Suspension and Scepticism
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Wolfgang Freitag in
Current site
Google Scholar
Search for other papers by Alexandra Zinke in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
Recent debates in epistemology have assumed a positive conception of suspension of judgement, according to which suspending requires the presence of a distinctive mental state, either a sui generis indecision-representing attitude or a higher-order belief about one’s doxastic situation. The paper challenges this orthodoxy by arguing that sceptical traditions, in particular Pyrrhonian and Cartesian scepticism, operate with a privative conception of suspension: scepticism does not suggest adopting a positive mental attitude but simply to refrain from both belief and disbelief (given suitable cognitive preconditions). We show that the Pyrrhonian strategy of equipollence and Descartes’ method of doubt do not aim for suspension positively conceived. We tentatively suggest that privative suspension is thus of primary significance for epistemology.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
[Descartes, R.]. Œuvres de Descartes. Adam, C. & Tannery, P. (eds.), 1897–1910. Vols. I– XII. Paris: Vrin/CNRS. (= AT)
-
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism. Annas, J. & Barnes, J. (eds. & trs.) 2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (= PH)
-
Archer, A. 2019. Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions. Disputatio 11, 63–88.
-
Atkins, P. 2017. A Russellian Account of Suspended Judgment. Synthese 194, 3021–3046.
-
Bergmann, M. 2005. Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55, 419–436.Brittain, Ch. 2006. Cicero. On Academic Scepticism. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.
-
Broughton, J. 2002. Descartes’ Method of Doubt. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Bueno, O. 2011. Is the Pyrrhonist an Internalist? In: Machuca, D. E. (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Leiden: Brill, 179–192.
-
Burnyeat, M. F. 1980. Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism? In: Schofield, M., Burnyeat, M. & Barnes, J. (eds.), Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20–53.
-
Burnyeat, M. F. 1982. Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed. Philosophical Review 91, 3–40.
-
Castagnoli, L. 2017. Aporia and Inquiry in Ancient Pyrrhonism. In: Karamonilis, G. & Politis, V. (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 205–227.
-
Crawford, S. 2004. A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle About Belief. Analysis 64, 223–229.
-
Dunphy, R. 2021. From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Apeiron 55, 455–484.
-
Eichorn, R. 2020. Sextus Empiricus on Isostheneia and Epochê: A developmental model. Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 11, 188–209.
-
Fine, G. 2000. Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage? The Philosophical Review 109, 195–234.
-
Frede, M. 1987a. The Sceptic’s Beliefs. In: Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 179–200.
-
Frede, M. 1987b. The Sceptic’s Two Kinds of Assent. In: Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 201–222.
-
Friedman, J. 2013. Suspended Judgment. Philosophical Studies 162, 165–181.
-
Friedman, J. 2017. Why Suspend Judging? Noûs 51, 302–326.
-
Greco, D. 2012. The Impossibility of Skepticism. Philosophical Review 121, 317–358.
-
Grgić, F. 2012. Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 22, 653–673.
-
Johnsen, B. C. 2001. On the Coherence of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Philosophical Review 110, 521–561.
-
Larmore, C. 2006. Descartes and Skepticism. In: Gaukroger, S. (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 17–29.
-
Machuca, D. 2011a. Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism. Philosophy Compass 6, 246–258.
-
Machuca, D. 2011b. Pyrrhonism and the Law of Non-Contradiction. In: Machuca, D. (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Dordrecht: Synthese Library, 51–77.
-
Machuca, D. 2013. Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality. Elenchos 34, 201–228.
-
Machuca, D. 2021. Is Pyrrhonian Suspension Incompatible with Doubt?. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45, 27–55.
-
Masny, M. 2018. Friedman on Suspended Judgment. Synthese 197, 509–526.
-
McGrath, M. 2021. Being Neutral: Agnosticism, Inquiry, and the Suspension of Judgment. Noûs 55, 463–484.
-
McGrath, M. 2024. Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, not Really. In: Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Steup, M. & Turri, J. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 55–56.
-
McGrath, M. 2025. The Availability of Further Evidence and Agentialism about Suspension. In: Wagner, V. and Zinke, A. (eds.) Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. New York: Routledge, 7–22.
-
Morison, B. 2018. The Sceptic’s Modes of Argumentation. In: Bénatouïl, T. and Ierodiakonou, K. (eds.) Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 283–319.
-
Palmer, J. 2000. Skeptical Investigation. Ancient Philosophy 12, 351–375.
-
Perin, C. 2010. The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Perin, C. 2012. Knowledge, Stability, and Virtue in the Meno. Ancient Philosophy 32, 15–34.
-
Perin, C. 2015. Skepticism, Suspension of Judgment, and Norms for Belief. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5, 107–125.
-
Raleigh, T. 2021. Suspending is Believing. Synthese 198, 2449–2474.
-
Rosa, L. 2020. Rational Requirements for Suspended Judgment. Philosophical Studies 178, 385–406.
-
Rosenkranz, S. 2007. Agnosticism as a Third Stance. Mind 116, 55–104.
-
Sturgeon, S. 2010. Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes. In: Gendler, T. S. & Hawthorne, J. (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 126–149.
-
Sturgeon, S. 2020. The Rational Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Veres, M. 2020. Keep Calm and Carry on: Sextus Empiricus on the origins of Pyrrhonism. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23, 100–122.
-
Vogt, K. M. 2021. No More This Than That. Pyrrhonian Indeterminacy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45, 57–76.
-
Wagner, V. 2022. Agnosticism as Settled Indecision. Philosophical Studies 179, 671–697.
-
Wagner, V. 2025. Committing to Indecision: A Taxonomy of Suspension of Judgment. In: Wagner, V. and Zinke, A. (eds.) Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. New York: Routledge, 23–41.
-
Williams, M. 1988. Scepticism Without Theory. Review of Metaphysics 41, 547–588.
-
Zinke, A. 2021. Rational Suspension. Theoria 87, 1050–1066.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 249 | 249 | 34 |
| Full Text Views | 17 | 17 | 4 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 39 | 39 | 10 |
Suspension and Scepticism
In: History of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Wolfgang Freitag in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Alexandra Zinke in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Recent debates in epistemology have assumed a positive conception of suspension of judgement, according to which suspending requires the presence of a distinctive mental state, either a sui generis indecision-representing attitude or a higher-order belief about one’s doxastic situation. The paper challenges this orthodoxy by arguing that sceptical traditions, in particular Pyrrhonian and Cartesian scepticism, operate with a privative conception of suspension: scepticism does not suggest adopting a positive mental attitude but simply to refrain from both belief and disbelief (given suitable cognitive preconditions). We show that the Pyrrhonian strategy of equipollence and Descartes’ method of doubt do not aim for suspension positively conceived. We tentatively suggest that privative suspension is thus of primary significance for epistemology.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 249 | 249 | 34 |
| Full Text Views | 17 | 17 | 4 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 39 | 39 | 10 |
