By the mid-2010s, a significant decrease in the number of jihadists in the North Caucasus, in addition to internal ideological differences, was facilitated by fundamental factors: the lack of mass support in local Muslim communities, the anti-terrorism activities of the state, its informational and ideological support, and the policy of post-conflict integration. The number of supporters of the Caucasus Emirate decreased due to the split after the 2014 Olympics in Sochi; in 2015, the Caucasus Emirate officially ceased its activities, and after 2017, the flow of radical Islamists leaving Russia and joining ISIS stopped—violent extremism has begun to de-escalate in the region. To reduce ethnoreligious extremism and strengthen the integration of Muslims into Russian society, the federal government adopted a multi-level deradicalization strategy, including anti-terrorism operations and a large-scale policy of co-optation and support for moderate Russian Muslim leaders and their traditional communities.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
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By the mid-2010s, a significant decrease in the number of jihadists in the North Caucasus, in addition to internal ideological differences, was facilitated by fundamental factors: the lack of mass support in local Muslim communities, the anti-terrorism activities of the state, its informational and ideological support, and the policy of post-conflict integration. The number of supporters of the Caucasus Emirate decreased due to the split after the 2014 Olympics in Sochi; in 2015, the Caucasus Emirate officially ceased its activities, and after 2017, the flow of radical Islamists leaving Russia and joining ISIS stopped—violent extremism has begun to de-escalate in the region. To reduce ethnoreligious extremism and strengthen the integration of Muslims into Russian society, the federal government adopted a multi-level deradicalization strategy, including anti-terrorism operations and a large-scale policy of co-optation and support for moderate Russian Muslim leaders and their traditional communities.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 861 | 342 | 32 |
| Full Text Views | 15 | 8 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 74 | 21 | 0 |