^** Appeal 279-283/58, Psakim, (Judgments of the District Courts of Israel) vol. 44, at 362.

^* Psakim, No 3/57, vol. 17, at 90.

1. Military Justice Law - 1955, 9 LSI, at 184.

2. Criminal Code Ordinance No. 74 of 1936, Consolidated Edition as in force on 1st March, 1945 (Published by Ka- di, Jerusalem, 1945). Original text is in Official Gazette (Palestine), Extraor- dinary Supp. I, December 14,1936, at 285. For convenience the text of the provisions of the Code that are cited in this judgment is added at the end of these notes by the Editor. It should be noted that the final version of this Code was incorporated in Israel's Pe- nal Law, Special Volume - 1977.

^* Said on receiving news of a person's death-Trans. 3. I Laws of Palestine, at 157 (Drayton, ed., 1934).

4. This appears to refer to Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council 1922 which made the English common law an ancillary part of the Palestine legal system. Text in III, Laws of Palestine, at 2569 (Drayton, ed., 1934). Article 46 was repealed in 1980 by virtue of the Foundations of Law, 34 LSI, at 181.

All notes were omitted. Ed.., .,

^* Editor's Note The case of Ikrit is perhaps one of the longest legal battles ever known. It has lasted for over thirty years. Israel's Supreme Court has so far issued three judgments on this case; all have been translated and reproduced hereafter. The people oflkrit have notgiven up their claim to their village which is situated in Western Galilee. The case is a landmark in the Palestinian struggle against Israel's colonization processes. It is also a typical case of how law is twisted and utilized to serve the interests of an exclusive settler colony. In its first judgment the Supreme Court ordered the Israeli authorities to allow the villagers to return to their village. The authorities flouted the order, and the Israeli army was quickly mobilized to blow up all the houses in the village. The only recognizable building now is the ruins of the village church. In the second case, the Supreme Court allowed the government offcial to present a testimony in cameraand in the absence of the petitioners' counsel. It confirmed the expulsion order. Then a new law was enacted by the Knesset according to which, inter alia, the entire land of Ikrit was expropriated and ownership thereof was transferred to the Development Authority, an arm of the Government of Israel. In the third judgment the Supreme Court simply provided the "legal" grounds for the expulsion and the colonization orders. See, Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 91-92 (1976) ** Piskei Din (Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel), vol. 5, part 2, at 1117-1123 (1951). Translation for the Yearbook. All notes are added by the Editor.

1. See note 3 below. 2. See note 3 below. 3. 3 LSI, at 56 4. 4 LSI, at 153 5. 5 LSI, at 26

* Piskei Din, (Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel), vol. 6, Part 1, at 229-233 (1952). Translation for the Yearbook. All notes are added by the Editor. 1. I Laws of Palestine, at 157 (Drayton, ed., 1934)

2. 6 LSI, at 12.

^* Piskei Din, (Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel), vol. 36, part 1, at 129-133 (1982). Translation for the Yearbook. All notes are added by the Editor.

1. 7 LSI, at 43. 2. This Section (2) is indicative of how Pa- lestinian land was "legally" usurped. It reads as follows: 2. (a) Property in respect of which the Minister certifies by certifi- cate under his hand— (1) that on the 1st April, 1952 it was not in the possession of its owners; and (2) that within the period between the 14th May, 1948 and the 1st April 1952 it was used or assigned for purposes of essential devel- opment, settlement or security; and (3) that it is still required for any of these purposes- shall vest in the Development Authority and be regarded as free from any charge, and the Devel- opment Authority may forthwith take possession thereof. (b) The property shall vest in the Development Authority as from the date specified in the said cer- tificate ; the certificate may only be issued within one year from the day of the coming into force of this Law, and shall be pub- lished in Reshumot as early as possible after the day of its issue. (c) Property vested in the Devel- opment Authority as aforesaid shall be registered in the Land Register in its name, but non- registration shall not affect the validity of the vesting of the property in the Development Au- thority. (d) A certificate under this sec- tion shall not constitute an ed- mission that acquired property is not or was not State property or that the State has not or had not a right or interest therein. (Hebrew dates omitted)

3. See infra at 217. 4. Regulation 125 reads: 125. A Military Commander may by order declare any area or place to be a closed area for the pur- poses of these Regulations. Any person who, during any period in which any such order is in force in relation to any area or place, en- ters or leaves that area or place without a permit in writing issued by or on behalf of the Military Commander shall be guilty of an offence against these Regula- tions.

^* Editor's Note Piskei Din (Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel), vol. 33, part 2, at 113-134 ( 1979) Translation for the Yearbook. This case is better known as the Beit-EI case. All notes are added by the Editor. The central legal issue in this case was whether the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 are applicable to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. As in the Elon Moreh case (see, I Pal, Y.B. Int'l. L., 134 (1984)), the Supreme Court of Israel held that the former does not apply on the grounds that treaty law does not become part of the law of the land until the Knesset passes legislation to that effect. The Hague Regulations, on the other hand, are applicable to the occupied territories on thegrounds that they reflect customary internationallaw which is deemed part of Israeli law in the absence of a conflicting municipal law. The Supreme Court in its analysis has overlooked several basic and crucial facts. Israel ratified all the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and deposited its letter of ratification on July 6, 1951. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), a state "is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purposes of a treaty" when it has taken an act expressing its consent thereto (Art. 18). The Treaty, which is substantially a codification of customary international law, itself provides that a state "may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty". (Art. 27). The Court also fails to note that while the Fourth Geneva Convention has incorporated most of the protective clauses of the Hague Regulations, the preamble of the Fourth Hague Convention clearly set the minimum standard of states' behaviour in cases of coercion. It stated that the contracting parties "deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the

protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience." In Military Order No. 3 of June 7, 1967 effective immediately, Israel directed its military courts operating in the occupied territories to give effect to the Fourth Geneva Convention and to the provisions thereofpriority over those of the said Order (Art. 35). Subsequently, the Military Administration amended the Order and deleted this provision. The ambivalent position of the Supreme Court on this issue has been expressed subsequent- ly in the Ansar Camp case (see, I Pal. Y.B. Int'l. L., 164 (1984)). In that case, the Court in effect held that the Geneva Convention is applicable and did not resort to the thin techniques used in this case. TheBeit-EI case produced several complex legal issues. The Court established the military character of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. It accepted and justified the establishment of Jewish settlements on privately owned land on the grounds that they constitute an integral part of the Israeli army defence network. If this is true, should these settlements then be regarded as legitimate targets of the Palestinian resistance military operations?Another issue relates to the settlers' title to "requisitioned" land. It is not clear if such land has been leased by the Israeli military authority or has been put under the control of settlers for defence purposes. In the light of Israel's protracted occupation, what prescription rights would accrue to Jewish settlers? On the issue of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, see, Boyd, The Applicabili- ty of theFourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories, 1 lsr. Y.B.H.R. 258 (1971); Mallison, Statement in the Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 46 (1977); Feinberg, The West Bank's Legal Status, New Outlook, 60 (Oct. - Nov. 1977); Meron, West Bank and Gaza: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the Period of Transition, 9 Isr. Y.B.H.R. 106 (1979); Stone, Aspects of theBeit-El andElon Moreh Cases, 15 Isr. L. Rev. 476 (1980); Rosenne, Communication to the Editor, Id., at 463; Cohen, Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories, 1967-1982, at 51-56, 142-163, (1985).

1. 35 Proclamations, Orders and Appoint- ments of the Israeli Defence Forces in the West Bank Area (hereinafter POA-WB), February 25, 1967, at 1414. 2. 21 POA-WB, April 22, 1970, at 733.

3. However, the Commentary stated at 614 that "it might be rightly claimed that ...... the new provisions [of the Geneva Conven- tion] have entirely replaced the 1907 Regu- lations. For that reason, when a State is a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, it is almost superfluous to enquire whether it is also bound by the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 ....". 4. But the Court failed to note that Advo- cate Khoury had referred in his written submittal (at 4) that Pictet, in the same article, had characterized the Geneva Con- ventions as "declaratory", and quoted Pictet as saying "For these principles [of Geneva Conventions] are today an integral part of the law of nations and constitute the codifications of international custom". (em- phasis added)

^** Justice Ben Porat's opinion is deleted.