In antiquity, it was a lively debated question whether medicine requires logic. I argue that Sextus Empiricus, a Pyrrhonian skeptic and Empiricist, contributed to this debate with an argument to the effect that the solution of medical fallacies does not require logic. I reconstruct Sextus’ argument and suggest that a galenic argument to the effect that the solution of medical fallacies does require logic serves as a useful model for the kind of dogmatic argument Sextus wishes to oppose. Doing so gives us a version of the full skeptical opposition, and allows us to appreciate Sextus not only as a skeptic, but as a medical-philosophical thinker who argued for an empirical approach to medical fallacies in his own time. Furthermore, it brings Sextus and Galen into a hypothetical conversation which illuminates both the empirical and the dogmatic side of the debate about the use of logic in medicine.
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In antiquity, it was a lively debated question whether medicine requires logic. I argue that Sextus Empiricus, a Pyrrhonian skeptic and Empiricist, contributed to this debate with an argument to the effect that the solution of medical fallacies does not require logic. I reconstruct Sextus’ argument and suggest that a galenic argument to the effect that the solution of medical fallacies does require logic serves as a useful model for the kind of dogmatic argument Sextus wishes to oppose. Doing so gives us a version of the full skeptical opposition, and allows us to appreciate Sextus not only as a skeptic, but as a medical-philosophical thinker who argued for an empirical approach to medical fallacies in his own time. Furthermore, it brings Sextus and Galen into a hypothetical conversation which illuminates both the empirical and the dogmatic side of the debate about the use of logic in medicine.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 152 | 152 | 18 |
| Full Text Views | 8 | 8 | 3 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 20 | 20 | 6 |