This chapter sketches the regional implications of the legal gap in the international protection of pmdcc by undertaking a case study of the Pacific Island States (pis).558 The adverse impact of climate change and disasters have long been articulated as an âexistential threatâ for the pis,559 which have often been framed as âsites of future catastrophic forced migrationâ.560 Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, the pis have not established a regional response for the regional protection of pmdcc.561 This seriously reinforces the legal gap that exists under international law and hinders efforts to prevent and address the adverse impact of climate change and disasters on human mobility.562 In order to develop its argument, this chapter first sets the scene by discussing the impact of climate change and disasters on the region. Then, it explores hmdcc in the region, first, by comparing the available pathways for inter- and intra-regional movement, and second, by examining the recently adopted regional trade agreement, i.e. the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus (pacer Plus), in order to discuss the prospects of a regional approach to
1 Setting the Scene
Geographically fragmented and sea-locked, the pis stretch over a large area of ocean covering 30 million km², almost the size of the African continent.563 The total population of the region is estimated to be 10 million, with about 6.9 million people living in Papua New Guinea (png) and about 900,000 people living in Fiji.564
The fifth assessment report of the ipcc concluded with high confidence that there was a ârisk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoodsâ in small island states and low-lying coastal zones âdue to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea-level riseâ.565 Acknowledging the similarities in the challenges they face, the pis have been forming or joining negotiation blocs and advocacy groups, in order to demand international action on climate mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.566
Within the UN system, the pis are part of the Small Island Developing States (sids), which represent a group of developing small island countries facing similar sustainable development challenges.567 Growing out of the need to
The Fijian Presidency of the unfccc cop23 in 2017 was especially significant for small island nations.575 Fiji intended to advocate for the climate-related vulnerabilities of sids and to ensure that the completed version of the Paris Agreement Work Programme (also called the Paris Rulebook) at the next cop included priorities, such as increased pledges for climate adaptation and addressing loss and damage.576 Such priorities were to be achieved in the Fijian âBula Spiritâ of friendliness, inclusiveness and solidarity.577 Fiji launched two important initiatives with this aim: a âGrand Coalitionâ of nations, regions, cities, towns, civil society, labour, the private sector, women, youth and communities for climate action, and the Talanoa Dialogue for Climate Ambition, which operationalised the Facilitative Dialogue mandated at cop21, to share ideas, skills and experiences through storytelling.578 cop23 marked itself as an
In spite of collective efforts at the international level on climate action, the pis lack a regional integration body similar to the European Union, the African Union or the Caribbean Community.580 Instead, several political fora provide space for regional and sub-regional cooperation, such as the Pacific Islands Forum (pif),581 Pacific Islands Development Forum (pidf),582, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (msg),583 and the Polynesian Leaders Group (plg).584 There are also several regional technical organisations, such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (spc)585 and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Programme (sprep).586
In the absence of legally binding regional responses, declarations have been used to reflect consensus. The pif adopted one of the earliest regional declarations on climate change, the so-called Niue Declaration, in 2008.587 The Niue Declaration encouraged pif members to âincrease their technical and financial support for climate change action on adaptation, mitigation
Another important regional declaration is the Moana Declaration, which was released by the Pacific Island Parliamentarians in 2013 on the occasion of the 6th Asia Pacific Population Conference.592 The Moana Declaration includes the commitment to âaddress the cross-cutting nature of population issues, vulnerability to climate change, globalisation and environmental degradationâ, as well as to âapply a human-rights based approach to the issues of internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum seekers in the Pacificâ.593
In 2015, the Suva Declaration on Climate Change was endorsed during the 3rd Summit of the pidf.594 Its demands include: that âloss and damage [â¦] be anchored as a standalone element that is separate and distinct from adaptation in the Paris Agreementâ; âa special provision in the Paris Agreement to fast-track urgent action required to assist the most vulnerable countries that are already experiencing existential threats from climate changeâ; and that âadaptation measures for Pacific Small Island Developing States [â¦] be 100% grant financedâ.595
As this section has discussed, the pis face major challenges due to the impact of climate change and disasters.603 As one commentator maintains,
2 Human Mobility in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change in the Region
Although the pis stand at the frontline of climate change and disasters, there are a wide range of available legal pathways for inter- and intra-regional mobility.606 One of the reasons for this differentiation is the lack of a regional approach to human mobility.607 In order to unpack the nuances between different pis, this section first compares the available legal pathways for movement and then analyses the prospects for a regional approach to human mobility by focusing on pacer Plus, which includes a chapter on the movement of natural persons and a side-arrangement on labour mobility.608
2.1 Comparing the Pathways for Inter- and Intra-regional Movement
When comparing the available legal pathways for mobility in the region, it is possible to divide the eleven independent pis into four groups.609
The Compacts also include immigration provisions, which give the citizens of the fsm, rmi and Palau the right to enter, work and live in the US with some restrictions, such as on voting rights.614 One of the most salient limitations is the lack of financial support for affected persons to make use of the compact immigration provisions, the legal provisions on the denial of admission on health-related grounds and the inherently uncertain status of the migrants under the compact (for instance, the compacts are unilaterally terminable by any party).615 In contrast to the gats Mode 4 and ptas, the Compact facilitates the movement of persons in the context of decolonisation.616 It is important to note, however, that considering the nuclear testing carried out on a massive scale by the US in the region during the years of the trusteeship, the Compact has been viewed as an âarrangement for strategic denialâ.617
The second group consists of Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, which have âhigh mobilityâ, through historical ties as well as bilateral agreements providing limited
The third group consists of png, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, which have âlow mobilityâ due to severely restricted external labour market access.621 Although these countries participate in several temporary labour mobility programmes offered by New Zealand and Australia, their citizens are not eligible for pac.622 Nonetheless, these countries (along with other pis) participate in four important temporary labour mobility programmes, which can be mentioned here.623 First, since 2012, the msg skills movement scheme has allowed 400 people from each member State (i.e. png, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji) to work in another msg country temporarily.624 Second, New Zealandâs Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme (rse), which was launched in 2007, allows workers from nine participating pis to be recruited for a maximum of 7 months (in the case of the Tuvaluans and Kiribati, a maximum of 9 months).625 Third, the Australian Seasonal Worker Programme (swp), which was launched as a pilot programme in 2008, assists Australian employers in the
The fourth group consists of Kiribati and Tuvalu, which are two low-lying atoll nations that have been severely impacted by climate change, but lack open labour market access.629 Although I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan citizens are eligible to participate in pac, as well as rse, swp and pls, they face competition from the larger pis included in these schemes.630 As two low-lying atoll nations, Kiribati and Tuvalu are particularly vulnerable to the impact of sea-level rise.631 Compounded with the fact that these countries also do not have âadvantagesâ, such as deposits of natural resources or substantial tourism revenue, some commentators argue that the citizens of these countries should be given preferential access to labour markets.632
2.2 The Prospects for a âRegionalâ Approach to Human Mobility: pacer Plus, Free Movement and Labour Mobility
pacer Plus is a regional pta which was opened for signature on 14 June 2017 and entered into force on 13 December 2020.635 Australia, New Zealand and six pis (i.e. Samoa, Kiribati, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Niue and Cook Islands) are Parties to the Agreement.636 Additional members â namely, Nauru, Tuvalu and Vanuatu â have signed, but not yet ratified it.637 Although not the first pta of the region, pacer Plus is particularly important, because it consists of a chapter on the movement of natural persons and a separate arrangement on labour mobility. This section examines the role of pacer Plus in enhancing the development of a âregionalâ approach to hmdcc.
As discussed earlier, trade agreements can be important tools for facilitating the mobility of persons, especially in the context of disasters and climate change.638 In this context, pacer Plus builds on the original pacer, which was ratified in 2001 as a framework agreement for gradual trade and economic integration.639 However, pacer is not the front-runner for addressing human
In the absence of a regional approach to human mobility, trade negotiations for pacer Plus provided a significant opportunity to promote policy cooperation in this area.642 One of the critical demands made by the negotiating pis on Australia and New Zealand was greater labour mobility for their workers in the latter countries.643 However, it is hard to argue that pacer Plus achieved this.644 On the one hand, a chapter on the movement of natural persons was included in the text of the pta. On the other hand, the content of this chapter is a simple reproduction of the wto gats Mode 4 Commitments of the States Parties. Thus, preferential treatment for services mobility amongst the member states was not implemented.
Similarly, the arrangement on labour mobility does not liberalise labour market access. Instead, Australia, New Zealand and twelve pis have reached several âunderstandingsâ.645 At the core of these understandings lies the establishment of the Pacific Labour Mobility Annual Meeting (plmam). The plmam is a mechanism for advancing cooperation and review progress on the
Interestingly, during the meeting of the plmam in 2019, the participants considered the scope and options for a Labour Mobility Secretariat, which could be formed either as a part of the pacer Plus implementation unit, as a standalone secretariat or as a secretariat housed in the pifs.647 Participants expressed a range of views and debated the allocation of resources for such a body.648 In June 2021, the ministerial representativesâ meeting of the Parties to pacer Plus âwelcomedâ the decision to host the Labour Mobility Secretariat in the pacer Plus implementation unit.649 However, it remains unclear as of yet what functions this new secretariat will perform.650
In conclusion, although pacer Plus might be viewed as a stepping stone in the direction of discussing a regional approach to human mobility, the current commitments do not open up market access or come closer to creating free movement. As discussed earlier, ptas can provide legal pathways to people fleeing their homes in the context of disasters and climate change.651 For instance, regional free-movement agreements empower people of the Caribbean Islands to make short cross-border trips to take up employment when a disaster hits, to send remittances back home and to help rebuild, as well as to enhance their skills and exchange knowledge.652 As they are highly vulnerable to the impact of disasters and climate change and as they lack international protection, the citizens of the pis could benefit from regional approaches to facilitating movement.
3
Given the lack of a regional approach to hmdcc, the prospect of an inquiry into domestic approaches to protecting pmdcc remains highly relevant. Recently, Vanuatu and Fiji have become one of the first countries to launch domestic frameworks on displacement and the planned relocation of communities in the context of environmental changes.653 This development followed the increasing calls at the international and regional levels to identify adaptation strategies to slow- or sudden-onset environmental events and to take action in cases where land is no longer habitable.654 On the one hand, planned relocation serves as an adaptative measure to climate change, which can be used as a protective tool that aims to reduce the risk of harm and discharge the duty of Statesâ to uphold human rights.655 On the other hand, it must be adopted as a measure of last resort, with careful safeguards being applied at each stage, since a failure to do so can have long-term ramifications for individual and collective civil, political, economic and cultural rights.656 This section will first discuss the notion of planned relocation, before analysing the policies of Vanuatu and Fiji.
3.1 The Notion of Planned Relocation and the Pacific Island States
In the last few decades, increasing attention has been directed at developing policy and legal frameworks to address planned relocation in the context of climate change and disasters, as well as neighbouring concepts, such as evacuation, displacement and resettlement. Generally, significant differences can
A quest to trace the origins of resettlement and planned relocation reveals the long history of how these concepts have been carved into legal tools. Studying their development from the 18th century onwards, McAdam argues that the seeds of the idea of transferring populations from high-density
Perspectives from the distant and recent past reiterate that the planned relocation of communities is not a new concept.668 On the contrary, it has been utilised as a political and legal instrument in a plethora of contexts, alongside its neighbouring concept resettlement. It would be pertinent to ask why, despite its long history, international law has lagged behind in creating a framework to address planned relocation.
An international framework on planned relocation would undoubtedly use analogies with the past as a âdiagnostic and predictive toolâ,669 serving
Starting with the decision, referred to as the Cancun Adaptation Framework adopted during cop16 to the unfccc, the international community gradually identified the potential interlinkages between climate change and the movement of people.672 Within this preliminary framework the emphasis was on the identification of adaptative measures and initiatives aiming to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected effects of climate change.673 Against this background, the concerns over the effects of climate change on human migration and displacement were addressed as matters for cooperation, rather than for liability or compensation, and planned relocation was suggested as a possible adaptation strategy.674 In cases where habitation on land is no longer possible and the population in question lacks the resources for planned migration, government-assisted relocation was put forward as a solution.675
The establishment of the unfccc wim breathed new life into planned relocation within the framework the climate change regime. wim was created in 2013, with a mandate to enhance âknowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approachesâ and âaction and support, including finance, technology and capacity-buildingâ as well as to strengthen âdialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholdersâ for loss
Whether in the context of colonialism, disasters or climate change, the pis have experience with planned relocation. Historically, at least three planned cross-border relocations were carried out during the colonial period and at least three more were contemplated.679 In the context of climate change, Campbell and others have identified 37 relocations due to natural hazards and disasters in the region.680 Reflecting on these past relocation experiences is a crucial part of informing the development of the current frameworks.681 Building on this idea, the representatives and experts at the regional consultations of the Nansen Initiative stressed that the participation of the relocating community was as crucial as the participation of the community inhabiting the lands to which the relocation occurs.682 This is particularly true in relation to the customary land laws prominent in the Pacific region, which generally apply to most of the lands in the pis. Contrary to freehold lands, customary lands have significant restrictions on permanent alienation.683 Therefore, a community
Regionally, the incorporation of planned relocation into national policy and legal frameworks has been emphasised in several key documents. For instance, the Niue Declaration, adopted in 2008, includes a commitment to encouraging an increase in âtechnical and financial support for climate change action on adaptation, mitigation and, if necessary, relocationâ was adopted in 2008 by sixteen pis, together with Australia and New Zealand.685
The Moana Declaration, which was adopted in 2013, emphasised âa human rights-based approach to the issues of internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum seekers in the Pacificâ.686
Two recent regional declarations, namely, the Nadi Bay Declaration on the Climate Change Crisis in the Pacific687 and the Kainaki ii Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Now,688 reiterate that forced migration and displacement will remain an essential part of the climate change crisis.
Furthermore, the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2017â2030 was adopted as âvoluntary guidelines for the Pacific Islands regionâ.689 The Framework advises the national and subnational governments and administrations to âintegrate human mobility aspects, where appropriate, [â¦] through targeted national policies and actions, including relocation [â¦]â.690
In conclusion, it is possible to view planned relocation in the context of disasters and climate change as a protective measure that aims to prevent future harm by moving people out of harmâs way.695 It is also a powerful tool that provides a solution to âallow displaced people to rebuild lives when a disaster or future risks associated with disasters, environmental degradation, or adverse effects of climate change threaten human security at origin or render places of origin unfit for habitationâ.696
3.2
Vanuatu has launched its National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-induced Displacement (National Policy) in September 2018.697 Before discussing the National Policy as a protection tool, this section first gives some background information about Vanuatu.
Vanuatu is a Small Island Developing State under the UN system, with a population of 282,000 people scattered over 80 islands.698 It is considered to be one of the worldâs most vulnerable countries to natural hazards, ranking as the most at-risk in 2016.699 It incurs an average of usd 48,000 million a year in losses due to natural hazards, corresponding to 6.6% of its gdp.700 These losses reached an astronomical figure of usd 450 million, representing approximately 64% of the countryâs gdp, in March 2015 when the Category 5 Tropical Cyclone Pam struck Vanuatu.701 A combination of factors explain its vulnerability, including its high exposure to disaster events, the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events due to the impact of climate change, and the effects of developmental challenges.702
While the reasons for internal migration and displacement in Vanuatu are complex, sudden- and slow-onset disasters create additional pressure for people to become mobile.703 For instance, increased volcanic activity in the Ambae Island started a process of evacuation in 2017, which was eventually finalised when the entire population of the island comprising around 11,000 people was relocated to the neighbouring islands of Maewo and Santo.704 Tropical Cyclone Pam, on the other hand, impacted an estimated 188,000
Addressing internal displacement has presented challenges for the government of Vanuatu, particularly since there was a lack of clarity about which government agency was resonsible.708 Although the communities in need of assistance tended to approach the area councils, in addition to provincial and municipal governments, the procedures to be followed by these agencies and the contact points at the national level were not well defined.709 As a result, responses were adopted on an ad hoc and fragmented basis, with communities receiving support and assistance from different agencies in their various mandates and capacities. In 2016, the Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy had called for the âdevelopment of a national policy on resettlement and internal displacementâ,710 which was fulfilled with the adoption of the National Policy.711 The National Policy was developed with the technical support of the iom, funded by the iom Development Fund.712 It aims to âhelp guide emergency and development planners to work together with the Government of Vanuatu to address the needs of all communities affected by displacementâ.713 Its development is stated to have followed a âconflict-sensitive approachâ and to have incorporated the views of âmany different stakeholdersâ
The National Policy proposes twelve strategic priority areas for action, which are divided into systems-level and sectoral-level interventions. Systems-level interventions relate to the following areas: institutions and governance; safeguards and protection; evidence, information and monitoring; and capacity-building, training and resources. Sectoral-level interventions relate to: safety and security; land, housing, planning and environment; health and well-being; education; infrastructure and connectivity; agriculture, food security and livelihoods; traditional knowledge, culture and documentation; and, finally, access to justice and public participation. Furthermore, there are âcross-cutting prioritiesâ including disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, community participation, gender responsiveness, partnerships, social inclusion, and safe and well-managed migration, which aim to underpin the twelve strategic priority areas.715
The scope of the National Policy encompasses five broad groups of people, which are categorised as internally displaced people, people at risk of displacement and/or relocation, people living in informal or peri-urban settlements, internal migrants and other communities directly or indirectly impacted by displacement.716 Regardless of this categorisation, the National Policy specifically states that it does not aim to discriminate against affected communities on the basis of the cause of displacement.717 A broad concept of disaster which includes natural and human-made crises is therefore preferred. Furthermore, a spectrum of effects, from evictions to planned relocation, are covered.
The National Policy envisages a mainstreaming process into existing and future government policies and legislation, annual plans, work programmes, and sector plans and policies. The development of two instruments has been committed to for further implementation: a comprehensive Implementation Plan and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, which will outline the specific roles and responsibilities of different government agencies and partners, and the Standard Operating Procedures, which will oversee emergency response, return and reintegration, evictions and planned relocation.718
Furthermore, under Chapter 12 of the Constitution of Vanuatu, all land in the Republic of Vanuatu belongs to the indigenous custom owners and their descendants.720 Accordingly, the rules of custom form the basis of ownership and use of land. Customary land inheritance is predominantly patrilineal, meaning men are generally land owners.721 Article 81 of the Constitution of Vanuatu vests the Government with the power to buy land from custom owners and transfer ownership of it to indigenous citizens or indigenous communities from over-populated islands.722 This power could represent the basis for the voluntary relocation of persons or communities from overpopulated islands. However, planned relocation for other reasons may require the consent of custom land owners for access, use and (if applicable) ownership of land. Therefore, the community subject to planned relocation in the context of climate change and disasters must be assisted in exercising their right to adequate housing and land in conformity with the customary rules of Vanuatu.
According to the most recent upr report, Vanuatu has taken positive steps to improve the human rights situation since its last review, which was concluded in 2014. It formed a national implementation plan for the recommendations contained in the previous upr, becoming the first pis to take such a step.723 As a result, it has enacted various laws on the protection of rights, including laws on health, education and access to information.724 Furthermore, Vanuatu
One of the most important topics in relation to which serious human rights concerns were raised is the rights of women. Currently, none of the 52 elected members of the Parliament of Vanuatu are women.726 How Vanuatuâs patriarchal and customary structures impinge on the struggle of women to achieve full equality in all aspects of social and political life has long been discussed.727 Participation in decision-making at all levels is especially noted as being restricted by the violence women face.728 This can have serious implications for the planned relocation of communities. From the perspective of community-based rights, the transparent and inclusive participation of the community in the process may not be achieved if women are left out. From the perspective of the satisfaction of individual human rights, women are entitled to the enjoyment of their rights without fear. Ensuring that women are included and can actively participate in the planning, decision-making and implementation processes of planned relocation is crucial. In this regard, the upr outcome report recommends that Vanuatu include women in the National Advisory Board on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction to ensure the effective participation in the planning, decision-making and implementation processes of the National Policy.729 The National Policy itself adopts gender equity and responsiveness as a guiding principle.730 It is important to be vigilant of the
3.3 Planned Relocation Policy of Fiji
Fiji has adopted its Planned Relocation Guidelines in 2018 and Displacement Guidelines (together referred to as âGuidelinesâ) in December 2019.732 This section first introduces Fiji and then analyses the Guidelines.
Fiji is located in the Pacific Ocean over a total geographical area of 18,272 km2.733 It has a population of approximately 900,000 people living on over 332 mountainous and volcanic islands.734 Approximately 90% of the people live in three urban centres situated on the coast.735 Cyclones, storm surges, coastal erosion, floods and sea level rise are among some of the known risks facing the human settlements in these centres.736 Rural communities along the coast are similarly vulnerable to sea-level rise, cyclones and storm surges.737 Furthermore, thousands of people live in low-lying outer islands of Fiji, which are âdifficult and expensive to protect against sea level rise and storm surges, calling into question their viability over the long termâ.738 Thus, human settlements in Fiji are vulnerable to the impact of climate change.739
In 2006, Vunidogoloa village, which is situated on the coast of Fijiâs second-largest island, known as Vanua Levu, approached the Fijian government for
The relocation of Vunidogoloa village took place in a legal vacuum â in the absence of any domestic laws or policies directly addressing and planning relocation processes. The relocation of Narikoso village, which is situated on Fijiâs fourth-largest island, Kadavu, was the second government-assisted relocation in Fiji.746 A National Relocation Taskforce Team was formed to support this relocation.747 A national consultation for the development of a national framework thus began in 2015. Shortly afterwards, the Fijian Ministry of Economy took over the process to develop the Planned Relocation Guideline.748 Affected communities, households and individuals are specifically referred to as having been consulted during the formulation stage.749 This composition is stated to
The Planned Relocation Guideline is structured in two parts. The first part gives an overview and includes the definition of planned relocation, as well as its main pillars and principles. Accordingly, planned relocation is âunderstood as a solution-oriented measure, involving the State, in which a community (as distinct from an individual/household) is physically moved to another location and resettled permanently thereâ.751 The principles listed in the Guideline are applicable to all stages and consist of: a human-centred approach (i.e. the application of anthropocentric management concerns of environmental resources); a livelihood-based approach (i.e. addressing the specific adaptation needs of communities and households on the move); a human-rights based approach (i.e. upholding the rights of individuals to meaningful and transparent engagement throughout the planned relocation process); a pre-emptive approach (i.e. ensuring potential humanitarian crises are avoided); and a regional approach (i.e. bringing domestic policies in line with existing regional norms).752
The second part of the Planned Relocation Guideline concerns the three stages of planned relocation, which are: the pre-planned relocation process, the in-planned relocation process and the post-planned relocation process.753 For each stage, there is specific guidance tailored towards government stakeholders and âother stakeholdersâ, which are defined as ânon-State actorsâ.754 The clear designation of the roles attributed to State and non-State actors is a lesson learnt from the relocation of Vunidogoloa village.755 The coordination amongst various stakeholders who contributed to the process in Vunidogoloa was heavily criticised, since problems such as the reduplication of the same task by different actors arose.756 The Planned Relocation Guideline conditions the disclosure of a âtransparent participation planâ as early as possible in order to engage all stakeholders in a collaborated and efficient cooperation.757
So far, Fiji has identified 81 communities for potential relocation,761 of which 42 have been recommended for relocation.762
The Planned Relocation Guideline states that when implementing a planned relocation process in Fiji, âaddressing human rights aspects is unavoidable in all three stages of movementâ.763 The same emphasis is present in the Displacement Guideline. Therefore, ensuring that the planned relocation is sustainable in all phases of movement is tied to the safeguards deriving from community-based rights and individual human rights. An analysis of the human rights situation in Fiji might indicate some of the problems that are currently emerging and could become an issue in the future.
The situation regarding the rule of law in Fiji represents an initial point of inquiry. With a history of four coups dâétat since independence from colonial rule in 1970, Fiji is rated as a âhybrid regimeâ,764 in which strict limitations on
A critical reading of the Bill of Rights in Fiji, which is found in Sections 6 to 45, Chapter 2 of the Constitution, can inform the discussion.773 The Fijian Bill of Rights binds âthe legislative, executive and judicial branches of government at all levels, and every person performing the functions of any public officeâ.774 Relevant rights enshrined in the Constitution include: the right to education (Section 31), the right to economic participation (Section 32), the right to housing and sanitation (Section 35), the right to adequate food and water (Section 36), the right to health (Section 38), the right to a clean and
The freedom of movement and residence is protected under Section 21 of the Constitution of Fiji, which includes the right to move freely throughout Fiji and the right to leave Fiji.778 According to Section 21(6)(f), this right can be restricted in order to regulate, control or prohibit âthe entry of persons on to land or property owned or occupied by othersâ.779 This provision must be read in conjunction with rules on land and property ownership. Section 28 of the Constitution specifically addresses the ownership and protection of the iTaukei, Rotuman and Banaban customary lands, three indigenous communities of Fiji.780 An important exception to the prohibition of the permanent alienation of such lands is State acquisition for âa public purposeâ under Section 27.781 It is important to note that the State is required to revert to the customary owners âif the land is no longer required by the Stateâ.782 Protection of freehold land ownership, as well as other rights and interests in land (such as leases), is stipulated under Section 29.
Customary land in Fiji corresponds to 87% of the overall land.783 So far, the relocation in Fiji has largely taken place within the boundaries of the communityâs customary land.784 How a community could permanently relocate outside of its own customary land into the customary land of another community
Furthermore, the planned relocation of Vunidogoloa village revealed serious problems with gender awareness.787 For instance, the newly constructed homes had no separate space for women, not even a separate kitchen, which exposed women to the risk of invasion of their privacy and bodily integrity.788 The National Gender Policy was released by the Ministry in 2014, which commits to, amongst other things, the promotion of gender-aware policies on climate change and disaster relief.789 Yet, in its recent report, CEDAWCom provided recommendations to Fiji on a plurality of issues, including ensuring that women participate in the drafting of plans and strategies for disaster preparedness, as well as protecting rural women from land grabbing.790
4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a case study of the pis, as a means of examining the regional responses to hmdcc given the absence of an international protection mechanism for pmdcc. The analysis has demonstrated that, as a region highly vulnerable to the effects of disasters and climate change, the pis have been advocating for rigorous climate action at the international level. However, this call for action has not resulted in the creation of a regional approach to
Recently, with the adoption of pacer Plus, a more visible step in the direction of discussing a regional approach to human mobility was taken. Although pacer Plus includes a chapter on the movement of natural persons, and a separate arrangement on labour mobility, the current commitments of States Parties do not liberate market access or come closer to creating free movement in the region. Perhaps with the establishment of a Labour Mobility Secretariat in the pacer Plus implementation unit, as well as through plmam, new commitments can be made in the near future.
Noting the lack of a regional response to addressing hmdcc, this chapter concluded by examining domestic approaches. The notion of planned relocation as a protection tool was discussed by examining its specific uses in Vanuatu and Fiji. Analyses have shown that planned relocation can prevent future harm by moving people out of harmâs way. However, it must be used as a measure of last resort, and a human rightsâbased approach must be embedded throughout all stages of planned relocation. A failure to do so might result in long-term ramifications for individual and collective civil, political, economic and cultural rights.
As planned relocation finds expressions in national frameworks, it is gradually acquiring a sufficient foundation to become eligible for funding from donors as an adaptation strategy in relation to climate change. Fijiâs recently launched climate change relocation fund is a case in point.791 This provides further evidence for alternative domestic solutions to protecting pmdcc, in the absence of an international or regional response.
The Pacific Island States (pis) consist of 22 countries and territories; of which 12 are independent states, 2 are self-governing territories, and 8 are dependent territories. The independent states are Fiji, Samoa, Nauru, Tonga, Papua New Guinea (png), Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Federated States of Micronesia (fsm), Republic of the Marshall Islands (rmi), and Palau. The self-governing territories are Cook Islands, and Niue, which are in free association with New Zealand. The dependent territories are French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Pitcairn Islands, and Tokelau.
UN Secretary-General, âSecretary-Generalâs remarks on Climate Change [as delivered]â (10 September 2018) <
Jon Barnett and Celia McMichael, âThe effects of climate change on the geography and timing of human mobilityâ 39 Population and Environment, 339â356.
Eberhard Weber, âEnvisioning South-South relations in the fields of environmental change and migration in the Pacific Islands â past, present and futuresâ [2015] 2 Bandung: Journal of the Global South 6.
Laczko and Piguet (n 322) 1â20.
Neil L. Andrew and others, âCoastal proximity of populations in 22 Pacific Island Countries and Territoriesâ [2019] 14 Plos One 9; Stephen Levine, Pacific Ways: Government and Politics in the Pacific Islands (Victoria University Press 2016); Hoe Ee Khor, Roger P. Kronenberg and Patrizia Tumbarello (eds), Resilience and Growth in the Small States of the Pacific (imf 2016).
The Nansen Initiative, âHuman Mobility, Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacificâ (Background Paper, 21â24 May 2013) <
ipcc, âSummary for Policymakersâ in Ottmar Edenhofer and others, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of the Working Group iii to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2014) 13.
See Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, The New Pacific Diplomacy (anu Press 2015).
The sids was first recognised as a distinct group of developing countries at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992. The Barbados Programme of Action was developed in 1994 to assist the sids in their sustainable development efforts. An important framework launched by the sids in 2014 is the Accelerated Modalities of Action (samoa Pathway) which sets out the sustainable development priorities of islands. samoa Pathway has 18 priority areas, which are: sustained and sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth and decent work for all; climate change; sustainable energy; disaster risk reduction; oceans and seas; food security and nutrition; water and sanitation; sustainable transport; sustainable consumption and production; management of chemicals and water, including hazardous waste; health and ncds; gender equality and womenâs empowerment; social development; biodiversity; invasive alien species; means of implementation, including partnerships; sids priorities for the post-2015 development agenda; monitoring and accountability. See un-ohrlls, âsids Accelarated Modalities of Action Pathwayâ <
psids grew out of a need to raise funds for climate change adaptation and mitigation projects, and in time has gained impetus to promote the common interests of its members. Its members are Fiji, rmi, fsm, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and png. See psids, âViews on the Possible Security Implications of Climate Change to be included in the report of the Secretary-General to the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assemblyâ (2009) <
Alliance of Small Island Developing States (aosis) has 44 members and 5 observers. From pis, all twelve independent countries, and two self-governing territories are members. Additionally, American Samoa and Guam are observers. See Espen Ronneberg, âSmall Islands and the Big Issue: Climate Change and the Role of the Alliance of Small Island Statesâ in Cinnamon Pinon Carlarne, Kevin R. Gray and Richard Tarasofsky, The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 761â790.
Climate Vulnerable Forum has 48 members in total. Fiji, rmi, Palau, png, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu are members from the pis. For a recent statement of the forum, see Climate Vulnerable Forum, âClimate Change and Human Rightsâ (Joint Statement, 46th Session of the Human Rights Council, 09 March 2021) <
Climate Action Pacific Partnership was established in 2017 to form a coalition of Pacific stakeholders to exchange ideas and provide inputs to the unfccc process. See Climate Action Pacific Partnership, âBackground to the Climate Action Pacific Partnershipâ (2017) <
Kiribati, Tuvalu, rmi, Tokelau, and the Maldives are members of the Coalition of Low Lying Atoll Nations on the issue of Climate Change, which aims to voice the position of the frontline nations to climate change in a unified voice. See sprep, âAtoll nations make a collective stand for their right to remain in their islands in the face of climate changeâ (12 December 2019) <
David Freestone, Richard Barnes and Payam Akhavan, âAgreement for the Establishment of the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Lawâ [2022] International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law; Simona Marinescu, âcop26: Major polluting countries face legal action from small island states over rising sea levelsâ (unsdg 2021) <
For the appointed fourteen legal experts, see cosis on Climate Change and International Law, âCommittee of Legal Expertsâ (Twitter 2022) <
George Carter, âPacific Island States and 30 Years of Global Climate Change Negotiationsâ in Carola Klöck and others (eds), Coalitions in the Climate Change Negotiations (Routledge 2021).
Lisa Benjamin, Adelle Thomas, Rueanna Haynes, âAn âIslandsâ COPâ? Loss and Damage at cop23â [2018] 27 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 3, 332â340.
Wolfgang Obergassel and others, âThe calm before the storm: an assessment of the 23rd Climate Change Conference (cop 23) in Bonnâ [2018] 30 Environmental Law and Management, 104â113.
Luis Mundaca and others, âThe global expansion of climate mitigation policy interventions, the Talanoa Dialogue and the role of behavioural insightsâ [2019] 1 Environmental Research Communications 6; Rosemary Lyster, âThe idea of (Climate) Justice, neoliberalism and the Talanoa Dialogueâ [2019] Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 35â61; Feja Lesniewska and Linda Siegele, âThe Talanoa Dialogue: A Crucible to Spur Ambitious Global Climate Action to Stay Within the 1.5°C Limitâ [2018] 12 Carbon and Climate Law Review 1, 41â49.
Benjamin, Thomas and Haynes (n 576) 3.
Lavenex (n 370) 1275â1293.
Founded in 1971, pif has 18 members, which are Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, fsm, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, png, rmi, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
pidf members are Fiji, fsm, Kiribati, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Palau, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
msg members are Fiji, png, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front of New Caledonia. Indonesia is recognised as an associate member.
plg members are the leaders of American Samoa, the Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, Tokelau, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna.
For the recent strategic plan of the spc, see Pacific Community, âPacific Community Strategic Plan 2016â2020â (2015) <
For the recent strategic plan of sprep, see sprep, âStrategic Plan 2017â2026â (2015) <
Pacific Islands Forum, Niue Declaration on Climate Change, 39th session, Forum Communiqué Annex B (19â20 August 2008).
ibid.
Pacific Islands Forum, â2050 Strategy Blue Pacific Continentâ <
ibid.
ibid.
Pacific Island Parliamentarians included Fiji, Cook Islands, Nauru, Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, png and the fsm. See Moana Declaration (Outcome Statement of Pacific Parliamentarians for Population and Development, 13â15 August 2013) <
ibid.
Suva Declaration on Climate Change (Issued at the Third Pacific Islands Development Forum Leadersâ Summit, 2â4 September 2015, Grand Pacific Hotel, Suva, Fiji) <
This ambitious declaration is in line with the vision of the organisation. pidf is a Fiji-led regional forum that has been evolving since 2010, following the suspension of Fiji from pif after the coup dâétat which lead the Bainimarama government to assume power. It advances the Pacific Island nationsâ âshared interests and common concerns around sustainable developmentâ by ârenewing special cultural bonds and regional kinshipsâ to the exclusion of Australia and New Zealand. However, it is important to note that regardless of pioneering this project, Fiji is currently an active member of pif, which includes Australia and New Zealand. See Litia Mawi, âFijiâs Emerging Brand of Pacific Diplomacy: A Fiji government perspectiveâ in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, The New Pacific Diplomacy (anu Press 2015) 101â110; Makereta Komai, âFijiâs Foreign Policy and the New Pacific Diplomacyâ in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, The New Pacific Diplomacy (anu Press 2015) 111â124.
Pacific Islands Development Forum, Nadi Bay Declaration on the Climate Change Crisis in the Pacific (29â30 July 2019) <
ibid.
Pacific Islands Forum, Kainaki ii Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Now, 50th sess, Forum Communiqué Annex A (13â16 August 2019) <
Pacific Islands Forum, Boe Declaration on Regional Security (5 September 2018) <
Pacific Islands Forum (n 598).
ibid.
ibid.
Jon Barnett, âAdapting to Climate Change in Pacific Island Countries: The Problem of Uncertaintyâ [2001] 29 World Development 6, 977â993.
Betzalel Newman, âSunk Coast Fallacy: How Island Nations Should Approach Climate Diplomacyâ (Council on Foreign Relations, 7 August 2019).
Benjamin Norman Forbes, âAOSIS v The World: A Blueprint for the First International Multi-Party Climate Change Caseâ [2021] 8 Groningen Journal of International Law 2; Daniel Bodansky, âThe Role of the International Court of Justice in Addressing Climate Change: Some Preliminary Reflectionsâ [2017] 49 Arizona State Law Journal 689â712.
Fornalé (n 329).
Eberhard Weber, âTrade agreements, labour mobility and climate change in the Pacific Islandsâ [2017] 17 Regional Environmental Change, 1089â1101.
Alisi Kautoke-Holani, âLabour Mobility in the PACER Plusâ [2018] 5 Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 1, 90â101.
This section does not discuss the mobility options available for self-governing territories and dependent territories in the Pacific region. This is majorly because persons from these territories are entitled to New Zealander, Australian, (US) American, French or British citizenships, depending on the territory. See World Bank, âPacific Possible. Long-term Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Pacific Island Countriesâ (2017) <
Kevin Morris, âNavigating the Compact of Free Association: Three Decades of Supervised Self-Governanceâ [2019] 41 University of Hawaii Law Review 2, 388â440.
Compact of Free Association Act, Pub. L. No. 99â239, 1985 u.s.c.c.a.n (99 Stat.1770); Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2003, Pub. L. No 108â188, § 331 (a), 117 Stat. 2720, 2781; see also Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99â658, § 312, 100 Stat. 3672, 3695.
Donald R. Shuster, âThe Republic of Palau and its Compacts, 1995â2009â [2009] 44 The Journal of Pacific History 3, 325â332.
Robert A. Underwood, âThe amended U.S. Compacts of Free Association with the Federates States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands: less free, more compactâ (East-West Center Working Papers, September 2003).
Briana Dema, âSea level Rise and the Freely Associated States: Addressing Environmental Migration under the Compacts of Free Associationâ [2012] 37 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 177â204.
ibid.
Jon Hinck, âThe Republic of Palau and the United States: Self-Determination Becomes the Price of Free Associationâ [1990] 78 California Law Review, 915â972.
Morris (n 610) 388â440.
World Bank (n 609).
New Zealand Government, âInformation about Pacific Access Category Visaâ <
New Zealand Government, âInformation about Samoan Quota Resident Visaâ <
World Bank (n 609).
Richard Bredford, Charlotte Bredford, Janet Wall and Margaret Young, âManaged Temporary Labour Migration of Pacific Islanders to Australia and New Zealand in the Early Twenty-first Centuryâ [2017] 48 Australian Geographer 1, 37â57.
Yvonne Underhill-Sem and Evelyn Marsters, âLabour Mobility in the Pacific: A Systematic Literature Review of Development Impactsâ [2017] New Zealand Institute for Pacific Research.
msg, âMelanesian Spearhead Group Secretariatâ <
New Zealand Government, âRecognised Seasonal Employer (rse) Scheme Researchâ <
Australian Government, âSeasonal Worker Programmeâ <
Australian Government, â2017 Foreign Policy White Paperâ <
John Connell and Kirstie Petrou, âPacific Labour Mobility: Towards a future research agendaâ (University of Sydney, 2019)>
World Bank (n 609).
Carmen Voigt-Graf and Sophia Kagan, âMigration and labour mobility from Kiribatiâ (Australian National University, Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 56, Marc 2017).
J.A Church and others, â2013: Sea Level Changeâ in ipcc, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2012).
Sophia Kagan, âMaking the case for preferential access to labour markets for Kiribati and Tuvalu migrantsâ (Development Policy Blog, 20 January 2015) <
For a discussion on sub-regionalism, see Tess Newton Cain, âThe Renaissance of the Melanesian Spearhead Groupâ in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, The New Pacific Diplomacy (anu Press 2016) 151â160.
François Gemenne and Julia Blocher, âHow can migration support adaptation? Different options to test the migration-adaptation nexusâ (iom Working Paper Series No.1/2016) <
pacer Plus (signed 14 June 2017, entered into force 13 December 2020) <
See pacer Plus, âCountries Involvedâ <
ibid.
See Chapter 2.1.5 of this book.
pacer Plus also replaced the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (sparteca). See Cheryl Carmichael, âsparteca, picta, and the wto: How the Pacific Island States are Impacted by Free Trade Agreementsâ (PhD thesis, University of Prince Edward Island, December 2019) <
picta tis was signed by ten pis: namely, the Cook Islands, fsm, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, rmi.
Wadan Narsey, âPICTA, PACER and EPAs: weaknesses in Pacific island countriesâ trade policiesâ (Pacific Economic Bulletin, 19 (3), 2004, Asia Pacific Press) <
Kautoke-Holani (n 608) 90â101.
Pacific Network on Globalisation, âPACER-Plus Labour Mobility Analysis : Unbound promises and an annual meetingâ (February 2020) <
For a critical evaluation of pacer Plus, see Adam Wolfenden, âPacer Plus: the case againstâ (Development Policy Blog, 25 November 2020) <
These twelve pis are: Cook Islands, fsm, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, rmi, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. See Arrangement on Labour Mobility <
ibid.
Pacific Labour Mobility Annual Meeting, Outcome Statement (7â9 October 2019) <
ibid.
pacer Plus Communiqué (30 June 2021) pp.min.003/c/final <
Richard Curtain, âIs PLMAM fit for purpose?â (Development Policy Blog, 21 October 2019) <
See Chapter 2.1.5 of this book.
Francis (n 385); Montoute, Mohammed and Francis (n 396) 2; Sealey-Huggins (n 396) 2444â2463.
Dalila Gharbaoui, âClimate change, planned relocation and land governance in the Pacific regionâ (PhD thesis, Université de Liége, 24 May 2021) <
Elizabeth Ferris and Sanjula Weerasinghe, âPromoting Human Security: Planned Relocation as a Protection Tool in a Time of Climate Changeâ [2020] 8 Journal on Migration and Human Security 2, 134â149.
Melanie Pill, âPlanned Relocation from the Impacts of Climate Change in Small Island Developing States: the Intersection Between Adaptation and Loss and Damageâ in Walter Leal Filho, Managing Climate Change Adaptation in the Pacific Region (Springer, 2020) 129â150.
See, eg, Task Force on Displacement (n 1). See, eg, Pacific Community (spc), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (sprep), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (pifs), United Nations Development Programme (undp), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (unisdr) & University of the South Pacific (usp), âFramework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2017â2030â (2016) <
ila (n 168) 3.
ibid.
ibid.
See, eg, Government of Vanuatu, National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement, Vanuatu, Government of Vanuatu, 2018 <
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr), unhcr Resettlement Handbook (Geneva, unhcr, 2011) <
It must be noted that resettlement can also refer to relocations in the context of development projects. See Jeanette Schade, âClimate Change and Planned Relocation: Risks and a Proposal for Safeguardsâ in Thomas Faist and Jeanette Schade (eds), Disentangling Migration and Climate Change: Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human Rights (Netherlands, Springer 2013) 185.
Jane McAdam, âRelocation and resettlement from colonisation to climate change: the perennial solution to danger zonesâ [2015] 3 London Review of International Law 1, 95.
ibid 94â120.
ibid 96.
Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research (apn), âCommunity Relocation as an Option for Adaptation to the Effects of Climate Change and Climate Variability in Pacific Island Countriesâ (Suva, apn, 2005) <
See Stuart Kirsch, âLost Worlds: Environmental Disaster, âCulture Loss, and the Lawââ [2001] 42 Current Anthropology 2, 167â198; Brooke Wilmsen and Michael Webber, âWhat can we learn from the practice of development-force displacement and resettlement for organised resettlements in response to climate change?â [2015] 58 Geoforum 1, 76â85.
See Ronald W. Perry and Michael K. Lindell, âPrinciples for Managing Community Relocation as a Hazard Mitigation Measureâ [1997] 5 Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 1, 49â59.
Thomas Birk, âRelocation of reef and atoll island communities as an adaptation to climate change: learning from experience in Solomon Islandsâ in Kirsten Hastrup and Karen Fog Olwig (eds), Climate Change and Human Mobility: Challenges to Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press 2012) 99.
Schade (n 662) 109.
Robin Bronen, âClimate-induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrineâ [2011] 35 n.y.u. Review of Law & Social Change 2, 394â395.
United Nations Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc), Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, UN Doc fccc/cp/2010/7/Add. 1, 15 March 2011, para. 14(f).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc), âDefinition of Terms Used Within the dcc Pages, Glossary Aâ, ipcc Data Distribution Centre <
Koko Warner, âHuman Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Climate Change: the Cancun Adaptation Framework and Potential for Future Actionâ [2012] 30 Government and Policy 6, 1066.
Eli Keene, âResources for Relocation: In Search of a Coherent Federal Policy on Resettling Climate-Vulnerable Communitiesâ [2018] 48 Texas Environmental Law Journal 1, 119â142.
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, âReport of the Conference of the Parties on its Nineteenth Sessionâ (19th sess, 31 January 2014) UN Doc fccc/cp/2013/10/Add. 1 <
Task Force on Displacement (n 1).
ibid.
Jane McAdam, âHistorical Cross-Border Relocations in the Pacific: Lessons for Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Changeâ [2014] 49 Journal of Pacific History, 301.
Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research, âCommunity Relocation as an Option for Adaptation to the Effects of Climate Change and Climate Variability in the Pacific Island Countriesâ (2015) <
The Nansen Initiative, âHuman Mobility, Natural Disasters and Climate Change in the Pacific: Summary of Conclusions, Nansen Initiative Pacific Regional Consultationâ (Outcome Report, Cook Islands, 21â24 May 2013) <
ibid.
The notion of customary land dates back to British colonial times, according to which such lands could not be permanently alienated. In certain British colonies and protectorates, the common law rule on the ultimate ownership of all the land in the country by the King was not applied. Instead, legislation provided that the King owned only the land that was not owned by the indigenous people. To read more about the application of this rule in Fiji, please refer to Jennifer Corrin-Care and Donald Edgar Paterson, Introduction to South Pacific Law (Cavendish, Routledge 2017) 317â318.
The Nansen Initiative (n 681).
Pacific Islands Forum (n 587).
Pacific Island Parliamentarians, The Moana Declaration, Outcome Statement of Pacific Parliamentarians for Population and Development (13â15 August 2013), recommendation 3.
Pacific Islands Development Forum, Nadi Bay Declaration on the Climate Change Crisis in the Pacific (29â30 July 2019) <
Pacific Islands Forum (n 598).
spc, sprep, pifs, undp, unisdr & usp, Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2017â2030.
Goal 1 of the Framework for Resilient Development recommends âstrengthened integrated adaptation and risk reduction to enhance resilience to climate change and disastersâ.
Koko Warner and others, âNational Adaptation Plans and Human Mobilityâ [2015] 49 Forced Migration Review.
Carol Farbotko and Celia McMichael, âVoluntary immobility and existential security in a changing climate in the Pacificâ [2019] 60 Asia Pacific Viewpoint 2, 148â162; Jessie Connell and Sabira Coelho, âPlanned relocation in Asia and the Pacificâ [2018] Forced Migration Review, 46â49.
Seizing the opportunity, Fiji launched the first fund titled Climate Change Relocation and Displaced Peoples Trust Fund for Communities and Infrastructure. The aim is to receive international support for planned relocation projects. For more information about the launch, see Worldâs First-Ever Relocation Trust Fund for People Displaced by Climate Change for People Displaced by Climate Change Launched by Fijian Prime Minister,<
Daniel Lund, âNavigating slow-onset risks through foresight and flexibility in Fiji: emerging recommendations for the planned relocation of climate-vulnerable communitiesâ [2021] 50 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 12â20.
Ferris and Weerasinghe (n 654) 137â138.
ibid.
Government of Vanuatu (n 660).
UN Data, Vanuatu (2019) <
Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (unu-ehs), âWorld Risk Report 2016â <
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (gffdr), âVanuatuâ (2019) <
ibid.
Government of Vanuatu (n 660).
Siobhan McDonnell, âThe importance of attention to customary tenure solutions: slow onset risks and the limits of Vanuatuâs climate change and resettlement policyâ [2021] 50 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 281â288.
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ifrc), âEmergency Plan of Action Final Report, Vanuatu: Ambae Volcanic Eruption 2018â (ifrc, 2019) <
Pacific Community (spc), âTropical Cyclone Pam Lessons Learned Workshop Reportâ (Suva, spc 2015) <
Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh and Tess Van Geelen, âProtection of Climate Displaced Persons under International Law: A Case Study from Mataso Island, Vanuatuâ [2018] 19 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 18.
Government of Vanuatu (n 660) 11.
ibid 14.
ibid 15.
Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, âVanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016â2030â, section 7.6.6.
The adoption of the National Policy, as well as the establishment of the National Advisory Board on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction and the formulation of a disaster and climate change committee in every province to help communities are commended in the upr outcome report.
Government of the Republic of Vanuatu (n 660) 8.
ibid 7.
ibid 8.
ibid.
ibid 19.
ibid 7.
ibid Annex E.
Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu arts. 7(d), (f), (g).
ibid Chapter 12.
Allens Linklaters llp, Housing, Land and Property Law in Vanuatu, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Australian Red Cross (2017) <
Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu art. 81.
unhrc, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Vanuatu, 41st sess, Agenda Item 6, UN Doc a/hrc/41/10 (24 June-12 July 2019, adopted 5 April 2019).
ibid.
United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, âVanuatu Graduates from Least Developed Country Statusâ <
See, generally, UN cedaw, Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Vanuatu, 63rd sess, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, UN Doc cedaw/c/vut/co/4-5 (9 March 2016).
See, generally, Compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15(b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21, UN hrc, 18th sess, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, UN Doc a/hrc/wg.6/18/vut/2 (27 January-7 February 2014, adopted 6 November 2013).
UN cedaw (n 726).
UN hrc (n 723) para 90.17.
The National Policy explains the guiding principle of gender equity and responsiveness as: âplanning for durable solutions must be responsive to the different risks and needs of all people, including women, men, children. All people must be included in durable solutions planning and have equal opportunities to lead community-driven recovery processesâ.
ibid.
Government of Fiji (n 660). Government of Fiji, Displacement Guidelines in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters, Fiji, Government of Fiji, 2019 <
United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing States and Small Island Developing States (un-ohrlls), âAbout sidsâ (2019) <
ibid.
Government of Fiji, âNational Adaptation Planâ (2018) <
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
Karen McNamara and HeleneJacot Des Comboes, âPlanning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fijiâ [2015] 6 International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 315.
ibid.
Clothilde Tronquet, âFrom Vunidogoloa to Kenani: An Insight into Successful Relocationâ [2015] The State of Environmental Migration Review.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (unocha), Fiji: Building resilience in the face of climate change (2014) <
ibid.
Celia McMichael, Carol Farbotko and Karen E. McNamara, âClimate-Migration Responses in the Pacific Regionâ in Cecilia Menjivar, Marie Ruiz, and Immanuel Ness (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises (Oxford University Press 2019) 297â314.
Georgetown University, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) and International Organisation for Migration (iom), âA Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Changeâ (2017) <
ibid.
Both the Planned Relocation and Disaster Guidelines were established with the support of the German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbHv (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, also known as giz, the German development agency). The giz has been helping fifteen governments in the Pacific in various ways to adapt to climate change. giz, âAdapting to climate change: a new start in Fijiâ (2017) <
Government of the Republic of Fiji (n 660).
ibid.
ibid 7.
ibid 9.
ibid 11â15.
ibid.
Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur and Priyatma Singh, âCustomary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation â A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fijiâ in Leal Filho (ed), Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific Countries (Springer 2017) 19â33.
Annah E. Piggott-McKellar and others, âMoving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Case Studies in Fijiâ [2019] 8 Social Sciences 5, 133.
Government of the Republic of Fiji (n 660) 13.
Government of Fiji (n 732).
ibid 1.
ibid 4.
Government of the Republic of Fiji, âSecond National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changeâ (2013) <
Government of the Republic of Fiji, âA Green Growth Framework of Fijiâ (2014), <
Government of the Republic of Fiji (n 660).
This is according to the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (eiu), which classifies 165 countries as one of the four classifications (i.e. full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes or authoritarian regimes), based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation and political culture. More information about Fijiâs profile is available at <
Summary prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15(c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21 Fiji, UN hrc, 20th sess, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, UN Doc a/hrc/wg.6/20/fji/3 (18 July 2014, adopted 27 October-7 November 2014).
ibid 3.
ibid.
ibid 25.
ibid 28.
ibid 32.
Compilation on Fiji, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN hrc, 24th sess, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, UN Doc a/hrc/wg.6/34/fji/2 (22 August 2019, adopted 4â15 November 2019), para 35.
ibid.
Constitution of the Republic of Fiji (2013) <
ibid section 6(1).
ibid section 43.
unhrc (n 765) para 5.
Compilation on Fiji, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN hrc, para 32.
Constitution of the Republic of Fiji (n 773), section 21(3).
ibid section 21(6)(f).
ibid section 38.
ibid section 38.
ibid sections 28(2), 28(4) and 28(6).
unhrc (n 772) para 108.
Amanda Bertana, âThe role of power in community participation: Relocation as climate change adaptation in Fijiâ [2020] 38 Environment and Planning: Politics and Space 5, 902-919.
Carol Farbotko and others, âRelocation planning must address voluntary immobilityâ (Nature, 13 July 2020) <
Marilyn E. Lashley, âStrange Bedfellows? Customary Systems of Communal Land Tenure and Indigenous Land Rights in New Zealand, Fiji, and Australiaâ [2011] 34 Pacific Studies 2.
Andreas Kopf, Michael Fink and Eberhard Weber, âGender Vulnerability to Climate Change and Natural Hazards: The Case of Tropical Cyclone Winston, Fijiâ in Sara N. Amin, Danielle Watson, and Christian Girard, Mapping Security in the Pacific: A Focus on Context, Gender and Organisational Culture (Routledge 2020).
Amanda Rae Bertana, âEnvironmentally induced migration in Fijiâ (PhD thesis, University of Utah, May 2018) <
Ministry for Social Welfare, Women and Poverty Alleviation, âFiji National Gender Policyâ (2014), section 5.15(1).
UN cedaw, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Fiji, paras 49(g) and 50(e).
See Worldâs First-Ever Relocation Trust Fund for People Displaced by Climate Change for People Displaced by Climate Change Launched by Fijian Prime Minister, <