Political Theology between Reason and Will
Law, Decision, and the Self
In: Journal of Law, Religion and StateSearch for other papers by Richard Amesbury in
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Contemporary practitioners of political theology make use of Carl Schmitt’s account of sovereignty to criticize liberal political theory. But whereas Schmitt focused on “states of exception,” the new decisionism holds that decision-making is a quotidian feature of jurisprudence: the interpretation of law depends upon judicial decisions that serve to impose meaning on otherwise semantically indeterminate norms. Ironically, it is possible to detect in the contemporary decisionist critique of liberal theory, with its focus on law’s meaning, a liberalizing tendency: by insisting on the ubiquity of decision-making, the exception is made to seem unexceptional. In this way, Schmitt is tamed, and sovereignty is diffused into the mundane world of administrative governance. I want to resist this normalizing account on philosophical grounds: if one is to appreciate the exceptional character of the decision, it is important to retain some background of regularity with which it can be contrasted.
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Political Theology between Reason and Will
Law, Decision, and the Self
In: Journal of Law, Religion and StateSearch for other papers by Richard Amesbury in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Contemporary practitioners of political theology make use of Carl Schmitt’s account of sovereignty to criticize liberal political theory. But whereas Schmitt focused on “states of exception,” the new decisionism holds that decision-making is a quotidian feature of jurisprudence: the interpretation of law depends upon judicial decisions that serve to impose meaning on otherwise semantically indeterminate norms. Ironically, it is possible to detect in the contemporary decisionist critique of liberal theory, with its focus on law’s meaning, a liberalizing tendency: by insisting on the ubiquity of decision-making, the exception is made to seem unexceptional. In this way, Schmitt is tamed, and sovereignty is diffused into the mundane world of administrative governance. I want to resist this normalizing account on philosophical grounds: if one is to appreciate the exceptional character of the decision, it is important to retain some background of regularity with which it can be contrasted.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 3064 | 828 | 229 |
| Full Text Views | 200 | 11 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 55 | 6 | 0 |
