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Ockham's Assumption of Mental Speech
Thinking in a World of Particulars
Series: - Investigating Medieval Philosophy, Volume: 6
Author:
In Ockhamâs Assumption of Mental Speech: Thinking in a World of Particulars, Sonja Schierbaum advances a detailed philosophical reconstruction of William Ockhamâs (1287-1349) conception of mental speech. Ockhamâs conception provides a rich account of cognition and semantics that binds together various philosophical issues and forms a point of departure for many later and even contemporary debates. The book analyses the role of mental speech for the semantics and the use of linguistic expressions as well as its function within Ockhamâs cognitive theory and epistemology. Carefully balancing Ockhamâs position against contemporary appropriations in the light of Fodorâs LOTH, it allows us to understand better Ockhamâs view on human thought and its relation to language.
Sonja Schierbaum, Ph.D. (2012), University of Hamburg, is a postdoctoral researcher at the Humboldt-University, Berlin. She has published several articles in journals such as Vivarium. She co- authored a volume on the medieval conception of self-knowledge with Dominik Perler.
Acknowledgements ...vii
Abbreviations ...viii
Introduction...1
1 The Basic Characteristics of Language: Signification and Supposition...12
1.1 Introduction...12
1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation...14
1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms...21
1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of âSignifyâ (significare)...24
1.5 The Property of Supposition ...37
1.5.1 The âStandardâ Case: (Personal) Supposition and the Truth and Falsity of Affirmative Propositions ...47
1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and âTaking a Term Significativelyâ (Sumi Significative) ...55
1.5.3 Improper Use and Improper Supposition ...64
1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition ...70
1.6 Summary ...78
2 Ockhamâs Semantic Model: Subordination, Correspondence, and the Role of Mental Speech with Respect to Spoken Language ...80
2.1 Introduction ...80
2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition ...82
2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation ...93
2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence...102
2.4.1 The General Explanation of âTruthâ and âFalsityâ...111
2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again...123
2.4.3 Correspondence: Equivocation Again...129
2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms...134
2.6 Summary...143
3 Ockhamâs Model of Thought...146
3.1 Introduction...146
3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept...152
3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition...155
3.2.2 Some Objections...171
3.3 Ockhamâs Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts...174
3.3.1 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Mental Propositions...178
3.3.2 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Spoken Propositions...185
3.3.3 Acts of Judgement...190
3.3.3.1 The First Kind of Assent...194
3.3.3.2 The Second Kind of Assent...199
3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement...203
3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae...215
3.5 Summary...228
4 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor...231
4.1 Behaviourism vs. Cognitive Science...233
4.2 Fodor on Language Acquisition...236
4.3 Fodorâs Language of Thought (lot)...240
4.4 Fodor on Mental States and Acts...242
4.5 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor (Summary)...249
5 Conclusion...251
Literature...257
Index...264
Abbreviations ...viii
Introduction...1
1 The Basic Characteristics of Language: Signification and Supposition...12
1.1 Introduction...12
1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation...14
1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms...21
1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of âSignifyâ (significare)...24
1.5 The Property of Supposition ...37
1.5.1 The âStandardâ Case: (Personal) Supposition and the Truth and Falsity of Affirmative Propositions ...47
1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and âTaking a Term Significativelyâ (Sumi Significative) ...55
1.5.3 Improper Use and Improper Supposition ...64
1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition ...70
1.6 Summary ...78
2 Ockhamâs Semantic Model: Subordination, Correspondence, and the Role of Mental Speech with Respect to Spoken Language ...80
2.1 Introduction ...80
2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition ...82
2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation ...93
2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence...102
2.4.1 The General Explanation of âTruthâ and âFalsityâ...111
2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again...123
2.4.3 Correspondence: Equivocation Again...129
2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms...134
2.6 Summary...143
3 Ockhamâs Model of Thought...146
3.1 Introduction...146
3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept...152
3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition...155
3.2.2 Some Objections...171
3.3 Ockhamâs Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts...174
3.3.1 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Mental Propositions...178
3.3.2 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Spoken Propositions...185
3.3.3 Acts of Judgement...190
3.3.3.1 The First Kind of Assent...194
3.3.3.2 The Second Kind of Assent...199
3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement...203
3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae...215
3.5 Summary...228
4 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor...231
4.1 Behaviourism vs. Cognitive Science...233
4.2 Fodor on Language Acquisition...236
4.3 Fodorâs Language of Thought (lot)...240
4.4 Fodor on Mental States and Acts...242
4.5 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor (Summary)...249
5 Conclusion...251
Literature...257
Index...264
All interested in medieval philosophy and in the philosophy of Ockham and his assumption of mental speech, and any analytically inclined philosopher concerned with the relation between thought and language.