1 See text in 7 Palestine Y.B. Int'I L. at 232 (1992/94). 2 Illustrative of this role for external political actors was the high-profile US Government initiative to induce Israel and the PLO to do more on behalf of both the negotiating progress and the implementation of what had been previously negotiated (including arrangements for elections and Israeli troop withdraw- als). Greenhouse, Clinton Intervenes to Help Revive Stalled Mideast Peace Talks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1995; Graham, Clinton Pledge in Mideast, Fin. Times, Feb. 13, 1995. 3 Such initiatives seem peculiarly relevant at this stage with respect to human rights as neither negotiating party appears motivated to support compliance in self-rule areas. See The Gaza Strip and Jericho: Human Rights under Palestinian Partial Self Rule, Human Rights Watch: Middle East, February 1995.

4 The contention is not that there was a settler conspiracy, but that settler attitudes generate and ratify ter- rorist acts against Palestinians. See Said, Hebron Was Inevitable, The Progressive, May 1994, at 25-27.

5 Jordan and Israel signed a Peace Treaty on October 26, 1994, and both countries have been moving steadi- ly towards normalizing their bilateral relationship. ^* See text of the Treaty infra at 281 and the editorial notes attached thereto. Ed. 6 See Ibrahim, Gulf Nations Balk at Proposal for Mideast Development Bank, N.Y. Times, February 17, 1995. 7 Fletcher, Israel's Great Wall? Critics Belittle a Barrier Against Palestinians, Christ. Sci. Mon., January 27, 1995; Friedman, It's Time to Separate, N.Y. Times, January 29, 1995.

8 Indeed, the Rabin government has been reluctant to directly challenge efforts to memorialize the memory of Baruch Goldstein at the Kiryat Arba settlement. See Gellman, Palestinian Killed in Clash on Massacre Anniversary, Wash. Post, February 15, 1995.

9 Articlc V(2) commits the parties to begin negotiations "as soon as possible...but no later than the 6egin- ning of the third year of the interim period;" that is, after two years [my emphasis].

10 For example, see, Kohen, lnvitation to a Massacre in East Timor, The Nation, February 7, 1981, at 136.

11 1 For background see Falk and Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 Harv. Int'l L. J. 129 (1991); Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 Harv. Int'l L. J. 457 (1991); Falk and Weston, The Israeli-Occupied Territories, Inter- national Law, and the Boundaries of Scholarly Discourse: A Reply to Michael Curtis, 33 Harv. Int'l L. J. 191 (1992).

12 B'TSELEM's report Neither Law Nor Justice (August 1995) traces events and cases of unlawful arrest and torture by the Palestinian Preventive Security Service. ^* See infra at 219 Ed. 13 In addition to the absence of deadlines (contrasting with the specified date for holding elections), there is no assurance in the Arafat letter that, in fact, the PNC will accept the proposed changes, and no indication that its failure to do so is a violation of Palestinian obligations or gives Israel a legal pretext for not fulfill- ing its commitments.

14 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article VI (2) (B). 15 See the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/43/177 of December 20, 1988 whereby the Assembly "Decides that, effective as of 15 December 1988, the designation "Palestine" should be used in place of the designation "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the United Nations system ..." Text reproduced in 4 Palestine Y. B. Int'l L. at 312 (1987/88). For a list of diplomatic recognition accorded the PLO, see 2 Pales- tine Y. B. lnt'i L. at 189-190 (1985). More states than the list referred to above have extended their respec- tive recognition to the newly declared state of Palestine. 16 Article VI (2) (a) and (c). ^* See the list of the diplomatic missions accredited to the Palestinian Authority infra at 209 Ed.

17 See note 12 above. ^* See infra at 219 & 243 Ed.

18 See Dajani, The September 1993 lsrael-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis, 23 J. Palestine Stud. 5-23 (1994); Shehadeh, Questions of Jurisdiction: A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, 23 J. Pales- tine Stud. 18-25 (1994). 19 I have elsewhere drawn a distinction between "a bargain" struck on the basis of inequality, and "a solu- tion" that meets the reciprocal needs of both sides, and is likely to be politically viable over time; a peace treaty that embodies the results of victory and defeat is likely to be an unstable bargain if the stronger side exacts maximum advantage and the weaker side is denied basic rights. The Versailles Agreements after World War I are an exemplary instance of the vulnerability of one-sided arrangements to subsequent repudiation, as well as to links between one-sidedness and political extremism as a reaction to such per- ceived weakness and humiliation. See Falk, Can US Policy Toward the Middle East Change Course?, 47 Middle East J. 11-20 (1993).