Anglo-American theoreticians have to a large extent dominated the formulation and study of modern naval strategy in Western countries. This Anglo-American dominance has resulted in a focus on how the superior power should exploit its superiority in order to realize its strategic objectives. The present study differs from other books on naval strategy by analysing a military strategy for the inferior power instead. Along with Tirpitzâs ârisk theoryâ, The Jeune Ãcole is the most significant maritime strategy dealing with the dilemmas facing the weaker navy. This French body of naval thought is distinguished from other strategies of the weak by its elaborate prescriptions for the offensive use of naval forces. This book represents an unprecedented study of The Jeune Ãcole based on hitherto unexploited and unpublished primary sources from the Service Historique de la Marine.
Arne Røksund, Ph. D. (2005) in History, University of Oslo, is Rear Admiral and Commander of the Norwegian Defence Education Command and Commandant of the Norwegian National Defence College.
âThis book provides the English language reader with the only up-to-date study of this curious development since the appearance of Theodore Roppâs dissertation-turned-book. Røksund has made some significant additions by using primary sources in the French Navyâs archives which were closed to Ropp when he did his research in the 1930s. The result is a tight story which begins with the French Navyâs surrender of her budget to finance the rebuilding of the Army after 1870 and ends with the emergence of the submarine as the first viable weapon to do what the Jeune Ãcole proposed-wage a guerre de course.â
Chalmers Hood in Journal of Military History 72/1, Jan 2008
Acknowledgements .. vii
Introduction .. ix
Chapter One The Theoretical Foundation of the Jeune Ãcole .. 1
The Predecessor of the Jeune Ãcole .. 1
Strategic Assessment .. 7
Commercial Warfare .. 13
Raiding the Enemyâs Sea Lines of Communication .. 13
Bombardment of the Enemyâs Coast .. 21
The Jeune Ãcole and International Law .. 24
The Critics of the Jeune Ãcole .. 24
International Law Incompatible with War .. 27
Limited War or Total WarâImpacts on Military Thinking .. 35
From Cabinet War to the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars .. 38
The American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War .. 45
Summary .. 50
Chapter Two The Jeune Ãcole in Office .. 53
Strategic Assessment .. 53
Verifying the Excellence of the Torpedo Boats .. 63
Rapprochement between Aube and the Council of Admiralty .. 77
Summary .. 81
Chapter Three The Legacy of the Jeune Ãcole .. 85
The Strategic Outlook of the French Navy up to the Fashoda Crisis .. 86
The Disciples of Aube .. 97
Total War and International Law .. 98
The Potential Enemies .. 100
The Naval Programme of the Heirs .. 105
The Return of the Jeune Ãcole to Power .. 109
The Jeune Ãcole and the Staff College .. 111
From Lockroyâs First Period as Minister of Marine to the Fashoda Crisis .. 130
Summary .. 137
Chapter Four The Fashoda Crisis and the Development of a Modern Navy .. 143
Confrontation Between France and Great Britain .. 143
Italy, the Perfect Enemy .. 156
After Fashoda .. 161
Lanessanâs Analysis .. 161
The Reform .. 165
Summary .. 174
Chapter Five The Revitalisation of the Jeune Ãcole .. 177
Changing Alliances among the European Powers .. 177
The Submarine and the Jeune Ãcole .. 189
The Pelletan Regime .. 213
Summary .. 221
Conclusion .. 225
Appendix: Ministers of Marine 1870â1914 .. 231
Bibliography .. 233
Index .. 239
Scholars and students of modern naval history and readers interested more generally in the fields of strategic studies and contemporary warfare.