1 Introduction
The climate impacts of slcps’ emissions suggest the international climate change regime as a potential avenue for their global regulation and governance. The unfccc, adopted in 1992, is the core of this regime defining its scope and main principles and provisions. Two treaties have been adopted under the Convention’s auspices – the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015. Further, it is relevant to consider the decisions taken by the main governance bodies of these treaties – Conference of the Parties (cop), Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (cmp), and Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (cma). The decisions operationalize the provisions of the treaties and detail their implementation. Although formally such decisions are not legally binding, they are often treated by states similarly to binding international law.1
The international climate regime follows the framework-protocol model common for governing other global environmental problems, for instance acid rain and the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer.2 According to this model, framework conventions outline only broad principles and procedures while substantive obligations are defined in subsequent protocols. In reality, the unfccc sits somewhere in-between as it contains more substantive provisions than a typical framework convention would.3
The international climate change regime (‘unfccc regime’) has significantly evolved over the past two decades. Its development can be viewed in four phases, where the 1990s is described as agenda-setting (first phase), and
Two matters are important to highlight in the discussion of the unfccc regime: the issue of legal bindingness, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. On the first matter – legal bindingness – legal experts distinguish between the legal form of the overall instrument and the legal character of its specific provisions. Accordingly, all three instruments of the international climate regime are inter-state treaties and hence legally binding for their Parties. However, their provisions considerably vary in legal force ranging from declarations to legal obligations.6 This is an important distinction in the discussion of national commitments taken under international treaties on climate change, whether they exist and what exactly they contain.
Concerning the second matter, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities underpins the unfccc regime. At its core, the principle aims to define the extent to which responsibilities of developed and developing countries are common and to which they are different. However, the operationalization of the principle is still a hotly debated issue in the climate change negotiations and ‘there is very little agreement on its rationale, core content, and application in particular situations’.7 At the same time, the approach to differentiation among countries has evolved over time. The unfccc and the Kyoto Protocol follow annex-based differentiation where developed country Parties are listed in Annex i to the Convention whereas developing countries are referred to as non-Annex i Parties. In contrast, the Paris Agreement has a more flexible approach to differentiation between developed and developing countries, ‘which takes into account changes in a
This chapter outlines whether and how different slcps are covered in international climate treaties, namely the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, and discusses opportunities for strengthening the regulation and governance of slcps through these avenues. The chapter is structured according to the legal instruments, starting first with the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, and continuing with a more detailed discussion on the Paris Agreement. The main findings are summarised in the conclusion.
2 unfccc
The Convention’s objective is defined as limiting greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to such a level so as to ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.9 The legal standing of the objective remains unclear, and Parties to the Convention have not been able to agree on what greenhouse gas concentrations can be considered as safe.10 Instead, the objective has been operationalized in terms of temperature targets and long-term emissions in the Paris Agreement (see Section 4 of this chapter).
The Convention has a broad scope covering the entire spectrum of climate change related issues such as mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, and capacity building. Concerning mitigation, an important note is that the Convention follows a comprehensive approach where all sources and sinks of greenhouse gases are addressed collectively.11 This approach was justified in the negotiations of the Convention on the grounds that it allows states to choose which gases and sinks to focus on and determine the most cost-effective mitigation measures nationally, as well as eliminates incentives to switch from one polluting activity to another.12
Relating to which gases are covered under the unfccc, the text of the treaty does not give a precise list. However, its article 4.2 (on Annex i Parties’ mitigation commitments) gives the following guidance: ‘anthropogenic emissions
The comprehensive approach takes into account multiple greenhouse gases; however, they considerably differ in their atmospheric lifetime and climate impacts. For this reason, different greenhouse gases are expressed through a common emission metric. There is no single metric, and according to the ipcc, ‘the choice of metric, including time horizon, should reflect the policy objectives for which the metric is applied’.15 At the same time, Global Warming Potentials (gwp) over 100-years have been the prevalent metric in the unfccc to account for non-CO2 gases in their CO2-equivalent (CO2 eq). The application of this metric has been criticized for not accounting for the short-term climate impacts of slcps,.16 17 This occurs because the warming caused by slcps – due to their short life in the atmosphere – depends on their ongoing rate of emissions rather than their cumulative emissions.18 The metric also ignores other important impacts of slcps on human health and ecosystems.19 Other metrics have been proposed to better account for different climate impacts of non-CO2 gases but their wider application in climate policy is still contested.20
The issue of appropriate metrics for reporting greenhouse gases has been under continuous discussion in the unfccc under Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (sbsta) Methodologies agenda item on ‘Common metrics’. In parallel, relevant work is under way in the ipcc Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories on preparing a Methodology
Concerning the actions to be taken by Parties, the unfccc sets different types of commitments for different groups of countries – in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. These include: general commitments applicable to all Parties (Articles 4.1, 5, 6, 12.1); mitigation and reporting commitments applicable to Annex i Parties (Articles 4.2, 12.2); and specific commitments on financial and technology support extending only to Annex ii Parties (Article 4.3–4.5). General commitments and those of Annex i Parties are particularly relevant to consider in the discussion on slcps.
Concerning general mitigation commitments, these are general ‘not only in their application to all Parties but also in the content’.21 Consequently, the Convention only asks Parties to ‘formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change’.22 At the same time, general commitments relating to national inventories and reporting are seen as significant.23 This is because all Parties are required to prepare, periodically update and publish their national inventories of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases greenhouse gases, using methodologies agreed by the cop (Article 4.1). Comprehensive reporting of emissions at a country level is essential for developing mitigation actions including on slcp emissions.
On top of general commitments, Annex i Parties also have specific mitigation commitments: they must adopt national policies and measures to limit ghg emissions and to protect and enhance their sinks and reservoirs, with the goal of returning emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, as well as coordinate relevant economic and administrative instruments and identify and periodically review their policies and practices that contribute to increased ghg emissions.24
Overall, the Convention outlines the general contours of the international mitigation regime without defining the specifics. Its scope clearly includes non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as methane and hfcs though the general focus remains on mitigating CO2. Yet, the issue of emission metrics to be applied is still unresolved and has a direct relevance to mitigating slcp emissions.
3
The Kyoto Protocol was the first treaty adopted under the unfccc to operationalize its broad provisions and principles. It is regarded as ‘one of the most complex and ambitious environmental agreements ever negotiated’.25 The core of the Protocol are the legally binding quantitative emissions reduction targets for Parties included in Annex i to the unfccc, which are mostly developed countries and so-called economies in transition. The targets applied to the first commitment period running from 2008 to 2012. The Protocol is often described as a ‘top-down’ instrument in comparison to a presumably more effective ‘bottom-up’ Paris Agreement. This juxtaposition is not accurate as it confuses substance and process: although indeed the emission reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol had a binding, prescriptive nature, they were developed in a bottom-up fashion not dissimilar to the Paris Agreement and its Nationally Determined Contributions (ndcs).26
The history of the Protocol has been contentious with the lack of the US support and long negotiations on a second commitment period. The Doha amendment on emissions reduction targets for 2013–2020 was adopted in 2012, though it only entered into force in 2020. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the political significance of the Kyoto Protocol has diminished and its future remains highly uncertain. However, it is widely agreed that the Protocol has played a critical role in the evolution of the international climate regime, containing many innovative provisions and providing lessons for future climate agreements .27
The scope of the Kyoto Protocol is narrowly on climate mitigation, where the coverage of gases was one of the main issues in its negotiation.28 Specifically, countries disagreed on whether the Protocol should: apply only to CO2; include three greenhouse gases (plus methane and nitrous oxide); or follow a more comprehensive approach. The last option is adopted in the Protocol which initially included six greenhouse gases (CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons (hfcs), perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride),
Additional flexibility was provided by the Protocol through the possibility of achieving mitigation targets via market-based mechanisms. Two of these – Clean Development Mechanism30 and Joint Implementation31 – involved investment in and development of emission reduction and removal enhancement projects outside of national borders – in developing countries (Clean Development Mechanism) and developed countries (Joint Implementation). The achieved emissions reductions or removals could then be counted towards national mitigation targets, although such market-based mechanisms should have been only supplemental to domestic mitigation actions. The two above mentioned mechanisms have had an important role in spreading hfc and methane mitigation technologies through their projects both in Annex i and developing countries.32
To sum up, from the perspective of reducing slcp emissions, the Kyoto Protocol in principle covers two of them, namely methane and hfcs. However, it has a limited geographical coverage extending only to (some) developed countries whereas it is developing countries which are projected to be the key sources of future methane and hfc emissions (see Chapter 1). Therefore, the treaty is not an effective instrument in reducing global slcp emissions.33 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the political fate and future role of the Protocol are uncertain while the Paris Agreement has taken the main stage now as the major international framework for climate action.
4
4.1 Mitigation Action in the Paris Agreement
The already-mentioned Paris Agreement has been described as ‘a considerable achievement in multilateral diplomacy’34 and has now a near universal support with 193 countries having joined it by 2022. Without going into details on the various elements of the Agreement’s architecture, this section discusses only the provisions of the treaty that are relevant to mitigating emissions of slcps.
The Agreement ‘aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change’, as stated in its Article 2. The treaty is wide in its scope containing provisions on mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building, and transparency of action and support. However, despite the broad coverage, the Agreement treats these issues in different ways with the legal character of individual provisions also varying.35 Notably, the Paris Agreement departs from the annex-based approach to differentiation among countries that was set in the unfccc and the Kyoto Protocol, offering instead a more nuanced and tailored method of country differentiation across different issues of its scope.36
The Agreement follows a long-term temperature target in interpreting its mitigation goals:37 as such, it aims at holding ‘the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.38 To achieve this, countries agreed to aim ‘to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible’ to achieve ‘a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of the century’.39
The Paris Agreement follows a country-driven approach to mitigation in which Parties define and regularly update their climate action plans, known as ndcs. While countries can determine the scope and the contents of their ndcs, the Agreement includes strong procedural obligations concerning these national submissions.43 Each country must communicate an ndc every five years and pursue domestic measures to achieve the commitments.44 In addition, each ndc must represent a progression beyond existing pledge and reflect the highest possible ambition.45 Parties can adjust their ndcs at any time, but only with a view to enhancing the level of ambition.46 This is part
While countries have significant freedom in determining their domestic mitigation actions to be reported in ndcs under the Paris Agreement, they are still guided by the ndc guidance contained in cop decisions, first of all the cop21 decision accompanying the Paris Agreement51 and the Paris rulebook,52 adopted by cop24. These rules define the general characteristics of country submissions and suggest the types of information that could be provided ‘to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of’ ndcs. For instance, they propose ndcs to communicate information on the baselines, timeframes, scope, assumptions and methodological issues, among other matters.53 These provisions have a recommendatory nature and do not bind countries as to what substances have to be covered in ndcs: in other words, there is nothing preventing Parties from including slcps in their ndcs.
Another element relevant to slcps concerns emissions metrics (see also Section 2). Under the transparency framework for action and support, Parties to the Paris Agreement agreed to use the gwp values with the 100-year time horizon based on the ipcc Fifth Assessment Report for reporting aggregate emissions and removals of greenhouse gases, expressed in CO2 eq.54 This, however, excludes the gwp value for fossil methane.55 Indeed, some recently developed metrics show ‘greater climate benefits from rapid and sustained
4.2 ndc Experiences to Date
Thus far, most countries have submitted two consecutive national reports: the intended ndcs in advance of cop21 in 2015, and then updated these or submitted new reports in 2020 in line with the five-year ambition cycle. The following part discusses the treatment of slcps in these two rounds of ndcs.
By July 2018,58 174 countries had submitted their first ndcs to the unfccc. Given the flexible, nationally driven nature of the contributions, they greatly varied in their contents, scope and approaches. While some contained quantified absolute emission reduction targets, others were phrased in qualitative terms only. Further, many ndcs from developing countries were conditional on the provision of international support which brought further caveats to the level of their climate mitigation ambitions.
Concerning the scope of ndcs, most of these focused generally on CO2 but many also included methane. Of the first ndcs, 69 ndcs covered both methane and hfcs. Mexico’s first ndc also covered black carbon.59
There are three main approaches as to how slcps were included in national reports: as part of a quantitative economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reduction target; by setting a slcp-specific quantitative outcome for emission reductions; or by setting policies and actions directed toward specific slcps.60 These approaches are demonstrated in the following paragraphs.
Only nine of the 174 countries set a separate target for methane.64 For example, in its first ndc, Canada pledges to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector, including offshore activities, by 40–45 percent by 2025.65 Out of these 174 ndcs, only China’s report contained a specific quantitative target for hfc emissions: the country pledged to ‘phase down the production and consumption of hcfc-22 for controlled uses, with its production to be reduced by 35 percent from the 2010 level by 2020, and by 67.5 percent by 2025 and to achieve effective control on emissions of hfc-23 by 2020.’66
Mexico was the only country to include black carbon specifically in the first ndc: it committed to reduce 25 percent of its ghg and slcp emissions below business as usual for the year 2030. This commitment included a reduction of 22 percent in greenhouse gases and a reduction of 51 percent in black carbon emissions.67
Without any quantitative indicators, many countries listed policies and actions that will reduce slcps from various sectors. In such a way, Cambodia listed promoting ‘more efficient cookstoves’ as a key sectoral mitigation action
The overview above shows that only few countries focused specifically on slcps in their first ndcs and the way slcps were treated was mostly general and vague. Methane and hfcs were commonly included in absolute economy-wide ghg emission mitigation targets; however, describing specific compounds within the targets is not possible, and hence how exactly methane and hfcs are targeted is uncertain. Further, while many countries listed policies and actions to reduce slcps, these were not accompanied by clear objectives and implementation plans, and as a result, their effectiveness remains unclear.
In line with the five-year cycle, Parties with ndcs running to 2025 were requested to communicate a new ndc by 2020, and Parties with ndcs running to 2030 were requested to continue their existing ndcs or update it.72 By September 2022, 142 new or updated ndcs had been communicated by 169 Parties.73 Considering all 166 available ndcs, including the new or updated 142 ndcs, 91 percent cover methane and 53 percent cover hfcs.74 Out of the total number, 11 percent provided information on slcps.75 This includes several countries such as Bangladesh, Benin, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Eswatini, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, which covered black carbon in their updated ndcs. It is noteworthy that these countries were assisted by ccac in revising their ndcs to enhance their ambition to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goals by including slcps
To sum up, current ndcs in their majority cover individual slcps: first of all methane and to a less extent hfcs. Several ndcs include black carbon. However, in most cases, these measures cannot be described as strong as there are no specific targets or timelines attached.
4.3 What Are the Opportunities for Strengthening slcp Mitigation Action under the Paris Agreement?
Policy literature has entertained several opportunities on how to integrate stronger action on slcps under the Paris Agreement: some of these concern ndcs, and others involve other elements of the Agreement’s architecture. This section discusses these options, presenting their pros and cons.
Given that mitigation actions are determined at the national level, orchestrating a stronger focus on slcps in ndcs appears to be the first natural option. The summary above indicates that while many ndcs cover methane and hfcs, only few countries focus specifically on slcps in their first and revised ndcs. Indeed, ‘(j)ust because slcps are included in the first ndc does not necessarily mean that their mitigation potential and associated development benefits are being fully exploited.’78
There are several concrete opportunities for integrating actions on slcps under the Paris Agreement. First, all countries could include methane and hfcs in their absolute economy-wide targets.79 Contrary to the first round of ndcs,80 all of the revised or updated ndcs provide information on the scope and coverage of the ndc, including sectors and gases covered,81 but not all of them cover methane and hfcs.82 Black carbon cannot be included in the absolute economy-wide targets, because black carbon is not a ghg covered by the unfccc.
Second, in addition to the absolute economy-wide emission reduction targets in ndcs, it would be useful for countries to set individual targets for
From a legal point of view, the inclusion of a separate target for each climate pollutant, including slcps in ndcs, could first be developed through Parties’ voluntary action. The cma will consider further guidance on the ndcs at its seventh session in 202488 and this will offer for an opportunity to deliberate the inclusion of individual targets in formal guidance for all countries.
Individual targets for each climate pollutant in ndcs would provide important input for the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement. The global stocktake will be carried out every five years to assess ‘collective progress’ towards achieving the Agreement’s long-term goals.89 In addition to this, the stocktake could address specific climate pollutants, such as slcps. This would help giving slcps the attention they need and provide insights into slcp emissions and mitigation needs.
While countries are not required to report their black carbon emissions, under the Paris rulebook, Parties may provide information on other substances that have an impact on climate as well.93 Effectively, this means that under the Paris Agreement, countries can voluntarily report their black carbon emissions already now. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice will review and update the modalities, procedures, and guidelines for the transparency framework no later than 2028.94 This will provide for an opportunity to consider the adoption of the requirement of black carbon reporting for all Parties. Also, as already noted, the ipcc is currently developing methodologies for slcp measurement and reporting95 – this work is expected to further improve slcp reporting in the future.
Under the Paris Agreement, in addition to the ndcs, Parties should communicate long-term Low Emissions and Development Strategies by 2020.96 Long-term strategies provide an opportunity to view both near-and long-term benefits and strategies of slcp mitigation. Indeed, ‘while slcps themselves last only a short while in the atmosphere, the infrastructure that produces them can persist for decades.’97 Thus, the inclusion of slcp strategies in long-term policy planning and strategies is well-justified.
5 Conclusion
Overall, the general focus of the international climate regime has been on mitigating CO2, and no concerted effort to integrate slcps as a whole has taken place. However, when looking at individual pollutants, the picture becomes varied. The Convention and Paris Agreement, for instance, clearly integrate non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as methane and hfcs in their reporting and transparency system.
The focus on long-term greenhouse gases has several implications. For instance, methodologies for estimating emissions, in particular the issue of emission metrics to be applied, are significant in the discussion on slcps ̶ yet ones that still remain unresolved at the global level. Selecting an appropriate metric has a direct impact on the ‘value’ of mitigating slcps for securing a climate safe future. The current choice of CO2eq metric prioritizes mitigation of long-lived greenhouse gases, and indeed their mitigation is critical for slowing down global warming in the longer term. However, this metric does not
Concerning national mitigation pledges under the Paris Agreement’s ndcs, only few countries focus specifically on slcps in their first ndcs, and this is mostly done in a generic way. Methane and hfcs are commonly included in absolute economy-wide ghg emission mitigation targets: but since their composition is not specified, it remains uncertain how exactly methane and hfcs are targeted. Further, even though these ndcs list policies and actions to reduce slcps, information on their objectives and implementation is not available, casting doubt on their effectiveness.
This chapter – and the book’s conclusions – posit that a separate pathway for regulating and governing each substance among slcps should be pursued globally. This applies especially to black carbon: given the scientific uncertainties regarding the combined climate impact of black carbon emissions reductions and the fact that black carbon is emitted as a component of particulate matter, it seems wise to prioritize the relevant legal frameworks on preventing air pollution rather than the climate regime. The same goes for hfc emissions which are now firmly housed under the Montreal Protocol’s Kigali amendment (see Chapter 4).
Against this, what is the role of the unfccc in mitigating slcps globally? For the immediate future, the biggest potential of the international climate regime seems to be in enhancing action on methane emissions’ mitigation. This is supported by a growing political momentum for a stronger action on methane emissions illustrated by multiple policy steps taken recently at global, EU and national levels. The Convention’s regime will not be the only global avenue for governing methane emissions but it may fill some of the regulatory and governance gaps in the current patchwork of international and transnational arrangements (see Chapter 13).
Jutta Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1.
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2017) 119.
ibid 119–120.
Entry into force.
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 96.
ibid 18–19.
ibid 27.
Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’ (2016) 110 American Journal of International Law 4 <
Art 2, unfccc.
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 126.
ibid 133.
ibid 133–134.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc), New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994, 31 International Legal Materials (1992) 849 <
See however our discussion on the possibilities of including black carbon under ndcs below.
Andy Reisinger and others, ‘Cross-Chapter Box 2 ghg emission metrics’ in Priyadarshi R. Shukla and others (eds), Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change (ipcc ar6 wgiii report, cup 2022), p. 226 after Plattner et al 2009.
Kathleen A Mar, ‘Putting the Brakes on Climate Change – It’s about More than Just CO2’ [2021] Climanosco <
Reisinger and others (n15), 226–227.
ibid.
Mar (n 16).
Reisinger and others (n15), 226–228.
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 130.
unfccc (n13) art 4.1(b).
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 130.
unfccc (n13) art 4.2 (a)(b)(e).
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 161.
Joanna Depledge, ‘The “Top-down” Kyoto Protocol? Exploring Caricature and Misrepresentation in Literature on Global Climate Change Governance’ [2022] International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics <
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 161.
ibid 164.
Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime : A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge University Press 2004) 78.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 2303 unts 148, art 12.
ibid, art 6.
Veera Pekkarinen, ‘Going beyond CO2: Strengthening Action on Global Methane Emissions under the UN Climate Regime’ (2020) 29 (3) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 464.
Yulia Yamineva and Kati Kulovesi, ‘Keeping the Arctic White: The Legal and Governance Landscape for Reducing Short-Lived Climate Pollutants in the Arctic Region’ (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental Law 201.
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 209.
Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 337.
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 232.
ibid 228.
Article 2.1(a) of the ‘Paris Agreement’ (2015). The combined effect of national plans submitted in 2015 has been estimated as consistent with staying below an increase in temperature of 3–3.2°C by the end of the century. Thus, the unfccc regime is still not on track to meet the 2 degree target it has set for itself. See unep, ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2016’ (2016) unep Synthesis Report.
Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) 55 ilm 740 art 4(1).
Joanna Depledge, ‘Keeping expectations realistic for cop26 in Glasgow’ (Cambridge University Press Blog, 2021) <
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in V. Masson-Delmotte and others (eds.), Global warming of 1.5°C. An ipcc Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (ipcc 2018), 14 para. C.1.2.
unep, Emissions Gap Report 2022: The Closing Window (unep 2022), p. 35.
Sebastian Oberthür and Ralph Bodle, ‘Legal Form and Nature of the Paris Outcome’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 40.
Paris Agreement (n39), art 4(9).
ibid, art 4(3).
ibid, art 4(11).
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 235.
Paris Agreement (n39) art 14.
ibid, art 3, 4(3) and 9(3).
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 2) 234–235.
unfccc, ‘Decision 1/cp.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc fccc/cp/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016).
unfccc, ‘Decision 4/cma.1, Further Guidance to the Mitigation Section of Decision 1/cp.21’ UN Doc fccc/pa/cma/2018/3/Add.1 (19 March 2019).
ibid, Article 9.
unfccc, Decision 18/cma.1, annex, paragraph 37.ecision 5/cma.3, paragraph 25 and Decision 18/cma.1, annex, paragraph 37.
Decision 5/cma.3, paragraph 25.
Reisinger and others (n15), p. 227.
Mar (n 16).
The timeframe for which the analysis of slcps in the first ndcs is available: see Ross and others, ‘Strengthening Nationally Determined Contributions to Catalyze Actions That Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants’ <
Katherine Ross and others, ‘Strengthening Nationally Determined Contributions to Catalyze Actions That Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants’ 12 <
Ross and others (n 58).
ibid.
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States (2015), 1.
Myles R Allen and others, ‘A Solution to the Misrepresentations of CO2-Equivalent Emissions of Short-Lived Climate Pollutants under Ambitious Mitigation’ (2018) 1 npj Climate and Atmospheric Science 16.
Ross and others (n 58) 16.
Canada, ‘Canada’s 2017 Nationally Determined Contribution Submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (Revised submission 2017) 3.
Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (2016), 8.
Mexico, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (2016), 2.
Cambodia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (2017), 6.
Ross and others (n 58) 29.
Canada (n 65), 3.
Nigeria’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (2015), 3.
unfccc, ‘Decision 1/cp.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc fccc/cp/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016) paras 23–24.
unfccc, ‘Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Synthesis Report by the Secretariat’ (October 2022).
ibid, p. 4.
ibid, p. 15.
‘Increasing Ambition of ndcs’ (Climate & Clean Air Coalition) <
unfccc, ‘Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Synthesis Report by the Secretariat’ UN Doc fccc/pa/cma/2021/8 (17 September 2021) para 91.
Ross and others (n 58) 13.
ibid 16.
Ross and others (n 58).
unfccc ‘Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement’ (n77) para 68.
ibid, para 71.
Myles R Allen and others, ‘New Use of Global Warming Potentials to Compare Cumulative and Short-Lived Climate Pollutants’ (2016) 6 Nature Climate Change 773; Stephen M Smith and others, ‘Equivalence of Greenhouse-Gas Emissions for Peak Temperature Limits’ (2012) 2 Nature Climate Change 535.
Climate and Clean Air Coalition (ccac), ‘Annual Science Update: Methane Briefing Report’ (2018) <
Malley, C., et al, ‘Opportunities for Increasing Ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions through Integrated Air Pollution and Climate Change Planning: A Practical Guidance document’ (2019) Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Ghana and Stockholm Environment Institute,
unfccc, ‘Decision 18/cma.1. Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Transparency Framework for Action and Support Referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc fccc/pa/cma/2018/3/Add.2 (19 March 2019) Annex paras 47 and 92.
ibid.
unfccc ‘Decision 4/cma.1, Further Guidance to the Mitigation Section of Decision 1/cp.21’ UN Doc fccc/pa/cma/2018/3/Add.1 (19 March 2019) para 20.
Paris Agreement (n39), art 14(1–2).
ibid, art 13.
ibid, art 13(1–2).
unfccc ‘Decision 18/cma.1. Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines for the Transparency Framework for Action and Support Referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc fccc/pa/cma/2018/3/Add.2 (19 March 2019) Annex, para 48.
ibid, Annex, para 52.
ibid, para 2.
ipcc, ‘Methodology Report on Short-Lived Climate Forcers – ipcc’ <
Paris Agreement (n39), art 4(19).
Ross and others (n 58) 11.
Global Methane Pledge, ‘Fast Action on Methane to Keep a 1.5°C Future within Reach’ <
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