This paper aims to examine the nature and dynamics of military behavior during the July Uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee to the neighboring country of India. Alongside the police and bureaucracy-business nexus, the Sheikh Hasina regime is often accused of co-opting the military to strengthen autocratic control by suppressing opposition. However, during the July Uprising, the army, once seen as loyal to the regime, refused to shoot protesters from 3rd August, ignoring Sheikh Hasina’s directive. Using Bangladesh as a case study, in this study, I investigate several questions relating to military disobedience: Whether the army genuinely shifted its loyalty? If so, what factors might motivate the decision not to shoot, defying the norm of obeying orders from authorities? I argue that the army did not abandon the regime, particularly the top brass. In other words, the military’s loyalty to the regime was not shifted; rather, it was forced to be reluctant to take action against civilians. To explain such complicated dynamics of military allegiance, I coin the term “partial military defection”. I have shown that circumstantial factors compelled the military to shift its allegiance from the ruler to the people. Yet, paradoxically, this very military subsequently aided Hasina’s escape and sheltered her close associates.
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This paper aims to examine the nature and dynamics of military behavior during the July Uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee to the neighboring country of India. Alongside the police and bureaucracy-business nexus, the Sheikh Hasina regime is often accused of co-opting the military to strengthen autocratic control by suppressing opposition. However, during the July Uprising, the army, once seen as loyal to the regime, refused to shoot protesters from 3rd August, ignoring Sheikh Hasina’s directive. Using Bangladesh as a case study, in this study, I investigate several questions relating to military disobedience: Whether the army genuinely shifted its loyalty? If so, what factors might motivate the decision not to shoot, defying the norm of obeying orders from authorities? I argue that the army did not abandon the regime, particularly the top brass. In other words, the military’s loyalty to the regime was not shifted; rather, it was forced to be reluctant to take action against civilians. To explain such complicated dynamics of military allegiance, I coin the term “partial military defection”. I have shown that circumstantial factors compelled the military to shift its allegiance from the ruler to the people. Yet, paradoxically, this very military subsequently aided Hasina’s escape and sheltered her close associates.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 964 | 964 | 176 |
| Full Text Views | 43 | 43 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 121 | 121 | 1 |