Paul Thomâs book presents Kilwardbyâs science of logic as a body of demonstrative knowledge about inferences and their validity, about the semantics of non-modal and modal propositions, and about the logic of genus and species. This science is thoroughly intensional. It grounds the logic of inference on that in virtue of which the inference holds. It bases the truth conditions of propositions on relations between conceptual entities. It explains the logic of genus and species through the notion of essence.
Thom interprets this science as a formal logic of intensions with its own proof theory and semantics. This comprehensive reconstruction of Kilwardbyâs logic shows the medieval master to be one of the most interesting logicians of the thirteenth century.
Paul Thom, B.Phil. (Oxford), is Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities. He has authored numerous books on the history of logic.
"Robert Kilwardby (d. 1279) was almost always of interest to medieval philosophers. This interest, however, has seldom been replicated by modern editorial initiatives, leaving our appreciation of the Oxford masterâs intellectual profile incomplete, and perhaps uneven. We are aware of the different contributions that Kilwardby made to metaphysics and to the natural philosophy of his time, and we know that he was a dedicated and influential logician. We may even claim that Kilwardby was a fortunate logician, for he was one of the first scholars in the Latin West to read and to comment on the newly discovered books of Aristotleâs logic. This feature is greatly stressed in Paul Thomâs second book devoted exclusively to Kilwardbyâs "science of logic", as described in the title.[...] Thomâs volume already stands as a great and inspiring work for the almost timeless interpretative potential he fairly attributes to Robert Kilwardbyâs logic." Edit Anna Lukacs, in Speculum 96/1 , (January 2021).
Acknowledgements List of Figures and Tables Abbreviations
âIntroduction
â1Logic as Science and Art
â1âThe Evolution of Logic
â2âThe Art of Logic
â3âBranches of the Science of Logic
â4âThe Science of Logic as Sermocinal
â5The Science of Logic Distinguished from Other Content in the Organon
â6âKilwardbyâs Writings on Logic
â7âAspects of Kilwardbyâs Thought
â8âFormalisation
â2âThe Logic of Terms: Categories and Complex Terms
â1âThe Categories
â2âComplex Terms
â3âFormal Language
â4âModels
â5âTheorems
â3The Logic of Terms: Relations between Terms
â1âThe Predicables
â2âGenus and Species
â3âDifferentia
â4âProprium
â5âAccident
â6âFormal Analysis
â7âFormal Language
â8âModels
â9âTruth in a Model
â10âPostulates
â11âTheorems
â4âThe Logic of Statements: Assertoric Statements
â1âPropositions and Statements
â2âAssertoric Statements
â3âTruth
â4âUt nunc assertorics
â5âSimpliciter Assertorics
â6âNatural simpliciter Assertorics
â7âOpposition and Equipollence
â8âConversion
â9âNon-Aristotelian Consequences among Assertorics
â10âFormal Analysis
â11âTheorems
â5âThe Logic of Statements: Necessity and Possibility Statements
â1âModal Statements
â2âNecessity Statements
â3âPossibility Statements
â4âFormal Analysis
â5âFormal Language
â6âModels
â7âTheorems
â6âThe Logic of Statements: Contingency Statements
â1âUnampliated Contingencies
â2âKilwardbyâs Examples
â3âAmpliated Contingencies
â4âKilwardbyâs Rules for the Truth of Ampliated Contingency Statements
â5âKilwardbyâs Examples
â6âFormal Analysis
â7âTheorems
â7âThe Logic of Inferences: Consequences
â1âConsequences According to the Relations between Terms
â2âFormal Consequences
â3Pure Rules of Consequence
â4Rules of Consequence and Conversion
â5Rules of Consequence and Opposition
â6Rules of Consequence, Opposition and Repugnance
â7Rules of Consequence and Possibility
â8Rules of Consequence and Assertion
â9Rules of Consequence and Denial
â10Essential Consequences
â11Essential Consequence and Essential Inseparability
â12Syllogistic Consequences
â13Formal Analysis
â14Truth Conditions
â15Postulates
â16Theorems
â8The Logic of Inferences: Assertoric Syllogisms
â1Syllogistic Figures and Moods
â2Reduction
â3Perfection
â4Being Said of All
â5Families of Syllogism
â6Principles, Validity, Perfectibility
â7Mixed ut nunc / simpliciter Inferences
â8Summary
â9Formal Analysis
â10Generative Rules
â11Theorems
â9The Logic of Inferences: Necessity Syllogisms
â1Family 3. The LLL Family
â2Principles for LL Premises
â3Being Said of All
â4Reduction
â5Summary
â6Family 4. The LXlL Family
â7Principles for L / Xl Premises
â8Being Said of All
â9Inferences Related to the Perfect Syllogisms
â10Reduction
â11Summary
â12Formal Analysis
â13Theorems
â10The Logic of Inferences: Contingency Syllogisms
â1Unrestricted Syllogistic Conversion in Family 3
â2Unrestricted Syllogistic Conversion in Family 4
â3Family 5. The Qâ Qâ Qâ Family
â4Family 6. The QXlQ Family
â5Family 7. The QLQ Family
â6Formal Analysis
â11The Logic of Inferences: Non-perfectible Inferences
â1xq Premises
â2Realised Modals
â3Formal Analysis
â4Envoi
âReferences
âModern Author Index
âSubject Index
âAncient an Medieval Author Index
Anyone interested in the history of medieval logic, anyone interested in Kilwardbyâs thought, and anyone interested in ways to develop intensional logics.