Faint Impressions, Forceful Ideas
Humeâs Impression/Idea Distinction
äºHistory of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Alexander P. Bozzo in
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Abstract
A natural reading of Humeâs distinction between impressions and ideas is that impressions are forceful perceptions whereas ideas are faint. A problem emerges, however, when Hume countenances the possibility of faint impressions and forceful ideas. In this paper, I attempt a resolution to the problem. I argue that Hume characterizes impressions and ideas intensionally and extensionally, and sometimes uses the term in only one of the two senses. I argue that Hume intensionally defines impressions and ideas as forceful perceptions and weak perceptions, respectively, but takes these to be extensionally equivalent to original and copied perceptions, respectively. Hume recognizes that his two characterizationsâthe intensional and extensionalâdonât perfectly match up, and that there are exceptions to the purported equivalences (the exceptions being disease, sleep, madness, and enthusiasm). Nonetheless, I argue that Humeâs willing to proceed with his definitions.
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| å ¨é¨æé´ | è¿å»ä¸å¹´ | è¿å»30天 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| æè¦æµè§æ¬¡æ° | 620 | 103 | 8 |
| å ¨ææµè§æ¬¡æ° | 27 | 1 | 0 |
| PDFä¸è½½æ¬¡æ° | 56 | 2 | 0 |
Faint Impressions, Forceful Ideas
Humeâs Impression/Idea Distinction
äºHistory of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Alexander P. Bozzo in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
A natural reading of Humeâs distinction between impressions and ideas is that impressions are forceful perceptions whereas ideas are faint. A problem emerges, however, when Hume countenances the possibility of faint impressions and forceful ideas. In this paper, I attempt a resolution to the problem. I argue that Hume characterizes impressions and ideas intensionally and extensionally, and sometimes uses the term in only one of the two senses. I argue that Hume intensionally defines impressions and ideas as forceful perceptions and weak perceptions, respectively, but takes these to be extensionally equivalent to original and copied perceptions, respectively. Hume recognizes that his two characterizationsâthe intensional and extensionalâdonât perfectly match up, and that there are exceptions to the purported equivalences (the exceptions being disease, sleep, madness, and enthusiasm). Nonetheless, I argue that Humeâs willing to proceed with his definitions.
| å ¨é¨æé´ | è¿å»ä¸å¹´ | è¿å»30天 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| æè¦æµè§æ¬¡æ° | 620 | 103 | 8 |
| å ¨ææµè§æ¬¡æ° | 27 | 1 | 0 |
| PDFä¸è½½æ¬¡æ° | 56 | 2 | 0 |
