Apart from the section of book VII that Diogenes Laertius dedicates to Stoic logic, Sextus Empiricus’ treatment of the true, Adversus Mathematicos VIII 1–140, is the most extensive and important repository of testimonies about the Stoics’ theory of the lekton or sayable that has come down to us. Unlike Diogenes Laertius’, Sextus’ treatment is highly polemical. Fragments of Stoic theory are embedded in a context adapted to the needs of Pyrrhonian scepticism. To serve these purposes, Sextus imposes a framework on the views that he tackles which classifies them in terms of the questions he takes to be in dispute. The object of this essay is to assess Sextus’ performance as an expositor and critic of the Stoic theory. It argues that Sextus’ account was assembled out of originally separate and sometimes disparate pieces, and it detects a number of mis-matches between Sextus’ framework and his arguments, on the one hand, and the material to which they are applied, on the other. It concludes by recommending that readers approach Sextus’ evidence with caution.
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Apart from the section of book VII that Diogenes Laertius dedicates to Stoic logic, Sextus Empiricus’ treatment of the true, Adversus Mathematicos VIII 1–140, is the most extensive and important repository of testimonies about the Stoics’ theory of the lekton or sayable that has come down to us. Unlike Diogenes Laertius’, Sextus’ treatment is highly polemical. Fragments of Stoic theory are embedded in a context adapted to the needs of Pyrrhonian scepticism. To serve these purposes, Sextus imposes a framework on the views that he tackles which classifies them in terms of the questions he takes to be in dispute. The object of this essay is to assess Sextus’ performance as an expositor and critic of the Stoic theory. It argues that Sextus’ account was assembled out of originally separate and sometimes disparate pieces, and it detects a number of mis-matches between Sextus’ framework and his arguments, on the one hand, and the material to which they are applied, on the other. It concludes by recommending that readers approach Sextus’ evidence with caution.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 261 | 261 | 15 |
| Full Text Views | 17 | 17 | 2 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 40 | 40 | 4 |