1 Introduction and Background
During the past ten years, railway corridors linking different cities in China and the European Union (EU) have been showcased as a means to further bilateral trade and investments.1 While these corridors have been promoted as the success story of the Belt and Road Initiative (bri), a closer look at their formation reveals that they are simply natural prolongations of the ‘Develop the West’ strategy that was adopted by China three decades ago, when it joined the World Trade Organization (wto) in 2001. This strategy led to major investments in China’s central and western provinces,2 that covers almost seventy percent of its land area.3 The strategy guided the expansion and building of
In common parlance, a transport corridor is a ‘linear area that is defined by one or more modes of transportation like highways or public transit which share a common course’.7 Therefore, ‘development often occurs around transport corridors, creating linear agglomerations’.8 Evidently, such a definition is very narrow when compared with the immensity and diversity of the China-Europe railway corridors and the ambitions of the bri. A wider definition found in logistics literature, which defines a transport corridor as ‘a design based on using a high-density flow along an artery and short capillary services to nodes of the corridor’,9 adopts a more holistic view and is suitable to describe the China-Europe railway corridors. Notably, the wider definition
Interestingly, in just 10 years, the China-Europe railway corridors have opened many ‘doors’ for trade and transport for several businesses and landlocked countries.11 From that point of view, the bri undoubtedly has aided the rapid expansion of railway services and made the corridors a nebulous network of routes which are tied to a common geographical orientation.12 Such an approach is in line with the shift in production patterns, and the need to enable landlocked developing countries to participate more fully in global value chains, as recognized in the Vienna Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries for the Decade 2014–2024.13 However, the bri linkage
Be that as it may, so far, investment in hard infrastructure along the corridor has mostly been in facilities where change of gauge is necessary.15 Therefore, it is only logical to assume that the imminent role of the bri in the development of the corridor would be to further and support trade facilitation reforms. Such an assumption is reasonable because the investment needed in transport infrastructure to reduce transit time by one hour is substantially more than that needed to reduce border crossing processing time by an hour. In addition, experiences from other corridors show that trade facilitation at times is more important than the transport infrastructure itself.16 The bri Vision and Actions document17 lends policy support to expedite trade facilitation reforms
Following this introduction, section 2 makes an inventory of the various single window initiatives that have recently been undertaken in the countries situated along the Chongqing-Duisburg railway link. Here, the progress and implementation of single window reforms in China, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Poland is reviewed in contextual detail to set the ground for discussion on single window interoperability and cross-border data flows. Section 3 of the paper then proceeds to identify and discuss the first challenge for single window interoperability, namely, the legal and regulatory fragmentation that exists due to the multiplicity of international and regional institutions and instruments that govern railway transport and customs procedures along the China-Europe railway corridors. Section 4 then highlights that countries along the corridor may adopt different approaches to handle data related issues which is fundamental to cross border interoperability of single windows. This section in particular utilises the issue of personal data protection as an example to demonstrate how the different approaches adopted by the EU and China may impair seamless movement of trade data across borders. While trade facilitation efforts are crucial for seamless connectivity, the political relationship between the countries of the corridor impacts the deepening of the trade facilitation efforts and long-term viability of a corridor. Therefore, section 5 elucidates the ongoing interactions between China, the Eurasian Economic Union (eaeu), and the EU, which point towards the efforts made to achieve single window interoperability along the railway corridors. While the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict have stalled progress of the Eurasian corridors and may witness several steps backwards in the near future, but the provisioning of digital infrastructure and the digitalization strategy along the railway corridors requires a long-term view. With that in mind, section 6 briefly considers the Digital Silk Road (dsr) component of bri, and then highlights the emergence of further legal and regulatory fragmentation, which if not managed effectively, may create hurdles in the future expansion of the railway corridors. Section 7 concludes the chapter by presenting a strategy for tripartite collaboration between China, the eaeu and the EU to manage legal and regulatory fragmentation along the railway corridors.
It is submitted that as the bri is premised primarily on the Chinese government’s policy objectives and not on demand from the private sector. Therefore, the quantum of trade that will flow along these corridors remains to be determined. In addition, economists are still examining whether the transport corridors will to a significant extent lead to trade creation or trade diversion.
2 Single Window Initiatives along the Chongqing-Duisburg Railway Link
If border control is organized in such a way that traders submit documentation and/or data requirements for the importation, exportation, or transit of goods through a single-entry point to the participating authorities or agencies, then it could offer specific benefits to all stakeholders involved in international trade carried through the railway corridors.20 For more than a decade, single window systems and their benefits have been widely recognized and promoted by several international and regional organizations concerned with trade facilitation.21 Single window systems enable carriers, logistics service providers and traders to submit standardized documents and data that is required for import, export and transit formalities in electronic form to the customs and other control authorities at the border crossing.
A national single window that consolidates and processes regulatory information, usually covers different modes of transport. Therefore, linking railway information systems at border crossings with a national single window would reduce the need for resubmission of similar information across modes and maximize the opportunities for simplification of border crossing formalities. Moreover, information flowing through a single window is relevant for risk management which allow border agencies to separate legitimate traders from non-compliant ones, reduce random customs checks and permit low-risk consignments to clear faster. The main benefits from use of single window systems are trade facilitation, efficient electronic data exchange among stakeholders, and support for redesign and streamlined business processes.25
For seamless sharing of information and better integration of systems in the China-Europe railway corridors, interoperability between all the national single windows is necessary. Interoperability is defined as the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange and use information across borders
2.1 Single Window Reforms in China
For more than a decade, China has been proactive in developing its single window infrastructure and has coordinated its implementation efforts with related international developments and supporting initiatives at the wto,29 wco,30 un/cefact,31 unctad,32 and
The establishment of the single window in China is backed by several regulations and Laws. The most important of them are the amended Customs Law of 200036 and the Electronic Signature Law of 2004.37 The Electronic Signature Law, for example, governs the accuracy and completeness of the data in single window systems by provisioning for approval certificates for electronic signature. For cross-border application, article 26 of this Law stipulates that a certificate issued abroad can only be recognized if China has an agreement with the country of issuance. The provision mentions that according to the principle of reciprocity and after approval, the validity of the overseas certificate can be determined, but does not stipulate any clear approval procedures and/or
The State Council Guidelines on E-Port, promulgated by the central government in 2006 and 2012, served as important policy documents to define the major institutional arrangements and to map the way forward.38 Two additional policy documents on single windows were promulgated by the State Council in 2014 and 2015, which contributed to the fulfilment of China’s obligations under the wto tfa.39 Based on the mandate set by the policy document from 2015, ports in 10 cities and 5 municipalities across China instituted their respective sub-national single window systems.40 Later, various inland transport hubs in central and western China were asked to implement sub-national single window systems as they connect different countries in Asia and Europe by railways, roads and inland waterways.41
The implementation of single window in Chongqing is briefly discussed to trace the development of a sub-national single window system in a municipality that serves as a regional transport and logistics hub, and an important gateway for the train corridors connecting China and Europe. In October 2017, the Chongqing municipality inaugurated a standardized sub-national single window system called the ‘Chongqing International Trade Single Window’.47 The single window is built on the notion of the ‘three mutual’ reform plan, namely, mutual information-sharing across departments, mutual recognition of supervision, and mutual assistance in law enforcement at ports.48 Subsequently, in May 2018, the municipal government in Chongqing adopted the Measures for Promoting Cross-Border Trade Facilitation at Chongqing Port (Trial), mainly to reduce the overall customs clearance time and costs.49 The Measures are adopted to facilitate document processing, provide free electronic document exchange, facilitate the handling of import and export licenses; carry out ‘parallel operation’ of port logistics where various regulatory agencies would pursue border control activities concurrently; implement time-limited operations for port logistics;50 lower port operating fees; reduce trade finance cost;51 and
The single window in Chongqing is still a work in progress as more functionalities are slated to be added to the system in due course. For example, the export tax rebate declaration function will be added in the near future.52 In addition, the Chongqing single window has connected and shared information with some of the bri participating countries on a pilot basis.53 One such pilot is the China-Singapore (Chongqing) Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity, which is envisaged to strengthen data and information integration between the Chongqing and the Singaporean single windows leading to cross-border connectivity in the near future.54
2.2 Single Window Reforms in Kazakhstan and Belarus
Kazakhstan and Belarus are both members of the eaeu and therefore customs matters are mostly under the competence of the Union.55 The new eaeu Customs Code from 2018 lays down a substantial part the legislative framework for single window implementation in the Union.56 Through the Customs Code, several competencies were transferred from the national customs
As Kazakhstan is a landlocked country, trade facilitation reforms are imperative for expanding its own trade volumes, and also for supporting transit trade.61 Kazakhstan, as a member of the wto, implemented its national single
Belarus, as a member of the eaeu, de-facto has been fulfilling some of the wto obligations since 2012, but currently is not a member of the wto. Belarus is in the process of developing a single window based on article 10 of the tfa,66 but that is yet not operational.67
2.3 Single Window in Poland
Poland, as a part of the EU, is integrated with the half-century old economic and customs union.68 The single window facility in Poland is part of the EU Single
3 Efforts to Remove Legal and Regulatory Fragmentation in Railway Transport and Customs for Trade Facilitation along Eurasian Corridors
The first challenge to achieve single window interoperability, as introduced in the foregoing section, is legal and regulatory fragmentation at border crossings. The century old physical railway infrastructure connecting China and Europe may be put to blame for such fragmentation. Several institutions and legal instruments already subsist at various levels and in different forms to cater to international transportation by railway.70 Some of these instruments govern border crossings because international transportation by railway involves several intermediate frontier formalities. When varying national legislation on two sides of a border is compounded with multiple border control requirements that are enforced separately by customs and various other government agencies, then border crossing becomes a long-drawn process, full of inordinate delays.
Before progressing with the discussion on fragmentation, it is important to note that in this chapter the expression ‘legal and regulatory’ is used in conjunction with one another as it is not always possible to draw a bright line between ‘legal’ and ‘regulatory’ questions. This is particularly relevant when legal concepts define an authority’s regulatory perimeter. For example,
Figure 3.1 below depicts several overlapping legal and regulatory regimes on border crossings that applies to the China-Europe railway corridors. This chapter describes such a state as legal and regulatory fragmentation along the railway corridors, which is the result of increased proliferation of international institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries creating overlapping instruments and sometimes inconsistency.71
Fragmented legal and regulatory regimes on railway and customs in Eurasia
Note: See “Study on Border Crossing Practices in International Railway Transport”, ibid 28.
Adapted from unescap Study on Border Crossing Practices in International Railway Transport
The remainder of this section elucidates the fragmentation depicted in the diagram above through a discussion of various laws and regulations that govern border crossings, by broadly categorising them under railway and customs. The discussion also encompasses regional institutions and agreements that
3.1
International railway institutions and instruments are popularly referred to using acronyms of French or Russian names, as the case may be.73 The two international organizations, namely otif and osjd, play a key role in coordination and arrangement of transport along the China-Europe railway corridors.74 Both organizations coordinate railway laws, operating rules and key transport documents. Additionally, osjd coordinates policy, transit tariff, wagon use, train timetables, safety and technical standards for infrastructure and rolling stock.75 otif and osjd foster two different international legal regimes for freight transport, namely cotif/cim76 and smgs,77 respectively.
cotif/cim, under articles 6 and 7, stipulates that the contract of international carriage of goods by railway is a consensual contract, with the consignment note being only a documentary proof. Under these articles, a great degree of contractual freedom is permitted in order to offer flexibility, enabling the parties to the contract of carriage to contractually agree certain conditions such as itinerary, transit periods and surcharges. The opportunity to have a single contract for carriage of goods and to have a single consignment note for railway freight traffic among contracting parties at the respective territories where cotif/cim rules are applicable, is provided as well. At the border stations between the cotif/cim countries, it is neither necessary to conclude a new contract, nor to issue a new consignment note. The single contract/consignment note identifies the contractual carrier with whom the consignor has concluded the contract of carriage, as well as successive carrier(s), if applicable, that shall take over the goods at specified border stations. Article 26 of cotif/cim provides that with acceptance of the goods and the consignment note at the border crossing, successive carriers(s) will become a party of the contract and be liable to continue with carriage of goods under the same contract/consignment note. The carrier may also entrust the performance of the carriage, in whole or in part, to a substitute carrier, nevertheless the carrier will remain liable in respect of the entire carriage. While article 7 of cotif/
The other railway regime, smgs, through articles 7–8 and 14–16, requires carriers and shippers to enter into a formal contract for carriage and an obligation for carriers to set and publish transport tariffs.83 It is possible to issue a single contract for carriage and a single consignment note for railway transport among contracting parties at the respective territories where smgs apply. At the border stations between the smgs countries, it is not required to conclude a new contract or issue a new consignment note. Pursuant to article 14(5), the single consignment note identifies the contractual carrier with whom the consignor has concluded the contract of carriage as well as successive carrier(s) that would take over the goods at specified border stations. With acceptance of the goods and the contract/consignment note at the border crossing, successive carriers(s) would become a party of the contract and be liable to continue with carriage of goods under the same contract/consignment note. According to article 15(4), a consignment note may be produced in electronic form, based on agreement between the railway and the consignor. This provision also creates the legal bases for introduction of electronic exchange of consignment notes data.84
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the expansion of trade between cim and smgs countries, a stronger need to promote legal interoperability between the two regimes was felt both nationally and internationally. This led to the effectuation of the cim/smgs consignment note in 2006 which is used for block trains, wagon groups, single wagons or containers, in either paper or electronic format.85 The latest technical specifications for
The historical presence of the two international legal regimes in the China-Europe railway corridors creates inconvenience for both shippers and carriers. Therefore, a broader harmonization effort is currently advancing under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (unece) to offer “railway undertakings and their customers the opportunity to conclude a single contract of carriage for specific international transport of goods by railway (in particular between Europe and Asia) and to agree in this contract to apply a single international legal regime (known as an opt-in)”.87 In November 2009, unece established a Group of Experts Towards Unified Railway Law (url) under its Working Party on Rail Transport (sc2) to develop an international railway instrument with active participation from otif, osjd, cit and several other important stakeholders in the railway sector.88 Since then the group of experts have held several meetings and developed a draft international railway instrument covering a wide range of substantive issues, including transport documents, obligations of the parties, liability for loss or damage and delivery of goods.89 Currently, the exact manners in which the url will operate in conjunction with the existing railway conventions is being considered by the group of experts.90 In 2019, China has also presented a proposal at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (uncitral) on
3.2 International Customs Laws
At the international level, the revised Kyoto Convention of 1999 sponsored by the World Customs Organization (wco) is an important instrument that harmonizes and simplifies customs procedures.94 Although the Convention does not have provisions exclusively for railway transport, it is relevant for customs formalities at railway border crossings. The Convention includes standards, transitional standards and recommended practices, which are not directly applicable, but provide guidance on principles that the countries must use while adjusting their national customs legislation.
Another international instrument which does not address railway transport directly but is applicable for containerized cargo transport by railway is the Customs Convention on Containers of 1972. This Convention addresses the issues for standardized marking of containers; temporary admission of containers; and approval of containers for transport under Customs seal. The Annex 4 of the Convention details the regulations on technical conditions
There is also an international instrument which applies to free movement of goods across frontiers and their temporary admission into a Customs territory with relief from duties and taxes. The wco’s Customs Convention on Temporary Admission, known as the ‘Istanbul Convention’ of 1990 is designed to combine into a single instrument all the existing provisions on temporary admission which are found in a multitude of conventions and agreements, and also to harmonize procedures in pursuit of economic, humanitarian, cultural or touristic objectives. This Convention is relevant for international railway corridors as it prescribes the temporary admission procedure for railway rolling stock; together with their normal spare parts, accessories and equipment carried on board such as any special equipment for the loading, unloading, handling and protection of cargo. As per the Convention, temporary admission could be granted without a customs declaration or security being required. This Convention is fairly successful and many of the contracting parties to the revised Kyoto Convention subscribe to this instrument as well.95
While the above international instruments provide an overarching framework on matters related to customs, the finer practical aspects related to railway transport can be found in two other international instruments, namely, the International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods of 1982, and the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network of 2006.96 Interestingly, the groupings of countries that
3.3 Regional Institutions and Instruments
Regional institutions such as the eaeu,99 the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis),100 the Economic Cooperation Organization (eco)101 and the EU102 have created instruments that contribute to matters pertaining to border
In the eaeu, the the main legal instrument is the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of 2014,107 which among all other issues addresses the Customs Union108 and transport.109 The Treaty also includes in Annex 24, the Protocol on Coordinated (Agreed) Transport Policy, concerning all modes of transport including railway transport in Part v; and Annex 2 to the above Protocol with regard to Procedure for Regulating Access to Rail Transport Services, including two related annexes.110 The provisions regarding principles of functioning of the Customs Union mandate application of common customs regulation, and in general free movement of goods between the territories of eaeu members, without the use of customs declarations and state control on transport, sanitary, veterinary-sanitary, and phytosanitary quarantine matters.111 The Treaty on the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union has been developed within the framework of the provisions of Article 32 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union and is applied in the eaeu from 1 January 2018.112 The Customs Code, which is over 1,000 pages, synthesizes over 20 international treaties regarding the eaeu’s conduct of international trade.113 The Code includes several aspects relevant for railway freight border crossings. The Code also mandates the establishment and use of single window for purposes of e-customs declarations, customs clearance, and release of goods.114 The Code, among other provisions, includes new rules on customs valuation, rules of origin, and authorized economic operators (aeo). Notably, through
In summary, this section has shown that the legal and regulatory framework on border crossing along the China-Europe railway corridors is fragmented. Such fragmentation poses a challenge to seamless transportation of goods as different rules, documentation and/or data requirements and practices are imposed by the countries along the corridors.
4 Single Window Interoperability Depends on Data Flows
Another important challenge that may hinder achieving single window interoperability is the legal and regulatory fragmentation surrounding data flows. In the recent past, States and/or institutions have adopted different approaches towards promulgating laws including regulations governing the submission, receiving, using, sharing, retaining and archiving of data. In addition, the responsibilities and obligations imposed on participating entities in a single window environment in regard to security of data, besides issues of privacy and data protection, may vary depending on local interpretations.116 Therefore, orchestration of the legal framework for interoperability envisaged for railway corridors extends beyond customs and freight bureaucracy and in a contemporary context is dependent on agreements related to data flows.
The implementation of single window interoperability would be possible when data can flow seamlessly across borders along the railway corridors while ensuring information security of the stakeholders.117 International institutions
Data flows are regulated to varying extents across jurisdictions mainly to protect privacy of personal data; meet certain regulatory objectives; maintain national security; and promote domestic digital industrial policy.120 Although the data submitted through single windows are largely trade related, but some amount of personal data is also included in the submissions made by various supply chain participants. At present, there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules, specifically with respect to cross-border flow of personal data and privacy.121 Interestingly, the debate about trade data mainly revolves around three types of data, namely, the movement of personal data or more specifically personally identifiable information; sector specific data such as business or financial data; and the more recent trend towards a more sweeping and not always well-defined category of data referred to as ‘important’ data.122 Several international organizations that have an economic mandate, including the oecd, G-20, and apec, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to cross-border data flows and privacy.123 These guidelines,
The EU protects privacy and personal data of its citizens and residents as a matter of fundamental rights.125 The Privacy and Electronic Communications (ePrivacy) Directive,126 which concerns the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector including single windows, established a general prohibition on the processing of electronic communications content and metadata. In addition, the General Data Protection Regulation (gdpr)127 maintains a high level of personal data protection in the EU and applies directly to cross-border trade involving personal data from the EU, even if an organization operates from outside the EU.128 According to the provisions in Chapter v of gdpr, cross-border transfer of data is possible when – pursuant to article 45 of the gdpr, permits transfers to countries that the ec has decided have an ‘adequate level of protection’ of personal data; or transfers falling under one of the so-called safeguard situations outlined in article 46 where a transfer of personal data is allowed without the need for prior authorization from the ec (e.g., the use of binding corporate rules or model clauses adopted by the ec); or in case where a transfer is
At the other end of the railway corridors, China has been quickly building its legal framework on data protection.136 On 7 November 2016, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China issued the Cybersecurity Law (csl) (also referred to as the Network Security Law) that entered into force on 1 June 2017.137 The csl establishes an overarching regulatory framework to ensure network security and the law covers the construction, operation, maintenance and use of networks in China by international and domestic individuals and entities, as well as regulators’ administration and supervision of network security. The csl pays attention to the protection of personal information and individual privacy by standardising the collection and usage of such information.138 The csl defines security requirements for ‘network operators’, which are owners and administrators of networks and network service providers.139 It is submitted that in addition to telecom operators and internet firms, a single window system that collects personal information may also be defined as ‘network operator’ and fall within the ambit of this law.
Article 31 of the csl defines critical information infrastructure (cii) as infrastructure from important industries and sectors, such as transport and finance, that may pose severe threat to national security, people’s livelihood, and public interests if their data is damaged or disabled or leaked.140 Article 31 of the csl further delegates to the State Council the authority to formulate
Interestingly, China started to implement a pilot policy on cross-border data transfer in Lin Gang Zone located in the Shanghai pftz. The pilot policy briefly mentions the implementation of security assessments for cross-border data transfer, setting up information security maturity models and the filing of cross-border data transfer for certain sectors such as integrated circuit, artificial intelligence and life sciences and pharmaceutical, and for multinational companies that register their headquarters in that Zone.142 It remains to be seen how various industry regulators define and identify cii and whether a single window system would actually be considered as a ciio.
5 Interactions for Cross-Border Single Window Interoperability – Exploring the Geopolitical Frame
Two pertinent observations that emerge from the discussion made in section 2 above are – that all countries except Belarus have an operational single window, and that the scope and extent of single window vary from one country/region to another. Given the above, if consensus is achieved on technical, legal and political matters, then it would be possible to have interoperable single window systems that allow secure cross-border exchange of G2G, B2G and B2B information between countries along the railway corridors.143 But, achieving
Currently, there are several ongoing interactions that involve China, the EU and the eaeu, in various possible combinations, that aspire to achieve single window interoperability. Some of these interactions are presented below to highlight that there could be the possibility for developing interoperability in the future; and that through such reciprocal influence, the development of a harmonized set of rules on interoperability for the railway corridors is being attempted.
5.1 Interactions between China and the eaeu
China and the eaeu entered into an agreement on trade and economic cooperation which contains provisions related to customs cooperation.145 The Agreement includes provisions on customs cooperation,146 single windows,147 coordinated border management,148 mutual recognition of aeos,149 etc. The
Also, in recent years, the sco has been used as a platform for cooperation on trade facilitation between China and the eaeu. sco is generally perceived as an institution focused on regional security.154 However, Chinese scholars have always maintained that sco is like ‘a cart with two wheels’, referring to the equal degree of importance attached to both security and economic cooperation.155 The sco platform possesses optimal mechanisms for launching a a dialogue more favourable.157 The sco has established mechanisms for political coordination that can ensure that negotiations can be held at the upper echelons of government and administration.158
After the announcement of the bri, the sco has been particularly active in initiating customs cooperation between its members, observers and dialogue partners. In 2016, the sco instituted a joint task force to address streamlined customs and harmonized border control, inspection, quarantine as well as certification and accreditation.159 Subsequently, in November 2019, the sco adopted the ‘Concept of Cooperation between the Railway Administrations of the sco Member States’, which laid the legal foundation for development of cooperation for railway transport and interconnection in the sco region.160 Also, within the framework of the sco, China has signed several interaction procedures and roadmaps on mutual recognition of aeos. For example, in 2018, the heads of customs departments of Belarus and China signed the ‘Procedure for cooperation on mutual recognition of the authorized economic operators’ and the ‘Roadmap for concluding an Agreement on mutual recognition of the status of an authorized economic operator’ during the sco Summit in Qingdao.161
5.2
China and the EU are major trading partners.162 At present there is no legal instrument in effect that provides specifically for single window interoperability between China and the EU. However, the Agreement between the EU and China on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters has certain provisions that may be useful when building interoperability in the future.163 Article 6 provides for the scope of customs cooperation which includes establishing and maintaining channels of communication between customs authorities to facilitate and secure the rapid exchange of information and facilitating effective coordination between the customs authorities. Article 7 provides that the ‘[c]ontracting [p]arties affirm their commitment to the facilitation of legitimate movement of goods and shall exchange information and expertise on measures to improve customs techniques and procedures and on computerized systems with a view towards implementing that commitment in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement’.
Also, in an effort to improve transport connectivity between China and Europe, the European Commission’s (ec) Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (dg move) and the National Development and Reform Commission of China (ndrc) established the EU-China Connectivity Platform (cp)164 in 2015, which then successively featured in two documents of the ec, namely ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’ from 2016 and ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook document’ from 2019.165 The main objective of the cp, as agreed by both sides, was to explore opportunities for further cooperation in the area of transport with a view to enhance synergies between the EU’s approach to
In 2019, under the cp, a joint study on sustainable railway-based transport corridors between Europe and China has been proposed.169 The aim of the joint study to ‘define the most appropriate railway corridors between Europe and China, identify the bottlenecks, identify and prioritize the missing links to improve the capacity and efficiency of railway corridors’.170 The terms of reference of the joint study on transport corridors between Europe and China emphasize high level assessment of constraints that affect transport operations, and customs procedures has been identified as one area of work.171 In fact, enhancement of digital systems for efficient freight logistics, corridor data management or information management system has also been identified as key action areas.172 The ‘EU-China Connectivity Platform 2019 Action Plan’
The ‘Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation 2018 – 2020’ is another important instrument for strengthening EU-China customs cooperation for trade facilitation.174 Even though the document does not mention single window expressly, it mentions implementation of automated data exchange, to ensure the stable exchange of data, and the establishment of a risk-related information exchange between the EU and China via the Customs Risk Management System in the context of implementation of phase 3 of the ‘Smart and Secure Trade Lanes Pilot’.175
In December 2020, the EU and China agreed in principle on the negotiations for a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (cai).176 Currently, both sides are working towards finalising the text of the agreement, which will be submitted for approval by the EU Council and for ratification once it is legally reviewed and translated. cai aims to establish a deeper economic partnership, level playing field for business, and to open new market opportunities for the EU Member States and China.177 While the cai may be seen as a stepping stone
It should be noted that the EU perception of China has changed considerably in the last three years. In the past, the EU had prioritized deepening of trade and commercial relationship with a ‘realistic, assertive and multi-facetted approach’.178 However, this position now stands greatly altered in view of security concerns and geopolitical uncertainty. The question of security has become somewhat central in the EU-China relationship. The ambition of the cp described above was to explore the synergies between bri and EU connectivity initiatives such as ten-t. Until recently, the connectivity projects between the EU and China remained open and experimental. However, at present, such projects are a subject of the EU’s questions and concerns regarding level playing field, competition, and benefits for the EU industry. The EU currently seeks concrete progress on issues such as asymmetric market access, investment opportunities and state subsidies.179 To address these concerns the EU has undertaken some steps such as screening of foreign direct investments into the Union to address ‘potential risk to strategic industries’ and possible ‘loss of critical assets and technology’. Also, the proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability due diligence which is currently open for feedback until 23 May 2022, highlights the change in the EU posture towards supply chains.
More importantly, the EU’s engagement with China’s bri projects now operates under the shadows of its very own connectivity strategy, the Global Gateway. Within the frame of Global Gateway, the EU is investing in a study on railway corridors between the EU and China and the possibility of corridors through Iraq, Syria, India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The Global Gateway project can be considered as a rival project and the question remains open if it is launched to curb China’s influence. The Global Gateway project to a great
5.3 The EU’s Interaction with Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan
The EU has engaged independently with the constituent countries of the eaeu on matters relating to trade, development, etc., but outside the framework of the eaeu.180 Belarus is a crucial transit point for the Chongqing-Duisburg railway link. In the past, the EU engaged meaningfully with Belarus and was in the process of negotiating the EU-Belarus Partnership Priorities, which would set the strategic framework for cooperation in the coming years. The EU also provided Belarusian companies with funding, training, and support to export to new markets through the EU4 Business initiative.181 The 2021 EU4 Business Report on sme Support in the Eastern Partnership revealed that €53.07 million was spent on active projects in Belarus. However, this was 60.4% less compared with 2019. The EU-Belarus Twinning Project182 also follows the same trend of scaled back engagement with Belarus. In fact, the Twinning project with Belarus has been suspended until conditions allow following the October Council conclusions on Belarus (11660/20).183
In 2020, there were widespread protests Belarus against President Alexander Lukashenko’s re-election through a widely judged corrupt elections.184 Following the elections, there was considerable political unrest in Belarus which resulted in the EU’s withdrawal of its support for the central authorities to the maximum extent. In October 2020, the EU imposed sanctions on individuals and entities in response to the Belarusian authorities’ unacceptable
EU-Russia relations are legally, hinged on the Partnership Cooperation Agreement, signed in June 1994, which sets the principal common objectives and establishes the institutional framework for bilateral contacts. In the past, the EU maintained a ‘selective engagement’ approach when engaging with Russia guided by the Foreign Affairs Council’s five guiding principles.188 There has also been an ambition of comprehensive agreement between Russia and the EU. However, following Crimea’s annexation the relationship between the EU and Russia experienced a negative shift and the EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia.189 The relationship has further soured with Russia’s invasion
To sum up, at present, there exist no instrument or any ongoing negotiation to suggest that the EU is building a digital relationship with these three countries for single window interaction. The EU’s relations with both Belarus and Russia now are defined mainly by unilateral sanctions and EU’s engagement with these countries is not expected to be meaningful any time soon in the future. This has major implications for the railway links under the bri. While the Russia-Ukraine conflict has disrupted selected supply chains, it is interesting to note that the Chongqing-Duisburg railway link is still operational. While block trains are still running between Chinese and European cities using the above route,195 this does not mean that all is well. The complex framework of sanctions, and in particular financial sanctions, along with political and social censure have dissuaded most EU based logistics companies from accepting business that has any ties with Russia. This recent development has major consequences for the long-term viability of the Chongqing-Duisburg link, which
6 Single Window Interoperability, Digitalization Strategy and Fragmentation
Cross-border single window interoperability is an advanced technology-based feature of trade facilitation, which requires prior investment in digital infrastructure. Therefore the level of trade facilitation is directly proportional to the availability of digital infrastructure, which is generally connected to the degree of economic development in the country.196 Outside support is available to finance trade facilitation including provisioning of digital infrastructure, for instance through the wto’s tfaf Grant Program as mandated by the tfa,197 or through multilateral financial assistance such as the adb, New Development Bank, and Aid for Trade, but they are not adequate.
In recent years, another source of financing that can be accessed by countries to establish digital infrastructure along the railway corridors is through the Digital Silk Road (dsr).198 The dsr, which was initially called the ‘Information Silk Road’ in the Vision and Actions document,199 promotes investments in sectors ranging from e-commerce and telecommunication to scientific cooperation and the digital economy. The dsr comprises four interrelated, technology-focused components with the following objectives: first, to promote Chinese investments in digital infrastructure abroad, including next-generation cellular networks, fibre optic cables, and data centres;200 second, domestic investment
7 Conclusion and Way Forward
At present, railway transport is used to carry only a small share of China-EU trade, and the bri is not expected to change this in any substantial way.206 The growing interest in railway transport between Europe and China is understandable because the speed and reliability of transport is an important dimension of China-EU trade.207 Over the years, time-sensitive goods accounted for more than three-quarters of the value of China’s exports to the EU, and more than 60% of the EU’s exports to China.208 Therefore, trade facilitation reforms is vital for the continued development of the corridors.209 The formation of the eaeu has cut the journey time from China to Europe by around 5 days, which
Currently there are no concrete legal provisions to support single window interoperability between all the countries in the Chongqing-Duisburg railway link. The change in political situation because of Russia-Ukraine conflict casts a long shadow on the political willingness to build seamless single window interoperability. Therefore, the question that remains is – what approach should be adopted to build interoperability? Interoperability is conceived between China and the eaeu at a regional level through an agreement on trade and economic cooperation.211 In the future, interoperability may eventually materialize organically between the EU and China, as the policy agenda on transport point in that direction.212 Therefore, one approach could be that the two separate interoperable single window environments may then serve as building blocks for a grand scheme for creation of interoperability along an entire corridor in the future.
While fragmentation in railway and customs laws including regulations along the corridors evolved over half-a-century and would require some time to get harmonized, the divergence in data protection law is of recent vintage. In the latter sphere, the EU is driven by privacy concerns and China is focused on security. Most of the other countries along the corridors have promulgated some sort of laws related to personal data protection, but nothing comprehensive like the EU or China.213 At any rate, divergent national or regional approaches would only cause hardship to share data and collaborate meaningfully for all. One may argue that China’s legislative approach towards data protection now leans towards the EU. That may be seen as a success for the EU in exporting its data protection standards to an important non-EU country like China, by incentivizing the adoption of an equivalent standard of protection to ensure easier transfer of data from the EU. However, China’s approach is not merely a transplantation of the EU rules. Cyber-sovereignty and the dichotomy between the perspectives of privacy from private actors and privacy from the state are the most salient elements of the model that China is building.214
Given the economic and strategic realities as highlighted above, legal and regulatory fragmentation may soon pose as a serious risk for the further development of trade facilitation initiatives along the railway corridors. Fragmentation may sabotage the evolution of a more democratic and egalitarian international regulatory system in the Eurasian space, and in general undermine the normative integrity of international law.215 In this context the geopolitical dimension of fragmentation is particularly noteworthy because the lack of digital infrastructure may attract certain middle countries in the railway corridors to submit to investments and technology from powerful States.216 So, the question that arises is – could these powerful States influence the legislation related to data flows in these middle countries in a certain way? Based on the discussion on interactions related to cross-border single window interoperability made in section 5 above, it is likely that a multitude of competing institutions with overlapping responsibilities on transport and trade facilitation would provide the powerful States with an opportunity to abandon or threaten to abandon any given forum for a more sympathetic forum if their demands are not met. This may result in competition between institutions and can effectively marginalise the role of weaker States. To circumvent fragmentation, it is therefore necessary that States along the railway corridors –
- (i)enter into broad and integrative agreements and avoid a large number of narrow agreements that are functionally defined as exemplified in section 5 above;
- (ii)formulate agreements based on frequently convened multilateral negotiations; and
- (iii)
continue to engage with international and regional institutions even if they become more responsive to the interest of weaker States.
If a country or region along the railway corridors adopts a “divide and conquer” approach, where it would bargain with or compete on legal rules against those of other countries, or if it follows an intentional strategy of exploiting problems of coordination among multiple countries, then that may lead to uncertainty in the development of the corridors. Moreover, there is no straightforward way to determine whether the divide and conquer approach would reduce or enhance social welfare.217 However, if there is a call for the countries along the corridors to unite to trade, following that call would invariably lead to efficient movement of goods, support sustainable economic growth and improve social welfare.218 Therefore, countries along the China-Europe railway corridors should take decisive and definitive action in addressing the legal and regulatory fragmentation to ensure social and economic progress.
The development of railway connections between China and Europe can be divided into three primary corridors. (1) The northern corridor has three prongs extending from China, all of which join the Trans-Siberian Railway routes that runs through Russia. (2) The middle corridor called the New Eurasian Land Bridge (nelb) spans from the Pacific port of Lianyungang in China running through China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. At present, most containers are transported using this middle corridor that crosses the Chinese-Kazakh border at either Alashankou/Dostyk or Khorgos/Altynkol. The north and the middle corridors meet in the Urals near Yekaterinburg. The goods continue to the European Union via Belarus and are unloaded onto standard European gauge flatcars in Małaszewicze on the Polish-Belarusian border. A small number of trains from China have their terminus in the Baltic States. (3) A nascent southern corridor called the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is an intermodal land and sea connection running through the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and the Black Sea stretching to Europe is currently under development. See X Zhang, H-J Schramm, “Assessing the Market Niche of Eurasian Rail Freight in the Belt and Road Era” (2020) International Journal of Logistics Management.
Formally inaugurated in 2000, the ‘Develop the West’ strategy contained a number of different policy objectives to develop the western regions, building on earlier efforts, and reflecting more of a policy realignment in China. For a comprehensive discussion on the topic, see D Ma, T Summers, “Is China’s Growth Moving Inland? A Decade of ‘Develop the West’” (2009) Chatham House, 3, online: Chatham House <
The strategy covered 6 provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan), 5 autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang), and 1 municipality (Chongqing). “Western development strategy” Xinhua (22 December 2009), online: Xinhua <
For discussion on transportation issues related to this strategy, see J W Garver, “Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-West and South Asia” (2006) The China Quarterly, No. 185, 1–22; also see, N Yu, M Jong, S Storm, J Mi, “The growth impact of transport infrastructure investment: A regional analysis for China (1978–2008)” (2012) Policy and Society, 31:1, 25–38, online: Taylor & Francis Online <
J Jakóbowski, M Kaczmarski, K Popławski, “The Silk Railroad. The EU-China rail connections: background, actors, interests” (2018) Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) No. 72, 6, online: osw <
In 2011, the electronics and automotive sectors with support from leading logistics service providers started to experiment with various railway routes to connect their European and Asian supply chains. For example, Hewlett Packard (hp) started sending notebook computers from its factory in Chongqing through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland to Duisburg in Germany using block trains. Shipping one container by train costed hp about usd 10,000, which was about one-third the cost of air transit and twice the cost of shipping by sea. See C Rastogi, J-F Arvis, The Eurasian Connection: Supply-Chain Efficiency along the Modern Silk Route through Central Asia 44–45, online: World Bank <
“Transport corridor”, Wikipedia, online: Wikipedia <
ibid.
J Woxenius “Generic framework for transport network designs: Applications and treatment in intermodal freight transport literature”, (2007) Transport Reviews 27(6) 733–749.
There is mutual relationship between transport corridors and trade where one fosters the other. They are connected in the same way as the connection between economics and infrastructure. Corridors lead to increased productivity, lower transport costs, affects trade relationships and the location of production factors; see P Rietveld, FR Bruinsma, Is Transport Infrastructure Effective? Transport Infrastructure and Accessibility: Impacts on the Space Economy, (Springer, 1998). A successful transport corridor is often being followed by an integration that goes deeper than the physical infrastructure; see P Srivastava, “Regional Corridors Development in Regional Cooperation”, adb Economics Working Paper Series No. 258, Asian Development Bank, Mandaluyong City, Philippines, issn 1655–5252 (2011), online: Think-Asia <
Landlocked countries often lag behind their maritime neighbours in overall development and external trade. While the relatively poor performance of many landlocked countries can be attributed to distance from coast, it has been argued that several aspects of dependence on transit neighbours are also important. Four such types of dependence: 1) dependence on neighbours’ infrastructure; 2) dependence on sound cross-border political relations; 3) dependence on neighbours’ peace and stability; and 4) dependence on neighbours’ administrative practices. See, ML Faye, JW, McArthur, JD Sachs, T Snow, “The challenges facing landlocked developing countries” (2004) Journal of Human Development, 5(1) 31–68.
The China-Europe railway network connects 62 Chinese cities with 51 European cities in 15 countries. Jingxi Mo, “Customs clearance eased for international freight train users”, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China (3 March 2020), online: english.gov.cn <
More information on the Vienna Programme of Action is available online: <
S Olinga-Shannon, M Barbesgaard, P Vervest, “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): An Asia Europe People’s Forum (AEPF) Framing Paper” (November 2019) 7–8, online: <
See “Bridging Borders: Infrastructure to Connect Asia and Beyond”, Asian Infrastructure Finance 2019 at 90, aiib available online: <
This is exemplified by studies in the asean region by S Stone, A Strutt, “Transport Infrastructures and Trade Facilitation in the Greater Mekong Subregion”, Trade Facilitation and Regional Cooperation in Asia (2010) 156; also in Africa by S Teravaninthorn, G Raballand, “Transport prices and costs in Africa: a review of the main international corridors”, World Bank Publications (2009); and also in South East Asia by R Banomyong, “Multimodal transport corridors in South East Asia: a case study approach”, Doctoral Thesis, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, UK (2000).
The bri policy document lists five key priority areas: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. See “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (28 March 2015), issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (ndrc), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce with authorization of the State Council, online: Belt and Road Forum <
International institutions such as the wto, the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (un/cefact) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) have adopted broad and progressive definitions of trade facilitation that include simplification and standardization of procedures, practices, formalities and associated information flows relevant for movement of goods. The various definitions proposed by these international institutions refer not only to the government agencies that are concerned with the transit of goods but also include entities that conduct business associated with trade. Both un/cefact and oecd include within the ambit of trade facilitation information flows for the purpose of movement of goods from seller to buyer and making payments. For a discussion on definitions and scope of trade facilitation refer to A Basu Bal, T Rajput, “Trade in Digital Era: Prospects and Challenges for an International Single Window Environment”, in F Amtenbrink, D Prévost, RA Wessel, eds., Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2017: Shifting Forms and Levels of Cooperation in International Economic Law: Structural Developments in Trade, Investment and Financial Regulation, (Springer, 2017) 306–7.
There are daily train connections from Chongqing to Duisburg. Chongqing is located strategically in China’s central-western region and is part of the Yangtze Economic Belt. The Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe International Railway (also known as Yuxinou, a name derived from a combination of its Chinese characters – Yu (Chongqing), Xin (Xinjiang) and Ou (Europe)), has played a pioneering role in the opening up of China-Europe railway corridors. Duisburg is a city in Germany that enjoys a strategic location and serves as a logistics hub for Germany, France and the Benelux region. See P Oltermann, “Germany’s ‘China City’: how Duisburg became Xi Jinping’s gateway to Europe”, The Guardian (1 August 2018), online: The Guardian <
Single window systems allow government authorities to save costs and increase revenue collection through streamlined processes. Also, the traders and transporters save the hassle of multiple submission of paper work and quicker clearing of goods. In addition, the transportation, banking and insurance industries chance to benefit due to reduced information asymmetry engendered through efficient exchange of information electronically. See Basu Bal, Rajput (n 18).
Among them are the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (unescap), the unece and its Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (un/cefact), the wco, the United Nations Network of Experts for Paperless Trade and Transport in Asia and the Pacific (UNNExT), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad) and the wto.
Single window is defined by the wco as: ‘an intelligent facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information and documents with a single-entry point to fulfil all import, export and transit regulated regulatory requirements’, (wco 2008). This is largely in line with un/cefact Recommendation No. 33, “Recommendation and Guidelines on establishing a Single Window”, (2005), online: unece <
The international guidance on the legal framework related to national and cross-border exchange of trade data required for single window operations is provided in un/cefact Recommendation No. 35, “Establishment of Single Window Legal Framework for International Trade”, (2013), online: unece <
wto, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, wt/l/931, 15 July 2014. The tfa entered into force on 22 February 2017 after obtaining two-thirds acceptance from wto’s 164 Members. The text of the tfa is available online: wto <
For a comprehensive discussion on single windows, see “Understanding Single window Environment”, (n 22).
Interoperability standards are laid down in un/cefact Recommendation No. 36, “Single Window Interoperability”, (2017), online: unece <
The acronyms refer to government-to-government (G2G), business-to-government (B2G), government-to-business (G2B) and business-to-business (B2B).
Single windows vary in scope and implementation modalities due to differences with respect to involved stakeholders, transactions covered, territorial coverage and other relevant aspects. This section of the chapter does not go into the technical details regarding the functioning of different single windows. Single window initiatives of China, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Poland are discussed as the border control takes place at these countries for trains using the Chongqing-Duisburg railway link.
The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs procedures (Kyoto Convention) (1973) (as amended on 26 June 1999) entered into force in 2006. The convention has 128 contracting parties as on 11 October 2021. For position as regards ratifications and accessions to the convention, a list is available online: wco <
un/cefact is a subsidiary, intergovernmental body of unece which serves as a focal point within the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ecosoc) for trade facilitation recommendations and electronic business standards. The various un/cefact recommendations related to single windows are discussed later in this section of the chapter.
unctad, through its Automated System for Customs Data (asycuda) programme has been involved with customs modernization and computerization for more than three decades. Kazakhstan uses asycuda for its national single window. See note 63 below for more information.
unescap prepared the “Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-border Paperless Trade in Asia and the Pacific”, 2016E/escap/res/72/4. China is a signatory to the Agreement and the text is available online: UN <
United Nations Development Program (undp), (2006), “China Customs Modernization for Trade Facilitation and Equitable Development”, online: undp <
See “China E-Port Towards a Single Window Trading Environment”, UNNExT Brief No. 14 (June 2015), online: unescap <
An English translation of the Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China is available online: mofcom <
The Electronic Signature Law of the People’s Republic of China was passed at the 11th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress on 28 August 2004.
The guidelines from 2006 focused on the basic coordination mechanism and responsibility of the stakeholders, while in 2012 the guidelines highlighted the strategic goal of E-Port for the next 5 years.
Document No. 68 of the State Council [2014] entitled “Notice of the State Council on Issuing and Implementing the ‘Three Mutual’ Reform Plan to Promote the Construction of Large Customs Clearance” and Document No. 16 of the State Council [2015] entitled “Several Opinions of the State Council on Improving Port Work to Support Foreign Trade Development”. These two policy documents steered the implementation of the provisions of the tfa on single windows in China.
Document No.16 of the State Council [2015], ibid., set the goal for establishment of a single window at all ports in China by 2017. Based on this document, the gac promoted single window systems in all sea ports and subsequently in inland transport hubs. For more information, see “Single Window System to be Promoted to All Sea Ports”, gac (16 February 2015), online: gac <
Based on the experience of implementing single windows in the port cities, in 2017, China rolled out a standardized single window for customs clearance throughout the country. See “Standard Edition of Single Window for Promoting International Trade” gac (10 March 2017) available in Chinese, online: gac <
See D Liang, “Research on Establishment and Application of Single Window Data Element Set for International Trade”, (2014) Customs and Economic and Trade Research, Issue 6, 3.
un/cefact, Recommendation No. 34, “Data Simplification and Standardization for International Trade”, (2013), online: unece <
The Shanghai pftz was launched in 2013, followed by several more in 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2019. For a comprehensive discussion on these zones see, X Fan, J Xu “Report on the Development of Pilot Free Trade Zones in China”, in: Y Tao, Y Yuan (eds) Annual Report on the Development of China’s Special Economic Zones, Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path (Springer, Singapore, 2018).
For a detailed discussion on the topic see D Liang, “The Implementation and Enlightenment of ACE/ITDS in the United States”, (2016) Customs and Economic and Trade Research, Issue 5, 16. The China (Shanghai) International Trade Single Window remains the most sophisticated subnational Single Window system, which is organized as a public private partnership, and continues to serve as a beacon for the rest of the country. It is operated by Shanghai E&P International Inc. E&P International Inc. and provides enhanced single window capabilities, including both B2G and B2B functionalities. More information is available online: E&P International <
“China’s one-stop customs clearance facilitates international trade”, Xinhua (30 November 2017), online: Xinhua <
The establishment of the sub-national single windows is mandated through Document No. 16 of the State Council [2015] (n 93).
The wording ‘three mutual’ appears in the title of Document No. 68 of the State Council [2014] (n 39).
Y Chen, “Pioneer of Opening-up in Hinterland China: Chongqing Embraces the World”, iChongqing (12 March 2019), online: iChongqing <
For example, the Chongqing International Trade Single Window subscribes to customs clearance status information from the supervision department system and pushes it to airports, ports, railway systems and related enterprises in real time. In addition, goods circulation status information is subscribed from airports, ports and railway systems and sent to relevant units in real time.
The Chongqing Logistics Financing Service Co. Ltd. (clfs) was established by the local government in Chongqing on 25 December 2017 to serve as a one stop shop in the delivery of integrated financial services to traders operating in the Chongqing pftz. For more information on clfs see <
Overall Plan of China (Chongqing) Free Trade Zone.
Task Division of Chongqing to Implement Measures Supported by State Council for Deepening Reform and Innovation in Free Trade Zone, Chongqing Government [2019] No.3.
Article 21, Regulations of China (Chongqing) Free Trade Zone.
A discussion on Russia is excluded as there is free movement of goods between eaeu members.
In 2009, the Agreement on Customs Code of Customs Union was created under the auspices of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). This Code introduced the common comprehensive legal framework in the Customs Union. The EurAsEC was subsequently terminated from 1 January 2015 after the launch of the eaeu. In April 2017, the Treaty on the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union replaced the earlier Code and the new Code is applied in the eaeu from 1 January 2018. For a discussion on the new Code, see ES Smolina, RN Seryomina (2019), “Prospects for the Functioning of the New Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union” in S Ashmarina, M Vochozka eds., Sustainable Growth and Development of Economic Systems, (Contributions to Economics, Springer, 2019) 77–85. Also, an unofficial translation of the Code from Russian to English is available online: Eurasian Economic Commission (eec) <
The eec is the executive body of the eaeu responsible for implementing decisions, upholding the eaeu treaties and managing the day-to-day business of the eaeu.
Factual Presentation on the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union (Goods and Services), wt/reg358/1 (13 July 2018) 49, online: wto <
In 2017 the Eurasian Economic Commission appraised the status of development of national single windows of the eaeu member States. The results of these estimates are available in English online: eec <
In accordance with the main directions in development of the single window mechanism in the system of regulation of foreign trade activities (adopted by the decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council No. 68 of 29 May 2014) and the plan of their realization (adopted by the decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council No. 19 of 8 May 2015) the eaeu member States endeavour to coordinate their efforts in developing national single windows in order to ensure the interoperability between them and possibility of informational exchange. The above was submitted by the delegations of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia at the wto, made in relation to queries on the “Factual Presentation on the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union (Goods and Services)” (n 58). The delegation of Ecuador raised queries on the modus operandi of the single window of each eaeu member state and interconnectivity of customs services through single window. See “Questions and Replies on Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union (Goods and Services)”, wt/reg358/3/Rev.1 (22 November 2018) 6, online: wto <
It is estimated that by the year 2030 the cargo turnover on Khorgos Gate bordering China will reach 35 million tonnes; see A Gussarova, F Aminjonov, Y Khon, “The Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt: Competition or Convergence? Implications for Central Asia” (July 2017), online: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung <
“Kazakhstan rolls out a single window to boost trade”, online: unctad <
asycuda is an integrated customs management system, designed and developed for customs administrations and the trade community to comply with international standards when fulfilling import, export and transit related procedures. For more information on asycuda, see “Automated System for Customs Data In Action: Compendium 2019”, online: unctad <
See “Regulatory and procedural barriers to trade in Kazakhstan”, ece/trade/407 (2014) 32, online: unece <
More information on digital strategy of Kazakhstan is available online: Digital Kazakhstan <
Article 10.4 of tfa (n 24).
It is only a matter of time when Belarus will have an operational single window.
The EU’s Customs Union was first provided for in the Treaty of Rome and in 1968 it abolished the customs duties levied at the borders between members of the European Community. Today, it is a single trading area where all goods can circulate freely, whether produced in the EU or outside its borders. See “Celebrating the Customs Union: the world’s largest trading bloc turns 50”, online: ec <
For more information see “The EU Single Window environment for customs”, online: ec <
Railway laws are formulated at international, regional, multilateral, bilateral or national levels. Depending on the level, the laws could be in the form of conventions, agreements, protocols, domestic legislation, and regulations.
For a discussion on fragmentation, see M Koskenniemi & P Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern. Anxieties”, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 553–579 (2002); see also, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law”; Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc a/cn.4/l.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1. New York: International Law Commission, 2006, online: UN <
Bilateral agreements also address different aspects relevant for cross-border railway transport. While some of the bilateral agreements specifically regulate railway services and processes at border railway stations, the granular discussion is excluded from the scope of this chapter. For a non-exhaustive list of bilateral and tripartite agreements on railways and customs, which exist in some of the countries that are part of the China-Europe railway corridors, see Annex 5 of the “Study on Border Crossing Practices in International Railway Transport”, unescap, Bangkok (2018) 199–203, online: unescap <
In this sub-section of the chapter, the expanded names are provided in the footnotes to maintain continuity in the main text.
otif stands for the French abbreviation of Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail, and the EU plays a leading role in the organization. osjd stands for the Russian abbreviation of Organisation for Cooperation between Railways, and its membership has its history in the former Communist bloc. A comprehensive discussion about the two organizations can be found in Y Zhu, V Filimonov, “Comparative Study of International Carriage of Goods by Railway Between CIM and SMGS”, (2018) Frontiers of Law in China 13, 115–136. Also, see “Monograph Series on Transport Facilitation of International Railway Transport in Asia and the Pacific”, unescap, st/escap/2681, 18–22, online: unescap <
See Zhu and others, ibid.
otif promulgated the cotif which is the French abbreviation for the Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail, 1980. cotif is the ‘umbrella’ Convention that presented in a consolidated manner the regulations on contracts of international carriage of passengers and goods, use of vehicles, railway infrastructure, etc. For carriage of goods, Appendix B to the Convention, as amended by the 1999 Protocol, along with certain other subsequent amendments is relevant. This Appendix is generally referred to as cim and is the abbreviation of the Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail. The otif body of international legal rules has the character of an international treaty according to international law because it is subject to signatures, ratifications, acceptances, approvals and accessions from the member States in order to enter into force. Accordingly, cim in its member States has a formal status of a ratified convention. See ibid.
osjd created the smgs, which is the abbreviation for the Russian title of the Agreement on International Railway Freight Transportation, along with amendments in force from 1 July 2015. smgs by its nature is an interdepartmental agreement, as the signatories are ministries representing government transport authorities, railway companies, and affiliated enterprises. In a socialist setup these organizations were invariably related to the government and therefore the smgs was designed to produce an internal legal effect. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the transition of some members towards a market economy resulted in the smgs to have an external effect. For a more detailed discussion on this, see Zhu and others (n 32).
Currently the cotif/cim has more than 50 parties, including Germany, France, United Kingdom, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, to name a few. The EU acceded to the cotif/cim in July 2011 by virtue of Council Decision 2013/103/EU. Russia participates in the cotif since 1 February 2010 only with regard to two short lines in the Baltic harbour areas.
Out of the 28 government transport authorities that are members to the smgs, notable for the discussion are Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Mongolia, Russia Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The EU-member States, namely, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are parties to the cotif and also participates in the smgs.
Azerbaijan, Iran and Georgia participate in both cotif and smgs. The EU-member States that participate in both the regimes are listed in note 80 above.
A discussion on wagons and railway infrastructure are excluded as they are not directly related to trade facilitation and single windows, which is the remit of the discussion in section 3 of this chapter.
For a comprehensive discussion on cotif/cim provisions on contract of carriage and consignment notes, see “UNESCAP Study on Border Crossing Practices” (n 73) 14–5.
Transport tariffs are regulated with osjd Agreement on the International Railway Transit Tariff (mtt) and Agreement on the Uniform Transit Tariff (ett).
See “UNESCAP Study on Border Crossing Practices” (n 73) 13–4.
The cim/smgs consignment note represents a bridge between the two legal regimes. At the border crossings between territories where smgs to cim or vice versa is applicable, re-consignment is no longer necessary and rewriting of data from one type of consignment note to other is no longer required. The use of cim/smgs consignment offers possibility to streamline railway processes at border crossings, which used to be compulsory reconsignment points. For a detailed discussion see Zhu and others (2018) (n 75) 121.
The technical specifications of the electronic cim/smgs consignment note are available online: cit <
See unece, “Presenting the Unified Railway Law (URL) as a new UNECE statutory instrument for the international transport of goods by rail” (January 2019), online: unece <
The meeting documents are available online: unece <
The most recent version of the draft url is contained in: “Towards unified railway law in the pan-European region and along Euro-Asian transport: Draft of relevant legal provisions”, ece/trans/2016/15 (15 December 2015), online: UN <
See unece, “Options available for converting URL into a legally binding instrument – URL as contract of carriage’s convention”, ece/trans/sc.2/geurl/2019/5 (1 April 2019), online: unece <
See (n 51).
See “Possible future work regarding railway consignment notes” – Note by the Secretariat, a/cn.9/1034 (11 May 2020), online: UN <
See “Proposal on provisions about a negotiable transport document in the Unified Railway Law” (15 April 2020), online: unece <
The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs procedures (Kyoto Convention) (1973) (as amended on 26 June 1999) entered into force in 2006. The convention has 128 contracting parties as on 11 October 2021. For a position as regards ratifications and accessions to the convention, a list is available online: wco <
The Istanbul Convention entered into force on 27 November 1993 and has 72 contracting parties as on 25 November 2020. For a position as regards ratifications and accessions to the convention, a list is available online: wco <
The International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods of 1982, entered into force on 15 October 1985 and currently has 58 parties; the list of contracting parties is available online: unece <
See “Study on Border Crossing Practices in International Railway Transport” (n 73) 19–20.
ibid 20–1.
The eaeu comprises of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia encourages free movement of goods, services and provides for common policies among other things on customs regulation. More information on the eaeu is available online: eaeu <
Presently the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) includes: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. More information on cis is available in Russian online: cis <
The members of eco are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The eco Transit Transport Framework Agreement (ttfa) of 1998 covers railway transport along with other modes of transport. This Agreement aims to facilitate the movement of goods and provides necessary facilities for transit through the territories of the Contracting Parties. More information on the eco is available online: eco <
The Trans-European Transport Network (ten-t) policy of the EU addresses the implementation and development of a Europe-wide transport network which includes all modes of transport including railways. The current ten-t policy is based on Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013, which is available online: eur-Lex <
The role of sco with respect to the railway corridors is discussed in section 5 of this chapter.
traceca was established in May 1993 in Brussels for the development of transport initiatives between the EU member States, the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The EU and 12 States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Moldova, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan participate in this programme. The Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of the Europe-the Caucasus-Asia corridor of 1998 was agreed under the initiatives of the program for traceca. The Agreement regulates the international transport of goods and passengers under different modes of transport, including railway transport. With the Basic Agreement, the right for transit of international means of transport and goods is granted among contracting parties. An Inter-Governmental Commission is established to regulate the issues regarding the implementation and the application of the Basic Agreement. The technical annex on railways as part of the Basic Agreement promotes multilateral recognition of documents and cooperation at the level of competent authorities of the contracting parties in facilitation of border crossing operations.
For example, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (carec) Programme, supported by the Asian Development Bank (adb), runs a Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring (cpmm) regional study that collects and analyses data on road and railway transport in 11 member countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). For further information see “Railway Sector Development in CAREC Countries”, online: carec <
In the eaeu there are large number of agreements, decisions and recommendations that regulate various aspects of railway transport of goods, customs and other regulatory clearance such as, administrative assistance between customs authorities, exchange of advance information on goods and transport means, use of electronic transmission of customs documents, customs transit and transit declaration, equipment on checking posts, etc. These documents are available through the Law Portal of the eaeu, online: eaeu <
The working language of the eaeu is Russian. An English translation of the treaty is available online: UN <
Part Two Customs Union and particularly Section vi Functioning of the Customs Union.
Part Three Common Economic Space and particularly Section xxi Transport.
Annex 1: Rules for Access to Rail Transport Infrastructure within the Eurasian Economic Union and Annex 2 Rules for the Provision of Rail Infrastructure Services within the Eurasian Economic Union.
Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, article 25.
See (n 56).
ibid.
A more detailed discussion is made in section 2.2 of this chapter.
D J Lewis, “China-CEE ties on new economic path” China Daily (7 November 2016), online: China Daily <
For a discussion on legitimate use and sharing of data in a single window environment, see “Data: Ensuring Quality, Security & Privacy”, Part viii, Vol. 1, 18, online: wco <
Some of the other important issues that are connected to cross-border single window interoperability but not discussed in detail in this chapter includes business process analysis, data harmonization, data quality, messaging structures, connectivity options, and legal issues related to dematerialized documents.
“Cross-border Single Window Interoperability: A Managerial Guide” (2018) 34, online: unescap<
See “Trade and cross-border data flows”, tad/tc/wp(2018)19/final 12–13, online: oecd <
ibid 14.
Multilaterally agreed trade rules ensure a certain level of predictability for trade in goods through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt), and for services through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (gats). However, there are little to no multilaterally agreed trade rules to ensure such predictability for cross-border data flows.
See “Trade and cross-border data flows” (n 120) 12–13.
The oecd Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013) is available online: oecd <
See “Data: Ensuring Quality, Security & Privacy” (n 117) 20.
Arts. 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; article 6(1) of the Treaty on EU.
Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002, as amended by Directive 2006/24/ec and Directive 2009/136/ec.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/ec (2016) oj L119/1, hereinafter gdpr, entered into force in May 2018.
Art. 3(2) of gdpr.
For a simplified discussion on the topic, see “What rules apply if my organisation transfers data outside the EU?”, online: ec <
“Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield” (notified under document C(2016) 4176) (Text with eea relevance), online: Eur-Lex <
For more information see “Judgment in Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems”, Press Release No 91/20, Luxembourg (16 July 2020) online: cjeu <
See “EU-US data transfers: How personal data transferred between the EU and US is protected” online: ec <
See Memo on “Digital Single Market – Communication on Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World Questions and Answers”, (10 January 2017), online: ec <
EU have recognized Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organizations), Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay and the US (to a limited extent (n 131 and 132) as providing adequate protection. Adequacy talks are ongoing with South Korea. See “Adequacy decisions: How the EU determines if a non-EU country has an adequate level of data protection”, online: ec <
See “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/ec (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications)”, online: Eur-Lex <
See generally, J Xu, “Evolving Legal Frameworks for Protecting the Right to Internet Privacy in China”, in JR Lindsay, TM Cheung, DS Reveron, China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain (Oxford, 2015) 242–255.
Recently, on 10 June 2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the Data Security Law (dsl), which took effect on September 1, 2021. The primary purpose of the dsl is to regulate data activities, safeguard data security, promote data development and usage, protect individuals and entities’ legitimate rights and interests, and safeguard state sovereignty, state security, and development interests. The dsl, together with the csl and the upcoming Personal Information Protection Law, will form an increasingly comprehensive legal framework for information and data security.
csl, arts. 22, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 deals with collection of personal information.
csl, art. 76.
csl, art. 31.
See csl, art. 31. Also, for a general discussion on hierarchy of Chinese legislation, see D Cao, Chinese Law: A Language Perspective, (London, Routledge, 2004).
See G Zhang, K Yin, “What you need to know about China’s new draft measures on cross-border data transfers” (27 August 2019), online: International Association of Privacy Professionals<
un/cefact Recommendation 36 (n 26), mentions four critical areas for successful implementation of interoperability, namely, policy and legal interoperability, people and organizational interoperability, process and data interoperability, and platform and technical interoperability.
For example, see “Silk Road Transport Corridors”, which captures the growth potential of the railway corridors. In addition, the Logistics Performance Index (lpi) 2018 ranks countries on six dimensions of trade, including customs performance, infrastructure quality, and timeliness of shipments, see, “International LPI”, online: World Bank <
“Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation Between the Eurasian Economic Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the People’s Republic of China, of the Other Part”, (signed 17 May 2018 and entered into force 25 October 2019), online: eec <
Art. 6.10.
Art.6.15.
Art. 6.16.
Art. 6.17. China also fostered customs connectivity with EU through mutual recognition of aeos. The joint statement between the ec and the gac of China issued in 2015 is available online: ec <
Art. 6.15(1).
Art. 6.15(2) stipulates that “[t]he Parties shall endeavor to promote the interoperability between National Single Windows allowing the creation of conditions for mutual recognition of electronic documents and data necessary to carry out foreign trade activities and results of customs control for integrated border management. For these purposes, the Parties shall endeavor to develop institutional, legal and technical basis to ensure information exchange between National Single Windows”.
Eurasia Economic Union–China Agreement Art. 6.20(1), (2).
See Basu Bal, Rajput (2017) (n 18).
The creation of sco was announced on 15 June 2001. Currently, sco has eight members (China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan & India); four observer States (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia), six dialogue partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey); and four guest attendants (asean, cis, Turkmenistan and the UN). For more information on sco see “About SCO”, online: sco Secretariat <
MI Qadir, S Rehman, “Expansion of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Harbinger of Regional Peace and Prosperity”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 23, Issue – 1 (2016) 117–132.
R Alimov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Its role and place in the development of Eurasia”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 9 (2018) 114–124.
All members of the eaeu somehow connected to the sco either as members or observers or dialogue partners.
For more information on meetings of the Heads of State Council (hsc), Heads of Government Council (hgc) and other heads at various levels, see “About SCO” (n 155).
D Lewis, “China-cee ties on new economic path”, China Daily (7 November 2016), online: China Daily <
“Statement by Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Vladimir Norov at the 82nd session of the Inland Transport Committee of the UNECE”, Geneva (26 February 2020), online unece <
For more information see “Within the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, Heads of Customs Departments of Belarus and China signed Interaction Procedure and Roadmap” (11 June 2018) online: State Customs Authorities of the Republic of Belarus <
“China-EU – international trade in goods statistics”, online: eurostat <
“Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on cooperation and mutual administrative assistance in customs matters”, oj l 375 (23 December 2004), online: Eur-Lex <
For policy and other related documents on this platform see “The EU-China Connectivity Platform”, online: ec <
“Elements for a new EU strategy on China”, Brussels, join(2016) 30 final (22 June 2016), online: <
“The EU-China Connectivity Platform” (n 165).
FS Montesano, M Okano-Heijmans, “Economic Diplomacy in EU–China Relations: Why Europe Needs its Own ‘OBOR’” Clingendael Policy Brief, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (June 2016), online: Clingendael <
ibid.
“EU-China Summit Joint statement” Brussels, (9 April 2019) para. 17, online: ec <
“EU-China Summit Joint statement”, ibid.
“Terms of Reference of the Joint Study on Sustainable Railway-based Comprehensive Transport Corridors between Europe and China”, Annex to the Minutes of the 4th Chairs’ meeting, section 3.2.2, 3, online: ec <
ibid section 5, 4.
“China-EU Connectivity Platform 2019 Annual Action Plan”, online: ec <
“Enhancing EU-China Trade Security and Facilitation: Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation 2018 – 2020 between the European Union and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, Brussels, 9548/17 (22 May 2017), online: Council of the European Union <
Customs Risk Management (crm), according to the wco Risk Management Guide, “is the systematic application of management procedures and practices which provide Customs with the necessary information to address movements or consignments which present a risk. The crm is a means of customs authorities to improve trade facilitation processes by replacing full physical examinations of documents and shipments with planned and targeted working method determining the level and type of inspections”. The objective of crm is the effective selection of high – risk shipments and traders for control while allowing lower or risk-free trade to pass freely and with minimum waiting times. See “WCO Customs Risk Management Compendium”, online: wco <
For more information see online: <
“EU-China Summit, 9 April 2019”, online: Council of the European Union <
EU–China Connectivity Platform, Minutes of 4th chairs’ meeting, 8 Apr. 2019, p. 1. See also European Commission, ‘EU–China Summit: Rebalancing the strategic partnership’, Press release, 9 Apr. 2019.
J-C Juncker, President of the European Commission, Remarks at the joint press conference following the EU–China Summit, European Commission, 9 Apr. 2019.
See section 2.2 of this chapter above.
For EU4Business examples, see “EU Makes Businesses in Belarus Stronger”, online: European Union External Action <
“New EU-Belarus Twinning Project Launched in Minsk” (12 March 2020), online: European Union External Action <
“Belarus: EU adopts conclusions” available online: <
A Abdurasulov, “Belarus protesters battered, bruised but defiant after 100 days” available online: <
“Restrictive measures following the 2020 Belarus presidential elections” available online:<
“Belarus border crisis: How are migrants getting there?” available online: <
“Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine: EU agrees new sectoral measures targeting Belarus and Russia” available online: <
The Foreign Affairs Council in March 2016 outlined five guiding principles underlying the EU’s relations with Russia: (1) implementation of the Minsk agreement as the key condition for any substantial change in the EU’s stance towards Russia; (2) strengthened relations with the EU’s Eastern Partners and other neighbours, including Central Asia; (3) strengthening the resilience of the EU (e.g. energy security, hybrid threats or strategic communication); (4) selective engagement with Russia on issues of interest to the EU; (5) need to engage in people-to-people contacts and support Russian civil society. The first principle implicitly links the duration of some of the EU sanctions to the progress made towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. See “Fact sheets on the European Union – Russia”, online: European Parliament <
The EU has imposed unilateral economic sanctions to target exchanges with Russia in specific sectors: (1) Limited access to the EU’s primary and secondary capital markets for certain Russian banks and companies. (2) Export and import bans on the trade in arms and an export ban on dual-use goods for military use or military end-users in Russia. (3) No access to certain sensitive technologies and services that can be used for oil production and exploration. (4) Specific restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol apply, including an import ban on goods from the peninsula, an export ban on certain goods and technologies, restrictions on investment, and a prohibition on the supply of tourism services. (5) Measures concerning economic cooperation and suspension of any new financing operations in Russia by the European Investment Bank (eib) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ebrd). (6) Individual restrictive measures apply to more than 150 individuals and 40 entities, which are subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban because their actions undermined Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. The list includes the speakers of the two chambers of the Russian Federal Assembly (the State Duma and the Federation Council), as well as the incumbent chair of the Russian Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. See Fact sheets on the EU, ibid; also see, “Russia: Council renews economic sanctions over Ukrainian crisis for six more months”, online: European Council, <
“EU sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” available online: <
ibid.
“Council conclusions on the New EU Strategy on Central Asia” available online: <
More information is available online: ec <
Seeonline:<
S Ji, “What is the China-Europe Railway Express, and how much pressure is it under from the Ukraine crisis?”, South China Morning Post (6 March 2022), online: The South China Morning Post <
J Waters, “Unimpeded Trade in Central Asia: A Trade facilitation Challenge”, Transnational Dispute Management, obor Special Edition (August 2017).
tfaf Assistance, online: wto: tfaf <
The Digital Silk Road was proposed during the China-EU Digital Cooperation Roundtable in Brussels in July 2015. See “China, EU to promote digital Silk Road”, China Daily (7 July 2015), online: China Daily <
See “Vision and Actions document” (n17).
Chinese companies have been involved in upgrading internet connections in several bri countries in the form of new undersea cables linking east and west, and rolling out broadband in dozens of countries where such infrastructure is either underdeveloped or non-existent. See R Deeks, “The Digital Silk Road – China’s $200 billion project”, bbc Science Focus Magazine (8 December 2018), online: Science Focus <
There has been a massive expansion of China’s BeiDou navigation satellite network to rival the US-owned Global Positioning System. See A Halappanavar, “China’s Answer to GPS Is Now Fully Complete”, The Diplomat (26 June 2020), online: The Diplomat <
Automation of custom procedures through dsr it projects has been piloted in Malaysia, together with China’s Alibaba, launched a Malaysian digital free trade zone. For more information see Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation (mdec), which is an agency under the Ministry of Communications and Multimedia Malaysia, online: mdec <
China has been active at multilateral institutions to establish technological standards related to telecommunications infrastructure. See A Beattie, “Technology: how the US, EU and China compete to set industry standards”, Financial Times (24 July 2019), online: Financial Times <
J Blanchette, J Hillman, “China’s Digital Silk Road after the Coronavirus”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (13 April 2020), online: csis <
In November 2019, China expressed its intention to strengthen participation in un/cefact and to work on a digital Belt and Road based on open, international standards for sustainable trade and greater regional integration. See “UN/CEFACT standards can pave the ‘digital silk road’ and streamline trade for the Sustainable Development Goals”, online: unece <
Rail transport is expected to grow in importance, taking more cargo out of the air, in relative terms, than off container ships. See B Cosentino, D Dunmore, S Ellis, A Preti, D Ranghetti, C Routaboul, “Research for TRAN Committee: The new Silk Route – opportunities and challenges for EU transport” (2018), online: European Parliament, <
There are daily train connections from Chongqing to Duisburg. See (n19).
“Trade impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative” (June 2018), 8, online: ing <
At present, industry led initiatives has reduced the transport time between China and Europe. For example, only block trains ply the Chongqing-Duisburg railway link. Yuxinou (Chongqing) Logistics Co. Ltd. is a forwarding agent, which has been established using joint-funds from railway companies of China, Russia, Kazakhstan and Germany, and the Chongqing Municipal Government, to organize the cargo for the block trains. More information is available online: iChongqing <
See Jakóbowski and others (n 5) 33.
See (n 146).
See “EU-China Summit Joint statement” (n 170).
“Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide”, online: unctad <
See generally, J XU (n 137).
For a detailed discussion on ways in which fragmentation is accomplished, see E Benvenisti and GW Downs, “The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law” (2007) 60 Stan L Rev 595.
See M Guzdar, TJ Jermalavicius, “Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States”, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia (August 2020), online: icds <
See generally, EA Posner, K Spier, and A Vermeule, “Divide and Conquer”, Discussion Paper No. 639, 5/2009, online: Harvard Law School <
See in general (n 10).
Table of Authorities
International Treaties
Eurasian Economic Union and The Peoples Republic of China
The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union (eaeu) and its Member States, on the one part, and the People’s Republic of China (prc) on the other part. (2018) entered into force 2019.
Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (otif)
Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail (cotif) (adopted 9 May 1980, entered into force
1 May 1985) 1397 unts 76
Transport Corridor Europe Caucasia Asia (traceca)
Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of the Europe-the Caucasus-Asia corridor (signed 8 September 1998)
International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Goods Carried by Rail (adopted 10 January 1952, entered into force 1 April 1953) 163 unts 3.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (unece)
The International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods (adopted 21 October 1982, entered into force 15 October 1985) 1409 unts 3
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (unescap)
The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Asian Railway Network (adopted 12 April 2006, entered into force 11 June 2009) 2597 unts 3
World Customs Organization (wco)
The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs procedures (Kyoto Convention) (originally adopted 19 May 1973, entered into force 25 September 1974) (subsequently amended 26 June 1999, entered into force 3 February 2006) 950 unts 269
The Convention on Temporary Admission (Istanbul Convention) (adopted 26 June 1990, entered into force 27 November 1993)
World Trade organization (wto)
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) (adopted on 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 unts 190
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (gats) (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 unts 183
The Trade Facilitation Agreement (tfa) (adopted 27 November 2014, entered into force 22 February 2017)
EU-Law
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] oj C115/13.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2012/C 326/02 (2012).
Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union Guidelines for the Development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU (2013) online: eur-Lex <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013R1315>
EU General Data Protection Regulation (gdpr): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/ec (General Data Protection Regulation), oj 2016 L 119/1.
“Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield” (2016) online: Eur-Lex <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.207.01.0001.01.ENG>
EU Case Law
Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems”, Press Release No 91/20, Luxembourg (16 July 2020), available online: cjeu <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-07/cp200091en.pdf>.
National Legislation
China
The Electronic Signature Law of the People’s Republic of China (2004).
Document No. 68 of the State Council, “Notice of the State Council on Issuing and Implementing the ‘Three Mutual’ Reform Plan to Promote the Construction of Large Customs Clearance” (2014).
Document No. 16 of the State Council, “Several Opinions of the State Council on Improving Port Work to Support Foreign Trade Development” (2015).
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