1 Introduction
Following the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals (mdgs) period in 2015, the United Nations (UN) member states embarked upon a wider and disaggregated global agenda of development under the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) 2015–2030. Although there was a certain happiness about migration being included in Target 10.7 under the catch-phrase ‘no one to be left behind’, strictly speaking migration had once again missed the bus on account of it not being designated on its own as a major goal among the other sdgs. In fact, disappointment at this exclusion was voiced during the plenary session of the Metropolis International Conference held in
The pathways to implementing these objectives are subject to the country positions spelled out in their respective statements made at the concluding multilateral forum preceding the agreement (Khadria et al., 2019). These are reflected in the statements that each of the South Asian countries and China made at the time of ratifying the gcm, presented later in this chapter. The gcm derives its mission from sdg 10, which is to ‘reduce inequality within and among the countries’, and more specifically its Target 10.7—to ‘facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’.
This chapter analyses the relationship between migration, health and development during the period immediately prior to the covid-19 outbreak and throughout the pandemic up to early 2021 in South Asian countries and China with a view to recommending comprehensive policy initiatives for the post-covid-19 period. The chapter is divided into seven sections. Following this
2 Background
The income inequalities and development gaps between developing economies, like those of India and China, and developed economies, like those of the United States (US) contribute greatly to human mobility across borders as a result of wage differentials (Li, Bedford and Khadria, 2019). At the global level, gross domestic product (gdp) per capita is an important indicator of economic development in the countries of origin and the countries of destination of migrants. Dependency theory (Singer, 1950; Prebisch, 1959) and world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974) during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s talked about the factors of underdevelopment among Asian, African and Latin American countries. According to dependency theory (Toye and Toye, 2003), developed countries are rich because of the profit they gained at the expense of developing countries through the exploitation of cheap labour and resources available in the latter (i.e., periphery countries) in exchange for obsolete technologies from the former (i.e., core countries). Similarly, world-systems theory explains that underdevelopment in developing economies is the result of globalisation and the economic imperialism of developed economies. This theory emphasises that the world system is based on the classifications of core, semi-periphery and periphery countries. The core countries utilise high-skill and capital-intensive production techniques, whereas the rest of the world (comprising semi-periphery and periphery countries) are dependent on low-skill and labour-intensive production techniques.
Since the early 1990s, with economic globalisation, mobility of people has increased from the global South to the global North countries, resulting in more remittances (in the current account of balance of payments (bop)) from the destination countries to the sending countries of migrants. For example, migration of high-skilled people from India and China to the US in this phase
According to world-systems theory and dependency theory, the income inequality and development gaps between the centre and periphery economies cannot be bridged with the ongoing market economic structure, as reflected in the divergence of gdp per capita between the US and India as well as other South Asian countries. Whatever increase India and China experienced in their gdp per capita due to globalisation could not bridge the gap between them and the US. This was mainly because of multinational companies having the US as the source of their foreign capital, which facilitated a positive bop account for the US and other developed destination countries.
During economic crises, mainstream economics has both neglected the theories and stayed ignorant of the gaps in economic development and income inequalities. Therefore, there is a need to address these issues within mainstream economics and work on the causes and effects behind the underdevelopment that ultimately leads to migration pressures. Uneven development and income inequalities are instrumental to the migration decisions of migrants from the global South to the global North for their better living and working conditions. These issues have in some instances been addressed more actively during times of crisis by multilateral institutions like the UN. However, the gaps and inequalities could not be reduced at a greater scale even though migration did lead to improvements in the living standards of migrants and their families in the global South via higher wages in the destination countries and remittances to migrants’ countries of origin, such as India, which is the highest global recipient of remittances sent by migrants. Migrants also contributed to a greater scale in economic growth and development in their destination countries in the global North.
The UN has been instrumental in bridging the challenges of migration with approaches to development. In 1990, the United Nations Development
With this background, the ongoing covid-19 pandemic has led to further uncertainties resulting from the stricter immigration policies intended to contain fatalities and rising unemployment among the local population in countries of destination, particularly the US, as well as countries of origin such as India, other South Asian countries and China. Due to the covid-19 pandemic and the global recession, the inflows of remittances were also expected to decline in India by 9 per cent from usd 83.3 billion in 2019 to usd 76 billion in 2020 and in South Asian countries by 4 per cent from 2019 to 2020 (World Bank, 2020). Along with the decline in remittances to global South countries, immigration restrictions and travel bans were initiated by the US to protect life and the livelihood challenges arising from the covid-19 pandemic. It is expected that migration pressures will increase with stricter immigration policies in destination countries, creating more challenges of development gaps and income inequalities in the post-covid-19 era. It has been argued by economists and scientists that the neglect of the sustainable development indicators and early warning signals of the communicable disease at the global level have made the situation grimmer (Seshaiyer and McNeely, 2020). Prior to the covid-19 pandemic, the challenges of underdevelopment already existed as income inequalities along with emigration pressures in South Asian countries as well as China. It is now being observed that the covid-19 pandemic has made the situation even more challenging.
3
This article has three main objectives in examining the dynamic relationship between migration, health and development in the context of the covid-19 pandemic: (i) to highlight and assess the critical statements of India on the gcm objectives as compared to those of the other South Asian countries and China during the covid-19 period, particularly in the light of slower economic development and greater income inequalities during this time; (ii) to establish the relationship of migration and health with economic development in these countries in the pre-covid-19 period; and (iii) to highlight the challenges of migration, health and development in these countries during the covid-19 period. The sources of data used to examine these objectives are the World Bank, the undp, the International Monetary Fund (imf), the who, and the UN. On the basis of an analysis of these dynamic relationships, we suggest a number of policy implications to enhance the positive relationship between inclusive migration, sustainable development and the public health system.
4 Looking Back at the Country Statements on the gcm
This section analyses the statements on the gcm made by a select few signatory South Asian member states (India, Pakistan, Iran and Sri Lanka) and China. The statements of other countries (Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Afghanistan and Bhutan) are also briefly commented upon.1
4.1 India
In 2017, India stated that with regard to the gcm it
[…] may like to flag that in certain cases stringent and lopsided policies of the receiving States make the migrants vulnerable, make it difficult for the migrants to comply with obligations of retaining legal migratory status and in quite a number of cases migrants were forced to face criminal proceedings even for minor violations.
pmi Geneva, 2017, 12
International migrants are said to contribute nearly 10% of the global gdp even as they formed only 3% of global population […] There is a legitimate purpose to legal migration as the means of global economic development as opposed to illegal migration. […] India looks forward to continuing our engagement with partners to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration.
UN, 2018b, 2, 4
Of the above three statements made by India, the second and third, made in 2018, seem to be inconsistent with the first statement, made in 2017. The first raised concerns regarding the vulnerability of Indian overseas migrants to the discretion used by destination countries and employers through conflating minor and major violations of the legality of their status. The second concerns the definition of illegal or irregular immigration of ‘non-nationals’ in India, purporting it to be the sovereign jurisdiction of the country and not to be prescribed by the gcm. The third statement raises a doubt as to how 10 per cent of the global gdp could all be attributed to be the contribution of legal migrants alone who comprise just 3 per cent of the global population, assuming thereby that the contribution made by irregular migrants has not been recognised.
4.2 Pakistan
Pakistan gave three different statements on the gcm in 2018. It said, ‘While States retain the sovereign right to strengthen their border security, this right should be consistent with international law. Migrants regardless of their migration status, are entitled to the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, which must be respected, protected and fulfilled across all stages of the migration cycle’ (UN, 2018d, 4). Further, it added another statement: ‘The tendencies of xenophobia, racial profiling and Islamophobia in the countries of destination against migrants must be countered. All States must
Pakistan emphasised that the human rights of migrants should be taken care of irrespective of their legal or so-called illegal status in destination countries. It called for countering the increasing tendencies of xenophobia, racial profiling and Islamophobia against migrants in countries of destination.
4.3 Iran
In 2018, Iran stated that
the gcm could enhance the positive impact of cross-border migration for all through effective management and international cooperation. The validity of these notions depends on taking the various and unequal capacities of member states into account as well as the implementation of the compact by all members of the international community in good faith.
UN, 2018c, 1
Let’s not forget that the impact of migrants on their host countries is a function of the specific circumstances such as level of development and demographic situation of any given host country. We should also keep it [in] mind that [a] majority of developed countries have been well equipped with normative tools and natural and man-made barriers to shield themselves from negative impacts of migration and to tailor migratory flows in a way to maintain or even enhance their level of development.
UN, 2018c, 1
Iran also expressed concerns about the withdrawal from the gcm by developed countries, specifically the US.
4.4 Sri Lanka
The adoption of the Migration compact in our view marks a beginning of a new journey, a collective journey-consciously departing from the
UN, 2018e, 1path of negative and toxic narrative of migration and migrants, aiming at safe, regular and orderly migration, and adding real value and dignity to human mobility. […] Sri Lanka places high importance on inclusivity, particularly the active engagement with the business and private sector involved in labour migration.
4.5 Other South Asian Countries
The statements made by the other five South Asian countries, specifically Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Afghanistan and Bhutan, are in support of the gcm and offer assurance of the countries’ implementation of their commitments. The five countries made statements more or less similar to the statements made by Pakistan and Iran to work for positive relationships between international migration and sustainable development.
4.6 China
In today’s era of globalization, orderly migration flows help stimulate vitality for innovation, promote economic development and global inclusive growth, and enhance mutual understanding and cultural integration among nations. Meanwhile, one should also realize that irregular migration flows without effective governance may breed organized transnational crime and increase pressure on and challenges to countries in border control and societal governance. The protection of migrants’ own rights and interests is also often under threat. We need to strengthen global governance in the field of migration to bring about safe, orderly and regular migration.
UN, 2018a, 1
On the governance of global migration, China advocated four points: the first was related to upholding the principle of respect for national sovereignty; the second focused on the regularity, safety and orderliness of global migration flows; the third addressed resolving the main issues of migration, such as underdevelopment and unbalanced development; and the last point considered cooperation among member states to implement the gcm. In the last
Just around the time when stock-taking was due for the indicators of the gcm objectives being achieved at the end of the year, in December 2019, the world was struck by the covid-19 pandemic, which ‘left no one behind’ and created a ripple of disruption in people’s lives, livelihoods and migration. It remains to be seen how consistent the South Asian countries will be with respect to the gcm’s objectives, particularly in and after the extraordinary circumstances created by the covid-19 pandemic. The next part of this chapter examines the consistencies and contradictions in the relationship between migration and development by looking at the precariousness of the health risks let loose by the extraordinary circumstances in South Asia and China, which was the epicentre of the contagious infection.
5 Comparative Economic Indicators in India, South Asia and China
During times of recession, economic theory suggests increasing government expenditure so as to expand aggregate demand to counter the economic slowdown and to contain rising unemployment. It is therefore pertinent to examine the share of government expenditure in gdp. Table 8.1 shows that, at the world level, government expenditure in gdp was 16 per cent in 1990 and 1995 and increased to 17 per cent in 2015 and 2018.
General government final consumption expenditure in India, other South Asian countries and China (% of gdp)
Country/Region |
1990 |
1995 |
2015 |
2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Afghanistan |
naa |
na |
12 |
na |
Bangladesh |
4 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
Bhutan |
15 |
12 |
18 |
na |
China |
14 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
India |
11 |
11 |
10 |
11 |
Iran |
11 |
14 |
13 |
na |
Maldives |
na |
na |
na |
na |
Nepal |
9 |
9 |
11 |
12 |
Pakistan |
15 |
12 |
11 |
12 |
Sri Lanka |
10 |
11 |
9 |
9 |
South Asia |
11 |
10 |
10 |
11 |
World |
16 |
16 |
17 |
17 |
However, the government expenditure in India remained stagnant at 11 per cent in 1990 and 1995, thereafter declining to 10 per cent in 2015, and catching up again to 11 per cent in 2018. China’s government expenditure was relatively higher at 14 per cent in 1990, 13 per cent in 1995 and 2015, and 15 per cent in 2018. Both India and China were, however, lower than the world indicators for these years (World Bank, 2020).
The shares of government expenditure, especially in times of recession, are interlinked with the economic growth of gdp. The lower government expenditure in India was accompanied by higher economic slowdown as opposed to China’s higher government expenditure and lower economic slowdown. The world gdp growth rate also increased in 2018 along with higher government expenditure. Thus, it is clear from this analysis that there is a need to increase government expenditure to improve the demand conditions and employment generation in times of recessionary pressures.
Table 8.2 depicts the score values of the hdi from 1990 to 2018. The level of human development in China improved over these years, which is reflected in the improved hdi scores surpassing even the world hdi trend in 2010. The hdi
Human development in India, other South Asian countries, China, South Asia and the world, 1990–2018
hdi ranka |
Country |
1990 |
2010 |
2015 |
2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
65 |
Iran |
0.577 |
0.756 |
0.789 |
0.797 |
71 |
Sri Lanka |
0.625 |
0.75 |
0.772 |
0.78 |
85 |
China |
0.501 |
0.702 |
0.742 |
0.758 |
104 |
Maldives |
nab |
0.669 |
0.709 |
0.719 |
129 |
India |
0.431 |
0.581 |
0.627 |
0.647 |
134 |
Bhutan |
na |
0.571 |
0.606 |
0.617 |
135 |
Bangladesh |
0.388 |
0.549 |
0.588 |
0.614 |
147 |
Nepal |
0.38 |
0.527 |
0.568 |
0.579 |
152 |
Pakistan |
0.404 |
0.524 |
0.55 |
0.56 |
170 |
Afghanistan |
0.298 |
0.464 |
0.49 |
0.496 |
South Asia |
0.441 |
0.585 |
0.624 |
0.642 |
|
World |
0.598 |
0.697 |
0.722 |
0.731 |
gdp growth of a selection of Asian countries (1990–2020, annual %)
Country name |
1990 |
2015 |
2018 |
2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Afghanistan |
naa |
1.5 |
1.0 |
na |
Bangladesh |
5.6 |
6.6 |
7.9 |
na |
Bhutan |
10.9 |
6.6 |
2.3 |
na |
China |
3.9 |
6.9 |
6.6 |
1.0 |
India |
5.5 |
8.0 |
6.8 |
4.5 |
Iran |
13.8 |
-1.3 |
na |
na |
Maldives |
na |
2.9 |
6.9 |
na |
Nepal |
4.6 |
3.3 |
6.7 |
na |
Pakistan |
4.5 |
4.7 |
5.8 |
na |
Sri Lanka |
6.4 |
5.0 |
3.2 |
na |
South Asia |
5.4 |
7.5 |
6.7 |
na |
World |
2.9 |
2.8 |
3.0 |
-4.9 |
Table 8.3 shows that India’s gdp growth rate experienced a sharper decline of 1.2 percentage point from 8 per cent in 2015 to 6.8 per cent in 2018 whereas China’s gdp growth rate experienced a slower decline of 0.3 percentage points from 6.9 per cent in 2015 to 6.6 per cent in 2018. For improving human and economic development conditions, there is a need for higher government expenditure via expansionary fiscal policy in times of recession and the covid-19 pandemic to universalise the public healthcare system, increase employment opportunities and ensure safe, regular and orderly emigration and immigration.
gdp per person employed in a selection of Asian countries (1995–2019, constant 2011 ppp usd)
Country name |
1995 |
2015 |
2018 |
2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Afghanistan |
3,572 |
5,082 |
4,897 |
4,916 |
Bangladesh |
4,311 |
8,222 |
9,216 |
9,691 |
Bhutan |
8,092 |
16,419 |
19,524 |
20,436 |
China |
4,497 |
24,267 |
29,499 |
31,380 |
India |
5,645 |
15,898 |
18,565 |
19,589 |
Iran |
54,727 |
56,766 |
66,427 |
68,776 |
Maldives |
28,809 |
28,551 |
33,072 |
34,036 |
Nepal |
2,729 |
4,189 |
4,393 |
4,468 |
Pakistan |
11,997 |
14,095 |
15,430 |
15,906 |
Sri Lanka |
12,970 |
29,137 |
32,673 |
34,134 |
South Asia |
6,032 |
14,687 |
16,890 |
17,747 |
World |
21,975 |
34,290 |
36,750 |
37,739 |
gdp per employed person in a selection of Asian countries (1995–2019, constant 2011 ppp usd)
source: authors, using data from world bank (2020)
Thus, China experienced higher economic development in comparison to India as reflected in the two indicators. These indicators reflect a lower rate of economic development in India as compared to that in China, which can be linked to the migration trends in these countries as discussed in the next section.
Youth unemployment among 15–24-year-olds in a selection of Asian countries (1995–2019, % of labour force)—International Labour Organization (ilo) modelled estimate
Country name |
1995 |
2000 |
2005 |
2010 |
2015 |
2018 |
2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Afghanistan |
6 |
5 |
5 |
4 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Bangladesh |
6 |
10 |
9 |
6 |
11 |
12 |
12 |
Bhutan |
5 |
6 |
9 |
9 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
China |
6 |
7 |
10 |
10 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
India |
7 |
8 |
9 |
9 |
11 |
10 |
11 |
Iran |
20 |
23 |
24 |
28 |
26 |
28 |
29 |
Maldives |
2 |
4 |
6 |
9 |
15 |
17 |
18 |
Nepal |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
Pakistan |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
6 |
6 |
Sri Lanka |
35 |
24 |
27 |
19 |
21 |
23 |
23 |
South Asia |
7 |
7 |
8 |
8 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
World |
11 |
12 |
13 |
12 |
13 |
13 |
13 |
Table 8.5 shows the percentage of youth unemployment in the labour force in South Asian countries, including India, as well as China, South Asia as a
Youth unemployment in a selection of Asian countries (1995–2019, % of total labour force aged 15–24)—modelled ilo estimate
source: authors, using data from world bank (2020)
Figure 8.2 drawn for just three years—1995, 2015 and 2019—from amongst those in Table 8.5, shows that in other South Asian countries a similar trend was observed with an unemployment rate of 7 per cent in 1995 rising to 10 per cent by 2019. The latter double-digit figures of youth unemployment reflect recessionary pressures arising from economic slowdown, particularly after 2008. Before any effective recovery measures could come into force to uplift employment, there were a number of uncertainties that continued to destabilise the employment scenario, such as the Syrian refugee problem since 2015 followed by the covid-19 pandemic beginning in December 2019. Whereas the gcm signed in 2018 was an effort to make migration safe, orderly and regular through better governance, what followed in India was widespread public unrest triggered by the inaccurate results of the National Register of Citizens (nrc) in 2018–19, on the one hand, and the confusion around the effects of the Citizenship Amendment Act (caa) in 2019–20 on the other. This could be seen as part of a global trend for selectivity in immigration as reflected, for
6 Migration, Economic Development and Health in the Context of covid-19
In times of ongoing global health crisis due to the covid-19 pandemic and economic slowdown at the global level, the most populous countries, such as India and China, are also affected adversely with declining growth rates of gdp, which eventually affect the growth rates of the gdp per capita, and more importantly gdp per employed worker (as explained in the previous section). Figures 8.3 and 8.4 both show lower economic growth rates of gdp and gdp per capita respectively in 2020, i.e., the year of the pandemic and consequent recession. However, the same figures show an expected recovery being forecasted for 2021.
Country-wise growth rates of gross domestic product at constant prices in 2020 and 2021 (estimates in April 2020)
source: authors, using data from imf (2020)
Country-wise growth rates of gross domestic product per capita, constant prices in 2020 and 2021 (estimates in April 2020)
source: authors, using data from imf (2020)
The covid-19 pandemic also affected the current account balance (cab) adversely, reflected in the negative shares of cab in gdp in all the South Asian countries except Afghanistan in both 2020 and 2021 (Figure 8.5). However, it has been projected that the share of cab in gdp would be positive in both years in the case of China.
Country-wise current account balance (cab) as percentage of gdp in 2020 and 2021
source: authors, using data from imf (2020)
The higher shares of South Asian migrants in other countries had a positive impact on the inflow of remittances measured using the receiving country’s gdp. For example, in 2018, these shares ranged between a high of 28 per cent and low of 2 per cent as follows: Nepal (28 per cent), Sri Lanka (8.4 per cent), Pakistan (6.7 per cent), Bangladesh (5.7 per cent), India (2.9 per cent), Bhutan (2.3 per cent) and Afghanistan (2.0 per cent). The other South Asian countries and China had lower shares of remittances in their gdps (Figure 8.6a).
Migrant remittance inflows (usd millions) in India, South Asian countries and China, 2000–20
source: authors, using data from world bank (2020)
The covid-19 pandemic and global recession have adversely affected the inflows of migrant remittances in India and China. Figure 8.6b shows the level of remittances in India declining from usd 83.3 billion in 2019 to usd 76 billion in 2020 and in China from usd 68.4 billion in 2019 to usd 59.5 billion in 2020. These declines are expected to continue to have detrimental effects on development in the global South countries in the covid-19 period.
The covid-19 pandemic exacerbated the recessionary trend, leading to deep and widespread adverse effects on world economies. It dampened economic growth and development by causing large-scale loss of precious human
Cumulative cases of covid-19 from 24 March 2020 to 1 August 2020 in India and the United States of America
source: authors, using data from who (2020)
Cumulative cases of covid-19 from 24 March 2020 to 1 August 2020 in South Asian countries (except India), China, Cuba and Norway
source: authors, using data from who (2020)
Quality of health indicators in India, China, other countries and the world (various years)
Note: Data not available for Maldives, China, Bhutan, High human development, East Asia and the Pacific
source: authors, using data from undp (2020)
The three important health indicators related to a country’s ability to contain the pandemic are the lost health expectancy (in %), the number of physicians per 10,000 people and the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people. In the case of India, the three indicators are 14, 8 and 7 and for China 12, 18 and 42 respectively, reflecting poor health infrastructure in terms of numbers of doctors and hospital beds in India in comparison to China. In contrast to Norway and Cuba, ranked first and seventieth in the hdi respectively and having highly developed healthcare indicators of 15, 46 and 39 for Norway and 12, 82 and 52 for Cuba, these health indicators in South Asian countries are 14, 8 and 8, respectively (see Figure 8.9).
Expenditure on education and health as a percentage of military expenditure (various years)
source: authors, using data from undp (2020)
The poor health infrastructure indicators are also dynamically related to the health and education priorities of governments in comparison to their military expenditure. Figure 8.10 shows that expenditure on education and health as a percentage of military expenditure is lower for India at 3.1 per cent in comparison with that of the world at 6.7 per cent. The share in South Asian countries is only 3 per cent, reflecting their poor health expenditure.
The number of immigrants in South Asia declined from 19.54 million in 1990 to 15.28 million in 2000. It declined further to 14.05 million in 2015 and remained at a lower level, 14.08 million in 2019 (see Table 8.6). India, the most populous country in South Asia, also experienced a sharp decline from 7.59 million in 1990 to 6.41 million in 2000 to 5.24 million in 2015, and it declined further
Immigrants in South Asian countries, India, China and the world, 1990–2019 (in millions)
Major area, region, country or area of destination |
1990 |
1995 |
2000 |
2005 |
2010 |
2015 |
2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
World |
153.01 |
161.32 |
173.59 |
191.62 |
220.78 |
248.86 |
271.64 |
South Asia |
19.54 |
15.34 |
15.28 |
13.72 |
14.31 |
14.05 |
14.08 |
Afghanistan |
0.06 |
0.07 |
0.08 |
0.09 |
0.10 |
0.49 |
0.15 |
Bangladesh |
0.88 |
0.93 |
0.99 |
1.17 |
1.35 |
1.42 |
2.19 |
Bhutan |
0.02 |
0.03 |
0.03 |
0.04 |
0.05 |
0.05 |
0.05 |
India |
7.59 |
6.95 |
6.41 |
5.92 |
5.44 |
5.24 |
5.15 |
Iran |
4.29 |
2.94 |
2.80 |
2.57 |
2.76 |
2.73 |
2.68 |
Maldives |
0.01 |
0.02 |
0.03 |
0.05 |
0.05 |
0.06 |
0.07 |
Nepal |
0.43 |
0.69 |
0.72 |
0.68 |
0.58 |
0.51 |
0.49 |
Pakistan |
6.21 |
3.67 |
4.18 |
3.17 |
3.94 |
3.51 |
3.26 |
Sri Lanka |
0.04 |
0.04 |
0.04 |
0.04 |
0.04 |
0.04 |
0.04 |
China |
0.38 |
0.44 |
0.51 |
0.68 |
0.85 |
0.98 |
1.03 |
Percentage of world immigrants in South Asia and China, 1990‒2019
source: authors, using data from un (2020)
The share of India’s stocks of immigrants in the world shows a declining trend in the three decades, during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries—from 4.96 per cent in 1990 to 3.69 per cent in 2000, to 2.46 per cent in 2010, to 2.11 per cent in 2015 and 1.90 per cent in 2019. This determined the declining trend of South Asia’s share in world immigrants from 12.77 per cent in 1990, to 8.80 per cent in 2000, to 6.48 per cent in 2010, to 5.65 per cent in 2015 and 5.18 per cent in 2019. China’s share of world immigrants has remained lower at 0.25 per cent in 1990, increasing slightly to 0.38 per cent in 2019 (see Figure 8.11).
The total number of emigrants from South Asian countries was 24.53 million in 1990, which slightly declined to 24.29 million in 2000, then sharply increased to 33.95 million in 2010. Furthermore, it increased to 38.86 million in 2015 and 42.19 million in 2019, showing an increasing trend of emigration from
Emigrants from South Asian countries, China and the world, 1990–2019 (in millions)
Year |
World |
Afghanistan |
Bangladesh |
Bhutan |
China |
India |
Iran |
Maldives |
Nepal |
Pakistan |
Sri Lanka |
South Asian countries |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1990 |
153.01 |
6.82 |
5.45 |
0.03 |
4.23 |
6.62 |
0.63 |
0.0022 |
0.75 |
3.34 |
0.89 |
24.53 |
1995 |
161.32 |
3.72 |
5.43 |
0.12 |
5.03 |
7.16 |
0.75 |
0.0017 |
0.86 |
3.35 |
0.93 |
22.32 |
2000 |
173.59 |
4.61 |
5.44 |
0.12 |
5.89 |
7.93 |
0.83 |
0.0012 |
0.98 |
3.40 |
0.98 |
24.29 |
2005 |
191.62 |
3.90 |
5.79 |
0.12 |
7.33 |
9.60 |
0.89 |
0.0018 |
1.14 |
3.90 |
1.14 |
26.48 |
2010 |
220.78 |
5.06 |
6.75 |
0.09 |
8.73 |
13.23 |
0.99 |
0.0027 |
1.43 |
4.99 |
1.41 |
33.95 |
2015 |
248.86 |
4.98 |
7.31 |
0.05 |
10.16 |
15.93 |
1.17 |
0.0029 |
2.01 |
5.91 |
1.50 |
38.86 |
2019 |
271.64 |
5.12 |
7.84 |
0.05 |
10.73 |
17.51 |
1.30 |
0.0031 |
2.29 |
6.30 |
1.78 |
42.19 |
The dominance of Indian emigrants in world migration can also be analysed with the help of Figure 8.12. The percentage share of Indian emigrants in world migration increased from 4.33 per cent in 1990 to 4.57 per cent in 2000 and then from 5.99 per cent in 2010 to 6.40 per cent in 2015, reaching 6.45 per cent in 2019, reflecting a slowdown in the rate of increase in 2019. However, the share of South Asian emigrants in world migration declined in the last decade of the twentieth century from 16.03 per cent in 1990 to 13.99 per cent in 2000 but increased thereafter to 15.38 per cent in 2010 to 15.62 per cent in 2015 and remained at 15.53 per cent in 2019, which was still lower than in 1990. The share of Chinese emigrants in world migration has followed the same trend as India’s, increasing from 2.76 per cent in 1990 to 3.39 per cent in 2000, then 3.95 per cent in 2010 to 4.08 per cent in 2015, showing a slight decline thereafter in 2019.
Percentage of world emigrants from South Asia and China, 1990–2019
source: authors, using data from world bank (2020)
Thus, the South Asian countries experienced increasing trends in the aggregate stocks of emigrants, dominated by Indian emigrants in comparison
7 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
This article dwells on the gcm objectives as the benchmark for South Asian countries’ desirable sdg targets on migration, health and development in the context of the covid-19 pandemic. The first among the 23 objectives of the gcm is for signatory member countries to ‘collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies’ (UN Task Force on Data Integration for Disaggregated Statistics on International Migration, 2020). The
The second objective of the gcm is to ‘minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin’. Although all nine South Asian countries are in the category of developing economies belonging to the global South, and all have higher rates of emigration than of immigration, leading to a negative net migration rate over the 27 years between 1990 and 2018, they are diverse in their levels of economic growth and development and their consequences. For example, even with higher economic growth in India, the level of inequalities of income and wealth in the country has increased, leading to underdevelopment of large sections of society. These structures of inequalities and underdevelopment are dynamically and significantly driving the outflow levels of migrants, comprising both high-skilled and low-skilled workers, as elaborated in the case of India’s emigration. Other than economic factors, there are also social and political factors that drive such outmigration, like caste-, gender- and religion-based discriminations in India and other neighbouring countries (Thakur and Khadria, 2018; Akhil, 2019; Rejimon, 2018). There is, therefore, a need for the countries to work at all levels to minimise the economic, social and political differences and to ensure peace and harmony among South Asian countries in order to attain sustainable development and reduce the compulsions of migration.
Objectives 3 to 14 of the gcm are primarily meant for the safety of migrants in the destination countries. The measures suggested in these objectives are more relevant to migration of low-skilled and unskilled workers from the nine South Asian developing countries, like domestic workers, nurses, construction workers, taxi drivers, electricians, plumbers and carpenters, for example,
gcm objective 13 provides a ray of hope to facilitate safety and security for irregular migrants prior to resorting to their detention. This applies to the irregular immigrants from Bangladesh and Rohingya refugees from Myanmar entering India since 2015 and living in fear of detection and deportation (ht, 2019). Objectives 15 to 17 are meant to reduce the chances of scapegoating migrants in destination countries by enhancing their inclusivity. Objectives 18 to 23 are aimed at increasing the link between migration and development through partnerships.
Based on the study of economic development and health indicators and migration status in South Asian countries and China in the context of the gcm and the current pandemic situation, three prominent and significant issues have emerged. First, there are some gaps in the UN migration data. Therefore, there is a need to address these gaps to facilitate a qualitative study of migration stocks and flows that can clearly guide the migration policies for sustainable development. Secondly, compared to other South Asian countries and China, India’s stand on the gcm’s overall philosophy of reducing inequalities of wealth and income in tandem with the sdgs reflects an inconsistency in its position between emigration and immigration. India’s stand on immigrants ranges from being indifferent to being negative, whereas for emigrants it ranges from being concerned to being proactively positive. This creates a lack of clarity on India’s position with respect to the gcm objective of making migration ‘safe, orderly and regular’. The former approach promotes risks and fear among immigrants in India in contrast to the latter approach building hope and confidence among Indian emigrants in destination countries. This dichotomy acts against arriving at a triple-win situation for migrants, the receiving country and the destination country for sustainable development of all stakeholders. There is thus a need for change in the outlook and understanding on the part of India to create a win-win condition for itself as a country of destination as well as a country of origin. Simultaneously, there is a need for collective understanding on the part of the leading South Asian nation-states like India to have a wider horizon for reinforcing the positive link between migration and development by removing the above kind of inconsistencies from their migration policies. Such a collective understanding would facilitate a win-win-win condition
There has been a declining trend in the stock of immigrants and an increasing trend in the stock of emigrants in India between 1990 and 2019 and increasing trends in the stocks of both in China. China has undertaken a positive stance for immigration in its national immigration policy toward the gcm whereas India has undertaken a stringent stance on immigration in its statement on the gcm. These trends have policy implications for suitably adapting the recommendations of the gcm for sustainable migration and development in times of recessionary uncertainties and emergencies like the covid-19 pandemic.
There are two primary lessons drawn in this article: (i) there is a need for expansionary fiscal policy to revive gdp growth which has been forecasted by the imf to be negative for India and other South Asian countries and lower for China in the post-covid-19 period. The same is required to protect livelihoods and employment, which were adversely affected due to the crash of demand and supply caused by the nationwide lockdowns initiated by various governments; and (ii) there is an urgent need to universalise the public healthcare system, keeping in view that quality health indicators are instrumental in containing the recurrence of a covid-19-type pandemic in the future even if the development of vaccines seems to have helped us tide over the present crisis.
All country statements are available at
See also, ‘gcm: India calls for protecting Human Rights of migrants, libralising [sic] norms for economic migration, no to any additional barriers to migration’, official tweet of the Permanent Mission of India in Geneva at the UN on its representation at the first informal thematic session on ‘Human rights of all migrants, social inclusion, cohesion, and all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance’, 10 May 2017,
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments and observations that helped in revising the final draft.
Akhil, C. (2019) ‘India and the Global Compact for Migration’, Economic and Political Weekly, 54(1), https://www.epw.in/journal/2019/11/commentary/india-and-global-compact-migration.html (accessed on 15 April 2021).
ht (The Hindustan Times) (2019) ‘Detention Centre Case: CJI Ranjan Gogoi Pulls Up Assam Chief Secretary’, The Hindustan Times, 25 April, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/detention-centre-case-cji-ranjan-gogoi-pulls-up-assam-chief-secy/story-UCoE4MdnUEd4IRTqX3cjcK.html (accessed on 22 May 2021).
imf (International Monetary Fund) (2020) A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery, The World Economic Outlook Update, June 2020 (Washington, D.C.: iom), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020 (accessed on 15 April 2021).
iom (International Organization for Migration) (2019) World Migration Report 2020 (Geneva: iom), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf (accessed on15 April 2021).
Khadria, B. (2020) ‘Between the “Hubs” and “Hinterlands” of Migration in South Asia: The Bangladesh-India Corridor’, International Journal of South Asian Studies, 10, pp. 1–10, https://jasas.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Article-1_Binod_vol-10_2020.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2021).
Khadria, B. (2017a) ‘In Each Other’s Shoes: Making Migration Policies Equitable Across Borders’, in M. McAuliffe and M. Klein Solomon (eds.) Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate: Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration , (Geneva: iom), pp. 49–54, whttps://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/making_migration_policies_equitable.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2021).
Khadria, B. (2017b) Statement by Professor Binod Khadria, Thematic Expert of the Second Informal Thematic Session, Global Compact for Migration (GCM) for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, ecosoc Chamber, United Nations Headquarters, New York, 22–23 May, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/t2_p3_binodkhadria.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2021).
Khadria, B. (2015) From MDGs to Post-2015 SDGs: Whither ‘Migration Community’ Then? Whither ‘Migration Community’ Now?, plenary lecture given at the 2015 International Metropolis Conference, Mexico City, 7–11 September, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_IUhT4x0ek (accessed on 15 April 2021).
Khadria, B. (2011) Understanding Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region Through a Model of ‘Hubs and Hinterlands’, imds Working Paper Series No. 37 (New Delhi: International Migration and Diaspora Studies Project, Jawaharlal Nehru University), pp. 1–17.
Khadria, B. and R. Mishra (2021) ‘Migration in Asia and Its Subregions: Data Challenges and Coping Strategies for 2021’, Migration Policy Practice, 11(1), pp. 14–20, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mpp-44.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2021).
Khadria, B., N. Thakur, I. Nicolas, T. Lee, J. Yang and Y. Jang (2019) ‘The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Its Impact on Asia’, International Migration, 57(6), pp. 286–302, doi:10.1111/imig.12654.
Li, W., R. Bedford and B. Khadria (2019) ‘IM Special Section Introduction: Rethinking International Migration in China and India’, International Migration, 57(3), pp. 310–316, doi:10.1111/imig.12587.
pmi Geneva (Permanent Mission of India in Geneva) (2017) Statement by India, statement by Mr. Anil Kumar Rai, Counsellor (Humanitarian Affairs) on 3rd Informal Thematic Session on the Global Compact on Migration, United Nations Office Geneva, 20 June, https://pmindiaun.gov.in/pageinfo/NzY3 (accessed on 22 May 2021).
Prebisch, R. (1959) ‘Commercial Policy in Under-Developed Countries’, American Economic Review, 492, pp. 251–273, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816120.
Rejimon, K. (2018) ‘India Needs to Look Beyond the Debate on Regular and “Irregular” Migrants’, The Wire, 1 May, https://thewire.in/labour/india-needs-to-look-beyond-the-debate-on-regular-and-irregular-migrants (accessed on 27 April 2019).
Seshaiyer, P. and C.L. McNeely (2020) ‘Challenges and Opportunities from COVID‐19 for Global Sustainable Development’, World Medical & Health Policy, 12(4), pp. 443–453, doi:10.1002/wmh3.380.
Singer, H.W. (1950) ‘The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries’, American Economic Review, 40, pp. 473–485, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1818065.
Thakur, N. (2016) Globalization of India’s Human Capital: Interlinkages Between Education, Migration and Productivity, unpublished PhD thesis (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University).
Thakur, N. and B. Khadria (2018) ‘Gender Differentials of Indian Knowledge and Service Workers in the US Labour Market: A Comparative Analysis in the Context of “Age, Wage, and Vintage” Premia’, in A. Pande (ed.) Women in the Indian Diaspora (Singapore: Springer).
Toye, J.F.J. and R. Toye (2003) ‘The Origins and Interpretations of the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis’, History of Political Economy, 35(3), pp. 437–467, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1009.6709&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed on 15 April 2021).
UN (United Nations) (2020) Demographic and Social Statistics: International Migration, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/sconcerns/migration/ (accessed on 15 April 2021).
UN (2018a) China Statement, International Conference to Adopt Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakech, 10–11 December, https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/china.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2021).
UN (2018b) India Statement, International Conference to Adopt Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakech, 10–11 December, https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/india.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2021).
UN (2018c) Iran Statement, International Conference to Adopt Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakech, 10–11 December, https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/iran.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2021).
UN (2018d) Pakistan Statement, International Conference to Adopt Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakech, 10–11 December, https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/pakistan.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2021).
UN (2018e) Sri Lanka Statement, International Conference to Adopt Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakech, 10–11 December, https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/assets/pdf/GCM-Statements/srilanka.pdf (accessed on 21 April 2021).
UN Task Force on Data Integration for Disaggregated Statistics on International Migration (2020) Terms of Reference (of 24 January 2020), https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/migration-expert-group/task-forces/TOR_TF3.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2021).
undp (United Nations Development Programme) (2020) Human Development Report 2020 (New York: undp), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf (accessed on 15 April 2021).
Wallerstein, I. (1974) ‘Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy’, African Studies Review, 17(1), pp. 387–415, doi:10.2307/523574.
World Bank (2020) World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed on 15 April 2021).
who (World Health Organization) (2020) WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, https://covid19.who.int/ (accessed on 15 April 2021).