The provisions of the Napoleonic Code were not a dead letter in the Polish territories. Quite the contrary – about 2.000 divorces were granted based on them, which, considering the total population, means that divorces were at least comparably frequent in Poland as in the French Empire or in the Grand Duchy of Baden, and much more popular than in the Kingdom of Naples. Of course, this was not a solution employed on a mass scale in any of the European societies of the 19th century. This statement holds true also for non-Catholic countries, where marriage was not considered indissoluble, such as Russia, the German states, or England.1 The heyday of divorce did not arrive until the 20th century.
The reasons for the successful reception of Napoleonic divorce regulations2 can be traced back both to the popularity of marriage annulment at ecclesiastical courts of Old Poland, as well as to the politics of the Prussian invaders. The grounds for divorce were laid by the introduction of Landrecht3 in the Catholic Polish territories: its provisions on marriage law were based on the Protestant doctrine.
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Since it turns out that the reception of divorce regulations of the Napoleonic Code was successful in the Duchy of Warsaw and in the Kingdom, one has to wonder why so many authors claim that civil divorces were virtually non-existent. The proliferation of this opinion is surprising, especially in light of how popular the annulment of Catholic marriages had been in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Why should this change after the partitions? The scale of this phenomenon in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as well as immediately following the partitions, is not known, but we may surmise that to a considerable part of the Catholic landed gentry, marriage was not at all absolutely indissoluble. Thus, the introduction of a lay divorce did not constitute such a revolutionary change as could be expected by mere comparison of the
It should also be noted that some authors used expressions such as divorces adjudicated solely by state courts,4 which suggests that apart from divorces granted by civil tribunals, there must have been also others, resulting from judgements of both civil tribunals and clerical courts. Priest Piotr Kałwa authoritatively asserted: only 7 married couples divorced in the years 1808–1818 stopped at obtaining the judgement of a lay court only; all other cases were re-examined by ecclesiastical courts and were approved by the clerical authorities.5 Nevertheless, source research does not make it possible to tell if the civil tribunals followed the opinion of bishops’ courts, nor if they accounted for any norms of canon law in their judgements. It is also difficult to imagine that clerical courts “confirmed” divorce judgements issued for reasons of adultery or physical abuse during the marriage. None of the examined divorce judgements from Kalisz, Kraków, Bydgoszcz and Warsaw was based on premises that would justify lodging a motion for annulment of marriage with a bishops’ court.
The General Consistory of Poznań, in response to the application filed by Julianna née Mąkowska and Ignacy Walicki, divorced by the decision of a civil court, for a confirmation of the civil judgement issued by the Civil Tribunal of first instance of the Kalisz district on 21 January of this year dissolving the marriage union between the Walicki spouses pursuant to the civil provisions of law, hereby states that it is not within the competence of a Clerical Court to confirm the divorces decreed by civil courts.6
Our misfortune is brought on by the collision of the Code’s provisions and Church law. This is what causes so much outrage in the Church. And yet those higher up don’t think of it, and we, the lowly ones, must keep silent and suffer. As regards Muczewicz, a parishioner of yours, his own account does not conform to the wording of the decree. He claims that he only lived with his wife for eight weeks, while the decree lists years and years when she was harmed by him. […] All that must be done, and for this I hereby authorize you, is to enquire with this former wife and with others who may have knowledge of this, whether the woman really was only 14 years old, and whether she was coerced to marry, that is if the union was concluded cum metu gravi. If this is confirmed by the witnesses and by the petitioner under oath, which they are to give before you, and if I receive a report from you to this effect, I will immediately issue a religious decree pronouncing the divorce, to be confirmed in Judicio Prosynodali, and in a few days I will send a supplicant to you.9
The quoted passage from the letter, as well as many other types of remarks contained in the materials covered by my query, suggests that while Catholic dignitaries were quite principled in their officially issued opinions on divorce, lower-ranking clergymen were at times more liberal.10
Civil laws are so separate from the religious ones that the two do not interfere or contradict each other in any way; civil laws keep order in society and look after personal ownership, altogether leaving all things Godly to God. Thus, if the heads of all Churches propagate a solid religious education of the youth, and advise them to observe civil law, all will be harmonious. A person who is born (for purposes of order registered according to civil laws) will follow the rites of his confession and go to his church; the same will happen with a person who dies and with a person who marries. An announcement made by a civil registrar is not a church bann, but the policing purpose is the same: to find out about any obstacles. A civil contract made before a civil status registrar is what prenuptial agreements had been until recently, and not a sacrament. The law is the same for all people, regardless of their faith, and religion is only for one type of believers. Being the same for all people, the law does not favour any specific confession, and does not meddle with any, so as to avoid restricting the liberties given by God himself, which is a value to us. The law keeps silent about religion in a way out of respect for it, and it should stay out of it. Can the law order someone to follow a given confession? We have seen so many tragedies caused by this. This is why the Great Legislator has completely set apart the external Tribunal from the internal one, and while laws are for people, religion is for souls. This Minister of Justice confesses that he is honoured to be a true Catholic, and as such he finds this separation introduced by the Legislator to be most beneficial for religion. There will be no superficial Catholics, but there will be good ones, because if they observe the law, they will satisfy what the religion commands. Such was the spirit of the Godly Teacher when He told us to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; and to God the things that are God’s.11
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Meanwhile, the country has been governed by the Napoleonic Code for over twenty years, and not only did it not suffer any detrimental consequences for it, but it was indeed content with this law, as it was understood and desired by all, who became equal before it. The tribunals administered justice, the law reigned in all the senses of the word, while religion and the Church were not harmed in any way. The religious nation was faithful and zealous in observing all that the religion stipulated and the Church advised. Throughout these many years, government reports listed only three civil weddings without the religious sacrament and no more than seven divorces without the ecclesiastical approval in the entire kingdom.14
Barzykowski, however, did not indicate which reports gave this number, which was later indiscriminately adopted by Henryk Konic and then by other researchers15. Nevertheless, in light of the results of archive queries, it must be concluded that even if such a report could be found, it should not be trusted.16
This conclusion stems from the fact that it is difficult to assume that the administration of those times had the resources to determine the scale of divorces with a degree of precision, or even approximately. It must be kept in mind that neither tribunals of first instance nor civil status registrars (especially the lay ones) expected any kind of approval of divorce by the church authorities. It is not clear how these authorities could grant such an approval, especially since the divorce causes provided for in the Napoleonic Code were contradictory to the internal regulations of churches and other religious
Yet, even if we were to assume that spouses who obtained divorces at the same time turned to their religious leaders and initiated separate proceedings before them, citing causes that usually differed from those alleged before a civil court, and indeed had their marriages annulled of dissolved, how would state authorities ever learn about this? How could they possibly establish the precise number of seven, or any other, for this matter? After all, consistory, rabbinical and other religious courts had no obligation to notify any state authorities of their decisions. In light of the above, it must be concluded that even if this small number indeed appeared in official documents, it was likely chosen at random.
Perhaps this enigmatic report was based on an exploration similar to that commissioned by Jan Paweł Łuszczewski, who wanted to establish how many of the couples in the Duchy of Warsaw had only civil weddings. In order to do this, he asked individual bishops how many such couples lived in their dioceses. His strategy revealed only one such case, however.17 The problem, of course, lay in the calculation method. After all, couples who had married only civilly did not have a duty to notify religious authorities of this fact, as long as the civil status registrar was not a priest. As demonstrated in subchapter 2.7, there was no shortage of lay registrars in the Duchy. Of course, a parish priest could always find out through some other channels, but this did not necessarily have to happen, especially in large cities. Moreover, it must be remembered that the other Christian confessions had their own clergymen acting as civil status registrars, which further complicated the estimation of the number of divorces.
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A comparison of the number of church divorces in Old Poland which, although impossible to calculate precisely, but certainly significant, with the number of
At the same time, it must be noted that the depiction of daily lives of Poles in the first half of the 19th century, as portrayed in the divorce files, may be shocking to some readers. The number of examples of pathologies in many households is overwhelming. It must, however, be remembered that divorce proceedings are specific, and that in the time discussed here they were rather extraordinary in our country. Therefore, formulating any conclusions about the entire society based on divorce files is burdened with significant risk.
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In order to illustrate the Polish society of those times, it is of course important to determine the reasons for marital crises and divorces. This is not the place to once again discuss the formal bases for divorce petitions, especially since, as the readers surely remember, most of them were filed under Art. 231 of the cc, which was a general clause of sorts. Adultery and domestic violence were surely the reason for the dissolution of many marriages (a comparison of the popularity of both grounds is impeded by the fact that adultery is harder to prove than violence).19 Yet other reasons, not accounted for by the law, must not be overlooked.
All that can be stated is that marital conflicts were often underpinned with property disputes,20 alcoholism21 and actual separation (abandonment).22 Sometimes, courts found such accusations to be unbased,23 but other times judges determined they fit into the broadly defined Art. 231 of the cc, usually classifying them as injuries. In the case of abandonment, the point was often to legalize a separation that had taken place many years before.24
In the background of some conflicts there was maltreatment of a spouse’s children from a previous marriage,25 destruction of home appliances,26 world-view27 or class differences.28 Finally, some husbands cited as the source of marital conflicts the fact that their wives were either not virgins at the time of the wedding,29 or turned out to be infertile.30
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Even though I was not able to find a lot of opinions on divorces in the material covered by my query, I believe that the two following quotes are fairly representative of the erstwhile views, at least among the better-informed social classes.
I don’t know which one of us had better reasons to file for divorce, but as I love my own honour and that of my children, I did not want to be the talk of the city. Yet, since my [wife] is the petitioner, I will answer the allegations made against me. Having lived with her for twelve years, I would not do anything to tarnish her reputation if she had not forced me to do it. She can now own up to all things bad between us instead of blaming them on me. There are even worse things that I could hold against her, but these will be presented later before the tribunal, to her ever-lasting disgrace, and to the shame of myself and of the children.32
The jealousy of my mother in law, the protection that she granted to an impossible feeling, created an insufferable situation in my marriage. Mister Potocki desired to break the bonds that became nothing but a hindrance to him. I long objected to these plans, which go against my beliefs and principles, but seeing how badly the situation affected the upbringing of the children, I conceded to the solution that fills me with disgust. Since the Napoleonic Code, in effect in our country, facilitates divorce at mutual consent, we both regained our freedom.33
As much as divorce was viewed negatively, sometimes it was regarded as a necessary evil. For some Catholics orthodoxy delimited intransgressible
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One of the objectives of this work was to establish to what degree the Polish courts and state officials observed the French law: novel, largely contrary to the tradition and, additionally, written in a language that was unknown or poorly known by many of those who applied it.35
While discussing the subsequent stages of divorce proceedings, I attempted to point out any deviations from the letter of the law and differences in the practices adopted by individual tribunals. There were many, but in general it may be stated that the reception of family law was fairly smooth. Without delving into the unavoidable ordinary mistakes,36 of which I did not notice many, it is worth mentioning some provisions that were consistently applied against their literal wording.
The most important one of these was Art. 230 of the cc, which restricted the option of adjudicating divorce at the husband’s fault to cases where he kept a mistress in the shared marital household. Polish courts, in turn, against the principle that exceptions should not be interpreted broadly, found almost every adultery of the husband to be a fitting ground for divorce. An even more blatant departure from the letter of the law was that courts frequently interpreted the absence of one of the spouses as a basis for dissolution of marriage.37
Similar is my assessment of setting a probation period shorter than a year (observed only in Kraków, however), against the clear disposition of Art. 260 of the cc,38 or of the fact that the same court still applied the principle of testis unus, testis nullus, even though the free evaluation of evidence had been
Moreover, civil status registrars often violated Art. 35 of the cc by entering information not provided for by the law in records, for example on the estate background of the parties. Another significant breach of the effective law was that some pastors drafted civil status records in German, which was against Art. 84 of the constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw.39
The court practice in all the tribunals whose divorce judgements have made it to modern times in a number that allows for making comparisons (Kalisz, Kraków, Warsaw) was similar, although one should keep in mind the aforementioned approach of the Kraków court to the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or the fact that the Warsaw court treated acknowledgement of facts as absolute proof, which, in turn, I did not observe in Kalisz of Kraków.
Some provisions were not applied at all. One example is Art. 240 of the cc, which allowed the tribunal to suspend the consent for suing a spouse for divorce for a period of 20 days. This likely resulted from two reasons: the generally liberal attitude of the judges toward divorce cases, and the low effectiveness of this suspending veto. Similarly, I have not come across any mentions of application of provisions concerning disruption of court proceedings which, given the emotional nature of divorce cases, is worth making a note of.
The aforementioned shortcomings do not, however, undermine the general conclusion that the reception of the French legal system was effective and that the obstacle of the lack of official translations of the legal acts was overcome.
L. Stone, Road to divorce: England 1530–1987, Oxford 1990, p. 325.
As Alan Watson states the transplanting of legal rules is socially easy. A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, Athens 1993, p. 95.
In a letter dated 18 March 1808, the Minister of Justice Feliks Łubieński informed the monarch that the Prussian courts often considered divorce cases between Catholics (agad: Rada Stanu i Rada Ministrów Księstwa Warszawskiego, series 2, vol. 111, fols. 1).
J. Bardach, B. Leśnodorski, M. Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego, Warszawa 2009, p. 448.
P. Kałwa, Rozłączenie i rozwód, [in:] Rozbiór krytyczny projektu prawa małżeńskiego uchwalonego przez K.K., Lublin 1932, p. 144. His opinion, proclaimed in the midst of a debate on the shape of marriage law in times of the Second Republic of Poland, is not far from the views of most authors mentioned in footnote 6 of the Introduction.
Archdiocesan Archives in Poznań: Konsystorz Generalny w Poznaniu – Acta Causarum 0252, fol. 69. Similarly: Metropolitan Curia Archives in Krakow: Marital court files, folder entitled Marital Cases 1819–1839; case of the Miłkowski spouses, letter dated 31 December 1821: With all due respect for the laws effective in this country, by the virtue of which [the defendant] has obtained a civil divorce, [the Consistory] states that his [the defendants’] marriage is a union that no earthly power can dissolve without violating God’s law and thus, the Consistory is not competent to consent for his entry into a new marriage, and moreover states that if he dares to enter into such a new relationship in disregard of this judgement, for as long as his spouse Zofia née Maciejowska lives, even if recognized by the world, in the eyes of religion would be null and void. Furthermore, [the Consistory] advises him to follow the teachings of the Apostle Paul, that is to remain and live in piety, not seeking any new licence for as long as his spouse Zofia née Maciejewska, guided by the good advice and blessing of the Holy Spirit is not returned onto the path of calling and to him.
M. Chachaj, Poufne instrukcje dla adwokatów Aleksandra Chodkiewicza w sprawie rozwodowej z Karoliną z Walewskich, [in:] Zbrodnie, sensacje i katastrofy w prasie polskiej do 1914 roku, eds. K. Stępnik, M. Gabryś, Lublin 2010, p. 75; Sześcioletnia korespondencja władz duchownych z rządem świeckim Księstwa Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1816, pp. 260–262. Archdiocesan Archives in Poznań: Konsystorz Generalny w Poznaniu – Acta Causarum 0252, Acta viccari gen. et offic. Posn. Clementis Wierusz Walknowski custodis, fol. 225: The petitioner […] left the shared marital home and initiated divorce proceedings before the illustrious civil tribunal of the Poznań department, and after it ended in her obtaining the divorce, in order to calm her conscience she turns to the illustrious consistory to receive a similar judgement. Dziennik Wyroków Sądu Kassacyinego Xsięstwa Warszawskiego, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 4–7. Commentary: W. Sobociński, “Sprawy warszawskie przed sądami Księstwa Warszawskiego”, Przegląd Historyczny 1990, vol. 81, no. 3–4, p. 613 et seq.; T. Walachowicz, Kościół katolicki w prawodawstwie Księstwa Warszawskiego, Lublin 1984, p. 61.
For example: Agnieszka Radońska asserted before the clerical court that her husband was infertile, while before the civil tribunal she alleged that he had been unfaithful to her [Archdiocesan Archives in Gniezno: Trybunał Metropolitalny Gniezno, vol. 276 (the Radoński spouses case), fol. 2, and TCKal, vol. 22, fols. 101v]. Marianna Zimny at the consistory cited that her husband was unable to fulfil his marital duties, but she obtained the civil divorce based on Art. 231 of the cc (Archdiocesan Archives in Poznań, Konsystorz Generalny w Poznaniu – Acta Causarum 0252, Acta viccari gen. et offic. Posn. Clementis Wierusz Walknowski custodis Posn., fols. 88–92). Dorota Więckiewiczowa, in turn, at the consistory asserted that she had been forced to enter into the marriage, while the civil divorce was granted to her due to domestic violence (Diocesan Archives in Włocławek: Akta Konsystorza Generalnego Włocławskiego – zasób kaliski, vol. i 17 [bns], Summariusz spraw rozwodowych za administracji części Archidiecezji Gnieźnieńskiej do Diecezji Kaliskiej przyłączonej, w której strony rozwiedzione zamieszkują od roku 1816 do r. 1819 and TCKal, vol. 737, p. 386). Felicjanna Wiktorowiczowa obtained a divorce as a result of injuries inflicted by her husband (kar, vol. 30, p. 28), and subsequently, on 24 September 1822, lodged an application with the consistory, in which she wrote that she obtained a civil divorce from her husband […] from the Tribunal of the Free City of Kraków on 1 September 1820 on the basis of explicit provisions of law, where she proved with the aid of witnesses the harm and the mistreatment suffered at the hands of her husband, but respecting the laws of the Roman Catholic Church and relying on the salutary rules of this law, she now turns to the High Consistory with a view of proving that the marriage of the undersigned was concluded as a result of being forced, and that as such the union was invalid (Archiwum Kurii Metropolitalnej w Krakowie: Marital court cases, paper file no. iii [s.l.]). Why she had not cited coercion before the state court and why she applied for a divorce and not for annulment of marriage is of course forever a secret of Ms Wiktorowiczowa.
Diocesan Archives in Łomża: Fond ii – Akta ogólne, ref. no. 164, Akta dziekana augustowskiego 1816–1817, p. 524.
Sometimes it was priests who pronounced divorces: State Archives in Białystok (Łomża Branch) Akta stanu cywilnego Parafii Rzymskokatolickiej w Łomży [fond: 5/514/0], vol. 58, entry no. 6; Archiwum Parafialne Parafii Rzymskokatolickiej pw. Trójcy Przenajświętszej w Grajewie: Akta Zaślubienia Gminy Grajewskiej Powiatu Biebrzańskiego w Województwie Augustowskiem na rok 1821, entry no. 3; State Archives in Radom: Akta stanu cywilnego Parafii Rzymskokatolickiej Szydłowiec [fond: 58/166/0], vol. 10, p. 69. An example of officiating the wedding of a person with a civil divorce: G. Trafalski, “Alegata – źródło do badań genealogicznych. Aneksy z łowickich urzędów stanu cywilnego z lat 1808–1815”, Rocznik Lubelskiego Towarzystwa Genealogicznego 2014 (2015), vol. 6, p. 116. Sometimes, a priest assisted as a witness in the drafting of a divorce entry by a lay civil status registrar: Cyrkuł iv, vol. 17, fols. 98; State Archives in Płock: Akta stanu cywilnego gminy Płock, powiat płocki [fond: 50/375], vol. 82, p. 15.
Sześcioletnia korespondencja …, p. 249 et seq. Commentary: T. Mencel, Feliks Łubieński, minister sprawiedliwości Księstwa Warszawskiego (1758–1848), Warszawa 1952, p. 68. Similar were the thoughts of Henryk Rzewuski (Uwagi o dawnej Polsce przez starego szlachcica Seweryna Soplicę cześnika parnawskiego napisane 1832 roku, Warszawa 2003, eds. P. Dudziak, B. Szleszyński, p. 152, footnote 191): When the Duchy of Warsaw adopted the Napoleonic Code, civil contracts made prior to the sacrament of marriage offended many a pious soul, revealing in a way a certain contrariety with canons of the Council of Trent, which prohibits laymen from participating in this sacrament under pain of excommunication. Surely, this new regulation is against our customs, it is not a native invention, but rather a beneficial imitation of foreign ways. Yet there is nothing contrary to Catholic discipline in it. These contracts produce civil effects only and they have nothing to do with a sacrament, it is something akin to an extended prenuptial agreement, based on which the judiciary is to decide on affairs and assets left by those who enter into such contracts. Similar was the situation in Old Poland, when matters regarding prenuptial agreements were examined by ordinary jurisdictions, and not by the nunciature, which could only adjudicate on validity of marriages. The Napoleonic Code does not contradict the sacramental validity of marriages without civil contract, it simply does not confer any civil effects on them. There have been so many abuses at consistories, divorces have become so easy to obtain, obstacles so easy to prove, that I believe the civil contracts to be an advantageous solution in our country.
Diocesan Archives in Łomża: Fond ii – Akta ogólne, ref. no. 166, fols. 50. What is more, in this case a divorcee who did not obtain absolution complained to the lay authorities.
B. Grochulska, O niektórych aspektach konfliktu Kościoła z rządem Księstwa Warszawskiego, Rocznik Towarzystwa Literackiego imienia Adama Mickiewicza 1984, Y. 19, pp. 115–122. The conflict between the Napoleonic Code and the canon law in the Free City of Kraków was also noted by a judge of the local Court of Third Instance, at the same time a priest who, citing Art. 1 of the constitution (The Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion is maintained as the national religion) demanded the acknowledgement of divorces between Catholics as unconstitutional (Krakowskie sądy wyższe, vol. 180, p. 123).Similar was the argumentation of the counsel of a certain defendant: Since the marriage between the parties was concluded in the Polish times, when the laws of the country knew no such cause as grievous injuries, since the demand for such a divorce is, by virtue of the decisions of the Catholic Church, contrary to the spirit of the Gospel and to the spirit of this nation, it also runs against Art. 1.12 of the constitution of the Free City of Kraków. Given that this constitution, adopted later, abrogated the civil acts that do not conform to it, Article 231 of the Civil Code cited by the opponent in French, cannot be applied to our nation (Akta rozwodowe z terenu gmin, powiatu i miasta Krakowa, vol. 24, p. 235).
S. Barzykowski, Historia powstania listopadowego, Poznań 1883, vol. 1, p. 132.
Independently of this, Marceli Handelsman wrote: According to a report dated 25 March 1811 presented to the king by Łuszczewski, so far there have been 16 civil marriages that did not receive a church blessing (M. Handelsman, “Zasady napoleońskie w życiu Księstwa Warszawskiego”, Themis Polska. Pismo nauce prawa poświęcone. Seryi drugiej 1913, vol. 2, fasc. 1, p. 14, footnote 1). Along with the number of 16 only civil marriages as given by Handelsman, some researchers also claim that six divorces were pronounced by the end of the Duchy.
If all the Catholic divorcees had obtained a church annulment of marriage, the relatively numerous books of banns and marriages between people who obtained only civil divorces would not exist.
E. Ziółek, Między tronem i ołtarzem. Kościół i państwo w Księstwie Warszawskim, Lublin 2012, p. 112; T. Walachowicz, “Kodeks Napoleona a kościelna dyscyplina małżeńska w dobie Księstwa Warszawskiego”, Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne 1977, vol. 24, fasc. 5, p 144; idem, Kościół katolicki w prawodawstwie Księstwa Warszawskiego, Lublin 1984, p. 60. The General Consistory of Podlasie drafted a list dated 20 April 1833 which accounted for eight couples living together as husband and wife on the basis of a civil contract, and three living together as husband and wife following a civil divorce [Archiwum Diecezjalne w Siedlcach, Akta Kurii Diecezjalnej Siedleckiej, Akta ogólne, ref. no. 528, Miscellanea I (1798–1867), fol. 81 et seq.].
As noted by Franciszek Węgleński: Divorces, separations, are neither unheard of like before, nor overly easy (Mowa jaśnie wielmożnego Franciszka Węgleńskiego posła hrubieszowskiego miana na posiedzeniu seymowym dnia 15 grudnia 1811 roku, [Warszawa 1811], p. 1).
F. K. Szaniawski, Jak przepisy Kodexu Napoleona o rozwodach rozumianémi bydź maią? Rzecz czytana na publiczném posiedzeniu Szkoły Prawa dnia 27 marca r. 1811, Warszawa 1811, p. 12; TCKal, vol. 33, fols. 126v.
Often in connection with squandering of wealth by a spouse who fell into alcoholism, for example: Akta rozwodowe z terenu gmin, powiatu i miasta Krakowa, vol. 24, p. 380; Cyrkuł ii, vol. 99, fols. 225; TCKal, vol. 5, fols. 335 (he squandered her [petitioner’s] bedding to get drunk), vol. 23, fols. 145. Sometimes they had to do with the husband’s refusal to provide his wife with means for her maintenance, for example: Cyrkuł iii, vol. 108, fols. 9v (a husband’s reaction to his wife’s request: What pension do you want from me, you are not my wife, you are a whore and a monkey, leave through this door, you pig, or I will push you out of it), vol. 120, fols. 81 (appropriation of the wife’s wealth and banishing her).
TCKal, vol. 337, fols. 511 (He took such a liking to the bottle that he wasted away the entire household), vol. 41, fols. 239–239v; Akta rozwodowe z terenu gmin, powiatu i miasta Krakowa, vol. 24, p. 380; Cyrkuł iii, vol. 110, fols. 6 and 42, vol. 120, fols. 77 (wife’s alcoholism).
TCKal, vol. 62, fols. 552; Cyrkuł iii, vol. 97, fols. 20v et seq.
TCKal, vol. 44, fols. 647 (drunkenness is not a cause for divorce), vol. 298, fols. 26v (abandonment is not a cause for divorce).
TCKal, vol. 311, fols. 378–380: in this case, the husband went off to serve in the army and took over 10 years to return. In the meantime, his wife became involved with another man with whom she had four children.
Cyrkuł iii, vol. 120, fols. 79.
Ibid.
TCKal, vol. 330, fols. 218v: she told witnesses that if her husband does not join the same sect, or congregation, as her, she cannot continue to be married to him.
Archdiocesan Archives in Gniezno: Trybunał Metropolitalny Gniezno, vol. 188 (the Wojciechowski spouses case), fol. 3v; TCKal, vol. 321, fols. 439v.
TCKal, vol. 2, pp. 258–259, vol. 6, fols. 355; Akta rozwodowe z terenu gmin, powiatu i miasta Krakowa, vol. 91, p. 134.
TCKal, vol. 7, fols. 246v, t. 41, fols. 239–239v.
Diocesan Archives in Łomża: Fond ii – Akta ogólne, ref. no. 166, fols. 50.
Cyrkuł iii, vol. 99, fols. 284–284v.
A. z Tyszkiewiczów Potocka-Wąsowiczowa, Wspomnienia naocznego świadka, ed. and introduction B. Grochulska, Warszawa 1965, pp. 318–319.
Aleksander Chodkiewicz said: A marriage oath is not a trifle. God heard it. My ancestors did not divorce (Archiwum Młynowskie Chodkiewiczów, p. 90).
It must also be kept in mind that French literature was difficult to access (R. Hube, “Uwagi nad systematem Kodeksu cywilnego francuskiego”, Themis Polska 1829, vol. v, pp. 308–310).
For example: TCKal, vol. 294, fols. 288 (dismissal of the petition for divorce and ordering of a probationary period).
Absence was not listed in Art. 227 of the cc; P. Burzyński, Wykład prawa cywilnego francuzkiego, Kraków 1852, vol. 1, p. 209. Nevertheless, sometimes the wives of absent husbands were treated as divorcees: Akta rozwodowe z terenu gmin, powiatu i miasta Krakowa, vol. 18, p. 515 et seq.; Cyrkuł ii, vol. 41, p. 7.
Akta rozwodowe z terenu gmin, powiatu i miasta Krakowa, vol. 15, p. 686 (2 months), p. 715 (4 months), p. 790 (3 months), vol. 18, p. 338 (5 months).
For example: State Archives in Poznań: Akta stanu cywilnego Parafii Ewangelickiej Bnin [fond: 53/3767/0], vol. 5. In the town of Śmigiel, in turn, a part of the records was made both in Polish and in German [State Archives in Poznań: Akta stanu cywilnego Parafii Rzymskokatolickiej Śmigiel (pow. kościański) [fond: 53/3524/0], series 1, vol. 1].