[| 233]1 In 1929, the famous German philosopher Edmund Husserl celebrated his 70th birthday. He lived to a ripe old age without abandoning his scholarly work, as demonstrated by the new publications and lectures given in Paris at the invitation of Sorbonne. The invitation also testifies to the intense interest in his philosophy in France. In Anglo-Saxon countries, this interest has been strong for many years, as shown by, among other things, Husserlâs lectures delivered shortly after the end of war at the University of London. There are numerous adherents to phenomenology in the Far East, especially in Japan. There is also a large group of phenomenologists in Germany, where the largest philosophical society, Kantgesellschaft [Kant-Gesellschaft], made Husserl its honorary member a few months ago. However, Husserlâs influence reaches far beyond their ranks since many representatives of various philosophical disciplines recognize the importance of his individual views while negatively assessing their totality. We find a comparable attitude toward Husserl in Poland. While acknowledging the value of many of his concepts, Polish philosophers oppose the form in which they are given, accusing them of lacking sufficient clarity and a scientific level of accuracy.
The thinker, who managed to move the minds of people across the world, certainly arouses interest outside the narrow circle of specialists. Perhaps, then, the publication of the following memoirs, written in 1925, immediately after meeting the then 66-year-old Husserl in one of the last years of his activity at the university, will prove interesting. The events that took place after 1925 are included mainly in footnotes.
[| 234] Husserl is known in Poland, especially as the author of Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen.2 Since these works were published many years ago and their author is still active, one can rightly suppose that his views have been more or less reformulated in relation to those presented in both works. It is known that the difficulties he struggled with while continuing his Philosophie der Arithmetik, the first and last volumes of which appeared in 1893, prompted him to change his fundamental views completely and to polemicize against empiricism in general and against psychologism in logic in particular; we find both polemics in the first volume of Logische Untersuchungen. Husserl advocates this negation of empiricism to this day and has often repeated during seminars and lectures the well-known arguments proving the skeptical consequences of empiricism. In turn, Husserl changed his attitude to the investigations included in the second volume of Logische Untersuchungen, which was the basis of a system of pure logic already announced in the first volume. He considers these investigations to be somewhat outdated, although he recognizes their importance as the first step in the path toward phenomenology. A few years later, he realized that these investigations, especially the Fifth and the Sixth [Investigation], as accounting for lived experiences, are part of a special scienceâphenomenology, which is not only a prolegomena to pure logic but also to philosophy and all other sciences. With that in mind, Husserl revisited the second editionâagainst Diltheyâs insistent adviceâwhich he now regrets. The author ranks Ideen higher, the first volume of which was published in 1913. However, even this work stands âauf einem niederen Standpunktâ3 from the point of view of todayâs scholars, as Husserl himself emphasizes. It contains only a general outline of what is today developed in detail. One proof of that is that Husserlâs subsequent publications do not present a continuation of Ideen, which is therefore not formally complete. Nevertheless, today, Husserl is ready to accept everything he announced in Ideen. Therefore, it is not about changing views but about developing them further.
Husserl remains active, although he has not published very much since 1913.4 The fruits of his work are contained primarily in the many research manuscripts he holds in his office. They have not been published due to practical difficulties, which, according to Husserl, never leave a true philosopher. Nevertheless, he believes in the rightness of his solutions to a number of important problems. The scope of his interests covers all philosophical disciplines, including ethics. Most of the manuscripts are lectures. [| 235] Husserl attaches great weight to the lecture entitled Einführung in die phänomenologische Psychologie, which contains a solution to the question of the relationship between psychology and the humanities. Husserlâs major philosophical shift consists in a turn toward transcendental idealism. This transcendental idealism caused many doubts among his students and followers. See Celmsâs new book Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls, Riga 1928. Before Husserlâs work and his phenomenology can be assessed, all his manuscripts must be published. Their influence is already enormous, as they are known to his direct students, who used to make pilgrimages from all over the world to Göttingen, and now to Freiburg. The difficulty of understanding the works of these phenomenologists arises mainly from the fact that they use an enormous number of concepts and methods disclosed only in these manuscripts, which are unavailable to us. This material does not present a uniform system, and it was never Husserlâs intention to create such a system. In his opinion, he only created certain methods and points of view which could serve as a starting point for the work of entire generations. Assessing his lifeâs work, Husserl said that many things still remain a mystery to him but that he has done more than he expected.
While it is commonly believed that Logische Untersuchungen is scientifically superior to Ideen, Husserl considers the formulation of phenomenology to be his magnum opus. It is difficult to say briefly and clearly what phenomenology is for its creator. He complained that sometimes eminent scholars asked him to explain in a letter or in a 15-minute talk what had become clear to him over the years. He believes that this is impossible because first one must understand what phenomenological reductions are, and this implies knowledge of a whole set of other concepts. The reason why phenomenology is not popular among non-experts, which Husserl is happy with, lies precisely in the fact that it is difficult to characterize it in a few formulas. People are rather reluctant to take the effort of doing their original cognition. [| 236] If I try to characterize phenomenology in a few sentences in the following pages, it is only with the proviso that I will attempt to do this roughly and for the sake of general orientation. I rely on Ideen without taking into account further changes introduced by Husserl himself or the different views of his students.
The starting point for Husserlâs doctrine was a polemic against empiricism. We will refer to the polemic only insofar as it will help us to explain the positive claims of phenomenology. In line with empiricism, Husserl accepts, as a final principle, that every originally presentive intuition (originär gebende Anschauung) is a legitimizing source of cognition, and everything that is directly given to us in âintuitionâ is to be accepted as given to us, yet only within the limits in which it is given to us. The fallacy of empiricism lies in accepting only one kind of original seeing, i.e., empirical perception, and in the fact that empiricism does not accept the existence of eidetic intuition or seeing essences (Wesenschau). Contrary to empiricists, Husserl states that apart from individual objects, given in empirical perception, there are the essences (
We already know, then, the genus proximum of phenomenology. To define it completely, it is also necessary to know its method and its object. Thisâ according to Husserlâis a specific case where the object of this discipline can be discovered and investigated only through the phenomenological method. The method consists in shifting the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, the surrounding world is given to us, and we are a part of the world; it is given as the world of objects present in time and space but also as the world of values and praxis. This world also contains all the acts of consciousness by means of which I present the world, think about it, react to it emotionally, etc.âI am not the only subject in this world; I know that there are others and that the world around me is identical [| 237] with the world surrounding these other subjects. I always apprehend this world as real in its entirety, even if I doubt the existence of this or that element of it. Husserl calls this positioning of the reality of the whole world the âgeneral thesisâ of the natural attitude. Apart from the natural attitude, in which the real world is given, there are also attitudes toward this or that ideal world, e.g., the arithmetic world of numbers. The real world and ideal worlds are not related to each other, apart from the fact that my âIâ can be directed toward both. The attitude toward the ideal world does not require altering the attitude toward the real world. Therefore, both attitudes can exist side by side in the present moment, while the natural attitude still grasps the world as real. However, it is within our power to shift our natural attitude. This shift was made, for example, by Descartes, who questioned the reality of the world. In turn, the phenomenologist does not doubt the existence of the world, nor rejects the general thesis of the natural attitude, but, as it were, modifies, suspends, and brackets it. The general thesis still exists as a lived experience, but we do not make use of it, in the sense that we do not make any judgment. Husserl calls this kind of modification of the general thesis phenomenological
There is no place to assess this theory here. I attempted a critical assessment of both meanings of phenomenology in two lectures delivered at the meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society on April 28 and May 5, 1928 (see the reports in Ruch Filozoficzny [The Philosophical Movement], volume 11).5 In both talks, I took a negative stance toward the theory of phenomenology, which does not reject the value of the results of concrete phenomenological studies. Husserlâs results in the field of intentional analysis, which are sometimes excellent, seem to me unquestionable. One cannot say, however, whether phenomenology will fulfill the hopes placed in it by its followers. In any case, the history of philosophy will classify Husserlâs conception as an attempt to grant a priori moments in cognition the importance that they have been denied recently.
The influence of this theory on contemporary philosophical literature is enormous. Its followers are mainly Husserlâs direct students, many of whom are eminent. In Germany, those are Scheler, who recently died, Pfänder, Heidegger, Becker, Geiger, Hildebrand, Ms. Conrad-Martius, Stein, and many others; in PolandâRoman Ingarden, Rosenblum [Rozenblum-Augustowski]; and in France, Hering and Koyré. With his students, Husserl publishes the journal Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, whose volume 10 has recently come out. One of the most prominent co-editors of this magazine was Adolf Reinach, who died during the war. It should be noted that there is a certain difference in views between Husserl and some of his students regarding the essence of phenomenology. The so-called Munich school, which was led by Pfänder and Scheler and adopted Husserlâs earlier views, breaks with the views Husserl holds today. Another group of students, headed by the very influential Heidegger, is moving away from him in a different direction. Husserlâs influence, however, reaches far beyond the group of his [| 239] direct students, the most influential of his works being Logische Untersuchungen. According to Husserl, he influenced Lipps, Stumpf, Rickert, Meinong, and many others. In particular, Logische Untersuchungen influenced the students of Lipps and Külpe (experimental psychology). Husserl was widely criticized by philosophers grouped around Marty and Kraus in Prague, who, in Husserlâs opinion, did not understand his examinations. For Husserl himself, he is deeply influenced by his teacher, Franz Brentano, whose teaching on the intentionality of psychic acts was the starting point for his activities. Logische Untersuchungen displays significant affinities with Twardowskiâs work Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894).6 The same also holds for Meinongâs object theory, which, however, cannot be identified with phenomenology sensu stricto. Although his object theory, similar to phenomenology, is an a priori theory that does not take into account the existence of its objects, it differs from phenomenology, as it includes theories that are removed by phenomenological reduction, such as mathematics and logic. Meinong brackets only the sciences of facts, while Husserlâs reductionsâas we have seenâhave a much broader scope. Moreover, Husserl emphasizes the juxtaposition of the immanent and the transcendent, and he limits the subject-matter of phenomenological studies to the immanent and to the problem of how the transcendent is constituted in the immanent. Meinongâs object theory, on the other hand, deals with the objects of lived experiences for their sake. Husserlâs phenomenology cannot be identified with Stumpfâs phenomenology either, the latter being related to hyletics, a part of Husserlâs phenomenology. In fact, Stumpfâs phenomenology is part of eidetic psychology, whichâaccording to Husserlâ differs from phenomenology since it does not perform
An external proof of the growing interest in Husserlâs ideas was, for example, the group attending his seminar in the summer semester of 1925. Half of the attendees were foreigners. Among them were 1 Englishman, 2 Americans, 1 Russian, 1 Hungarian, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Latvian, and even 2 Chinese attendees; in addition, the total group of students included 5 university docents. Another interesting finding is the small number of women (three out of more than twenty participants). Husserl tries to get to know these young people (âeveryone is taken seriously by meâ) thoroughly. He asks them about biographical details, scientific interests, attitudes toward theatre, literature, [| 240] music, nature, etc. In his opinion, the fledgling philosopher should learn about natural, mathematical, and historical sciences. He recommends doing mathematics completely naively, without philosophizing about what one is doing. He greatly appreciates the synthetic way of understanding history, and he highly values the so-called historical sense. He is, however, an opponent of being widely read in philosophical literature, which, in his opinion, makes creativity impossible. He claims that it is precisely for these reasons that he himself, having originally studied mainly mathematics (Husserl has a PhD in mathematics) and learned the most difficult mathematical works already at the age of 18â20, is âso uselessâ to mathematics. He rightly thinks that at this age, one can be a great musician, painter, mathematician, but not a philosopher. He is also against working too hard at this age. When hears that someone works, e.g., 8 hours a day, he sadly shakes his head and says half-jokingly: âDas ist ein schwerer Fall. Wohl kaum noch zu helfen.â7 Instead, he recommends independent work, observation, and description of phenomena, just as they manifest themselves. These views, correct in many points, require, however, critical evaluation because a condition of all philosophical work is knowledge of the issues, and this can be thoroughly learned by reading classical philosophical works. However, one should use the acquired knowledge as the foundation of oneâs own original work. Husserl also warns against the practice of premature publishing, which contributes to the large amount of philosophical âtrash literature,â which is not worth reading. Reading should be limited to outstanding works, and views should be learned directly from the original texts and not from journals, books on the history of philosophy, etc. These principles are therefore similar to those common in our country; however, in Freiburg, there are currently no debates, which are important components of Polish philosophical education. There is also a lack of systematically organized work in seminars, compulsory texts, colloquiums, etc. After a few years of study, during which they listen freely to lectures, attend seminars, and are perhaps in private contact with the professor, students write a doctoral dissertation. On the other hand, Husserl highly values our more difficult studies, and he holds that the students of the University of Lvov have âeine tüchtigere philosophische Vorbildung, als die Schüler der deutschen Durchschnittsprofessoren aufweisen.â8 Finally, contrary to our standards, Husserlâs inclination is to educate his collaborators in phenomenology andâaccording to his own statementâhe is ready to pay genuine attention only to the people who stand on the ground of phenomenology.
By appreciating subtle distinctions, insightful thoughts, and the richness of theories in Logische Untersuchungen or the momentum and encouraging prospects of Ideen, one wishes to come into contact with the author of these outstanding philosophical works.
Husserl is a person of short stature; he is slim and gray. His facial expression is gentle, he has kind eyes, and his forehead is high. He lectures in a low voiceâslightly restless as he stands on the cathedral. He is not so much [| 241] polite while dealing with students or with guests from all over the world, but he is extremely good and honest. While lecturing, at seminar meetings and in private conversations, he speaks insightfully, with a deep conviction which it is hard, if not impossible, to shake. It is evident that he tries to be understandable, giving long and patient explanations, but he also tries to be convincing. To this day, he is creative, works with much effort, and is apparently ill at ease when distracted from his work by private conversation. He speaks reverently about Kant and Brentano, and has good feelings for Dilthey, Lipps, Stumpf, and Twardowski. He emotionally recalls his most eminent students, who had long conversations with him in the room where he works and welcomes his guests. Regarding Husserl himself, he is modest. While speaking about Kant once, he expressed himself as follows: âWir kleinen Leute machen nur mit Wortenâ uns fehlt die Intuition, die die grossen Menschen charakterisiert.â9 In turn, he attaches great importance to his phenomenology. He has so much faith in his own views that he believes that future students will begin their university studies with phenomenology and only then move on to the study of individual disciplines of knowledge and philosophy. Polemics do not impress him; he considers it to be the result of a misunderstanding of his examinations or calls it simply âreckless.â âMan kann gegen mich hin und her polemisieren, ich bin überzeugt, dass die Phänomenologie die Grundlage aller künftigen Philosophie sein wird. Ich arbeite sub specie aeternitatis.â10 There are people who think this is hilarious. To me it seems natural. Perhaps a person such as Husserl cannot be different; perhaps he does not dare to doubt or look back, so he does not lose his balance and is able to continue his work. Otherwise, the creative tendency would die in him. One cannot be both the creator and the critic of oneâs own ideas. In philosophy, it is extremely difficult to create with the same faith as Husserl does. After all, he is aware that at numerous German and foreign universities, many philosophers make similar claims about theories that are quite different from his. Such scholars can also be found in Freiburg. For instance, the eminent philosopher Jonas Cohn claims that phenomenology arrives at problems known already to German idealism, yet it arrives at them in a roundabout way. To work spontaneously and with enormous effort of will and thought for almost half a century in such circumstances, which would cause skeptical discouragement in an average person, one must have a special attitude toward philosophy comprehended as the purpose of life. This was made clear to me during one of my conversations with Husserl. I was already certain about the accuracy of the belief expressed by one of Husserlâs foreign students, who also devotes himself with great seriousness and honesty to philosophy, who said that Husserl is simply âobsessedâ with his research. During the aforementioned conversation with Husserl, I learned the sources of this obsession. âPhilosophy is heroism,â said Husserl. Philosophy can be practiced only on ethical or religious grounds. Philosophy is the moral task of mankind. God is waiting for it. What makes us human beings responsible for what we are and what the world is. Only through the truth can we reach ethical value. He spoke with pain and bitterness about the fall of mankind in our times and the necessity of rising again, about the fact that todayâs science is practiced by technicians, [| 242] by virtuosos, who do not know what they are doing and to what end, about the responsibility that lies with philosophers for all sciences. There is a need to combine all sciences from one perspective, which, in his opinion, phenomenology will provide. The path leads through phenomenology to philosophy and combined sciences and, through truth, to the ethical elevation of humanity from its present state. All this is the task of human beings who, despite their smallness and nothingness in the vast universe, have to accomplish something extremely important. Husserl spoke about the absolute reliability, which has to permeate the life and work of a philosopher, about the necessity of avoiding people who treat philosophy recklessly, with an ironic smile, hiding destructive skepticism under the guise of scientific reliability. He spoke about the insignificance of egoism in science and life, about the fact that, if you understand your mission and task, you are selfless, do not care whether you are an inventor, do not polemicize, and remain silent in regard to the question of authorship. You work with a steadfast awareness that God is waiting for your work.
When I began my university studies in philosophy, Professor Twardowski told us about the priesthood of a philosopher, about the fact that only those who have acute ethical awareness should be philosophers. Edmund Husserl seems to me to be such a dignified priest of philosophy, worthy of deep veneration.
[The page numbers placed in the main text refer to the original pagination of text from 1930. See (Blaustein 1930a, pp. 233â242). All additions placed in square brackets in the text come from the translator. The style of references was edited in accordance with the style of references used in this book].
Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, the first edition in two volumes, published in Halle a. d. S. in 1900; the second revised edition of vol. 1 and the first part of vol. 2 were published there in 1913, whereas the second part of vol. 2 was published in 1921; the third unrevised edition was published there in 1922. Husserl, Ideen [was published] as the first book Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, vol. 1, 1913. [See (Husserl 1950; 1983; 1984; 2001)].
[â[O]n the lower pointâ].
Only in recent year, two subsequent works of Husserl were published: Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, ed. by M[artin] Heidegger, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, vol. 9, 1928 [see (Husserl 1966)] and Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft, there in vol. 10, 1929. [See (Husserl 1974)].
[See (Blaustein 1928/29a, pp. 164bâ166b)].
[See (Twardowski 1894; 1977)].
[âIt is a difficult case. It is hard to helpâ].
[â[A] more efficient philosophical education than the students of average German professors haveâ].
[âWe the little people only act with wordsâwe lack the intuition that characterizes the greatâ].
[âOne can polemicize against me back and forth; I am convinced that phenomenology will be the basis of all future philosophy. I work sub specie aeternitatisâ].