This book addresses ethical conflicts arising from saving the lives of patients who need a transplant while treating living and dead donors, organ sellers, animals, and embryos with proper moral regard. Our challenge is to develop a better world in the light of debatable values and uncertain consequences.
Charles Hinkley teaches philosophy at Texas State UniversityâSan Marcos, Texas in the United States. He took the MA in philosophy from Bowling Green State University and the PhD in the medical humanities from the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, Texas. His current research interests include the sources of moral disagreement, preventive medicine, and moral psychology. Along with his research interests, Dr. Hinkley is committed to increasing his anti-war efforts and his support for those suffering from mental illness.
âAcknowledgments
âIntroduction
Part 1: A Philosophical Framework
1 Dilemmas, Conflicts, and Residue
â1 Terminology
â2 Moral Residue
â3 Epistemology and Ontology of Dilemmas
â4 Dilemmas and Deontic Logic
â5 Guilt, Regret, and Remorse
â6 Autonomy and Wrongdoing
â7 Survivorâs Guilt
â8 The Nature of Emotion
â9 Residual Requirements to Act
â10 Can We Do without Residue?
â11 Intuitively Knowing Dilemmas
â12 Conclusion
2 Medical Ethics and Its Limitations
â1 Cliffâs Choice
â2 Beauchamp and Childressâs Principlism
â3 Virtue Ethics
â4 Feminist Bioethics
â5 Case Analysis
â6 Engelhardtâs Postmodern Libertarianism
â7 Gert, Culver, and Clouser on Common Morality
â8 Cliffâs Choice Revisited
â9 Conclusion
3 Pluralism, Incommensurability, and Weighing
â1 Moral Pluralism
â2 Incommensurability
â3 Covering Values
â4 The Plurality of Values
â5 The Calculation of Values
â6 The Irresolvability of Conflict
â7 Education and Skill
â8 Merited Desire Strength
â9 Weighing Our Options
â10 Conclusion
Part 2: Conflicts of Organ Retrieval
4 Transplant Recipientsâ Quality of Life
â1 Heart Transplants
â2 Liver Transplants
â3 Kidney Transplants
â4 Conclusion
5 Can We Wrong the Dead?
â1 Bioethics and Patient Autonomy
â2 The Pitcher-Feinberg Thesis
â3 Callahanâs Challenge
â4 Serafiniâs Thesis
â5 Symbolic Action and the Preferences of the Living
â6 For the Living
â7 Conclusion
6 Defining Death
â1 Historical Background for the Whole-Brain Definition of Death
â2 Problems with the Whole-Brain Definition of Death
â3 The Higher-Brain Definition
â4 Revisiting the Whole-Brain Definition
â5 The Cardiopulmonary Definition
â6 Renewed Challenges to Whole Brain Death
â7 Is Defining Death a Moral Issue?
â8 Conclusion
7 The Selling of Organs
â1 Models of Organ Vending
â2 Cultural Values and Meaning
â3 Financial Incentives and the Supply of Organs
â4 Commodification
â5 Defenders of Organ Sales and Their Critics
â6 Risks of Living Donation
â7 Respect for Persons
â8 Cadaveric Organ Sales and the Altruistic Tradition
â9 Conclusion
8 Xenografts
â1 Historical Background
â2 Qualitative Distinctions and Human Privilege
â3 Risks to Third Parties
â4 Responding to Risk
â5 The Prospects of Xenografts
â6 Conclusion
â9 Stem Cell Research
â1 United States Policy
â2 The Moral Status of Early Human Life Forms
â3 Property Rights
â4 Adult Stem Cells
â5 iPSCs
â6 Conclusion
Part 3: A Philosophical Response
10 The Regulative Principle
â1 Marcusâs Regulative Principle
â2 Mothersill on the Regulative Principle
â3 The Regulative Principle and Dilemmas
â4 The Regulative Principle and Conflicts
â5 Implications for Prevention
â6 Prevention
â7 Conclusion
11 Constructive Pluralism
â1 Rationality amid Incommensurability
â2 Routine Retrieval, Presumed Consent, and Familial Consent
â3 The Definition of Death
â4 Selling Organs
â5 Xenotransplants
â6 Stem Cell Research
â7 Additional Strategies
â8 Sets of Strategies
â9 Conclusion