This article examines the conditions under which state actor-social movement (sasm) coalitions form in policy-making in authoritarian states. Based on a comparison of three cases of policy reform undertaken by the Party of Justice and Development (pjd) in the municipality of Kenitra, Morocco, it argues: 1) in authoritarian states, we must analyse sasm interactions and the interactions between elected state actors and nominated state actors representing the central authorities; 2) the pjd forms coalitions with social movement organizations (smos) depending whether its policy preference is in opposition to the authorities’ and whether it has mass appeal; 3) when its preference conflicts with that of the authorities yet has broad support, the pjd formally mobilizes smos; when it conflicts with the authorities’ preference but has limited appeal, informal party-social movement coalitions are formed; and when it is neither in conflict with the authorities’ preference nor has mass appeal, coalitions are unnecessary.
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Jack A. Goldstone, “Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics” in States, Parties and Social Movements, ed. Jack A. Goldstone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.
See Clark, “Relations”; El-Ghobashy, “Metamorphosis”; Kenneth W. Foster, “Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian state,” Studies in Comparative International Development 35, no. 4 (2001): 84–109; Judith A. Teichman, Policymaking in Mexico (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1998).
Mona El-Ghobashy, “Constitutionalist Contention in Contemporary Egypt,” American Behavioral Scientist 51, no. 11 (2008): 1604. See also Myriam Catusse, Le temps des entrepreneurs? Politique et transformations du capitalisme au Maroc (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2008), 27.
Stearns and Almeida, “Formation,” 481. See also Paul D. Almeida, “Opportunity Organizations and Threat Induced Contention,” American Journal of Sociology 109, no. 2 (2003): 345–400; Hanspeter Kriesi, Rund Koopmans, Jan-Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni, The Politics of New Social Movements in Western Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
Since November 11, 2011, when the the pjd formed the national government, there have been increasing accusations that the pjd has been co-opted by the regime. The authors consider the pjd’s inclusion at the highest level of the Moroccan political sphere as indicative of the regime’s last available option in the context of the 2011 Arab Spring to prevent similar uprisings as in Tunisia and other parts of the region and not of the final act inthe co-optation process of the pjd. It is beyond the scope of this article to determine the degree to which the pjd’s participation in the national government has fostered the cooptation process that, the authors agree, the Moroccan regime regularly uses vis-à-vis potential competitors. Any political process needs time to take place and thus we consider it highly improbable that the pjd’s inclusion in the government has immediately determined the cooptation of the entire pjd. As is well documented in the literature, the pjd is a party that operates according to different logics than the traditional parties of the notables.
Eva Wegner and Miquel Pellicer, “Islamist Moderation without Democratization,” Democratization 16, no. 1 (2009): 157–175; A. Boukhars, Politics in Morocco (New York: Routledge, 2010).
See among others, Luca Ozzano, “The Many Faces of the Political God,” Democratization 20, no. 5 (2013): 807–830; Suveyda Karakaya and Kadir A. Yildirim, “Islamist Moderation in Perspective,” Democratization 20, no. 7 (2013): 1–28; Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi, “The Islamists are not Coming,” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2010, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/the_islamists_are_not_coming; Stacey Philbrick Yadav, “Understanding ‘What Islamists Want,’” Middle East Journal 64, no. 2 (2010): 199–213; Michaelle L. Browers, “Origins and Architects of Yemen’s Joint Meetings Parties,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 4 (2007): 565–586; Amel Boubekeur and Samir Amghar, “Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and Their Links with eu,” Euromesco Paper 55 (2006); Janine A. Clark, “The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 4 (2006): 539–560; Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); El-Ghobashy, “Metamorphosis”; Quinn R. Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 25, 2 (2004): 339–358; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “The Path to Moderation,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 205–228.
Janine A. Clark and Amy E. Young, “Islamism and Family Law Reform in Morocco and Jordan,” Mediterranean Politics 13, no. 3 (2008): 333–352.
Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner, “Socio-economic voter profile and motives for Islamist support in Morocco,” Party Politics 20, no. 1 (2014): 119.
Interview, Rabat, February 21, 2011.
Interview, Rabat, February 23, 2011.
Sylvia Bergh, “Assessing the Scope for Partnership Between Local Governments and Community-Based Organizations,” International Journal of Public Administration 33, no. 12–13 (2010): 740–751.
Interview, Khenifra, March 24, 2011.
Eva Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 21.
Interview, Rabat, April 14, 2011.
Interview, Kenitra, March 3, 2011.
Interview, Kenitra, April 14, 2011.
Interview, Kenitra, July 3, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, December 5, 2012.
Interview, Kenitra, June 26, 2013.
Interview, Rabat, April 14, 2011.
Interview, Kenitra, July 1, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, June 26, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, July 5, 2013.
Myriam Catusse and Karam Karam, “Back to Parties? Partisan Logics and Transformations of Politics in The Arab World,” in Returning to Political Parties? Political Party Development in the Arab World, eds., M. Catusse and K. Karam (Beyrouth, Presses de l’Ifpo, The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2010), 11–59; Myriam Catusse and Lamia Zaki, “Gestion communale et clientélisme moral au Maroc,” Critique internationale 42 (2009): 73–91.
Interview, Kenitra, March 3, 2011.
Interview, Kenitra, December 12, 2012.
Interview, Kenitra, December 6, 2012.
Interview, Kenitra, March 3, 2011.
Interview, Kenitra, June 26, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, July 3, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, December 6, 2012.
Interview, Kenitra, December 12, 2012.
Interview, Kenitra, December 12, 2012.
Interview, Kenitra, December 5, 2012.
Interview, Kenitra, July 2, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, June 28, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, July 5, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, June 27, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, June 28, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, June 28, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, July 1, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, December 3, 2013. While, as demonstrated above, the pjd is highly cooperative with ismos and with smos that do not display an Islamic ethos, it employs a different attitude and strategy vis-à-vis smos linked to other political parties. When it comes to countering other political parties’ policies and/or activities, the pjd does not consider the smos sphere as neutral.
Interview, Kenitra, June 28, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, July 1, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, June 27, 2013.
Interview, June 26, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, July 5, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, June 27, 2013.
Interview, Kenitra, December 3, 2013.
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This article examines the conditions under which state actor-social movement (sasm) coalitions form in policy-making in authoritarian states. Based on a comparison of three cases of policy reform undertaken by the Party of Justice and Development (pjd) in the municipality of Kenitra, Morocco, it argues: 1) in authoritarian states, we must analyse sasm interactions and the interactions between elected state actors and nominated state actors representing the central authorities; 2) the pjd forms coalitions with social movement organizations (smos) depending whether its policy preference is in opposition to the authorities’ and whether it has mass appeal; 3) when its preference conflicts with that of the authorities yet has broad support, the pjd formally mobilizes smos; when it conflicts with the authorities’ preference but has limited appeal, informal party-social movement coalitions are formed; and when it is neither in conflict with the authorities’ preference nor has mass appeal, coalitions are unnecessary.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 584 | 75 | 9 |
| Full Text Views | 238 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 36 | 4 | 0 |