¹ 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993), better known as the Oslo Declaration after the city in which the text had been agreed. For analysis, see Ben Achour, L'accord Israelo-Palestinian du 13 septembre 1993, 98 R_Ev. Gt:N. D. I_NT'_L. PUBLIC 337 (1994); Benvenisti, The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Princi- ples: A Framework for Future Settlement, 4 Eult. J. I_NT'_L. L. 541 (1993); Blum, From Camp David to Oslo, 28 I_SR. L.R. 211 (1994); THE ARAB-ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Cotran & Mal- lat eds., 1996); Dajani, The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis, 23 J. P_AL- _ESTINE STUD. 5 (1994); Malanczuk, Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law, 7 E_UR. J. I_NT'_L. L. 485 (1996); Shlaim, The Oslo Accord, 23 J. P_ALESTINE STUD. 24 (1994). ² See, e.g., C_ATT_AN, P_ALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL L_AW (2nd ed., 1976); QU_IG_LEY, P_ALES_TINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE (1990). As a result of this development it was possible for Israel and Jordan to conclude a peace treaty in November 1994 formally ending half a century of conflict. ³ Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Preamble; Blum, supra note 1, at 214. The Oslo Declaration was the culmination of the peace process initiated at the Madrid Conference in October 1991 based on the implementation of the principle of "land for peace" and the application of Security Council resolu- tions 242, UN SCOR, 22nd Sess., Res. & Dec., at 8 (1967), and 338, UN SCOR, 28th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 10 ( 1973), in order to establish a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, id., Art. 1. ⁴ Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Art. V(3). 5 Id. ⁶ Id., Art. V(2). See further, the Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622 (1994); the Israel-PLO Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997), pursuant to which a Final Status Agreement regarding these territories is to be concluded by 1999; and the Israel-PLO Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Jan. 21, 1997, 361.L.M. 650 (1997). ⁷ Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Arts. I and V, according to which the transitional period shall not exceed five years.

⁸ United Nations Charter, Art. 2(3). This principle has been reaffirmed in a number of landmark Gen- eral Assembly resolutions, including the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 121 (1970), and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, GA Res. 37/10, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 261 (1982). See further, Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace, 3l 1.L.M. 953 (1992); Rybakov, Principle ofPeaceful Settlement of Disputes as One of the Most Fundamental Principles of Contemporary International Law, 37 R_Ev. R_ELLENIQUE D. Irrr'L. 7 (1984). ⁹ Organization of African Unity, Charter, May 25, 1963, Art. 3(4), 19, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 3 (Naldi ed., 1992). The latter provision plac- es an absolute requirement on the Member States to settle all their disputes by peaceful means. Cf. UN Charter, Art. 2(3). It should be observed that the OAU constitutes a regional agency within the meaning of Article 52 of the UN Charter and cooperation between the two organizations is common, see BouTRos-GHALi, CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES 340-41 (1995). See further, Amankwah, Inter- national Law, Dispute Settlement and Regional Organizations in the African Setting, 2l lrro. J. I_NT'_L. L. 352 (1981); Kenig, L'Organisation de l'Unite Africaine et le reglement des differands internationaux en Afrique, 33 AFRICA BULL. 7 (1986); Kenig, Le reglement des differands entre les etats africains, 19 V_{ERFASSUNG UND} R_{ECHT IM} U_BERSEE 75 (1986); Maluwa, The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among African States, 1963-1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends, 38 I_NT'_L. & C_OMP. L.Q. 299 at 301 (1989), who states that "the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes has been recognized and accepted as a binding principle of international law by African States." It could be said that a practice has evolved in Africa whereby resort should initially be had to regional agencies for the peaceful resolution of local disputes which, however, does not exclude the possibility of bringing disputes before other fora. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Provisional Measures, 1984 l.C.J. Rep. 169 at 392, 440; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objec- tions, International Court of Justice, June 11, 1998, paras. 48-60. The OAU includes all fifty-three African States, including the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, with the sole exception of Morocco, which withdrew in 1985 in protest at the admission of the Saha- ran Arab Democratic Republic. ¹⁰ For example, in 1992 ONUMUZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique) was given the task of verifying and monitoring the peace agreement between the Government of Mozambique and the RENAMO rebels, see B_OUTROs-GHALi, supra note 9, at 274-79. Similarly, in 1995 UNAVEM III (United Nations Angola Verification Mission III) was mandated with facilitating the implementation of the peace agreement between the Angolan Government and the UNITA rebels, see, Maluwa, supra note 9, at 301-306. In 1994 UNOMSA (United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa) monitored the transition to democracy in South Africa by providing observers to check the electoral process.

¹¹ OAU Charter, supra note 9, Art. 7(4). ¹² Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, July 21, 1964, 3 1.L.M. 1116 (1964), reprinted in N_ALDI, supra note 9, at 32. See A_MATE, INSIDE THE OAU: PAN-AFRICANisM IN PRACTICE (1986); NALDI, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY : AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ROLE 19-26 (1989); Degan, Commission ofMediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the OAU, 20 R_EV. E_GYP- _TIENNE D. I_NT'_L. 53 (1964); Elias, The Commission ofMediation, Conciliation and Arbitration ofthe OAU, 40 BRIT. Y.B. I_NT'_L. L. 336 (1964). Cf The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee estab- lished to deal with, inter alia, disputes, Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Art. X. ¹³ See Mavrommatis, Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.1.J. Rep., Ser. A, No. 2, at 11; East Timor (Por- tugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90 at 99-100. ¹⁴ Cf UN Charter, Art. 33(l); Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, supra note 8. ¹⁵ E_LIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL L_AW 172-76 (Akinjide, 2nd rev. ed., 1988). See generally, MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2nd ed., 199 1). ). ¹⁶ M_ERRILLS, supra note 15, Ch. 2; B_RIERLY, THE L_AW OF NATIONS 373-76 (Waldock, 6th ed., 1963). Mediation seems to share common characteristics with good offices so that the two may be indistin- guishable in practical terms. In the latter case, a third party, whether on its own initiative or at the request of one or more parties to the dispute, and subject to acceptance by all the parties to the dis- pute, may offer his good offices to facilitate efforts towards a peaceful settlement. ¹⁷ M_ERRILLS, supra note 15, Ch. 4. See also H_UDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 223 (1944). Cf. Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Art. X(2).

¹⁸ Id., Ch. 5. See Protocol, supra note 12, Arts. 27, 28, 29(I). Cf. Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Art. X(3). ¹⁹ Protocol, supra note 12, Art. 29(l)(a). Cf. Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Art. X(3). ²⁰ Protocol, supra note 12, Art. 29(2). The power of the parties to specify the applicable law is a fea- ture characteristic of arbitration, see Simtrsorr & Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 140-42 (1959). In absence thereof, Art. 30, id., states that the Tribunal must decide the case according to treaties concluded between the parties; international law; the OAU Charter; the UN Charter; and, if the par- ties agree, ex aequo et bono. ²¹ Negotiation describes a flexible means of dispute settlement that only involves the parties to the dis- pute, which can therefore conduct the process in the way they deem most appropriate, M_ERRTLLS, supra note 15, Ch. 1. Cf. Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Art. X(1). ²² The principal judicial organ of the UN is the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a permanent court, the judgments of which are binding and final, Merrils, supra note 15, Chs. 6, 7. In addition, the Court can deal with urgent matters such as requests for interim measures of protection, see Statute of the ICJ, Art. 41. African States have often had recourse to the ICJ in recent years, see infra note 46. ²³ The ICJ has observed that there is nothing in the UN Charter nor in general international law that requires the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations as a precondition for a dispute to be referred to the ICJ. Furthermore, the existence of procedures for regional negotiation whatever their nature, cannot prevent the ICJ from exercising its judicial function, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 1998, slip opinion, paras. 48-73. ²⁴ These describe an impartial third-party procedure for fact-finding and elucidation of facts where they are in dispute and to suggest appropriate remedies, M_ERIULLS supra note 15, Ch. 3. ²⁵ Protocol, supra note 12, Art. 18. 26 _Id., Art. 14. ²⁷ Protocol, supra note 12, Art. 12.

^Zg Id., Art. 13. The Assembly is the supreme organ of the OAU, see OAU Charter, supra note 9, Art. 8, whereas the Council of Ministers is a subordinate body entrusted with the power of implementing the Assembly's decisions, id., Art. 13. See further, N_ALDI, supra note 12, at 14-16. ²⁹ Protocol, supra note 12, Art. 13(2). ³⁰ Maluwa, supra note 9, 305-307; Bedjaoui, Le Reglement Pacifque des Differands Africains, A_NN. F_R. D. I_NT'_L. 85 (1972). ³¹ A_MATE, supra note 12, 162-68, Chs. 14, 15; Maluwa, supra note 9, 307-13; Cervenka, The Settle- ment of Disputes Among Members of the Organization ofAfrican Unity, 7 V_ERFASSUNG utaD R_{ECHT 1M} U_BERSEE 117 (1974); Myers, Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization ofAfrican Unity, 28 I_NT. O_RG. 354 (1974); Shaw, Dispute Settlement in Africa, 37 Y.B. WORLD AFFAIRS 149 (1983). It should be noted that the Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict which erupted in May/June 1998 saw unsuccessful mediation efforts made by Rwanda and the United States as endorsed by the OAU. ³² N_ALDI, supra note 12, at 33-35; A_MATE, supra note 12, at 405-408; Shaw, supra note 31, at 152-53. ³³ N_ALDI, supra note 12, at 35-37; A_MATE, supra note 12, at 408-19; Shaw, supra note 31, at 153-56. ³⁴ N_ALDI, supra note 12, at 78-8I. 1.

³⁵ Id., at 54-58. ³⁶ Boutros-G_hali, supra note 9, at 296-99. ³⁷ A_MATE, supra note 12, at 167-68. ³⁸ Whereas the attempts of a US envoy in March 1998 to re-establish negotiations between the two parties were welcomed, the visit of the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, representing the European Union, to the Middle East with a view to mediating in the peace process was surrounded by controversy, 44 I_CEesM_O's RECORD OF WORLD EvENTS 42160 (1998). Nevertheless, the European Union continues to exert pressure on Israel to accelerate implementation of the Oslo Declaration, The Guardian (London), July 28, 1998. ³⁹ Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, AHG/Dec. 3 (XXIX) (1993), reprinted in 6 A_FR. J.I_NT'L. & Com^p. L. 158 (1994) (hereafter Cairo Declaration). The Cairo Declaration reaffirms the OAU's adherence to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in Africa, id., para. 14.

⁴⁰ Id., paras. 15, 19, 22. See also Gutto, The OAU's New Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Manage- ment and Resolution and the Controversial Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in International Law, 7 P_ROC. A_FR. Soc. I_NT'_L. & Com^p. L. 348, 349 (1995). Cf An Agenda for Peace, supra note 8, 960-63. ⁴¹ Cairo Declaration, supra note 39, paras. 24, 25. See further Osman, The Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and Resolution of Conflicts: Need for Strengthening Cooperation and Partnership, 7 P_ROC. A_FR. Soc. I_NT'_L. & Com^p. L. 171 (1995). ⁴² The success of the Mechanism is ultimately dependent on adequate financing and the political will- ingness of Member States to support it, see Hefny, Enhancing the Capabilifies of the OAU Mecha- nism for Conflict Prevenfion, Management and Resolution: An Immediafe Agenda for Action, 7 P_ROC. A_FR. Soc. I_NT'_L. & Com^p. L. 176, 181-83 (1995). It should be observed that the OAU's first attempt at establishing a peace-keeping force, to maintain the security of a Chad ravaged by civil war, turned out to be an unmitigated disaster, see N_ALDI, supra note 12, at 27-29. ⁴³ Cairo Declaration, supra note 39, para. 14. ⁴⁴ Id. Hefny calls for a comprehensive conceptual framework underpinning the OAU's revised approach to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, supra note 42, at 180.

⁴⁵ An Agenda for Peace, supra note 8, at 969-70. ⁴⁶ Merrills, supra note 15, Chs. 6, 7. The ICJ has observed that the "resolution of..legal questions by the Court may be an important and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute," United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States of America v. Iran), 1980 ICJ Rep. 3 at 22. See generally, GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL L_AW (1987); R_OSENNE, THE L_AW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (2nd rev. ed., 1985). ⁴⁷ Statute of the ICJ, Art. 60. ⁴⁸ Statute of the ICJ, Art. 36(1). 49 Id. ⁵⁰ Id., Art. 36(2). ⁵¹ See Maluwa, supra note 9, at 301-303, and especially references cited at footnotes 7-9. ⁵² Intra-African cases submitted to the ICJ include the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya) 1982 ICJ Rep. 18; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) 1986 ICJ Rep. 554; Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) 1994 ICJ Rep. 6; and currently pending, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria); and Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia).

⁵³ 30 I.L.M. 1241 (1991), reprinted in N_ALDI, supra note 9, at 203, Art. 87. ⁵⁴ 9 A_FR. J. Irrr'r.. & C_OMPo L. 953 (1997), Arts. 3-5. ⁵⁵ 5 A_FR. J. I_NT'_L. & Cotvrn. L. 415 (1993), Arts. 9(l)(f), 16. ⁵⁶ See Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 8 A_FR. J. I_NT'_L. & Cow. L. 187 (1996), Art. 76, and the Protocol on the ECOWAS Court of Justice, 8 A_FR. J. I_NT'_L. & C_OMPo L. 228 (1996), Art. 9(2). ⁵⁷ Only States may be parties to cases before the ICJ, Statute, Art. 34. However, although only the ICJ has the power to determine its own jurisdiction, Statute, Art. 36(6), including the question whether a party to a case constitutes a state for the purposes of the case, see, e.g., Application of the Conven- tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugosla- via), Provisional Measures, 1993 ICJ Rep. 3 at 12-14, it seems unlikely that Palestine would present- ly be considered a state for the purposes of international law notwithstanding the declaration of independence in 1988, see Salmon, Declaration of the State of Palestine, 5 P_ALESTINE Y.B. Irrr'L. L 48 (1989); Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon? I EuR. J. Irrr't. L. 307 (1990). ⁵⁸ See the Manila Declaration, supra note 8, and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, supra note 8. ⁵⁹ OAU Charter, supra note 9, Arts. 2(l.c), 3(3).

⁶⁰ This emerges from State practice and opinio juris, see East Timor, 1995 ICJ Rep. at 196-97 (Judge Weeramantry), McCorquodale, Negotiating Sovereignty: The Practice of the United Kingdom in Regard to the Right of Self-Determination, 66 BRIT. Y.B. I_NT'_L. L. 283 (1995), also reflected in numerous General Assembly resolutions and conventions, see, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514 (XV), UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66 (1960), the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, supra note 8, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 1, 999 UNTS 171, see M_CGO_LDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS C_OM- _MITTEE 14-16, 247-68 (1994), Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993) para. 2. The jurisprudence of the ICJ clearly proclaims it to be so, see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ Rep. 12, East Timor, 1995 ICJ Rep. 90, and see further, Naldi, The East Timor Case and the Role of the International Court of Justice in the Evolution of the Right of Peo- ples to Self-Determination, AUSTRALIAN J. HuM. R_TS. (1998). Jurists who support this conclusion include B_ROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL L_AW 595-98 (4th ed., 1990), C_ASSE_SE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 109, 115 (1995), CRAWFORD, THE CREA- TION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-105 (1979), HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNA- _TIONAL L_AW AND How W_E USE IT 113 (1994), and O_PPENrI_EIM'_S INTERNATIONAL L_AW, V_OL. 1, 285 (Jennings and Watts eds., 9th ed., 1992). ⁶¹ See generally, C_ASSESE, supra note 60. ⁶² Oslo Declaration, supra note 1, Art. 1,1II( 1), (2). Thus, in January 1996 Palestinians from East Jeru- salem, Gaza and the West Bank voted to elect a Palestinian Council and the President of its execu- tive authority, see 42 KEESING's RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 40925-6 (1996). ⁶³ C_ASSESE, supra note 60, at 243-44. It should be observed that the consensus of the international community is that the Palestinians are entitled to self-determination, id., at 230-42, especially refer- ences at note 36. See further, McKinney, The Legal Effects of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Princi- ples: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine, 18 SEATTLE U.L. R_Ev. 93 ( 1994); Schulman, The Israel- PLO Accord on the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements: The First Step Toward Palestinian Self-Determination, 7 EMO_RY I_NT'_L. L. R_Ev. 793 (1993).

⁶⁴ Human Rights Committee, General Comment 12, Twenty-first session, 1984, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/ Rev. 2, para. 8. The Manila Declaration, supra note 8, establishes a link between the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and the principle of self-determination of peoples. ⁶⁵ General Comment 12, supra note 64, para. 1. See also Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Com- mission Opinion No. 2, 92 1LR 167, para. 3. ⁶⁶ Id., para. 6. This obligation appears to have been reinforced by the ICJ's observation in East Timor, 1995 1CJ Rep. at para. 29, that the right of self-determination has an erga omnes character. Although international law does not seem to require that the right of self-determination be exercised by any particular method, the freely expressed will of the people through informed and democratic process- es must be observed, Western Sahara, 1975 1CJ Rep. at 32-33, 81 (Judge Nagendra Singh), 123 (Judge Dillard), and 170-71 (Judge de Castro). ⁶⁷ The Guardian (London), July 9, 1998, and July 28, 1998. It is likely that recognition would follow promptly if Palestinian statehood were endorsed in a referendum. ⁶⁸ Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 567. See also, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras, Nicaragua Intervening), 1992 ICJ Rep. 35 at 386-387. ⁶⁹ Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 566; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 386, 388; Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3, 31 I.L.M. 1499 at 1500 (1992). The principle of uti possidetis thus fixes the territorial limits of an emergent State. See further, Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 67 BmT. Y.B. I_NT'_L L. 75, at 97-98, 125-28 (1996).

⁷⁰ See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 565. See also, B_ROWNLIE, supra note 60, at 135. ⁷¹ Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 566, 568; Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3, supra note 67, ibid.; Shaw, supra note 69, at I I 1-19. ⁷² Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 386-87; Territorial Dispute, 1994 ICJ Rep. at 84-86 (Judge Ajibola, Separate Opinion); Shaw, supra note 69, at 98-100; K_LABBERS AND LEFEBER, AFRICA: LOST BETWEEN SELF-DETERMINATION AND Uti Possidetis, (Brolmann et al. eds.), PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL L_AW 37 (1993) at 54-56; Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 A_MER. J. I_NT'_L L. 590 at 593-95 (1996). ⁷³ It seems safe to assume that the principle of uti possidetis was accepted as a regional custom of international law, see Ratner, supra note 72, at 599; Naldi, The Case Concerning the Frontier Dis- pute (Burkina FasolMali): Uti Possidetis in an African Perspective, 36 ICLQ 893 898 (1987). But see Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 566, para. 24, where the ICJ was clearly of the view that it was applying a pre-existing norm. ⁷⁴ Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 565-66. See also, Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands), 1959 ICJ Rep. 209 at 240 (Judge Armond-Ugon, Dissenting Opinion), and at 255 (Judge Moreno Quinta- na, Dissenting Opinion). Judge Ajibola has expressed the view that uti possidetis is a principle of customary international law, Territorial Dispute, 1994 ICJ Rep. at 89 (Judge Ajibola, Separate Opin- ion). See further, Shaw, supra note 69, at 106-109; H_IG_GINs, supra note 60, 123. Seefiirther K_LAB- _BERS AND L_EFEBER, supra note 72, at 59-65, who are critical of the lacunae in the ICJ's reasoning. ⁷⁵ Opinion No. 3, 31 I.L.M. at 1500 (1992). See also Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) 83 ILR 1, 37-38. It is believed that ud possidetis is derived from the principle of stability of frontiers, incorporated in Article I I of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978), and endorsed by the ICJ, see, e.g., Territorial Dispute, 1994 ICJ Rep. at 37, and see fur- ther, e.g., B_ROwNLiE, supra note 60, at 670; S_HAW, INTERNATIONAL L_AW 683-85 (2nd ed., 1997). ⁷⁶ See supra note 69 and accompanying text. But cm K_LABBERS AND L_EFEBER, supra note 72, at 63-65, who point out that the content of the principle is still unclear.

⁷⁷ S_HAW, TITLE To TERRITORY IN AFRICA 183 (1986). ⁷⁸ See N_ALDI, supra note 9, at 49. This commitment has been reinforced by the Cairo Declaration, supra note 39, para. 14, which lists the "inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism" as one of the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter." See also IQ._ABBERS AND L_EFEBER, supra note 72, at 56-58. ⁷⁹ Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 565. See also Territorial Dispute, 1994 ICJ Rep. at 87-88 (Judge Ajibola, Separate Opinion). Nevertheless, the success of this objective has been muted as border incidents have been numerous. ⁸⁰ Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 566-67. See also Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, 83 ILR at 37-38. ⁸¹ Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3, supra note 67, para. 2, citing, inter alia, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, supra note 8. See jurther SC Res. 242, supra note 3; SC Res. 478, UN SCOR, 35th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 14 (1980).

⁸² The principle of good faith is one of the most fundamental principles of international law, see Dec- laration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, supra note 8; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1974 ICJ Rep. 253 at 267. See generally O'C_ONNOR, GOOD Fa.�ra �rr INTERNATIONAL LAw (1991). In addition, negotiations must be meaning- ful, see North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3 at 47; Affaire du Lac Lanoux (France/Spain), 24ILR 101, 119. ⁸³ THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), July I, 1998.