^* The Plan of Partition was recommended by virtue of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) concerning The Future Government of Palestine (29 Nov. 1947), 2 U.N. GAOR, at 131-32 (16 Sept. - 29 Nov. 1947). That Resolution was carried by a vote of 33-13-10. Only Part I of the Plan is reproduced herein. All notes in the original text were deleted; the notes appearing herein were added by the Editor. For a legal analysis of this Resolution, see Cattan's Recollections on the United Nations Resolution to Partition Palestine, infra at 260; Cattan, Palestine, The Arabs & Israel - The Search forJustice, 25-30 (1969); Mallison & Mallison, The Juridical Bases for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1 Pal. Y.B. Int'l L. 36 at 48-54 (1984). ). The United States was fully aware of the doubtful legality of this Resolu- tion, see [1948] Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. V, at 548, 563-64, and it helped frustrate all attempts to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice, id. at 554, 558, 562 (hereinafter "FRUS"). However, see the Memorandum of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State to the Under Secretary, id. at 959-65.

As a matter of record, certain officials of the U.S. Department of State found"it legally embarrassing to support the creation of a "Jewish State." See FRUS - 1947 at 1096-1101. In his review of the UNSCOP report for partitioning Pales- tine, Mr. Henderson, then Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to Secretary Marshall, said, inter alia, that 6. The proposals contained in the UNSCOP plan are not only not based on any principles of an international character, the maintenance of which would be in the interests of the United States, but they are in definite con- travention to various principles laid down in the Charter as well as to prin- ciples of which American concepts of Government are based. These proposals, for instance, ignore such principles as self-determina- tion and majority rule. They recognize the principle of a theocratic racial state and even go so far in several instances as to discriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons outside of Palestine. We have hitherto always held that in our foreign relations American citizens, regardless of race or religion, are entitled to uniform treatment. The stress on whether persons are Jews or non-Jews is certain to strengthen feelings among both Jews and Gentiles in the United States and elsewhere that Jewish citizens are not the same as other citizens. The United States is undoubtedly honor bound to take steps to make sure that the Jews in Palestine are not discriminated against and that they participate on at least an equal basis with other peoples in the Govern- ment of Palestine. We are under no obligations to the Jews to set up a Jewish State. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate provided not for a Jewish State, but for a Jewish national home. Neither the United States nor the British Government has ever interpreted the term "Jewish national home" to be a Jewish national state. Id. at 1157.

^* Licence en Droit, University of Paris; LL.M. University of London. His works include Palestine and International Law (1973) and The Palestine Question (1988). Member of the Advisory Board of the Yearbook. 1. Cmd. 6019. 2. Other members for the special session were Emil Ghouri, Rajai Husseini, Wassef Kamal, Isa Nakhleh and Rasem Khalidi. At the second session, the Palestinian delegation comprised Jamal Husseini, Isa Nakhleh and the pre- sent writer.

3. Doc. A/AC.14/32 and Add.l. 4. For several denials in 1947 by the U.N. General Assembly of Arab requests for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, see U.N. docu- ments A/AC.14/21, 14 Oct. 1947; A/AC.14/24, 16 Oct. 1947; AJAC.14/25; 16 Oct. 1947; A/AC.14/32, 11 Nov. 1947. 5. The Palestine Problem before the United Nations, 42 Am. J. Int'l L. at 860 (1948).

6. As to President Truman's personal exertions to secure that the votes of states amenable to U.S. influence be given in favour of partition, see The Forrestal Diaries, at 309, 323, 344, 348, 357-8 and see also 363 (Millis ed., 1951), Under- Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail, 63. 7. Supra note 5, at 861. 8. The Palestine Problem, at 10 (American Friends of the Middle East, N.Y.).

^* Editor's Note: On the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel, the Israeli State Archives published, for the first time, the Protocols of the National Administration from 18 April to 13 May 1948. The National Adminis- tration, together with the National Provisional Council, were formed on 12 April, 1948 by a resolution of the Zionist Executive. In that resolution it was stated that a National Provisional Council [People's Council] of 37 members and a National Administration [People's Administration] of 13 members would be formed. The Zionist Executive also decided that as the British Mandate rule in Palestine was coming to an end, a provisional Jewish government would be set up. On 15 May 1948, as the State of Israel was established, the National Administration became the Provisional Government of Israel, while the National Provisional Council became the State's Provisional Council. The Protocols of the National Administration represent the political, mili- tary, and administrative problems confronting the leaders of Israel during the weeks before 15 May 1948. The Protocols also include the outcome of the dis- cussions about the drafting of the Israeli Proclamation of Independence and defining the title of the State. This section includes excerpts from the discussions, translated from the Hebrew - "Ginzakh Hamdinah, Menhelet Ha-'Am, Protokolim, 18 April - 13 May 1948, Jerusalem, 1978" (State Archives, National Administration, Protocols, 18 April - 13 May 1948, Jerusalem, 1978). Footnotes and emphases were added by the Editor. 1. Members of this Administration represented all political parties active within the Jewish community in Palestine, in the proportions in which they had been

represented in the Va'ad Leumi, the National Council of Jews in Palestine, and the Jewish Agency Executive. Most prominent among those present were D. Ben-Gurion, then Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive (later first Prime Minister of Israel) and M. Shertok, head of the Agency Political Department (later Sharett, first Foreign Minister of Israel). 2. This Commission was established by virtue of the U.N. Partition Resolution 181, and was to have been the receiver of powers from the Mandatory Govern- ment and the distributor of authorities to the Jewish and Arab Government as suggested by the Partition Plan. See supra 249.

3. This is a highly important issue which was frustrated by the Jewish Agency's relentless efforts within the U.S. Government. As early as January 19, 1948, a few weeks after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, the U.S. realized that the "Partition of Palestine cannot be implemented without the use of force, ...". See the Report by the Policy Plan- ning Staff on Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine in [1948] Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. V, at 546 (1976) [Hereinafter "FRUS" with year designation]. The Report may be the first policy formulation of the U.S. Government involving a reversal of its earlier policy which was adopted before and during the voting on the Partition Resolution. For the pressure exerted by the U.S. in favour of partitioning Palestine see FRUS-1947, vol. V at 999 and passim(1971).

4. On April 1, 1948 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution S/714 n, in which it requested the Secretary General to convoke a special session of the General Assembly "to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine". This Resolution, in effect, casts doubt on the validity of the Par- tition Plan Resolution. It was tabled by the U.S. Government. It should be noted that President Truman in his speech of March 25, 1948 clearly called for the adoption of a trusteeship system for Palestine as a substitute for the Parti- tion Resolution.

5. See FRUS-1948, at 915 and passim. See in particular Mr. Shertok's letter to Sec- retary of State Marshall at 929.

6. See draft text as approved by the U.S. President, id. at 927-29. 7. Security Council Res. S/723 of April 17, 1948.

8. It is probable that Mr. Shertok is referring to the letter dated May 7, 1948 as published in FRUS-1948 at 929. However, see the memorandum of May 8, 1948 (id. at 930) from Dean Rusk to the Secretary of State. See the Secretary's tele- gram to Mr. Bevin, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, id. at 940-41. 9. President of the American Jewish Committee. 10. Member of the National Council of Americans for Haganah. Formely Governor of the State of New York (1939-1942).

11. In his memorandum to Bevin, Secretary Marshall said that Shertok, "had gained the definite impression" that King Abdullah of Jordan "would move his Arab Legion into Palestine but would occupy only the Arab section and not the presently defined limits of the proposed Jewish state". Id. at 940. Shertok also conveyed information to Secretary Marshall that Glubb's assistant, Colonel Goldy, both of them British and then in charge of the Arab Legion, "had made contact with the Haganah in order to coordinate their respective military plans in order to avoid clashes without appearing to betray the Arab cause". Id. The American Consul in Jerusalem reported to the Secretary of State on May 9, 1948, that the Chief Secretary of the Mandatory Government in Pales- tine had informed him that he had expected "Trans-Jordan and other Arab states to invade Palestine on May 15 or May 16 with objective to occupy Arab areas [of Palestine]". Id. at 945-46.

12. Assistant Principal Secretary, U.N. Palestine Commission; Head of the Com- mission's Advance Party in Palestine, March-April, 1948. 13. President of the World Zionist Organization.

14. Israeli expansionist policies and territorial designs never come to an end. Four days after Israel's Declaration of its Establishment was issued, the U.N. Sec- urity Council on May 18, 1948 addressed certain questions to the new Govern- ment of Israel. The Government replied: Question (a): Over which areas of Palestine do you actually exercise con- trol at the present time? Answer to Question (a): The Provisional Government of Israel actually exer- cises control at present over the entire area of the Jewish State as defined in the Resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th of November, 1947. In addition, the Provisional Government exercises control over the city of Jaffa; Northwestern Galilee, including Acre, Zib, Bassa and the Jewish set- tlements up to the Lebanese frontier; a strip of territory alongside the road from Hulda to Jerusalem; almost all of new Jerusalem; and of the Jewish Quarter within the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem. The above areas, outside the territory of the State of Israel, are under the control of the military authorities of the State of Israel, who are strictly adhering to international regulations in this regard. The Southern Negev is uninha- bited desert over which no effective authority has ever existed. Question (b): Do you have armed forces operating in areas (towns, cities, districts) of Palestine where the Arabs are the majority, or outside Pales- tine ? Answer to Question (b): We consider the territory of Israel as a single unit with a Jewish majority. As indicated above, the Government of the State of Israel operates in parts of Palestine outside the territory of the State of Israel, parts which, with the notable exception of Jerusalem, formerly, for the most part, contained Arab majorities. These areas have, however, been mostly abandoned by their Arab population. No area outside of Palestine is under Jewish occupation, but sallies beyond the frontiers of the State of Israel have occasionally been carried out by Jewish forces for imperative military reasons, and as a part of an essentially defensive plan. Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, vol. 1, 14 May - 30 September 1948 (Freundlich ed., Israel State Archives, Jerusalem, 1981) at 62-63. In another communication dated May 20, 1948 which recorded the minutes of a meeting between a Zionist delegate and Mr. Bevin, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it was reported that: Bevin's reply was to make a long and rambling statement about the bound- aries never having been delineated, and there was an exchange on the question of Jaffa [which was to be part of the Arab State], which he took to the evidence of Jewish intention not to stay within the boundaries. [em- phasis added]. Id. 40 at 41. Mr. Shertok, first minister of Foreign Affairs, was advised that it was "Very important to publish soonest official declaration that Israel accepts borders laid down 29th November, claims no part territory assigned [? Arab State], and territories occupied defence measures will be returned as soon as peace restored,... Fact that independence proclamation not explicit this point used against us. Harold MacMillan yesterday asked whether this is absolutely clear." Id. at 156. Mr. Shertok was also advised on May 24, 1948 by Mr. A. Eban, that "Ambiguity

in proclamation regarding frontiers" had been exploited by Israel's opponents, and he "urge[d] official statement defining frontiers [of] Israel in accordance [with] November resolution, ..." Id. at 70. See also id. at 84, 124.

15. This is a reference to the "Balfour Declaration". For a legal analysis of this Declaration see, Mallison & Mallison, The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order, 18-78 (1986). 16. On this fallacy, see id. at 51-60. 17. One of the early and Basic Laws that was enacted to give effect and this objec- tive was the Law of Return, 4 Laws of the State of Israel ("LSI") at 114 (1950), as amended in 8 LSI, 114 (1954); and 24 LSI, 29 (1970).

18. It must be noted that Israel's Supreme Court held that the Declaration had no legally binding character; it was merely a political document. See, e.g., HCJ 620/85, Meari vs The Knesset Speaker et al, Piskei Din, vol. 41, part 4, at 222 - 227.

19. See Law and Administration Ordinance, no. 1 of 1948, in 1 LSI, at 7 (1948)

^* Text in 4 Ayyoub, Basic Documents in the Arab-Zionist Struggle, Mar. 1946 - Oct. 17, 1949, at 185-188 (in Arabic, Samed, Beirut, 1985) [hereinafter "Ayyoub"]. 1. The name "Ghazzat Hashim" has been traditionally attached to the City of Gaza after Hashim Ibn Abd Manaf, great-grandfather of the Prophet Moham- med who died and was buried there. Gaza was a seaport where many com- modities coming from Mecca were stored until being sent on to Damascus and Europe. ^** Text in Ayyoub, id. at 189.

^* Editor's Note: This speech was delivered on July 31, 1988, by the Jordanian Monarch him- self. The day before, the Jordanian Parliament had been dissolved (see Official Gazette (Jordan), no. 3562 of Aug. 1, 1988, at 1488). The parts reproduced herein were taken from the official English version of the text as released by Jordan's Ministry of Information (undated). All notes were added by the Editor. The King's speech poses many legal issues on both the domestic and interna- tional levels. It is important to note that the speech was not published in Jor- dan's Official Gazette. Neither were the administrative measures that have been taken by the Jordanian authorities pursuant thereto [see note 7 infra]. On the plane of international law, critical legal issues are still pending and have not yet been tackled. These include, for example, the problem of state succession in general and derivative legal questions relating to, inter alia, pub- lic property, public debts, nationality, and jurisdiction. The problem is com- pounded by the issue of what relationship the ceded territory and its pro- claimed authority might have under the famous U.N. Security Council Resolu- tion 242 of 1967. This Resolution affirms the right of "every State in the area" to live in peace within secure boundaries. The PLO has accepted this Resolu- tion. [See Doc. 6-a infra.] 1. The 1964 National Charter of the PLO; it was explicitly stated in Article 24 thereof that the PLO lays no claim to any territorial sovereignty over the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or Al-Hammeh region [then under Syrian administration and now under Israeli occupation]. This Article was deleted in the 1968 amend- ment to the PLO Charter. Its deletion is significant in that the PLO began to advance its proclaimed objective of establishing its own state in the West Bank and Gaza. This objective was first declared in the resolutions of 1974 of the Palestine National Council (PNC) and ultimately adopted in the 1988 Declara- tion of Independence by the PNC. See Doc. 5-a infra. 2. For a short legal survey of this relationship between the two Banks, see Kas- sim, Legal Systems and Deuelopmerits in Palestine, 1 Pal. Y.B. Int'l L. 19 at 27-28 (1984) and the authorities cited therein.

3. The unity resolution was passed on Apr. 24, 1950, by the Jordanian Parliament, which then consisted of equal numbers of representatives from both the East and West Banks. That resolution emphasized the "preservation of all Arab rights in Palestine" and that the unity was being achieved "without prejudice to the final settlement" of the Palestine problem in accordance with national aspirations, Arab cooperation, and international justice. See the official Arabic text of this resolution in 1 Compilation of Laws and Regulations Issued and in Force in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan until 1960, at 4 (in Arabic, 1961). ). 4. The legal status of the territories so ceded as a result of the King's statement has not changed. They will remain, strictly legal, occupied territories, and Israel will continue to be a belligerent occupant. 5. The U.S. and Israeli governments have maintained a long-standing policy that only Jordan can represent the Palestinians, and both governments have advo- cated what they called the "Jordanian option." The King's statement has put an end to this wavering and fruitless approach. See, for example, Int'l Herald Tribune, Aug. 3, 1988, at 2, cols. 1-3, and the editorials at 4; see also Arthur Hertzberg's article in N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1988, at 23.

6. The Rabat Summit Conference acknowledged the public status of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and recog- nized its right to establish a Palestine national authority in any Palestinian ter- ritory that Israel might evacuate. 7. After three-day talks between Jordanian and PLO officials, Mr. Nabih Nimer, the Secretary General of Jordan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reported to have said that the bridges across the River Jordan would remain open for the movement of people and produce to and from the West Bank and Gaza; ser- vices relating to civil registration such as the issue of birth, death, marriage, and divorce certificates would not be affected; and Jordan would continue to issue to West Bankers Jordanian passports that would be valid for two years, although this would not confer on the holders Jordanian nationality. See Jor- dan Times, Aug. 16, 1988, at 1, cols. 7-8, and at 5, cols. 1-3. The Jordanian Cabinet, however, decided, inter alia, that all Jordanian employees working in government departments and agencies in the West Bank should retire as of August 16, 1988. All their retirement dues and pension funds should be respected. Those employees who were not part of the civil ser- vice system and were employed on the basis of special contracts would be ter- minated as of August 16, 1988. The number of employees so far affected by this

^* The English text is based on the official U.N. translation, A/43/827, S/20278. All notes were added by the Editor. 1. This is an allusion to the very early Zionist motto: Give Palestine, "a land with- out a people, to a people without a land." 2. Text in Cmd. No. 1785 (1922); also see Stoynovsky, T'he Mandate for Palestine, 355 (1928). 3. Text in Cmd. No. 1929 (1923). That came into effect on Aug. 6, 1924, the date when the war with Turkey was officially terminated. See Official Gazette (Palestine), no. 125, Oct. 15, 1924, at 840.

4. See text supra at 249. 5. G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX) of Nov. 22, 1974, which requested the U.N. Secretary General to establish contacts with the PLO "on all matters concerning the question of Palestine," and G.A. Res. 3237 of Nov. 22, 1974, which conferred on the PLO the status of Observer. 6. For example, the PLO is a full member of the League of Arab States, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned bloc. 7. On the uprising, "Intifadah", see supra at 85.

8. According to the Alexandria Protocol, the Arab states resolved that "Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab world and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab world." The Protocol was signed on Oct. 7, 1944, in Alexandria, Egypt, by the then independent Arab States that met to establish the League of Arab States.

^* Official text in English as made by the U.N. A/43/827 - S/20278. Some minor stylistic changes were introduced in the text by the Editor.

^* Official text in Proceedings of the 19th Extraordinary Session of the PNC Held in Algiers on Nov. 12-15, 1988, at 78 (PLO publication, in Arabic, undated). Trans- lation for the Yearbook. ^** A/RES/43_/177, Dec. 20, 1988.