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Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism
in Journal of Reformed TheologySearch for other papers by Paul Helm in
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Abstract
The aim of this article is to show that the claim of Richard Muller in his recent book Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought, that the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists in their view of freedom but held to the indeterminate freedom of the will, is false. The argument takes the reader through Turretin’s claim in his Institutes that freedom does not consist in indifference but in rational spontaneity. It assesses Muller’s argument that indeterminate freedom incorporates choices between two or more contraries and of none by showing that Edwards respected the same distinctions, and that Turretin and Edwards were agreed that God, the human nature of Christ, and the redeemed in heaven did not act from indifference. The article ends with remarks on Muller’s interpretation of Turretin’s position, that it involves ‘multiple potencies,’ arguing that this proposal meets serious difficulties.
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| Insgesamt | Letzte 365 Tage | In den letzten 30 Tagen | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aufrufe von Kurzbeschreibungen | 1364 | 106 | 22 |
| Gesamttextansichten | 224 | 9 | 0 |
| PDF-Downloads | 394 | 20 | 0 |
Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism
in Journal of Reformed TheologySearch for other papers by Paul Helm in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
The aim of this article is to show that the claim of Richard Muller in his recent book Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought, that the Reformed Orthodox were not compatibilists in their view of freedom but held to the indeterminate freedom of the will, is false. The argument takes the reader through Turretin’s claim in his Institutes that freedom does not consist in indifference but in rational spontaneity. It assesses Muller’s argument that indeterminate freedom incorporates choices between two or more contraries and of none by showing that Edwards respected the same distinctions, and that Turretin and Edwards were agreed that God, the human nature of Christ, and the redeemed in heaven did not act from indifference. The article ends with remarks on Muller’s interpretation of Turretin’s position, that it involves ‘multiple potencies,’ arguing that this proposal meets serious difficulties.
| Insgesamt | Letzte 365 Tage | In den letzten 30 Tagen | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aufrufe von Kurzbeschreibungen | 1364 | 106 | 22 |
| Gesamttextansichten | 224 | 9 | 0 |
| PDF-Downloads | 394 | 20 | 0 |
