This volume collects writings of Leopold Blaustein (1905â1942 [?]), a Polish philosopher of Jewish origin, aesthetician, psychologist, schoolteacher and educationalist. In his writings, he attempted to connect various approaches, including descriptive psychology, phenomenology, and Gestaltism, in order to explore original phenomena like watching a theater play or listening to radio. He was educated primarily in Lvov (Lwów, Lviv), but he also studied in Germany. The key figure for him in Poland was Kazimierz Twardowski (1866â1938), a disciple of Franz Brentano (1838â1917). Twardowski acted as a supervisor of Blausteinâs doctoral dissertation, and he trained Blaustein in descriptive psychology. In Germany, in Freiburg im Breisgau, he participated in the classes of Edmund Husserl (1859â1938). In Berlin, Blaustein took part in lectures given by, among others, Carl Stumpf (1848â1936) and Max Wertheimer (1880â1943). Due to his stay in Berlin, he was familiar with Gestalt psychology. Blaustein is commonly regarded as a member of the LvovâWarsaw School, i.e., a school of thought rooted in the philosophy of Twardowski, which flourished in the first decades of the 20th century (until the outbreak of World War II).1 The LvovâWarsaw School was a multi-disciplinary intellectual formation where logic was dominant. Other areas, such as metaphilosophy, ontology, methodology, ethics and philosophical psychology, were also present. Due to his interdisciplinary training, Blaustein adopted various methodological tools, which he devised to connect different inquiries.
This volume brings together the complete collection of studies written by Blaustein on Husserl and his phenomenology. It also contains the very first English edition of Blausteinâs epistolary exchange with Twardowski, where one finds, among other things, Blausteinâs discussion of Gestalt psychology. All the texts were originally written in the Polish language between 1927 and 1937. The entire collection provides a unique insight into the legacy of Blaustein and shows how his thought was shaped in confrontation with Husserlâs philosophy, Gestalt psychology and within the framework of the LvovâWarsaw School. Blausteinâs texts demonstrate how important philosophical and psychological ideas migrated to new intellectual landscapes, and how they were modified and rephrased, leading to new formulations and original explorations. By confronting the vibrant intellectual environment of the LvovâWarsaw School with the mainstream currents in European philosophy, Blaustein has shown that in the first decades of the 20th century, philosophical ideas were able to connect different traditions (see Smith 2006, pp. 19â39). Overall, this collection contributes to the history of the 20th century philosophy by reintroducing an underrepresented scholar into contemporary scholarship.
Blaustein was born in 1905. He began his philosophy studies at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov probably in 1923. As has been mentioned above, the central figure for him in Lvov was Twardowski, the founder of the LvovâWarsaw School. Twardowski developed a philosophy in the spirit of Brentano. Twardowski lectured in Lvov on a wide scope of topics, including logic, the psychology of emotions, and the basics of descriptive psychology. From a metaphilosophical point of view, he put great emphasis on the clarity of language and the strictness of arguments. In addition, he promoted an analytical approach in philosophy. Blaustein took part in Twardowskiâs seminars. He discussed his dissertation with Twardowski during classes, private exchanges, and in letters. Due to Twardowskiâs training, Blaustein was familiar with Brentanoâs philosophy. Blaustein also classified his project, in accordance with Brentano, as âdescriptive psychologyâ (in Polish: âpsychologia deskryptywnaâ), where he conceived of mental phenomena as presentations or as based upon presentations; not to mention the Brentanian idea, clearly present in Blausteinâs texts, that psychology is a form of science (Brentano 1874, pp. 126â127; 1995, pp. 74â75). For Blaustein, Brentano was an important scholar who contributed to the ongoing debate on intentionality. In his doctoral dissertation, Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treÅci i przedmiocie przedstawienia [Husserlâs Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation] (Blaustein 1928),2 Blaustein traced the roots of Brentanoâs philosophy to Bernard Bolzano (1781â1848), namely the debate on the so-called objectless presentations. How can one present, think of, or judge something which does not really exist? For Blaustein, Brentanoâs solution lies in defining the intentional relation in terms of âin-existentâ objects, i.e., in the idea that the mind is intentional and has in-existent objects, even though these objects do not have to exist outside the mind (Brentano 1874, pp. 126â127; 1995, pp. 74â75).3 For this reason, Blaustein concludes, Brentanoâs psychology subscribes to the view that all psychic phenomena include something as their object. In so doing, Brentano reduces the object to a (mental) content. In Blausteinâs assessment, this reduction was crucial within the debate on presentations, as it was later criticized by, among others, Twardowski, Husserl, and Blaustein himself. Blaustein disagreed with Brentano that objects are mentally inexistent, arguing for a radical transcendence of the intentional object.
Apart from igniting his interest in Brentano, Blaustein owes Twardowski for the many ideas that later formed the basics of his philosophy. Blaustein referred to his Lvov teacher on many occasions in his writings. Moreover, he often consulted his research plans with Twardowski.4 Therefore, Twardowskiâs mentorship made a huge impact on Blausteinâs development. To make manifest Twardowskiâs influence, Blaustein, following his teacher, was aware that mental phenomena are accessible in inner perception, and thus they both accepted introspection as the infallible source of psychological knowledge. Furthermore, they were both aware that introspection itself can be insufficient as experiences are temporal and momentary. If a psychologist is unable to notice actual experiences because of their fluidity and instability, introspection requires a supplementary tool, namely memory, treating it as a reliable tool. Accordingly, Blaustein classified retrospection, following Twardowski, as a supplementary method in relation to the method of introspection. The aim of such a description is to classify mental phenomena, despite the fact that Blaustein was focused chiefly on the classification of presentations, leaving the taxonomy of judgments and emotions unaccounted for. It should be emphasized that all the aforementioned elements are common in Blaustein, Twardowski and Brentano. This is connected with the fact that Twardowskiâs psychology also bore the mark of Brentanoâs thought.5
Twardowski was not the only teacher in Lvov who played a role in shaping Blausteinâs ideas. Blaustein was also trained in Lvov by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890â1963) and Roman Ingarden (1893â1970). Ajdukiewicz, a prominent fellow of the LvovâWarsaw School, was a logician and methodologist. One of Ajdukiewiczâs most original contributions was made to the theory of meaning, establishing the so-called âdirectival theory of meaning.â Blaustein participated in Ajdukiewiczâs lectures on logic given in 1924/25, to which he referred in his book on schematic and symbolic presentations (Blaustein 1931, pp. 59â60, fn. 1). He also was familiar with Ajdukiewiczâs theory of meaning. In the 1930s, Ajdukiewicz discussed with Blaustein the latterâs account of the phenomenon of listening to the radio. Finally, there was Ingarden, a member of the Göttingen Circle of Husserlâs students, who used phenomenology in ontology and aesthetics. In 1927, Blaustein participated in Ingardenâs course on the literary work of art; and later, in 1934â39, Blaustein took part in Ingardenâs seminars on aesthetics. Like Ingarden, Blaustein was interested in issues of aesthetics, including the question of the structure of aesthetic experiences. Not only did Blaustein review Ingardenâs works in scholarly journals, but he also made far-reaching connections between Ingardenâs ideas and his own. By and large, it is evident that Blausteinâs Lvov training in philosophy shaped his thought. In his early books, he explicitly expressed his gratitude to Twardowski, Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden (e.g., Blaustein 1931, p. 99, fn. 1).
Blaustein was an outstanding student. In 1925, he determined the topic of his dissertation, which was to explore Husserlâs theory of intentionality. It is difficult to determine all the reasons behind his interest in Husserl. Arguably, Blaustein was encouraged by Twardowski who regarded Husserlâs theory as rooted in the theory set out in Twardowskiâs habilitation book on objects and contents of presentations. Moreover, Husserlâs Logische Untersuchungen was a popular textbook among Twardowskiâs students. Blaustein attempted to situate Husserlâs theory in the tradition of Bolzano and Brentano. He discussed topics such as the concept of presentation in relation to Husserlâs lived experiences, the problem of sensations in the structure of intentional acts, the problem of understanding the intentional content by Husserl or his account of intuitive fullness and noematic sense (Blasutein 1928).6
While working on his dissertation, Blaustein went to Germany to meet Husserl in person. To go there, Blaustein was recommended to Husserl by Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden. In a letter written to Ingarden, Ajdukiewicz called Blaustein âa very modest and decent boy,â adding that Blaustein âread the entire pre-Husserlian and post-Husserlian literature devoted to the topic and fell in love with Husserlâ (Ajdukiewicz 1925). In the same letter, Ajdukiewicz asked Ingarden to write a recommendation for Blaustein so that he could visit Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau and take part in his lectures. Indeed, Ingarden wrote the letter of recommendation, and Husserl, as he wrote back, would welcome Blaustein to Freiburg (Husserl 1994, p. 226). At that time, Husserl lectured on phenomenological psychology and conducted a seminar on describing psychic acts. Blaustein took part in both classes. In his memoirs on Husserl and his stay in Freiburg, Blaustein expressed a conviction that Husserlâs lectures on phenomenological psychology are of primal importance. Blaustein claimed, for instance, that only on the basis of these lectures is one able to understand Husserlâs view of psychology in its relation to philosophy and to respond adequately to the realismâidealism controversy (Blaustein 1930a, pp. 233â242; 2013, pp. 223â233).7 The latter topic was broadly discussed among Polish scholars in Lvov. In addition, Husserlâs practical remarks on the role of philosophy and its moral value also drew Blausteinâs attention. Blaustein spent a few weeks in Germany, probably in July, 1925.
Some scholars argue that the influence of Husserl on Blaustein is clear, which led them to push for a classification of Blausteinâs philosophy as âanalytic phenomenologyâ (WoleÅski 1989, p. 310, fn. 11; Pokropski 2015, p. 94), since Blaustein seems to connect Twardowskiâs analytical approach with Husserlâs phenomenological approach. Some even argue that Blaustein rejected the former and adopted the latter (RosiÅska 2005, p. xvii). This classification, however, is not fully adequate. Blausteinâs phenomenology was developed more along Brentanian-Twardowskian lines, rather than along Husserlian lines. In defense of this reading, it is important to note that Blaustein criticized Husserlâs methodology. This critique was formulated after Blaustein returned to Poland to finalize his doctoral dissertation and pass the final exams.8 After passing his exams, Blaustein took a job at the ninth gymnasium in Lvov as a teacher of German and philosophy.
In his assessment of Blausteinâs dissertation, Twardowski recommended publishing it as a monograph. To this end, Blaustein went for a few months to Berlin, where, thanks to Twardowskiâs recommendation, he received a fellowship to work on the final version of his dissertation. Blaustein was in Berlin between December 1927 and March or April 1928. There he participated in lectures held by Stumpf, who was Brentanoâs student and a friend of Twardowskiâs. In addition, Blaustein took classes given by Wertheimer, Kurt Lewin (1890â1947), and Wolfgang Köhler (1887â1967), who were prominent fellows of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology. Blaustein participated in seminars organized by Wertheimer at the Berlin Psychological Institute, where he discussed phenomenology with the Gestaltists. While being there, Blaustein corresponded with Twardowski, informing him about possible cooperation with the Berlin scholars and his own ideas.9 Blausteinâs stay in Berlin not only inspired his original studies on the theoretical basis of descriptive psychology, but also opened his eyes to practical applications of descriptive psychology, e.g., the use of experiments in descriptive psychology. In one of his letters, Blaustein mentioned that during discussions with the Gestaltists, he finally realized the main critical points regarding phenomenology.
Intensive studies in Berlin resonated in Blausteinâs texts. For instance, he took from the Gestaltists the idea that one can combine descriptive and experimental approaches. He also referred to the idea of Gestalt. At the Berlin Psychological Institute, Blaustein had an opportunity to observe how the Gestaltists designed experiments. For instance, he was impressed by the way in which the Gestaltists used a film camera to illustrate concrete objects of research or to control an ongoing experiment. Blaustein even suggested that he wished to popularize the Gestaltistsâ way of designing and using experiments in psychology among the Lvov scholars. Arguably, Blaustein saw in experimentation a promising way of developing descriptive psychology, especially because he claimed that the Gestaltistsâ use of experiments is uncritical.10 In addition, on many occasions, Blaustein wrote about Gestalts as important factors that shape and determine our experiences. In particular, he was interested in perception which, according to him, is not so much object-oriented as it is aimed at certain wholes or Gestalts. Of course, the concept of âGestaltâ is ambiguous as it may refer to a structure, a form or an aspect. For Blaustein, this concept underlines the fact that, rather than being only aspect-based, experiences capture their objects holistically. Thus, an object is always given in a certain context which significantly determines the manner by which one perceives the object. As such, objects are present as Gestalts; meaning, they are already ordered to a certain degree and are experienced by someone as higher-order wholes. This idea was developed by Blaustein in his works (Blaustein 1930b, p. 33; 2005, p. 61; 2011, p. 228).
Back in Lvov, Blaustein edited the final version of his dissertation for publication. The book was finally published in 1928 as Husserlowska nauka⦠[Husserlâs Theoryâ¦]. In the same year, Blaustein presented, during a talk given at the meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society, his thorough critique of phenomenologyâs methods. In his talk, he explicitly offered to comprehend phenomenology as a version of descriptive psychology, which should be empirical and focused on types of lived experiences, rather than on essences of acts (Blaustein 1928/29, pp. 164bâ166b).11 In his reading of Husserlâs works, Blaustein draws a sharp division between Husserlâs Untersuchungen and Ideen I (Blaustein 1930a, p. 234; 2013, pp. 226â227).12 In the former, according to Blaustein, phenomenology is basically a form of descriptive psychology (Husserl 1984, p. 24, fn. 1; 2001, vol. 1, pp. 176â177). In what sense is phenomenology regarded as a psychological discipline in Untersuchungen? First of all, phenomenology investigates lived experiences, and for this reason it adopts an introspective procedure. Here, Husserlâs aim is to notice and describe basic elements of an intentional act. The description is limited to actual experiences, and it does not deal with causes that go beyond what is actually experienced. Defined thusly, description aims at identifying dependent and independent parts that together form an act. An act of consciousness and its properties, e.g., intentionality, are not accounted for as an object that is separable from a lived experience, but rather, in Blausteinâs terms, as a âpurely descriptiveâ element; i.e., as a âquality of certain lived experiencesâ or, more precisely, as an âessential property of psychic phenomenaâ (Blaustein 1928, pp. 28, 56).13 The ultimate aims of Husserlâs investigations are, first, a classification of mental phenomena and, second, a formulation of relevant psychological laws that explain the order of mental life.
According to Blaustein, this early project from Untersuchungen was changed in Ideen I. In the latter, Husserl introduced and subsequently used the method of reduction (epoché). This method changes the subject-matter of descriptions since, after the performance of reduction, one deals not with an empirical consciousness, but with the so-called pure consciousness. According to Blaustein, phenomenology in Ideen I is a sophisticated procedure that employs the method of phenomenological reduction, which is equivalent to treating it as descriptive eidetics of pure experiences of consciousness based on seeing essences (Wesenschau). In his complex criticism of Husserlâs methodology, Blaustein attempted to show that phenomenological eidetics and Husserlâs method of seeing essences, contrary to Husserlâs conviction, eventually fall prey to the petitio principii fallacy.14 It is precisely for this reason that a psychologist should investigate mental phenomena that are understood as types (as Twardowski would suggest), rather than as essences (as Husserl would suggest). By âtypeâ, Blaustein understood the lowest species formulated by way of abstraction from incidental properties (Blaustein 1928/29, p. 165a).15 Types are arrived at not through a form of (Husserlâs) seeing essences, but through a series of observations (in the spirit of Brentanoâs and Twardowskiâs descriptive psychology) by skipping certain properties. In this regard, Husserlâs eidetic variation has to be replaced by the method of abstraction. This approach, which is different from seeing essences, does not require affirmation of the existence of essences understood as general objects. The latter, from Blausteinâs point of view, are a mere linguistic hypostasis. Thus, one should apply the inductive method instead of any form of questionable seeing essences. This is why, according to Blausteinâs conclusion, â[â¦] phenomenology is possible only as an empirical, descriptive science of types (the lowest species) of experiences in pure consciousness, not as an a priori, descriptive science of higher essences as ideal objectsâ (idem, p. 165b).16
Given Blausteinâs criticism of Husserlâs method, it is evident that he accounted for Husserlâs phenomenology first and foremost as a descriptive analysis of intentionality. This is not the right place to discuss the details of this reading. However, it is instructive to highlight one point. As has already been stated, Blaustein was critical of Brentanoâs classification of the intentional object as mentally in-existent. To argue against this psychological standpoint, Blaustein used Husserlâs theory of intentionality. For Blaustein, Husserlâs intentionality is relational in the sense that it is a two-relata relation, wherein acts are focused on the transcendent object. In this regard, Blaustein wrote about the âintentional relationâ (in Polish: âstosunek intencjonalnyâ). This relation is grounded in an actâs function of apprehending or interpreting sensations. Nonetheless, with regard to experiences, one does not see sensations but the perceived object (Blaustein 1928, p. 33).17 The presenting content of oneâs lived experiences is comprised of the sensations that present the object, and the object itself appears through interpreted content. Only by virtue of interpreting sensations (Blaustein also used the German term âDeutungâ for âinterpretationâ) can an object appear as a perceived object. For Blaustein, the relationship between consciousness and its object is best described as intended, âgoing toward somethingâ or simply as âbeing conscious of somethingâ (idem, p. 38).18 With that said, the object is transcendent and cannot be reduced to the presenting content. Blaustein takes the transcendence of the object, following Husserl, to entail that the object has its own properties (such as color) with their corresponding (yet not identically equivalent) sensations (located also on the side of lived experience). While perceiving an object, only some properties may be intended in oneâs experience, whilst others may be ignored. This, however, does not mean that the object is nothing, but rather that it is a subjective and private presentation. Blaustein clearly emphasized that â[a]ll intentional objects exist [â¦] outside of presentationâ (idem, p. 41).19 Of course, here the term âexistenceâ is not understood metaphysically but rather descriptively. This term describes the feature of all presentations, which are directed toward something. In this regard, Blaustein writes:
the intentional object of a presentation is identical with its real [object], if such [an object] exists. A transcendent object would not be the object of the presentation it is the object of if it were not its intentional object. This statement is evident and analytic. In turn, if we state that an object is âonly intentional,â this does not mean that it exists in the intentional act as its real part or some adumbration of the object; rather, this means only that there exists an intentional act, an act which intends such an object. However, if the intentional object is real, not only does the intentional act exist, but so too does its object.
idem, p. 4220
All things considered, Blaustein does not hold the term âintentionalâ in the expression âintentional objectâ as referring to existence in consciousness or a kind of âin-existence,â but to the existence of the act in which the object is intended. Blausteinâs account is close to contemporary accounts of intentionality as a de re relation.
From 1928 to 1931, Blaustein worked on the basics of his theory of presentations. The latter was eventually formulated in two books: Przedstawienia imaginatywnne [Imaginative Presentations] (originally published in 1930) and Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations] (originally published in 1931). In these works, Blaustein referred to aesthetics to illustrate how his original theory of presentations can be applied to, e.g., experiences related to contemplating a painting, a sculpture or a theater play. The theory of presentations that he put forth in these books resembled Ingardenâs theory as presented in his 1931 book, Das literarische Kunstwerk. Interestingly, in a footnote included in § 57 of the book that discusses the theater play, Ingarden noted that a comparable theory to the one presented in his book can be found in Blausteinâs Przedstawienia imaginatywnne [Imaginative Presentations]; yetâas he wroteâhe had not read Blausteinâs book before the publication of Das literarische Kunstwerk.21 Even though he published a few books, Blaustein never got an official position at the university. Ingarden, on the other hand, assumed a chair at the university.
Blausteinâs analysis of Husserl was comprehended by him as the basis for his general theory of presentations, which he adopted in his aesthetics. Undoubtedly, Blausteinâs aesthetics is rich and complex,22 but a few remarks can be helpful. According to Blaustein, aesthetic experiences are described as complex acts which combine different mental phenomena, presentations, judgments, emotions and volitions. Among these, presentations occupy a central position. As he upheld, there are aesthetic experiences with no judgments or with a minimal presence of volitions (Blaustein 1932, pp. 365â367). The subject who experiences relevant presentations constitutes the aesthetic object which, in turn, is given in specific modes or ways. For this reason, Blaustein wrote about different âways of givennessâ or âways of manifestationâ (Gegebenheitsweisen) of the object (Blaustein 1937, pp. 245â249). These modes, however, are not passively given, but are constituted in their corresponding experiences. Although the preliminary phase of any aesthetic experience is passive, the subject is strictly active in adopting adequate attitudes toward the object. To understand these remarks, it is instructive to refer to Blausteinâs analysis of the experience of watching Shawâs Caesar and Cleopatra, formulated in his 1930 book, Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations] (Blaustein 1930b, p. 15; 2005, p. 48; 2011, p. 216). During the play, what one directly or perceptually experiences are events that are happening on stage. Here, one perceives conversations of two persons, their interactions on stage, etc. Blaustein observes that these objects are adequately presented in perceptual presentations. However, as the viewer shifts their attitude toward the distant objects on stage, they perceive Caesar talking with Cleopatra. Accordingly, the viewer perceives actorsâ performances which, strictly speaking, are not parts of their surrounding world but the world represented in the theater performance. The actors are in the theater, but Caesar and Cleopatra are in Egypt. Blaustein described such objects as quasi-real or imaginative. In this example, the imaginative object (e.g., Caesar) is constituted in the imaginative presentation and is given at once as intuitive (the real movements and words happening on stage) and as non-intuitive (Caesar meeting Cleopatra). Whereas the former is the close or proper object of the perceptual intention, the latter is the distant or improper object of the imaginative intention. Blaustein compared this experience with illusion as both experiences are based on a first-person perspective. What differentiates the imaginative experience from the illusionary one is the lack of a belief that the object exists (in the case of an illusion, according to Blaustein, one has to believe that the illusionary object exists). Blausteinâs key insight is that aesthetic experiences are structured as combinations of presentations, which are apprehended by the subject who adopts different attitudes toward close or distant objects.
In 1930, Blaustein married Eugenia Ginsberg (1905â1942 [?]), Twardowskiâs student who wrote her dissertation on Husserlâs wholeâpart theory. Later, in the 1930s, Blaustein worked as a secondary school teacher in Lvov. Nonetheless, he attempted to continue his academic research. For instance, he cooperated with the Polish Philosophical Society, and he translated into German Alfred Tarskiâs (1901â1983) text on the concept of truth in formalized languages.23 At that time, Blaustein was developing a few parallel projects. Two of them are worth mentioning. The first project concerned the structure and character of cinemagoersâ experiences. In 1933, Blaustein published a short book, Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer], which contained a detailed analysis of the structure of this type of experience. In his book, Blaustein referred also to, among others, Stephan Witasek, Moritz Geiger, Wilhelm Schapp and Ingarden. He systematically analyzed the structure of phenomena related to watching a movie in a cinema. He identified three major parts of these experiences taken as wholes, namely, content, act and object. In the case of watching a movie, the presenting contents are visual sensations which are given âonâ a cinema screen, as well as auditory sensations which accompany the visual ones. Blaustein describes visual sensations as phantoms that are flickering and changing all the time âonâ the screen (Blaustein 1933, pp. 6â7; 2005, p. 94). He also described this experience as a permanent game of lights and shadows. Oneâs watching a movie is not a perception of meaningless lights and colors. They âseeâ some objects. This is possible due to the relevant apprehensions: phantoms are not experiences as such, but they are apprehended in an act. One does not âseeâ phantoms, but objects; e.g., one âseesâ a house filmed in the movie and displayed âonâ the screen, not a game of lights and shadows understood as a combination of meaningless shapes and surfaces. Thus, a viewer watches a movie in the sense that they adopt a specific attitude which enables them to be directed toward objects represented in the movie. For Blaustein, the viewer identifies themselves with the point of view of a camera. Blaustein rightly noted that the world filmed in a movie has a specific orientation, i.e., it is presented from the perspective of a camera. He attempted to explain this with a reference to the phenomenon of projecting (in Polish: ârzutowanieâ) a cinemagoerâs body into the imaginative world as if they were standing where the camera filmed the reproduced objects (Blaustein 1933, p. 14; 2005, pp. 99â100).
The second project concerned the radio experience. The 1930s was a period that saw a growing popularity of radio. In 1938, Blaustein published a book which presented his explorations: O percepcji sÅuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama]. The book contained insightful views on the structure of the radio phenomenon, and some practical instructions on how to improve the reception of a broadcast. This book was published by the Research Bureau of Polish Radio. In this book, one finds an interesting analysis of the phenomenon of what he called âacousionâ (in Polish: âakuzjaâ). This term was designed by Blaustein on the basis of the term âvisionâ (Blaustein 1938, p. 4; 2005, p. 147). Blausteinâs idea lies between the parallels of perceiving sounds (acousion) and visual perceptions (vision). Just as one can directly âseeâ objects, one can also âseeâ objects that make sounds, yet only on the basis of auditory experiences. Therefore, the phenomenon of acousion is described as a way in which one constitutes an auditory âspaceâ, where one âplacesâ heard objects. How does Blaustein describe this process? First, on a very rudimentary level of experience, the presenting content is given, which in this class of experiences includes purely auditory sensations. Here, the presenting content is comprised of sounds or murmurs. As such, these are non-intentional components, which are not perceived per se. One does not apprehend the presenting content in the same way it can be apprehended in, say, listening to music. Instead, one perceives sounds made by living creatures or by things. This is possible due to the fact that the content is apprehended by relevant acts. As a result, one apprehends the content which enables them to be intentionally directed to certain objects. For example, one hears meaningful sounds, and while apprehending them, they realize that they hear the sound of the river or the clatter of the train. For this reason, one perceives objects in a radio drama directly or âintuitivelyâ in propria persona. It is precisely this aspect of perceiving sounds that Blaustein has in mind when he uses the term âacousion.â Acousion, then, refers to the specifically auditory way of presenting objects that are heard by the listener. Blausteinâs point is that one does not âseeâ the object represented by sounds while listening to a radio drama; rather, one âhearsâ the represented objects. The following fragment taken from O percepcji sÅuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama] should be read in the context of the above: â[â¦] to perceive a radio drama, one has to have auditory experiences of ambient sounds, such as a ringtone or the wind, as well as an understanding the words and sentences uttered by the characters of the radio dramaâ (Blaustein 1938, pp. 20â21; 2005, p. 160). In a nutshell, acousion describes a first-person way of presenting heard objects given in apprehended auditory sensations.
Blausteinâs interests in aesthetics were planned to be summarized in a comprehensive study, Die ästhetische Perzeption [The Aesthetic Perception], written in German, which was completed in 1939 just before the outbreak of World War II. Unfortunately, the manuscript of the book was lost during the war. The role of perception in aesthetic experiences was present in other studies written by Blaustein in the 1930s. One can get an impression of how Blausteinâs book might have developed its main arguments from these studies. After the outbreak the war, and because of his Jewish origins, Blaustein and his family were moved to the Jewish Ghetto in Lvov. Blausteinâs exact date of death is unknown. He probably died there (together with his wife and their son) in 1942.
This volume provides a framework for Blausteinâs entire oeuvre by showing his embeddedness in the legacy of Brentano, Twardowski, Husserl, and Gestalt psychology. As has been demonstrated above, Blausteinâs philosophy was shaped by these frameworks, and for this reason it is important to track this multiplicity of ideas as they present themselves in his writings. This volume will provide the reader with an opportunity to examine the theoretical foundations of Blausteinâs thought.
The texts published in this collection are edited on the basis of the following publications and documents:
The texts collected in this volume refer to the original pagination of the above listed publications in square brackets included directly within the main text.
All remarks put in square brackets are from the editor. The style of references is consistent throughout the volume. The list of references attached at the end of this collection was edited by Witold PÅotka.
Blaustein, L. (1928). Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treÅci i przedmiocie przedstawienia. Lvov: NakÅadem Towarzystwa Naukowego z ZasiÅkiem Ministerstwa WyznaÅ Religijnych i OÅwiecenia Publicznego.
Blaustein, L. (1928/29). Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii. Ruch Filozoficzny 11, 164bâ166b.
Blaustein, L. (1930). Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia. PrzeglÄ d Humanistyczny 5(2), 233â242.
Blaustein, L. (1927/37). Letters to Kazimierz Twardowski. In: Korespondencja Kazimierza Twardowskiego. Tom 03. Bed-Blu. Signature AKT=K-02-01-03. Warsaw: Archiwum Cyfrowe PoÅÄ czonych Bibliotek WFiS UW, IFiS PAN i PTF oraz Polskiej Akademii Nauk Archiwum w Warszawie. Available online: https://archiwum.polaczonebiblioteki.uw.edu.pl/akt/dokumenty/korespondencja-naukowa/ Accessed on October 19, 2023.
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Blaustein, L. (1928/29). Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii. Ruch Filozoficzny 11, 164bâ166b.
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For more on the LvovâWarsaw School, see, e.g., (Brożek 2020, pp. 197â233; Citlak 2019, pp. 1049â1077; Citlak 2023, pp. 1665â1681; Jadacki 2006, pp. 41â83; WoleÅski 1989, pp. 1â26; WoleÅski 2022).
See the edition below.
For more on Brentanoâs theory of intentionality, and on âmental inexistence,â see (Chrudzimski 2001; Taieb 2018).
See (Blaustein 1927/37). See Blausteinâs letters to Twardowski in this edition. For an overview, see (Jadczak 1993, pp. 19â27). For more on Twardowskiâs account of Brentanoâs psychology, see (PÅotka 2022, pp. 351â370).
See (Brożek 2020, pp. 197â233; PÅotka 2022, pp. 351â370; WoleÅski 2017, pp. 47â64).
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
Blausteinâs philosophy exam was on May 19th, 1927, whichâin Twardowskiâs assessmentâhe passed âvery well.â The final exam took place on November 18th, 1927. See (Twardowski 1997, p. 307).
For this correspondence, see the edition below.
He expressed this attitude, for instance, at the very beginning of his 1930 book, Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]. He wrote as follows: âI do not oppose descriptive and experimental psychologyâin line with the intentions of eminent experimental psychologists such as Köhler, Wertheimer and others. Descriptions and experiments are two methods of one and the same discipline. This is not to say that there are no areas in psychological research that are available only to the descriptive or only to the experimental method. In the great majority of cases, however, descriptions and experiments are two phases of psychological investigation. Even though experiments will sometimes verify the results of descriptive psychology, they are usually used to study specific problems on the basis of fundamental concepts that are analyzed and defined within the framework of descriptive psychologyâ (Blaustein 1930b, p. 5, fn. 1; 2005, p. 40, fn. 1). My translation. Note that my translation differs from the one by Bokiniec, in: (Blaustein 2011, p. 209, fn. 1).
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
For more on this criticism, see (PÅotka 2021, pp. 249â270; 2024, pp. 113â139).
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
See also the edition below.
See (Ingarden 1931, p. 329, fn. 1; 1965, p. 340, fn. 1; 1973, pp. 319â320, fn. 10). It is worth noting that Ingarden tried to discuss this convergence of ideas with Blaustein. In 1931, Ingarden sent a note to the journal Polskie Archiwum Psychologii [Polish Archive of Psychology], in which he accused Blaustein of plagiarizing his theory of purely intentional objects. Nonetheless, Ingardenâs reply was never published since it was blocked by Baley, who was Twardowskiâs and Stumpfâs former student and the editor-in-chief of the journal. I am grateful to Aleksandra Horecka for her remark on Ingardenâs unpublished text.
For more on this issue, see (RosiÅska 2011, pp. 199â208).
For more on this issue, see (Gruber 2016).