Ens Primum Cognitum in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition presents a reading of Thomas Aquinasâ claim that âbeingâ is the first object of the human intellect. Blending the insights of both the early Thomistic tradition (c.1380â1637AD) and the Leonine Thomistic revival (1879âpresent), Brian Kemple examines how this claim of Aquinas has been traditionally understood, and what is lacking in that understanding.
While the recent tradition has emphasized the primacy of the real (so-called ens reale) in human recognition of the primum cognitum, Kemple argues that this misinterprets Aquinas, thereby closing off Thomistic philosophy to the broader perspective needed to face the philosophical challenges of today, and proposes an alternative interpretation with dramatic epistemological and metaphysical consequences.
Brian Kemple, Ph.D. (2016), is a recent graduate of the Center for Thomistic Studies at the University of St. Thomas (Texas, USA). He writes on metaphysics, epistemology, phenomenology, and semiotics and is author of Peirce and Heidegger: The Intersection of Phenomenology and Semiotics (Mouton de Gruyter, 2017).
Acknowledgements
Introduction: Escaping the Framework of Modernity
âPrefatory Notes on Terminology
âSubject and Object, ens naturae and ens rationis
âIdeoscopic and Cenoscopic
âConcept, verbum mentis, species expressa
âEns ut primum cognitum and ens primum cognitum
âInfluential Approaches to Ens Primum Cognitum
âObjectively and Socially-Constituted Reality
âThomas Aquinas: Intellectus Agens, Verbum Mentis, Relatio
1 The Latin Thomists and Ens Primum Cognitum
â1.1âThe Early Dispute: Setting the Stage
ââ1.1.1âThe Scotistic Foil
â1.2âThomas Cajetan and the Doctrine of Being
ââ1.2.1âCajetanâs Four Cognitions and Three Abstractions
ââ1.2.2âThe Doctrine of Analogy
ââ1.2.3âConclusion
â1.3âJohn Poinsot, the Nature of Concepts and Ens ut Primum Cognitum
ââ1.3.1âObjectivity and Conceptualization
ââ1.3.2âDe Primo Cognito
ââ1.3.3âObjectivity and the Concept of Ens Primum Cognitum
2 Recent Thomistic Interpretations of Ens Primum Cognitum â2.1âÃtienne Gilsonâs âMetaphysical Realismâ
ââ2.1.1âOvercoming Critique ââ2.1.2âAbstraction and the Nature of the Concept ââ2.1.3âRealism vs. Idealism and the Question of Ens ut Primum Cognitum â2.2âJacques Maritain
ââ2.2.1âMaritain on Abstraction ââ2.2.2âConcept Formation ââ2.2.3âMaritain on Ens Primum Cognitum â2.3âConclusion
3 The Intellectus Agens and Concept Formation â3.1âSt. Thomas and the Obiectum Intellectus ââ3.1.1âEns, ens ut verum, and ens intelligibile ââ3.1.2âQuod quid est, quid est, and quod quid erat esse ââ3.1.3âQuidditas rei and quidditas rei materialis â3.2âIntellectus Agens
ââ3.2.1âIlluminare ââ3.2.2âDigression on Nature: Matter, Form, and Understanding ââ3.2.3âAbstrahere
4 The Discursion of Concept Formation â4.1âThe Discursion of Intellectual Discovery
ââ4.1.1âFrom Pre-Philosophical Cognition to Philosophical Science ââ4.1.2âIntellectual Discovery and the Philosophical Sciences â4.2âFormation of the Verbum Mentis ââ4.2.1âThe Derivation of Primary Concepts ââ4.2.2âTerminus of Intellectual Operation and Intentional Fundamentum ââ4.2.3âNecessity of Composition ââ4.2.4âDefinition and Quiddity â4.3âA Recursive Analysis of the Species Expressa ââ4.3.1âTrue and False Concepts ââ4.3.2âSpecies Expressae and Cognition-Dependent Objects ââ4.3.3âWhat is Inessential to Things is Essential to Our Concepts
5 Relation andEns Primum Cognitum â5.1âWhat is Relation?
ââ5.1.1âRelativa Secundum Esse ââ5.1.2âRelativa Secundum Dici ââ5.1.3âThe Constitution of Cognition-Dependent Relative Being â5.2âRelations and Objectivity
ââ5.2.1âIntellectual Apprehension of Relations ââ5.2.2âInterpretation and the Constitution of Objective Realities ââ5.2.3ââRealityâ, âThe Realâ, and Objective Constitution
6 The Nature ofEns Primum Cognitum â6.1âSummary of Argument
â6.2âThe Nature of Ens Primum Cognitum
ââ6.2.1âSt. Thomas and the Resolutio ad Ens Primum Cognitum â6.3âConclusion
References Historically Layered
All those interested in Thomas Aquinas, metaphysics, epistemology, first principles, Thomistic scholarship, and the nature of relation.