Preface IX
List of Abbreviations XI
Part 1
Introduction
1
The Investigative Response to Civilian Casualties: More Questions Than Answers 3
1.1
Introduction 3
1.2
Taking a Closer Look 7
1.3
Book Overview 9
1.3.1
The Use of Force, Civilian Casualties and Investigations 9
1.3.2
Manoeuvring between Operational Paradigms and Legal Regimes 15
Part 2
Setting the Normative Framework
2
‘The Trigger Question’: When Do Civilian Casualties Require an Investigation? 23
2.1
The Investigation Trigger under International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 24
2.2
The Investigation Trigger under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 26
2.2.1
War Crimes 27
2.2.2
A Failure of Precautions 30
2.2.3
A Duty to Investigate All Cases of Civilian Casualties? 41
2.3
Conclusion 46
3
‘The Standards Question’: How to Investigate Civilian Casualties? 48
3.1
Investigation Standards under IHRL 48
3.1.1
General 48
3.1.2
An Effective Investigation 50
3.1.3
Independence and Impartiality 53
3.1.4
Victim Involvement and Transparency 58
3.1.5
3.2
Investigation Standards under LOAC 64
3.2.1
General 64
3.2.2
War Crimes 65
3.2.3
A Failure of Precautions 70
3.3
Conclusion 76
4
Translating Investigation Obligations to LOAC Situations 77
4.1
The Interaction between IHRL and LOAC 77
4.2
Classification Issues 80
4.3
International Armed Conflict (IAC) 84
4.4
Non-international Armed Conflict (NIAC) 86
4.5
A Conduct-of-Hostilities Paradigm: Temporal and Geographical Dimensions 89
4.6
Occupation 92
4.6.1
General 92
4.6.2
Troubled Occupation 95
4.6.3
The Use of Force 96
4.7
Conclusion 98
Part 3
Investigating Civilian Casualties in Practice
5
Challenges in Classifying and Identifying the Applicable Normative Framework(s) 103
5.1
‘Stretching’ a Hostilities Paradigm 104
5.1.1
US 104
5.1.2
UK 107
5.1.3
Israel 110
5.2
‘Stretching’ a Law-Enforcement Paradigm 114
5.2.1
Iraq 115
5.2.2
Afghanistan 116
5.2.3
oPt 117
5.3
Uncertainty in Relation to the Intensity Test 123
5.4
IAC/NIAC Classification 129
5.5
Further Complications: Additional Legal Sources and Policy Considerations 132
5.5.1
UK, Canada 132
5.5.2
US 135
5.6
5.6.1
General 138
5.6.2
Effective Control and Provision of Governmental Services 140
5.6.3
Consent of the Local Government 141
5.6.4
Prolonged Occupation 143
5.7
Al-Skeini and B’tselem Cases: Two Sides of a Legal Coin 146
5.7.1
Al-Skeini 146
5.7.2
B’tselem 147
5.8
Conclusion 152
6
Investigation Models and Constraints in Domestic Military Justice Systems 153
6.1
Introduction 153
6.2
Models Identified in State Practice 155
6.2.1
The Commander Model 155
6.2.2
The Professional Model 166
6.2.3
A Mixed Model: Mandatory Reporting to a Professional Body in Serious Cases 170
6.3
Conclusion 182
7
Military In-House Investigations and Some Mitigating Arrangements 184
7.1
Command Investigations 184
7.1.1
A Controversial Mechanism 184
7.1.2
Judging Command Investigations in Light of Their Function 189
7.2
Considering Mitigating Arrangements 191
7.2.1
Enhancing the Involvement of Professional Bodies 191
7.2.2
Setting Time Frames and Considering Initial Findings Carefully 194
7.2.3
Openness 195
7.3
Problems with Professional Bodies 197
7.3.1
Failure to Open a Formal and Professional Investigation 197
7.3.2
Problems with the Conduct of Criminal Investigations 201
7.4
Conclusion 205
8
Civilian Oversight of Military Investigations 207
8.1
An Ad Hoc Civilian Investigatory Body 207
8.2
Administrative Review 210
8.3
Judicial Review 211
8.3.1
General 211
8.3.2
Jurisdiction and Admissibility 212
8.3.3
8.4
A Permanent Civilian Expert Body 218
8.4.1
The MPCC (Canada) 218
8.4.2
HMIC (UK) 220
8.4.3
Israel 221
8.5
Conclusion 222
Part 4
Looking Forward
9
A Proposal for a Permanent Expert Commission 227
9.1
A Question of Mandate 228
9.1.1
General 228
9.1.2
External-Civilian Investigations? 229
9.1.3
IHRL and Lessons Learned from the Civilian Oversight of Police Investigations 231
9.2
The Proposed Mandate 238
10
The Duty to Investigate and Shaping the Normative Discourse 242
10.1
The Difficulties of Investigating 242
10.2
Enhanced Scrutiny and Heavier Burden 245
10.3
State Pushback 251
10.4
A Permanent Expert Commission: Incentives for States 254
10.5
Conclusion 257
Table of Treaties and Other International Instruments 259
Table of International Cases 261
Table of Domestic Instruments 264
Table of Domestic Cases 266
Bibliography 269
Index 289