This paper examines the relationship between human sin and divine hiddenness, drawing on views that are widely acknowledged within the Reformed tradition. It argues, first, that according to these views there is no inculpable nonbelief, and thus, second, that a crucial premise in the atheistic argument from divine hiddenness is untenable. The overarching question here is: If there is a sensus divinitatis, is it possible to be an inculpable nonbeliever? To answer this question, the cognitive effects of sin on our sensus divinitatis as a faculty of producing basic beliefs about God will be assessed. I conclude that the premise which many find plausible—that there is inculpable nonbelief—is in fact controversial and dubious.
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See Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, 42-43. This idea, is famously represented as the enkratic condition of rationality: Necessarily, if you are rational then, if you believe your reasons require you to F, you intend to F. Obviously, the enkratic condition says that akrasia is irrational. See John Broome, ‘Rationality’, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, (Blackwell, 2010), 285-92. And also his ‘Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?’ Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4 (2007), 349-74.
Tim J. Mawson, ‘Praying to Stop Being an Atheist,’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2010): 173-86.
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This paper examines the relationship between human sin and divine hiddenness, drawing on views that are widely acknowledged within the Reformed tradition. It argues, first, that according to these views there is no inculpable nonbelief, and thus, second, that a crucial premise in the atheistic argument from divine hiddenness is untenable. The overarching question here is: If there is a sensus divinitatis, is it possible to be an inculpable nonbeliever? To answer this question, the cognitive effects of sin on our sensus divinitatis as a faculty of producing basic beliefs about God will be assessed. I conclude that the premise which many find plausible—that there is inculpable nonbelief—is in fact controversial and dubious.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 847 | 108 | 15 |
| Full Text Views | 237 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 107 | 2 | 0 |