The Threat to âUn-Moderateâ: Moroccan Islamists and the Arab Spring
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Across the Islamic world, Islamist groups have chosen to join popular protests stemming from the 2011 Arab Spring. In Morocco, however, an exception emerged. The countryâs main Islamist opposition political party â the Justice and Development Party (hizb al-aâdala wa al-tanmia) â declined invitations to join demonstrations organized by the February 20th Movement for Change. Under what conditions do Islamist movements support Arab Spring uprisings? Why did the PJD choose to stay outside these protests demanding greater reform? The PJD, some scholars argue, did not support Arab Spring unrest because it is a co-opted Islamist movement. In contrast, I argue that the PJD refused to join the protests because it thought it could leverage them to its advantage. By threatening the Moroccan regime to leave formal party politics for the street, the Islamist party used the unrest to increase its bargaining power, sideline its rivals, and win its policy demands. This threat to âun-moderateâ empowered the PJD to get what it wanted from the regime during the Arab Spring.
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The Threat to âUn-Moderateâ: Moroccan Islamists and the Arab Spring
In: Middle East Law and GovernanceSearch for other papers by Matt Buehler in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Across the Islamic world, Islamist groups have chosen to join popular protests stemming from the 2011 Arab Spring. In Morocco, however, an exception emerged. The countryâs main Islamist opposition political party â the Justice and Development Party (hizb al-aâdala wa al-tanmia) â declined invitations to join demonstrations organized by the February 20th Movement for Change. Under what conditions do Islamist movements support Arab Spring uprisings? Why did the PJD choose to stay outside these protests demanding greater reform? The PJD, some scholars argue, did not support Arab Spring unrest because it is a co-opted Islamist movement. In contrast, I argue that the PJD refused to join the protests because it thought it could leverage them to its advantage. By threatening the Moroccan regime to leave formal party politics for the street, the Islamist party used the unrest to increase its bargaining power, sideline its rivals, and win its policy demands. This threat to âun-moderateâ empowered the PJD to get what it wanted from the regime during the Arab Spring.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 1048 | 130 | 22 |
| Full Text Views | 246 | 8 | 3 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 178 | 14 | 0 |
