Form and Function in Aristotle
äºHistory of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Boris Hennig in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
On the one hand, Aristotle claims that the matter of a material thing is not part of its form. On the other hand, he suggests that the proper account of a natural thing must include a specification of the kind of matter in which it is realized. There are three possible strategies for dealing with this apparent tension. First, there may be two kinds of definition, so that the definition of the form of a thing does not include any specification of its matter, whereas the definition of a compound does. Second, the definition of a substance may not include a specification of its matter at all, but still reveal in what kinds of matter its form can be realized. Third, there may be a special kind of matter, functional matter, which belongs to the form of certain things. I will show that the functional matter of a thing does not belong to its form (in a strict sense of âformâ), but that an adequate account of natural substances and their functions must nonetheless involve a reference to their functional matter. This means that the function of a natural thing is not the same as its form and that its adequate account as a natural thing is not a definition (in a strict sense of âformâ and âdefinitionâ).
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Aristotle. On the Heavens. Guthrie, K. C. (tr.), 1939. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
-
Aristotle. Physics. Books I and II. Charlton, W. (tr.), 1970. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-
Aristotle. Metaphysics Books Z and H. Bostock, D. (tr.), 1994. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-
Aristotle. De Anima. Shields, Ch. (tr.), 2016. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-
[Descartes, René]. Oeuvres de Descartes. Adam, Ch. & Tannery, P. (eds.). Paris: Vrin.
-
Block, N. 1997. Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back. Noûs 31, Supplement 11, 107â132.
-
Bogen, J. 1996. Fire in the Belly: Aristotelian Elements, Organisms, and Chemical Compounds. In: Lewis, F. A. & Robert B. (eds.), Form, Matter, and Mixture in Aristotle. Oxford: Blackwell, 183â216.
-
Burnyeat, M. F. 1995. Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? In: Nussbaum, M. C. & Rorty, A. O. (eds.), Essays on Aristotleâs De Anima. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 15â26.
-
Caston, V. 2009. Commentary on Charles. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy XXIV (2008), 30â49.
-
Charles, D. 2009. Aristotleâs Psychological Theory. In: Clearly, J. J. & Gurtler, G. M. (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy XXIV, 2008, 1â30.
-
Cohen, S. M. 1995. Hylomorphism and Functionalism. In: Nussbaum, M. C. & Rorty, A. O. (eds.), Essays on Aristotleâs De Anima. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 57â73.
-
Cooper, J. M. 2004. Hypothetical Necessity. In: Cooper, J. M. (ed.), Knowledge, Nature, and the Good. Princeton University Press 130â147.
-
Corcilius, K. & Gregoric, P. 2010. Separability vs. Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 39, 81â120.
-
Frede, M. 1990. The Definition of Sensible Substances in Met. Z. In: D. Devereux, D. & Pellegrin, P. (eds.), Biologie, Logique, et Métaphysique chez Aristote. Paris: Ãditions du CNRS, 117â121.
-
Frede, M. & Patzig, G. 1988. Aristoteles âMetaphysics Z.â München: C. H. Beck.
-
Gill, M.-L. 1989. Aristotle on Substance. The Paradox of Unity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
-
Granger, H. 1990. Aristotle and the Functionalist Debate. Apeiron 23(1), 27â49.
-
Green, C. D. 1998. The Thoroughly Modern Aristotle. History of Psychology 1(1), 8â20.
-
Hartman, E. 1976. Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence. The Philosophical Review 85(4), 545â561.
-
Heinaman, R. 1979. Aristotleâs Tenth Aporia. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61(3), 249â270.
-
Heinaman, R. 1990. Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem. Phronesis 35(1), 83â102.
-
Heinaman, R. 1997. Frede and Patzig on Definition in âMetaphysicsâ Z.10 and 11. Phronesis 42(3), 283â298.
-
Johansen, T. K. 2012. The Powers of Aristotleâs Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Kim, J. 1992. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(1), 1â26.
-
Koslicki, K. 1997. Four Eighth Hephaistos: Artifacts and Living Beings in Aristotle. History of Philosophy Quarterly 14(1), 77â98.
-
Kosman, L. A. 1984. Substance, Being, and Energeia. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2, 121â149.
-
Kosman, L. A. 1987. Animals and Other Beings in Aristotle. In: Gotthelf, A. & Lennox, J. G. (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotleâs Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 360â391.
-
Langton, R. 2000. The musical, the magical, and the mathematical soul. In: Crane, T. & Patterson, S. (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. London: Routledge, 13â33.
-
Lennox, J. G. 2008. As If We Were Investigating Snubness: Aristotle on the Prospects for a Single Science of Nature. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 35, 149â186.
-
Malink, M. 2013. Essence and Being. A Discussion of Michail Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotleâs Metaphysics. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 45, 341â362.
-
Matthen, M. 1987. Individual Substances as Hylomorphic Complexes. In: Matthen, M. (ed.), Aristotle Today. Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 151â176.
-
Nussbaum, M. C. & Rorty, A. O. (eds.). 1995. Essays on Aristotleâs De Anima. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-
Peramatzis, M. 2011. Priority in Aristotleâs Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Shields, C. 1993. The Homonymy of the Body in Aristotle. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 75(1), 1â30.
-
Wedin, M. V. 1996. Aristotle on How to Define a Psychological State. Topoi 15, 11â24.
-
Wedin, M. V. 2000. Aristotleâs Theory of Substance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Wehrle, W. E. 1994. The Definition of Soul in Aristotleâs De anima ii 1 Is Not Analogous to the Definition of Snub. Ancient Philosophy 14, 297â317.
-
Whiting, J. E. 1991. Metasubstance: Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth. The Philosophical Review 100(4), 607â639.
| å ¨é¨æé´ | è¿å»ä¸å¹´ | è¿å»30天 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| æè¦æµè§æ¬¡æ° | 1437 | 122 | 11 |
| å ¨ææµè§æ¬¡æ° | 239 | 2 | 0 |
| PDFä¸è½½æ¬¡æ° | 396 | 5 | 0 |
Form and Function in Aristotle
äºHistory of Philosophy & Logical AnalysisSearch for other papers by Boris Hennig in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
On the one hand, Aristotle claims that the matter of a material thing is not part of its form. On the other hand, he suggests that the proper account of a natural thing must include a specification of the kind of matter in which it is realized. There are three possible strategies for dealing with this apparent tension. First, there may be two kinds of definition, so that the definition of the form of a thing does not include any specification of its matter, whereas the definition of a compound does. Second, the definition of a substance may not include a specification of its matter at all, but still reveal in what kinds of matter its form can be realized. Third, there may be a special kind of matter, functional matter, which belongs to the form of certain things. I will show that the functional matter of a thing does not belong to its form (in a strict sense of âformâ), but that an adequate account of natural substances and their functions must nonetheless involve a reference to their functional matter. This means that the function of a natural thing is not the same as its form and that its adequate account as a natural thing is not a definition (in a strict sense of âformâ and âdefinitionâ).
| å ¨é¨æé´ | è¿å»ä¸å¹´ | è¿å»30天 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| æè¦æµè§æ¬¡æ° | 1437 | 122 | 11 |
| å ¨ææµè§æ¬¡æ° | 239 | 2 | 0 |
| PDFä¸è½½æ¬¡æ° | 396 | 5 | 0 |
