoleums of the Imams or his descendants is actively encouraged as part of official doctrine.13 The incorporation of rituals often considered “popular” into official Shia theology may be attributed
Currently, approximately 90 percent of the population of Islamic Republic of Iran identifies as Shia. Among these Shia populations are various ethnic groups, including the Fars15—whose native language is Persian16—Azeris,17 Lurs, some Kurds residing in Kermanshah and Ilam provinces, and Shia Arabs (see Map 1). Iran’s Islamization began after the fall of the Sasanian dynasty (226–651) and its Zoroastrian state religion, following the expansion of the Islamic empire under the third caliph, Uthman. Much later, during Safavid period, Shah Ismail I actively promoted Shiism through a combination of religious policy and coercion, resulting in the gradual conversion of the region’s predominantly Sunni population. Scholars argue that Ismail’s political objective was to use Shiism to legitimize his rule and distinguish his domain from the Sunni ottomans to the west and the Sunni Uzbeks to the east (Aghaie 2004; Keddie 2006).
Approximate distribution of ethnic groups in Iran and place names appearing in this book
PREPARED BY THE AUTHOR BASED ON A 2004 MAP BY THE US CIA CARTOGRAPHIC CENTER, ACCESSED 6 NOVEMBER 2025: HTTPS://WWW.LOC.GOV/RESOURCE/G7620.CT001323/. NOTE THAT THE BOUNDARIES OF ETHNIC GROUPS ARE APPROXIMATE
To support this transformation, Ismail I invited Shia jurists from southern Ottoman Syria (modern-day southern Lebanon), a historic center of Shia Scholarship. Through these efforts, Isfahan was elevated from a city of historical and strategic significance to the intellectual heart of Shia Islam. These efforts proved effective: until the decline of the Safavid dynasty in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Isfahan remained the preeminent center of Shia academic life. In the 18th century, the center of learning shifted to the Iraqi cities
Rituals such as mourning gatherings and processions have been practiced by the faithful since the early days Shiism and were later introduced and developed in Iran. During the Safavid period, Shia ritual practices underwent significant transformation and institutionalization (Ayoub 1978; Rahimi 2011). In 16th-century Iran, a form of martyrdom narrative known rowże emerged—an emotional, Persian-language retelling of the Karbala tragedy designed to make Shia doctrine accessible to those unable to read. This period also saw the rise of the rowże-khān, a storyteller who specialized in delivering these narratives (Aghaie 2004). Subsequently, during the Zand (1751–94) and the Qajar (1796–1925) dynasties, a new performative ritual taʿazīye—a dramatic reenactment of the martyrdom at Karbala—took shape and flourished (Chelkowski 1979; Deacon 2024).
Additionally, Shia rituals have incorporated indigenous customs and practices in their development. For instance, Masoudi (2018) discusses a region-specific mourning ritual chūb-bāzī, a ritual formerly practiced in Dezful, southwestern Iran, until the early 1980s. In this ritual, two individuals, each holding a wooden stick approximately 10–15 centimeters in length, would move rhythmically in circle formed by spectators, striking each other with the sticks. This ritual exemplifies how local traditions have been integrated into the broader Shia mourning practices, reflecting the adaptability of these rituals over time.
Masoudi (2018: 31–32) argues that, in the post-revolutionary context, the chūb-bāzī ritual was seen as either amusing or inappropriate, leading to its eventual disappearance. However, in 2016, its resurgence in Dezful as a “traditional ritual” was reported by the state-run news agency IRNA.18 This illustrates how Hossein’s mourning rituals have evolved over time, maintaining core religious symbols while adapting to the specific circumstances of different periods and regions. For example, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the current chest-beating ritual and the mourning songs performed during it are deeply connected to the sound culture of contemporary Iranian society.
In Iran, the nationalization of Shia rituals following the Iranian Revolution highlights the state’s role in recreating religious tradition. The body of Khomeini, who passed away in 1989, is enshrined in a grand mausoleum alongside the Behesht-e Zahra19 in southern Tehran. The 14th Khordad in the Iranian calendar (3 or 4 July) marks the anniversary of Khomeini’s death and is observed as a national holiday. On this day, his supporters gather to conduct a mourning ritual that includes “chest-beating” (sīne-zanī).20 It is important to treat this as a state ritual, rather than a traditional Shia ritual, as evidenced by its observance according to the solar (rather than the lunar) calendar, and
Currently, Hossein’s mourning rituals are primarily carried out in Iranian society by a social group known as the heyʾat. The word heyʾat derived from the Arabic term hayʾa, meaning “form,” “figure,” or “state.” It also carries the connotation of “group” that become the “form” or “figure” of an entire assembly, signifying a group with considerable responsibility as representative. In modern Persian the term retains these meanings, though it more directly refers to the concept of a “group.”21
Anthropologist Thaiss (1972), who conducted fieldwork in Tehran prior to the Iranian Revolution, classified two types of religious heyʾat meetings. The first type heyʾat-e ṣenfī, was associated with guilds, formed around occupations such as bazaar merchants. The second, heyʾat-e maḥalle, was organized in neighborhoods by lower-class residents who had migrated to the city. The latter can be further subdivided into groups based on the district of residence, ethnic identities such as Azeris or Lurs, or specific hometowns (e.g., groups from Kermanshah). Heyʾat are often named after districts or have Islamic-related names, and primarily attended by men. Women may hold a separate religious gathering jalase22 (Torab 2006; Osanloo 2009).
Heyʾat can be formed voluntarily, but for legal recognition, the group must be officially registered with the Islamic Development Organization.23 This institution, originally created by Khomeini’s order in 1979 and formally established in 1981, aims to promote the Islamic Republic’s ideology and is now under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Those responsible for organizing heyʾat must meet certain requirements, including age and educational background.
The heyʾat are loosely organized in concentric circles based on the level of commitment. At the center is the core group, responsible for overall management of the group and the execution of religious rituals. Surrounding this core are those who regularly participate in the heyʾat’s rituals, followed by those who only attend the rituals without any deeper sense of belonging to the group. Financial contributions are generally voluntary, with members donating to support the activities of heyʾat. However, the amount of an individual’s donation is typically kept confidential, even though it may be informally known. This is because donations are viewed as acts of goodwill, and revealing the amount could create power imbalances among donors. Additionally, in Islam, flaunting one’s deeds (riyā) is discouraged as it can be seen as hypocrisy. In principle, the heyʾat is an organization that seeks to treat all members equally in the name of God, the Prophet, and the Imams.
The district I inhabited from 2015 to 2017—a little southwest of Enqelab Square, where the University of Tehran is located—can be regarded as one of the central districts of Tehran. This area is home to many heyʾat, and during Muharram, the entire city is decorated for mourning rituals; at night, I witnessed ceremonies on every street. Even inside my home, I could hear the drums and maddāḥ singing outside. This phenomenon is characteristic of southern Tehran and closely tied to the city’s development amid Iran’s 20th century modernization. Therefore, we will next explore Teheran’s history in relation to the formation of heyʾat.
Tehran, the capital of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has an estimated population of approximately 9,616,000 as of 2024,25 making it the largest city in West Asia. Geographically, the city lies south of the Alborz Mountains and is situated roughly 100 km from the Caspian Sea (Map 2). Elevations in Tehran range from about 170 meters above sea level in the north to approximately 100 meters in the south (Beheshti 1395 [2016/17]). This north–south slope has shaped both the city’s socio-economic stratification and its cultural hierarchy: generally, wealthier residents occupy the higher elevations while lower-income communities are found farther south (Bayat 1997: 27). Tehran’s urban form reflects its historical evolution. Although it became Iran’s capital under Agha Mohammad Khan in 1796, it was until then a modest settlement lacking many features of a traditional Islamic city—such as grand mosques and fortified walls—that characterized older centers like Isfahan and Shiraz (Khosravi 2008). At the
Administrative divisions of Tehran city and place names mentioned in this book (drawn by the author)
The district in which I resided was formed in the 1960s following a rapid influx of rural migrants, coinciding with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s modernization policy (White Revolution). Residential areas were constructed without unified planning, leading to the formation of informal settlements (Bayat 1997). These unplanned characteristics persist today: many streets are one-way, and a network of narrow alleys and dead ends weaves through the neighborhood;
When this district was transformed into a residential area by influx of rural migrants, residents organized heyʾat around their places of origin or neighborhood. These groups not only performed religious rituals but also fostered social networks, introducing newcomers to local contacts and helping them find work (Thaiss 1972). In this way, migrants—separated from their former communities—built new ties. Consequently, the heyʾat and their rituals in southern Tehran played a pivotal role in mobilizing citizens during the Iranian Revolution: interpersonal bonds formed within these assemblies facilitated the circulation of cassette tapes containing Khomeini’s speeches and enabled members to share information about the dates and times of planned anti–monarchy demonstrations (Arjomand 1988).
Ashura in Contemporary Tehran
Nowadays, Hossein’s mourning rituals culminate at noon of Ashura—the day commemorating his martyrdom (Figure 2)—although ceremonies are held both before and after this central event. Mourning gatherings typically begin on the evening of the first night of Muharram and continue nightly thereafter. It is important to note that the Islamic (Hijri) lunar calendar marks the beginning of eachday at sunset. Consequently, when these dates are converted to the solar calendar, they correspond to the eve of the given date.27
Citizens watching the chain-beating street procession in Tehran, 2017
The months of Muharram and Safar—up to the twentieth day, known as Arbain (arbaʿīn), marking the 40th day after Hossein’s martyrdom—constitute a formal period of mourning in Shia communities. During this time, weddings are avoided, and entertainment programs are suspended on state-run television. Although it is not obligatory, citizens are encouraged to wear black as a symbol
Preparations for the rituals of month of Muharram begin approximately two weeks in advance. In the city, male members of heyʾat gather at night to work on mourning decorations. Trucks deliver the necessary materials, and elders of the heyʾat direct younger men in assembling structures and performing other heavy tasks. These preparations are carried out in stages, often on holiday evenings, such as Thursdays and Fridays, and sometimes continue until midnight. First, men erect iron pipes along either side of the road, enclosing the space like a gate. They then drape black cloth over the structure and decorate it with honorific phrases for the Imam, such as “Ya Hossein,” alongside the embroidered or printed name of the heyʾat. At night, the area is illuminated with green, fluorescent lights.
Throughout the month of Muharram, the streets are lined with numerous heyʾat stalls (īstgāh-e ṣalavātī), which offer hot tea, a sweet cold beverage known as called sharbat, or even a meal.28 These refreshments are freely distributed to
Rituals of remembrance vary across regions and even within individual cities.29 For example, the city of Yazd, located in central Iran, is renowned for the ritual of carrying a large wooden float known as nakhr through the streets (e.g., Fischer and Abedi 1990). In Lorestan province, home to many Luri people, participants perform a mourning procession on the morning of Ashura that involves smearing mud on their bodies—a practice called gelmālī (Figure 3). The same ritual is also observed in Tehran during street processions organized by heyʾat formed by migrants from Lorestan. Similarly, in parts of the Azeri region and among Azeri communities in Tehran, people practice the qame-zanī
The author, participating in a street march with mud in Khorramabad on the morning of Ashura, 2015
Ritual practices in Tehran are equally diverse. One of the most prominent heyʾat is composed of merchants from the Grand Bazaar, located in the city’s commercial center. This group has a long-standing presence in Tehran and takes pride in its identity as “genuine Tehranians” (aṣl-e tehrānī). At noon on Ashura, they set up a large black tent near the entrance of the bazaar, in front of the Panzdah-e Khordad subway station, where they perform a passion play depicting the martyrdom of Hossein. Similarly, in Tajrish—a popular district of northern Tehran—a group sets up a stage in the bazaar adjacent to the Mausoleum of Imamzadeh Saleh, a place usually used for selling vegetables and fruits.
Dowlat Abad, in southeast of Tehran, is home to many migrants from Karbala, Iraq, who fled Saddam Hussein’s regime. Though originally of Iranian descent, their native language is Arabic. In this area, stalls modeled after those along the route line the street in front of the ḥoseynīye or takīye—buildings permanently designated for Hossein’s mourning rituals—where Arabic mourning songs are played.
In general, the following observations can be made: First, in northern Tehran—a relatively affluent area characterized by large apartment complexes—residents tend to be less actively engaged in religious practices. Nevertheless, banners are hung during Muharram, and local heyʾat are formed to organize street processions (daste-gardānī). In contrast, the southern districts—including the area where I lived—are densely populated (Tehran Geographic Information Center 2005), and during Muharram, each heyʾat decorates its surroundings and prominently displays its name, making each group easily identifiable. It is no exaggeration to say that nearly every alley facing a main street hosts a heyʾat. At night, many of these groups march through the streets in mourning processions or hold indoor chest-beating (sīne-zanī) ceremonies. Even inside the home, one hears the constant sound of drums and amplified mourning songs echoing from all directions. In this way, the rituals exhibit considerable variation across different districts of Tehran.
Street Procession and Chain-Beating
Having outlined the general distribution of heyʾats across Tehran’s districts, I now focus on one specific group located in the area where I lived. This example sheds light on how ritual practices and neighborhood space are mutually constitutive. Situated in an alley off Imam Khomeini Street, heyʾat A is composed mainly of residents from the nearby alleys. Their rituals primarily involve street marches and chain-beating (zanjīr-zanī). During Muharram, the
Behind the gate, a corridor-like space is formed using black cloth draped over the sides and ceiling. Deeper inside the alley stands the house of the heyʾat’s chief. On the ground floor, the parking area is extended toward the street by means of a black wooden shed (tekīye) constructed for the ritual season. Inside, carpets are laid on the floor, and the walls are covered with black cloth embroidered with Islamic script. This space is exclusively for men, who gather there to perform indoor chest-beating rituals or to receive food distributed afterward.
The timing and duration of street marches also reflect local variation. While some heyʾats begin their processions as early as the first eve of Muharram, others continue even after Ashura has passed. Heyʾat A, for instance, holds nightly marches beginning on the eve of the fifth and continuing through the eve of the tenth day. The cycle of activities begins even earlier. On the eve of the first day of Muharram, adult members of the group gather in the street to carry out the ritual slaughter of cattle. After the animals are dismembered, the meat is used in a communal meal organized and served by the heyʾat (see Table 1).
Daily schedule of heyʾat A rituals (as observed in Tehran, 2017)
| 19:30 | Children begin to gather in the alley with drums. |
| 21:00 | The street march begins. |
| 22:00 | They visit the tekīye of the neighborhood heyʾat, and perform the chain-beating ritual in front of the ʿalāmat for 30–60 minutes. Upon completion, the march begins again. |
| 23:00 | The march returns to its starting point. |
| 23:30 | They return to the main site, and perform the chain-slapping ritual. |
| 00:30 | After the ritual, a meal is served in a hut built in the parking lot of the heyʾat chief’s house. Plastic sheets (sofre) are laid out so people can eat, but many take enough food for their families back home. |
The first eye-catching element of the street procession is ʿalāmat or ʿalam, a device that means “sign” or “mark” (Figure 4).30 The ʿalāmat is made of metal pillars, including one standing alone, and decorated with metal statues of animals,
A man carrying an ʿalāmat on the morning of the Ashura in Tehran, 2017
The decoration of the ʿalāmat is meaningful not only in itself, but also through comparison with other ʿalāmats. During Muharram, many heyʾat conduct street processions with ʿalāmat and because these processions are public, they are often compared with those of other groups. For instance, heyʾat A had two ʿalāmats, both owned by an adult member in his fifties who represented a trading company and dressed neatly, often wearing a suit. He explained that the ʿalāmat are usually kept at his home, under the surveillance of security cameras. In 2016, he told me: “Next year I’m going to paint gold on this ʿalāmat. Because that is what I can do for Imam Hossein.” When I revisited this heyʾat
By ornately decorating ʿalāmat, groups attempt to differentiate themselves from surrounding heyʾat processions. Each heyʾat also introduces its own striking innovations tailored to its budget, such as participants dressed as characters from the Battle of Karbala, marching on carts with models of the battle (such as Hossein’s decapitated body), and some riding alongside the march on horses and camels. These trends reflect an almost potlatch-like competition among heyʾats for prestige.
The procession of heyʾat A unfolds as follows: First, two children lead the procession, carrying a flag supported by two bamboo poles embroidered with the heyʾat’s name. Behind them comes the ʿalāmat, which is carried by one man for a certain distance before being passed to another man among five or six surrounding men. In turn, each person supports the ʿalāmat, waiting for the next to lift it and insert the prop into the hole in his belt; if a carrier begins to fall, the surrounding men support him.
Following the ʿalāmat, men line up in two equally spaced rows. Between the lines, a man sings nowhe into a microphone, while adults and children with various-sized drums (printed with the unofficial “YAMAHA”) follow behind him. A speaker mounted on a cart amplifies the voice of maddāḥ (religious singer). Men slam a pair of chains against their bodies in time with the beat of drums and the maddāḥ’s singing. The primary purpose of the chain-beating ritual is thought to reenact Hossein’s pain (Nakash 1993), although the chains here are made of light metal and lack blades, so the participants experience little pain when striking their bodies (Figure 5).
A chain used in chain-beating rituals
PURCHASED IN 2017 IN BAZAAR, SHAHR-E REY, AN ANCIENT CITY ADJACENT TO THE SOUTH OF TEHRAN
In this respect, it is better compared to the severe chest-beating discussed in Chapter 3 than to the self-flagellation ritual in Chapter 5. As I explain in more detail as below, the procession visits several other neighborhood heyʾats. After these visits, the group return to its base, where the chain-beating continues for roughly an hour. When the ritual is complete, the participants gather in black hut at the home of heyʾat’s chef to distribute alms meal in Styrofoam containers. Everything concludes after midnight.
The “alms” distributed after the rituals at heyʾat carry two meanings. As with the food stalls mentioned earlier, almsgiving is intended to be practiced without distinction, as sharing food in the name of Imam Hossein is considered virtuous. On the other hand, the alms meal distributed by heyʾat after the ritual is primarily for the participants and their families, with any leftovers given to passersby.32
Mourning Rituals Embedded in Local Neighborhood
The rituals discussed so far, whether street processions or other rituals, are intended primarily as expressions of grief within Shia doctrine. Nevertheless, they also serve a range of functions that go beyond the mere signification of mourning.
First, these rituals function to facilitate interaction and mutual respect among different heyʾats. The marching practices follow several protocols that are closely tied to the spatial organization of the district. In the case of heyʾat A, for example, the order of the procession changes daily to allow visits to strongholds of neighboring heyʾats. Upon arrival, the visitors prop up their ʿalāmat in front of the host heyʾat’ stalls. Each man who carries the ʿalāmat also picks up a stick with a chain, and a chain-beating ritual is performed in front of their own ʿalāmat for thirty minutes to an hour. During the ritual, participants beat their backs with chains in rhythm with the mourning chants of maddāḥ.
Occasionally, a sheep may be slaughtered in front of the ʿalāmat,34 while espand is burned nearby, releasing white smoke to ward off the evil eye.35 As the ritual progresses, the maddāḥ’s chants intensify, the drumbeats grow
Throughout Muharram, it is also common for multiple heyʾats to conduct marches on the same streets, leading to processional encounters. In such instances, the two groups first face one another, then sway their ʿalāmats back and forth in a gesture of mutual prayer. This act of reverence exemplifies the practice of taʿārof, a central element of respectful social conduct in Iranian culture.37 In this way, the ritual street march functions not only as an act of mourning but also as a medium of inter-group interaction and recognition.
Second, these rituals foster interaction not only among participants but also among spectators. One of the most socially significant aspects of the event is its function as a space of encounter between the sexes. Well before the procession begins, people line the roadside—often arriving an hour in advance—accompanied by their children or chatting with neighbors and acquaintances.
On occasion, young women with carefully applied makeup can be seen among the crowd. Although they might not ordinarily be permitted to go out at night without a specific reason, the rituals of Muharram offer a culturally accepted pretext. In this way, the rituals may serve as a space where heterosexual interactions occur under the guise of religious observance. As Varzi (2006) notes, some Islamic rituals plausibly function as pretexts for other social purposes.
One of the most commonly voiced critiques of ritual participation reflects this dynamic: that some young men join not out of sincere faith, but in hopes of attracting women. These narratives, while often moralizing in tone, reveal the extent to which mourning rituals are embedded not only in doctrinal meaning but also in the everyday social life of neighborhoods and their residents.
In this chapter, I have examined some of the basic assumptions underlying the mourning rituals for Hossein, the central focus of this book. I began by reviewing the origins of Shiism, proposing that its status as a minority tradition contributed to the development of a distinct communal identity through
The characteristics of the processional rituals discussed in this chapter resonate with several other practices examined throughout this book. The heyʾat processions, with their combination of coordinated bodily movements and mourning songs, parallel the chest-beating rituals explored in Chapter 3. They also share important features with the pilgrimage to Karbala, the subject of Chapter 4, such as movement through space, roadside stalls, and the formation of temporary communities through the exchange of alms offered in the name of Hossein. The embodied intensity of the chain-beating ritual—its physicality that exceeds verbal expression—finds its most extreme form in the self-flagellation practices analyzed in Chapter 5. While each ritual exhibits distinct features and operates in different contexts, they nonetheless share overlapping elements that suggest a broader ritual logic connecting Shia mourning practices across various settings.
The word marāsem, translated here as “ritual,” derives from the Arabic plural form of marsūm, which later came to mean “custom” (rasm), and originally denoted “order” or “rule.” The term rasm itself originally meant “drawing” or “diagram,” from which the meanings “rule” and “ritual” were subsequently derived. Related terms such as āʾīn and manāsek are also occasionally used. Asad (1993: 56) notes that in the 18th century, the English word “ritual” denoted conduct regulated by a script; the Arabic concept appears to share this regulatory connotation.
Sunnis recite the phrase, “There is no god but God. Muhammad is the Prophet of God.” Shias add to this the phrase, “Ali is the friend of God.”
Among the five daily prayers (morning, noon, afternoon, sunset, and evening), Shias often perform the noon and afternoon prayers consecutively during the time of the noon prayer, and the sunset and evening prayers consecutively at sunset. In contrast, Sunnis generally perform each of the five prayers at their designated times and keep them separate.
Note: In sections dealing with the historical emergence of Shiism, the names of key figures are rendered in Arabic to emphasize the origins of Shiism as a faith rooted in the Arab world (Figure 1). In other parts of the text, however, the same figures are referred to using their Persian forms, reflecting how they are commonly addressed by Iranian speakers.
The Prophet Muhammad’s cousin, and a husband of his daughter; henceforth “Ali”.
For this reason, in the Hijra calendar, the 18th of the twelfth month is called Eid al-Ghadir, the largest Shia holiday.
A term used to indicate the Muslim community’s political representative.
See, for instance, Chelkovski 1979, Ayoub 1978, and Aghaie 2001.
Shia rituals are not limited to commemorations of Hossein alone; they are also observed on the birthdays and death anniversaries of the Prophet Muhammad, his wife Fatima, and the twelve Shia Imams—collectively known as the Fourteen Infallibles (chahārdah-e maʿsūm)—as well as on other significant religious occasions.
The word daste originally meant “group,” similar to heyʾat, and does not strictly denote a street procession (Masoudi 2018: 61). However, the term daste-ye ʿazādārī (“mourning group”) primarily refers to a mourning procession, and only less frequently to a stationary gathering; thus, it is often interpreted as a marching group (cf. Mohaddesi 1391 [2012/13]: 189–90).
Shia rituals are practiced in several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain; in South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; and among immigrant communities from these regions in the West. More broadly, this includes Hosay, a ritual observed by Indian descendants in former British colonies such as Trinidad and Tobago (Korom 2003; Chelkowski 2010).
Marei et al. (2024) approach Shiism—including its various sects across different regions—through the lens of materiality and embodied experience. This approach is framed as a response to the growing scholarly interest in material culture more broadly, and as a counterbalance to research focused on self-cultivation. Nevertheless, this renewed focus can also be seen as a return to earlier forms of the anthropology of Islam.
However, despite Mashhad being a major Shia pilgrimage site, many of the populations living in the surrounding areas of northeastern Iran are Sunnis.
Here, I include the Gilaki and Mazandarani peoples, who inhabit the Caspian Sea coast.
The next most numerous group, primarily Turkic-speaking, originates from northwestern Iran and is also well represented in Tehran.
“The mourning ritual in Dezfur, the chūb-zanī [= chūb bāzī], is eligible for national registration,” IRNA, 10 October 2016, accessed 6 November 2025: https://irna.ir/xjhdYm.
Iran’s largest state cemetery, constructed in the 1960s, includes a section where those who died in the Iran–Iraq War are buried as martyrs. There is also a separate plot for those who opposed the revolutionary government, which at first glance resembles a wasteland, marked only by simple gravestones.
For example, the term heyʾat appears in usages such as heyʾat-e elmī (“faculty council”) and heyʾat-e dowlat (“cabinet”). When applied to a group responsible for religious rituals, it is referred to as heyʾat-e ʿazādārī (“mourning group”), heyʾat-e maẕhabī (“religious group”), or simply heyʾat. The term may also refer to the gathering or meeting held by such a group, as in the expression “going to the heyʾat.”
I primarily investigated heyʾat in which only men performed the rituals. However, at a heyʾat near F Square that I visited in 2019—introduced by the Japanese anthropologist Atsuko Tsubakihara—women also participated. In most cases, these were the spouses of the male participants, and they joined the rituals in a space separated by cloth, adjacent to the men’s area.
The literal Persian translation would be “Islamic Advertising Organization (sāzmān-e tablīghāt-e eslāmī).”
heyʾat registration site by the Islamic Development Organization, accessed 12 February 2023: http://tooba.tdm-ido.ir/regHeyat.aspx (site discontinued).
PopulationStat, accessed 2 February 2024: https://populationstat.com/iran/tehran.
Generally, most expatriates in Tehran live in the northern part of the city, where many embassies and businesses are also located. While foreign tourists often visit the northern districts, many cheap hotels can be found near the Grand Bazaar in the south. In contrast, I rarely saw other “foreigners” in the district where I lived, and my appearance often drew attention. However, those responsible for the district’s rituals came to recognize me as a resident. It seems that my foreignness, rather than being a barrier, positively contributed to the development of our rapport.
In Persian, there are two ways to refer to the night associated with a given day—for example, shab-e jomʿe (“the night of Friday”) and jomʿe-shab (“Friday night”). The former refers to the eve of Friday, which corresponds to Thursday night in the Western calendar, while the latter refers to Friday night itself.
Talebinezhad (1393 [2014/15]) classifies and critiques the large number of documentary films produced about Hossein’s mourning rituals across various regions of Iran. This work serves as an extremely valuable resource for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the diversity of these rituals.
On the use of the ʿalam in South Asia, see Ruffle (2021). She argues that ritual practitioners engage with symbolic objects such as the ʿalam “to produce sense-experiences that trigger cultural memory and instantiate the presence of the Imams and [the family of the Prophet Muhammad],” and she refers to the social space that enables this as the “religious sensorium” (Ruffle 2021: 166). While such an approach to faith through materiality is conceptually compelling, it remains difficult to demonstrate empirically.
I had the opportunity to lift the ʿalāmat several times. Some of the other bearers looked at me with expressions that seemed to say, “Can you really do that?” But when I demonstrated how to lift it, they responded with, “Well done!”
While sightseeing in Shiraz with a friend on the Day of Arbain in December 2013, we were approached in a residential neighborhood early in the morning and invited to eat āsh-reshte—a soup made with stewed herbs and flour-based noodles resembling shredded Udon noodles. At the time, I was completely unaware that I was participating in the practice of giving alms food to complete strangers.
It is often joked that there is no need to cook during Muharram because of the abundance of alms meals. On the eve of Ashura, restaurants sometimes distribute food, and satirical illustrations—appearing in newspapers and on social media—highlight the irony that, while many Iranians line up to receive these charity meals, they are not reaching those who need them most: the poor.
According to folk belief, applying the blood of a slaughtered animal to a newborn’s forehead can protect the child from misfortune—a ritual still practiced by some today.
The smoke produced by burning Peganum harmala (Syrian rue, or espand) seeds over a charcoal fire is believed to ward off the evil eye—a force thought to cause misfortune through the jealousy of others. This ritual is commonly performed during life events such as the birth of a child or sacrificial ceremonies. Beggars carrying portable furnaces often participate in these occasions. In Iran, the practice remains widespread, particularly at the birth of a baby, the construction of a new house, or even the purchase of a new car.
Ṣalavāt is the plural form of ṣalāt, the Arabic word for prayer, and refers to the recitation of a specific blessing commonly included in Islamic prayers: “May God bless Muhammad and his progeny and hasten [the coming of Imam Mahdi] the Day of Atonement” (Allāhumma ṣalli ʿalā Muḥammadin wa ʿāli Muḥammadin wa ʿajjil farajahum). In Iran, this phrase is recited upon hearing the name of the Prophet Muhammad or during acts of supplication, such as the aẕān or formal prayers (Thurfjell 2006: 31). When one person begins to recite the ṣalavāt, others nearby often join in, chanting in unison.
Just as Geertz argued that Balinese cockfighting symbolically represents Balinese society (Geertz 1973), the mourning rituals for Hossein can likewise be seen as embodying Iranian society and shaping how it is perceived by others.