The legitimacy of investor-State arbitration is a much-debated topic, with arbitratorsâ independence and impartiality being one of the core concerns. In The Independence and Impartiality of ICSID Arbitrators, Maria Nicole Cleis explores how unbiased decision-making is ensured under the ICSID Convention. Juxtaposing existing disqualification decisions in the ICSID system against corresponding requirements in related dispute settlement systems, the book convincingly argues that the current approach to disqualification requests against ICSID arbitrators is too exacting in light of the high stakes of investor-State disputes. The authorâs nuanced analysis of the status quo is followed by novel suggestions for reforms (including a proposal for ICSID-specific guidelines on conflict of interest), making the book a valuable source of ideas on constructive paths forward.
Maria Nicole Cleis, Ph.D. (2016, University of Basel), LL.M. (2014, Harvard Law School), Attorney-at-law, is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Basel, and a lecturer in International Investment Law at the University of Neuchâtel.
b>Acknowledgments
List of Illustrations List of Abbreviations
Introduction
âStructure of the Book
1 Independence and Impartiality in the icsid Convention and Arbitration Rules
â1âLegal Framework and Drafting History
ââ1.1âThe Requirement of Independence and Impartiality
ââ1.2âThe Disqualification of Arbitrators
ââ1.3âArbitratorsâ Disclosure Obligation
â2âDelimiting Independence and Impartiality in a System of Party-appointments
ââ2.1âThe Notions of Independence and Impartiality
ââ2.2âParty-appointments and Independence and Impartiality
2 Disqualification Decisions under the icsid Convention and Arbitration Rules
â1âFormally Inconsistent Interpretations of the Disqualification Threshold
ââ1.1âRequirement of Strict Proof under Amco Asia
ââ1.2âRequirement of Reasonable Doubts under Vivendi and sgs
ââ1.3âInconsistency of the Disqualification Threshold in Subsequent Decisions
âââAâChallenge Decisions Applying the Amco Asia Standard
âââBâChallenge Decisions Applying the Vivendi Standard
âââCâChallenge Decisions Referring to Both Standards
ââ1.4âConclusion
â2âApplication of the Standard to Specific Categories of Alleged Conflict
ââ2.1âBehavior in Current Proceeding
ââ2.2âFamiliarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
âââAâPrevious Contacts with a Party or Counsel
âââBâRole Switching between an Arbitrator and Counsel
âââCâRepeat Appointments
ââ2.3âFamiliarity with the Subject-matter of the Proceeding
ââ2.4âConnection to an Adverse Third Party
ââ2.5âConclusion
â3âFactors Underlying the Prevalent Dismissal of Arbitrator Challenges
3 Alternative Standards of Independence and Impartiality
â1âInternational Adjudication
ââ1.1âRelevance
ââ1.2âThe International Court of Justice
âââAâIndependence and Impartiality Requirements
âââBâRemoval of icj Judges
âââCâCase Law
ââ1.3âDispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization
âââAâIndependence and Impartiality Requirements
âââBâChallenge of Panelists and Members of the Appellate Body
ââ1.4âContextualization and Conclusion
â2âInternational Commercial Arbitration
ââ2.1âRelevance
ââ2.2âThe uncitral Arbitration Rules
âââAâBehavior in Current Proceeding
âââBâFamiliarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
âââCâFamiliarity with the Subject-Matter of the Proceeding
âââDâConnection to an Adverse Third Party
ââ2.3âThe scc Arbitration Rules
âââAâFamiliarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
âââBâFamiliarity with the Subject-Matter of the Proceeding
ââ2.4âThe icc Arbitration Rules
âââAâFamiliarity with Another Participant in the Proceeding
âââBâFamiliarity with the Subject-Matter of the Proceeding
âââCâConnection to an Adverse Third Party
ââ2.5âContextualization and Conclusion
â3âSelf-regulatory Codes of Conduct for Arbitrators
ââ3.1âRelevance
ââ3.2âThe iba Guidelines
âââAâGeneral Standards
âââBâApplication Lists
âââCâCase Law
ââ3.3âContextualization and Conclusion
â4âSui Generis Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
ââ4.1âRelevance
ââ4.2âThe IranâUnited States Claims Tribunal
ââ4.3âThe Permanent Court of Arbitration
ââ4.4âContextualization and Conclusion
â5âSummary Analysis
ââ5.1âBasic Consensus
ââ5.2âPrevalent Threshold
ââ5.3âEffect of the Threshold on the Outcome
âââAâMain Discrepancies
âââBâMain Similarities
âââCâGaps in the Case Law
4 Analysis of Existing Reform Proposals
â1âAbolishment or Modification of the System of Party-appointments
ââ1.1âAppointment by a Neutral Body
ââ1.2âParty-appointment from a Roster
ââ2âProhibition of Dual Functions
ââ2.1âComplete Prohibition
ââ2.2âTemporary Prohibition and Vesting Period
ââ2.3âDisinvolvement upon Challenge?
â3âClarification of the Threshold for Arbitrator Challenges
ââ3.1âExcessive Rigor of the Strict Proof Threshold
ââ3.2âAdequacy of the Justifiable Doubts Threshold
â4âThe Investment Court System Proposed by the European Union
ââ4.1âInvestor-state Dispute Settlement under ceta
ââ4.2âInvestor-state Dispute Settlement under ttip
ââ4.3âics â Panacea or Chimera?
5 Improvement Suggestions
â1âInstitutional Reforms
ââ1.1âAppointment of the Chairperson from a Roster
ââ1.2âInstitutional Confirmation of Party-appointed Arbitrators
ââ1.3âInstitutional Jurisdiction for Arbitrator Challenges
â2âGuidance on the Interpretation of a Justifiable Doubts Threshold
ââ2.1âCompulsory Grounds for Disqualification
ââ2.2âPotential Grounds for Disqualification
âââAâReversal of the Burden of Proof
âââBâBurden of Proof on the Challenging Party
ââ2.3âNo Grounds for Disqualification
ââ2.4âProposal for icsid-specific Guidelines on Conflict of Interest
âââAâIncompatibilities
âââBâPotential Grounds for Disqualification
âââCâUnproblematic Circumstances
â3âImplementation of Suggested Reforms
All interested in International Investment Law and investor-State arbitration in particular. Readership includes academics, lawyers and arbitrators involved in investment-related disputes (including in-house counsel), treaty negotiators and NGOs.