^* This translation was reviewed and annotated by Ms Sanaa A. Obeidat, LL.B. 1992, University of Jordan; LL.M. 1994, Me Gill University Montreal. Ms Obeidat is a member of the Jordanian Bar.

1 Presidential Decree No. (1) of 1995 Calling for the Elections. The text of the decree is set out here- inbelow: President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, President of the Palestinian National Authority Having reviewed Law No. (5) in respect of the Transfer of Powers and Authorities and Law No. (13) of 1995 in respect of Elections; We have issued the following decree: Article (1): The Palestinian People in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem shall be called for general, free and direct elections in order to elect the president of the Palestinian National Authority and the members of the Palestinian National Council on Saturday January 20, 1996. Article (2): Voting for candidates for the presidency of the Palestinian National Authority and Membership of the Palestinian Council shall be carried out according to the final lists of candidates and electors. Article (3): Presentation of candidacies shall commence as of December 14, 1997 and it shall continue for a period of nine days. Article (4): The President and members of the Central Elections Committee shall implement this decree. This decree shall enter into force as of the date of its issuance and it shall be published in the Pales- tinian Gazette. Issued in the city of Gaza on December 13, 1995 AD corresponding to Rajab 20, 1416 Hijri. Yasser Arafat Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization President of the Palestinian National Authority.

2 The distribution of seats among constituencies was determined under Presidential Decree No. (2) of 1995 in respect of the Elections. This was followed by Presidential Decrees No. (5), issued on December 25, 1995 and No. (6), issued on December 29, 1995, which redistributed the seats among four constituencies: Jerusalem; Gaza; Khan Younis; and Hebron, and, consequently, extended the period for submitting candidacy applications in these constituencies until December 31, 1995. It is not clear, however, on what basis the distribution of seats amongst constituencies was arranged, since no population census was carried out to ensure proportional representation. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Election Update No. 2, published as a press release on January 12, 1996. 3 Paragraph (2) of Presidential Decree No. (2) of 1995 in respect of the Elections, issued on December 14, 1995, allocated two seats for Christians in each of the constituencies of Beitlehem and Jerusalem and one seat in each of Gaza and Ramallah. 4 Paragraph (3) of the Presidential Decree No. (2) of 1995 in respect of Elections, id.

5 As amended by Article (1) of Law No. (16) of 1995 in respect of the Amendment of Some of the Provisions of the Elections Law No. (13) of 1995. The original text read: The Council shall consist of eighty three members elected by the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, by means of free and direct elections held in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

6 During the period of the election campaign, some candidates continued to serve as ministers in the PNA in clear violation of this rule and of that of Article 54(2) of the Law, since these candidates enjoyed a clear advantage over all other candidates because of their access to the media and the use of their official titles in public election meetings. Ghanem Founding Elections in a Transitional Period: The First Palestinian General Elections, Middle East Journal Vol. 50 No. 4 Autumn 1996 p. 519 at p. 522 [hereinafter "Ghanem"] citing Al-Nas Wal-Intikhabat, a special weekly newspaper on Palestinian electoral affairs (Ramallah), December 30, 1995. 7 Though fignres reported in the final lists of electors reflected a positive indication regarding the reg- istration of female voters, as women constituted 49% of the total number of eligible voters officially registered, several gender-specific obstacles impeded numerous women from registering. These obstacles were of two principal types: political and cultural. Political barriers were namely due to the lack of proper identification among many women who were married to Palestinian men and, despite coming from a Palestinian origin, arrived to the West Bank and Gaza on visitor permits. These women were considered to have an illegal status of residence by the Israeli authorities who main- tained relative control over the registration by requiring that Palestinians present an authorized ID to register; the vast majority of these IDs being issued by the Israeli authorities themselves. Another reason which lead to the lack of proper ID cards among women was the confiscation by Israeli offi- cials of blue ID cards belonging to the residents of Jerusalem in an effort to reduce the number of Palestinian residents in the city. The Israeli authorities arbitrarily confiscated IDs of Jcrusalemite women for joining their husbands who worked abroad - despite making several visits back to Jeru- salem to preserve their residential status, for moving to the West Bank or Gaza after getting married or for leaving the country to study or work for more than the period of time allotted under Israeli Law. Cultural impediments facing the registration of women voters, on the other hand, mainly revolved around traditional attitudes that prevailed in rural areas in which public and political life

7 continued remains the exclusive domain of the male. Illustrative of this attitude are some documented cases of women being subject to domestic violence and threats of divorce to withdraw their name from the registry or to refrain from participating in the elections. The Jerusalem Center for Women, Docu- mentation of the 1996 Palestinian Elections in Terms of Women: Findings on the Ra'ees and Coun- cil Elections, (1996: Jerusalem).

8 Reopening the registration in four constituencies (Jerusalem, Hebron, Khan Younis and Gaza) upon Arafat's instructions aroused strong debate over the legality of this measure. It was considered by some to be an infringement of the Law, while others regarded it as a necessary step because of the security problems in those areas at the time. Ghanem, supra note 6 at 522.

9 The Central Elections Committee was constituted of ten members and chaired by Mr. Mahmoud Abbas by virtue of the Presidential Decree No. (3) of 1995 in respect of Elections issued on December 21, 1995.

10 Daniel Polisar, executive director of Peace Watch which was one of the election observers, was quoted to have said that the organization had not found a single case in which a candidate's applica- tion was rejected by the Central Elections Commission. Gordon and Immanuel Rights Groups Ques- tion PA Democracy, The Jerusalem Post International, January 27, 1996, p.l. 1.

I I Presidential Decree No. (4) of 1995 in respect of Elections, issued on December 23, 1995, provided for the establishment of the Court with the membership of four judges headed by judge Zuhair Sourani.

12 This last sentence was added by virtue of Article (2) of Law No. (16) of 1995 in respect of the Amendment of Some of the Provisions of the Elections Law No. (13) of 1995. The amending law also introduced a provision that is supplementary to the addition to Article (43). Article (3) of the amending law reads: If the President decides to issue a decree for extending the candidacy period in accordance with Article (2) of this Law, the decisions of the Central Elections Committee accepting or rejecting candidacy applications submitted within the extended candidacy period may be challenged with- in twenty four hours of the date of publication of the decision in local newspapers. The Court shall decide on the appeal within two days of the date of its filing.

13 By virtue of Article (4) of Law No. (16) of 1995 in respect of the Amendment of Some of the Provi- sions of the Elections Law No. (13) of 1995 this period was reduced from (22) to (14) days.

14 See supra note 6. 15 By virtue of Article (5) of Law No. (16) of 1995 in respect of the Amendment of Some of the Provi- sions of the Elections Law No. (13) of 1995 this period was reduced from (22) to (14) days. Carl Lidbom, head of the European Union Electoral Unit, described the Palestinian authority's conduct in this respect as an "arbitrary use of power to redesign the electoral architecture" and said that short- ening the campaign "without any explanation breaches the Election Law and adds to the difficulties of independent candidates. It is debatable whether the 14 days now available can be regarded as suf ficient". lmmanuel Credibility ofPA Elections Questioned, Jerusalem Post International, January 13, 1996, p.l. 1. 16 The electoral campaign for several candidates continued in the hours before and during the poll in violation of this provision. Campaigning with placards, stickers, signs and newspaper advertise- ments started well before the end of December 1995 and continued into election day. Ghanem, supra note 6 at 522; Joint Press Release of the International Commission of Jurists, Article XIX (International Centre Against Censorship) and Al-Haq, Ramallah, West Bank, January 26, 1996, p. 2. [hereinafter "ICJ, Article XIX and Al-Haq"].

17 The Paris-based Reporters Without Borders charged that Palestinian journalists were so intimidated by the possibility of arrest for writing the wrong thing that they hardly covered the election cam- paign. As evidence of reporters' fears, they pointed to the fact that hardly one Palestinian journalist came to their press conference in east Jerusalem. Immanuel Elections called success, despite irregu- larities, Jerusalem Post International, February 3, 1996, p.l, 2. 18 The campaign was widely criticized as being brief and benefiting only those with well known faces. TV exposure was also said to have been "virtually nil" for most candidates except those like Plan- ning Minister Nabil Shaath who prides himself on "being known in every lady's bedroom - on their TV sets, of course". Immanuel Palestinian Elections Usher in the Future, Jerusalem Post Internal- tional, January 27, 1996, p.7, 14.

19 Although most voting at the polling stations began on time with no remarkable delays, the casting of votes had to be delayed or stopped in some polling stations for periods of time because there were insufficient voting materials. For example, polling station No. 5 in the North Gaza constituency was not opened until 9:36 a.m. because it did not have any ballot papers; polling station No. 80 in the same constituency was not opened until 8:15 a.m. because the stamps for envelopes and ballot papers were not provided; polling station No. 33 in Khan Younis was not opened until 7:45 a.m. because the keys for the ballot boxes could not be found, and thus it could not be verified that they were empty before the opening of the polls. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Election Update No. 4, published as a press release on January 27, 1996 [hereinafter "Election Update No. 4"]. 20 The Israelis insisted that slots on ballot boxes in the Jerusalem constituency be on the side, as on postal boxes, not on top, in order to maintain the impression that the voters were only mailing their ballots, not casting them. Shmemmann With High Hopes, Palestinians vote, San Jose Mercury News, January 20, 1996, p. 1, 9A. This matter was finally resolved by deciding that ballots would be put in sealed envelopes (in the form of a letter) and that in East Jerusalem all the ballot boxed would have a slot cut in the top edge (implying that the voter is making a political decision), so that both sides could claim victory. Also the Israelis insisted on training post office clerks as the voting offi- cials, and would allow only one to a place (as opposed to four members in all other polling stations). The Carter Center's report on the Trip to Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza, January 18-22, 1996, p.3.

21 In Jerusalem, where the voting took place in post offices, there was no guarantee of a secret ballot, since the post offices were open for regular daily postal work and voters had to make their choices while standing on the counter in front of the post office employee. It was also reported that voters did not have special booths to separate them from other people in the post office. Joint Press Release of the 1CJ & Al-Haq, January 4, 1996, p. 1. 22 Polling booths were made of cardboard, closed on three sides and were large enough to accommo- date only one person. However, booths were not provided at all in a number of polling stations (e.g., polling station No. 63 in the Gaza City constituency) where people had to vote in open conditions. Station No. 72 in Deir EI Balah, Middle Gaza Strip, for example, was established in the open air, not in a closed room, and there were no provisions for secret voting at all. In some other stations, where booths were provided, the open side of the booth faced the public, contrary to the guidelines issued by the Central Elections Commission that the open side must face a wall. Election Update No. 4, supra note 19.

23 Some complained that the red and white ballot boxes were sealed with playdough, rather than with wax which would better guard against tampering. International election observers, however, said that they did not consider that an issue, since the boxes were guarded throughout the day and count- ing was to take place in the polling stations. Immanuel, Surprisingly High Turnout Reported for PA Elections The Jerusalem Post, special Coverage http:/www.jpost.co.il/PalElect/2 ltextl.html, January 21, 1996, p. 2 of 3. 24 This provision was said to have been breached in many constituencies, as in the Jericho constituency where members of the polling station did not always verify the identity of the electors, which caused some members of the security forces to cast their votes several times and in more than one station. It has also been reported that some persons were allowed to vote without regard to whether their names were included in the lists of electors. This was done in accordance with the resolution of the Central Elections Commission that was issued on the day of the poll in violation of the provisions of the Law of Elections. Nonetheless, the said resolution was applied in a discriminatory manner, as some supporters of the opposition were not allowed to benefit from the resolution and were deprived of their right to vote. Press Release of the Elections Supervision Unit of the Land and Water Estab- lishment for Legal Services and Studies, Jerusalem February 4, 1996. 25 In Jerusalem, only one post office employee was designated to check the names against voters' lists, provide voters with ballot sheets, then receive the ballot sheets and insert the voting cast in the prop- er boxes set next to him. No double checking was practiced by another employee for any of the stag- es and there were no guarantees that these employees carried out all the procedures correctly. ICJ & Al-Haq, p. 1.

26 In one polling station, it was cited that one person helped ten people to vote claiming that they were illiterate, while subsequent inquiries of observers and candidates' agents revealed that quite a few of the persons assisted were in fact literate. It was also observed that several women who voted in the presence of their husbands were in fact capable of reading and writing. ICJ, Article XIX and Al- Haq, supra note 16, p. 3.

27 It has been reported that in some cases the polling station president relinquished responsibility for keeping law and order in the precinct of the polling stations to security personnel. ICJ, Article XIX and AI-Haq, supra note 16, p. 2. 28 At least in three post offices in Jerusalem where the voting took place, large groups of armed Israeli forces were present inside and in the surrounding areas. The soldiers were reported to have exten- sively checked identification documents and in some cases caused lengthy delays in the voting pro- cess. ICJ & Al-Haq, supra note 21, p.l. Former US President Jimmy Carter, who was heading the team of observers, was quoted as saying "I don't think there is any doubt [the Israeli police] are doing everything they can to intimidate the voters". Jerusalem Police Chief Arieh Amit said his offi- cers were trying to prevent violence, not disrupt the voting. Faramarzi Palestinians Endorse Arafat's 's Peace Moves in National Elections Huntsville Times, January 21, 1996, p. 1, A8.

29 Concerns were raised as to the sufficiency of members entrusted with the task of counting the votes and their working conditions. It was noted that they were working for long hours, often as long as (48) hours, without sufficient resting periods. Election Update No. 4, supra note 19.

30 The term "final count of votes" was interpreted by the Election Appeals Court as not having the same meaning as the "re-count of the ballots" The Court, thus, rejected the contestation that, because the Central Elections Commission did not conduct a public re-count of the votes, it violated Article (83) of the Law. Election Appeals Court, Appeals Nos. 21/96, 22/96, 23/96 & 24/96 [not published], February 21, 1996, Fayez Abu Shamaleh et al. v. The Central Elections Commission. In another case in which the same allegations were dismissed by the Court, the Central Elections Com- mission responded that "what is intended by Article (86) is to give the Central Elections Commis- sion the right to conduct the final scrutiny of the results, not a recount of the ballots". Election Appeals Court, Appeals Nos. 8/96, 9/96, 10/96 & 11/96 [not published], February 1, 1996, Ahmad Dahlan et al. v. The Central Elections Commission.

31 The lowest turnouts were reported in Jerusalem and Hebron where a massive presence of the Israeli police and settlers contributed to keeping the turnout at around 25 percent. See San Jose Mercury News "70 Percent of Palestinians Turn Out to Vote for Leaders" p. 12A, January 21, 1996. Howev- er, no re-elections were called for in either of the two constituencies.

32 During the voting process it had been observed that local observers were discriminated against, as some of them were prevented by Israeli forces from gaining access to polling stations while interna- tional observers were allowed access. Also, at least four local observers were detained for a few hours by the Israeli forces. ICJ & Al-Haq, supra note 2I, p.1. 1. 33 Cards issued by the Central Elections Commission to local observers from East Jerusalem and the West Bank differed, for no apparent reason, from those issued to observers in Gaza. The differences &ed not only in the form of the card, but in the extent of the activities which they prescribed. For example, the eards issued for observers in Gaza did not give the observer the right to monitor the election in the Gaza strip, but confined the observers to a particular constituency and confirmed that they were responsible for the procedures relating to elections in this constituency alone. A note on the reverse side of the accreditation card read: This is to certify that bearer of this card is an observer of the constituency shown at the reverse side of this card, and is responsible for the conduct of election preparations within that constitu- ency. By comparison, the note on the reverse side of a West Bank observation card read: The bearer of this card is an Election Observer entitled to all possible assistance in the conduct of his/her tasks in accordance with the Interim Agreement. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Election Update No. 3, published as a press release on January 17, 1996. 34 A PLO official was quoted reporting that a Palestinian policcman shot dead a Palestinian election observer at a polling station in Sallam village near Nablus on January 21, 1996. Israel Radio named the dead man as Hashem Nassar and said he was shot after asking the officer to leave the polling sta- tion while votes were being counted. The radio also said that, following the murder, the Palestinian Police arrested the assailant, sealed off the village and made a roundup of unregistered guns among the populace. "PA Policeman Kills Election Observer" The Jerusalem Post, special Coverage http:/www.jpost.co.il/PalElect/2 Itextl.html, January 22, 1996 , p. of 1.

^* This Proclamation was published in Pamphlet No. 164. Translation into English was prepared for the Yearbook. All Hebrew dates are deleted. Notes are added by the Editor. 1 Text of the Interim Agreement in 8 Palestine Y.B. lnt'l L. 353 ( 1994/95). 2 Article XI (3)(c), Id., at 362. 3 According to the Agreement, these are not defined. It seems Israel will unilaterally determine the scope of these Locations. See the Editorial Note attached to the Hebron accord infra at 437. 4 Article XII (5) at 362. 5 Article XX (5). The definition includes Israeli individuals and statutory agencies and corporate entities, registered in Israel.

6 See supra, at 163. 7 This provision is the central theme of this Proclamation. It demonstrates that the supreme authority and the source of authority in the Palestinian autonomous areas is still in the hands of the Israeli mil- itary government. Interfacing this provision with the provision of Article 6 of the Proclamation, one would easily ascertain that the Interim Agreement has just restructured the Israeli military occupa- tion. The authority of the elected Council will accrue from the Military Commander, and its scope of powers and authorities are limited to areas outside: Israeli Settlements, however defined; Military Locations that Israel will unilaterally determine, Area C which constitutes about 70% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip and Israelis, a term which includes natural and corporate entities as well as statutory agencies such as the Jewish National Fund.

8 Text published in 8 Palestine Y.B. Int'l L. 149 (1994/95). 9 Id., at 315. 10 Id., at 341. 1.

^* Sefer Ha-Chukkim, January 17, 1996, at. 34. Unofficial translation for the Yearbook. Hebrew dates are deleted. Notes are added by the Editor. 1 Text in 8 Palestine Y.b. lnfl L. 353 (1994/95). 2 The amendment is incorporated in the Emergency Regulations, and is, therefore, omitted here.

3 Text published in 8 Palestine Y.B. Int'l L. 149 (1994/95). 4 22 Laws of the State of Israel, at 20 ( 1967/68) (Hereinafter cited as "LSI"). 5 6 LSI, at 159 (1951/52). 6 Section (17) reads as follows: " (a) This Law shall not apply to a person who comes to Israel by vir- tue of a diplomatic or service visa. (b) The Minister of the Interior, after consultation with the Home Affairs Committee of the Knesset, may, by order published in Reshumot, exempt additional catego- ries of persons, either completely or with restrictions, from all or any of the provisions of this Law. (c) The Minister of the Interior may permit a passenger in transit, who has arrived in Israel by ship or aircraft, to stay in Israel without a visa or permit of residence until the departure of such ship or aircraft." "

7 2 LSI (New Version) (undated) at 30.

8 The amendment is incorporated in the Law and is, therefore, omitted here. 9 The amendment is incorporated in the Law and is, therefore, omitted here. 10 The amendment is incorporated in the Law and is, therefore, omitted here.

^* S. 1322/Public Law 104-45, 109 Stat. 398. This Law was passed by the Congress on October 24, 1995. As the President took no action on this Law, it entered into force on November 8, 1995. For a review of this Law and its interpretation, see Watson, The Jerusalem Embassy Act oj 1995, 45 Cath.U.A.L.Rev. 837(1996) [hereinafter "Watson"]. 1 This is not the first attempt by the U.S. to force the issue of Jerusalem against the will of its own people and the entire world. See, e.g., Will the U.S. Government Recognize Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel? in 5 Palestine Y.B. Int'l L. 325 (1989). See also the precursor of this Act (S.770) which was initially introduced in May, 1995, but was opposed by the Clinton administration "on policy and constitutional grounds." Watson, Id., at 840. 2 The U.S. Congress must be aware that since 1950, no state has recognized the city of Jerusalem as the capital of lsrael. 3 The U.S. Congress must be aware of the fact that because of that war, the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council have adopted numerous resolutions, often with the consenting vote of the U.S. representative, in which it was affirmed and reaffirmed that Jerusalem is "occupied territory"

4 Text in 7 Palestine Y.B. Int'l L. 232 (1992/94). The Congress must be cognizant of the fact that Israel, having accepted to negotiate the final status of Jerusalem, has acknowledged that the Jewish state has no solid claim over Jerusalem neither as its capital nor as an Israeli city. Israel would not have accept- ed, for example, to negotiate the status of Tel Aviv or Haifa in the final status negotiations. 5 Text in 7 Palestine Y.B. Int'l L. 243 (1992/94).

6 It would be of great interest to senators and congressmen to read Whitelam, The Invention ofAncient Israel: the Silencing ofPalestine History ( 1996). Professor Whitelam observed that: "A quick glance through the prospectuses and catalogues of [our universties, faculties of theology, divinity schools, the theological colleges, seminaries and departments of archeology, particularly in the USA, Europe, and Israel] will reveal numerous courses on the history and archeology of ancient Israel conducted in the context of the study of the Hebrew Bible from Jewish and Christian perspectives.... Interest- ingly, and revealingly, I have been able to discover very few courses on the history of ancient Israel in departments of History or Ancient History. It seems that ancient Israelite history is the domain of Religion or Theology and not ofHistory." [emphasis added, at 2-3].